Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book II/Chapter 1

Latin	English
[CAP. 1. DE DIVISIONE PROPOSITIONUM IN GENERALI]	[Chapter 1. On the division of propositions in general]
Postquam dicta sunt aliqua de terminis, nunc secundo dicendum est de propositionibus. Et primo ponendae sunt aliquae divisiones; secundo videndum est quid ad veritatem propositionum requiritur et sufficit; tertio de conversione propositionum sunt aliqua pertractanda.	After some things have been said about terms, we should secondly speak of propositions. And first, some divisions of the subject should be given; second, we should see what is requisite and sufficient for the truth of propositions; third, we must investigate certain things about the conversion of propositions.
Circa primum sciendum est quod una divisio propositionum est quod propositionum alia est categorica, alia hypothetica. Propositio categorica est illa quae habet subiectum et praedicatum et copulam, et non includit plures tales propositiones.Propositio hypothetica est illa quae ex pluribus categoricis est composita. Et illa dividitur in quinque species, secundum communem opinionem, scilicet in copulativam, disiunctivam, condicionalem, causalem et temporalem.	Concerning the first it should be known that one division of propositions is that some are categorical and others are hypothetical. A categorical proposition is what has a subject, predicate, and copula, and does not include several such propositions. A hypothetical proposition is what is composed of several categorical propositions. According to the common view, hypotheticals are divided into five species: namely copulative, disjunctive, conditional, causal, and temporal.
Copulativa est illa quae componitur ex pluribus propositionibus, sive categoricis sive hypotheticis, sive una categorica et alia hypothetica, mediante hac coniunctione 'et'. Exemplum primi, sicut hic 'Sortes currit et Plato disputat'. Exemplum secundi 'si Sortes est, animal est, et[/vel] Sortes currit et Plato disputat'. Exemplum tertii 'si homo currit, animal currit et Sortes disputat'. Tamen quia tales raro sunt in usu, ideo intendo loqui praecise de primis, quae scilicet componuntur ex duabus categoricis.	A copulative proposition is one which is composed of several propositions—either categoricals or hypothetical, or one categorical and the other hypothetical - joined by the conjunction 'and'. An example of the first is 'Socrates is running and Plato is disputing'. An example of the second is 'If Socrates exists, an animal exists, and Socrates is running and Plato is disputing'. An example of the third is 'If a man is running, an animal is running, and Socrates is disputing'. But because these such types are rarely used, I mean to talk only about copulative propositions of the first types, namely, those which are composed of two categoricals.
Disiunctiva propositio est illa quae componitur ex pluribus propositionibus mediante hac coniunctione 'vel'.	A disjunctive proposition is composed of several propositions joined by the conjunction 'or'.
Condicionalis est illa quae componitur ex pluribus propositionibus mediante hac coniunctione 'si', sicut hic 'si homo currit, animal currit', vel hic 'homo est, si Sortes est'; quia non refert istam coniunctionem praeponere primae propositioni vel ponere eam inter illas propositiones.	A conditional proposition is what is composed of several propositions joined by the conjunction ‘if’, as in 'If Socrates is running, an animal is running' or 'A man exists if Socrates exists'. For it does not matter whether you put the conjunction in question before the first proposition or put it between the propositions.
Propositio causalis est illa quae componitur ex pluribus propositionibus mediante hac coniunctione 'quia', sicut hic 'quia homo currit, homo movetur'.	A causal proposition is one composed of several propositions joined by the conjunction 'because', as in 'Because a man is running, a man is moving'.
Temporalis est illa quae componitur ex duabus propositionibus mediante aliquo adverbio temporis, sicut hic 'quando Sortes currit, Plato disputat'; similiter hic 'dum, Sortes currit, Ioannes est homo', et sic de aliis.	A temporal proposition is what is composed of two propositions joined by some temporal adverb, as in 'When Socrates is running, Plato is disputing' and, similarly, 'While Socrates is running, John is a man', and so on.
Alia divisio propositionis est quod quaedam est propositio de inesse et quaedam de modo vel modalis. Propositio modalis est illa in qua ponitur modus. Propositio de inesse est illa quae est sine modo.	Another division of propositions that some are assertoric propositions and some are ‘de modo’ or modal propositions. A modal proposition is that in which a modal term occurs. A assertoric proposition is one without a mode.
Et est sciendum quod quamvis omnes Sophistae quasi concordent quod tantum quatuor modi, scilicet necessarium', 'impossibile', 'contingens' et 'possibile' faciunt propositionem modalem, et hoc quia Philosophus plures modos non tetigit, nec de pluribus determinavit in libro Priorum, tractando de conversione talium propositionum et de syllogismis ex eis compositis, quia tamen alios non negavit, ideo generalius loquendo potest dici quod plures sunt modi facientes propositiones modales quam illi quatuor.	And you should know that although wise man seem to agree that only four modes, namely, 'necessary', 'impossible', 'contingent', and 'possible' make modal propositions – and this is because the Philosopher did not mention more modes, nor did he specify more modes in the Prior Analytics, when dealing with the conversion of such propositions and the syllogisms composed of them -nevertheless, since he did not deny that there are other modes, it may be said, more generally, that that there are more modes which make propositions modal than these four.
Circa quod est sciendum quod propositio dicitur modalis propter modum additum in propositione. Sed non quicumque modus sufficit ad faciendum propositionem modalem, sed oportet quod sit modus praedicabilis de tota propositione, et ideo proprie dicitur modus propositionis tamquam verificabilis de ipsamet propositione. Et a tali modo vel adverbio talis praedicabilis, si adverbium habeat, vel verbo dicitur propositio modalis. Sed tales modi sunt plures quam quatuor praedicti: nam sicut propositio alia est necessaria, alia impossibilis, alia possibilis, alia contingens, ita alia propositio est vera, alia falsa, alia scita, alia ignota, alia prolata, alia scripta, alia concepta, alia credita, alia opinata, alia dubitata, et sic de aliis.	About this, it should be noted that a proposition is called modal because of a mode added into the proposition. But not any mode is sufficient for making a proposition modal. Rather, the mode has to be predicable of a whole proposition, and therefore the mode of a proposition is properly predicated as though verifiable of the proposition itself. And in virtue of such a mode (or of the adverbial form of such a predicable, if it has an adverbial form, or its verbal form) a proposition is called ‘modal’. But there are more such modes than the four above. For just as one proposition is necessary, another impossible, another possible, another contingent, so one proposition is true, another false, another known, another unknown; another spoken, another written, another conceived, another believed, another opined, another doubted, and so on.
Et ideo sicut propositio dicitur modalis in qua ponitur iste modus 'possibile' vel necessarium' vel 'contingens' vel 'impossibile', vel adverbium alicuius istorum, ita potest dici aeque rationabiliter propositio modalis in qua ponitur aliquod praedictorum. Et ideo sicut haec est modalis 'omnem hominem esse animal est necessarium' et similiter ista 'omnis homo de necessitate est animal', ita etiam est ista modalis 'omnem hominem esse animal est scitum', 'omnis homo scitur esse animal’, similiter tales 'omnem hominem esse animal est verum', et sic de aliis.	And therefore, just as a proposition is called modal in which the mode 'possible' or 'necessary' or 'contingent' or 'impossible' or their adverbial form occurs, so a proposition in which one of the previous modes occurs can equally reasonably be called modal. And therefore, just as 'that every man is an animal is necessary' and similarly 'every man is necessarily an animal' are modal propositions, so also 'that every man is an animal is known' and 'every man is known to be an animal' are modal, and similarly those such as 'that every man is an animal is true'-and so on.
Et si quaeratur quare Philosophus non tractavit de istis, nec istas connumeravit inter propositiones modales, dicendum est quod Philosophus brevitati studens, quia illa, quae de aliis dixit, possunt istis applicari, noluit de istis diffuse tractare. Qualiter autem multa quae dicta sunt de aliis modalibus istis poterunt applicari, in sequentibus apparebit.	If someone should ask why the Philosopher did not deal with these propositions, and did not include them on the list of modal propositions, it should be said that the Philosopher, aiming at brevity, did not want to deal these extensively, for what he said about the others can be applied to them. And how many things which were said about the other modal propositions can be applied to these, will become clear in what follows.
Tertia divisio propositionum categoricarum potest esse ista quod aliqua propositio categorica est aequivalens propositioni hypotheticae, quamvis sit categorica, alia autem non est sic aequivalens propositioni hypotheticae. Propositiones primae sunt exclusivae et exceptivae et reduplicativae et quaedam aliae. Immo, ubicumque praedicatur concretum primo modo dictum vel subicitur, talis propositio aequivalet propositioni hypotheticae, sicut patebit. Aliae sunt sicut tales 'angelus est substantia', 'Deus est', 'Deus est Pater' et huiusmodi.	A third division of categorical propositions can be (1) where some categorical proposition is equivalent to a hypothetical proposition, although it is categorical, and (2) where it is not equivalent to a hypothetical proposition. Propositions of the first kind are exceptives, exclusives, reduplicatives, and certain others. Indeed, whenever a concrete term, predicated in the the first mode, is the subject or predicate, such a proposition is equivalent to a hypothetical proposition, as will become clear. Of the other kind are such as 'An angel is a substance', 'God exists', 'God is the Father', etc.
Alia divisio propositionum est quod quaedam est affirmativa et quaedam negativa.	Another division of propositions is that some are affirmative, some are negative.
Alia divisio est quod quaedam est universalis, quaedam particularis, quaedam indefinita, quaedam singularis. Propositio universalis est illa in qua subicitur terminus communis signo universali determinatus, sive fuerit affirmativa sive negativa, sicut hic ‘omnis homo est animal’, ‘nullus homo est animal’, ‘utrumque istorum currit’, et sic de aliis. Propositio particularis est illa in qua subicitur terminus communis signo particulari determinatus, sicut ‘aliquis homo currit’, ‘quidam homo currit’, et sic de aliis. Propositio indefinita est illa in qua subicitur terminus communis sine signo tam universali quam, particulari, sicut ‘homo est animal’, ‘animal currit’, et sic de aliis. Propositio singularis est illa in qua subicitur proprium nomen alicuius vel pronomen demonstrativum, vel pronomen demonstrativum cum termino communi. Exemplum primi ‘Sortes currit’; exemplum secundi ‘iste currit, demonstrato quocumque, exemplum tertii ‘iste homo est animal’.	Another division is that some propositions are universal, some particular, some indefinite, and some singular. A universal proposition is that in which the subject is a common term determined by a universal sign — whether the proposition is affirmative or negative — e.g. 'Every man is an animal', 'No man is an animal ', 'Both of them are running', and so on. A particular proposition that in which the subject is a common term determined by a particular sign, e.g. 'Some man is running', 'A certain man is running', and so on. An indefinite proposition is that in which the subject is a common term without either a universal or a particular sign, e.g. 'A man is an animal', 'An animal is running', and so on. A singular proposition is that in which the subject is the proper name of something, or a demonstrative pronoun, or a demonstrative pronoun with a common term. An example.of the first is 'Socrates is running'; an example of the second is 'That one is running', pointing to someone; an example of the third is 'That man is an animal'.
Tamen de multis propositionibus potest esse dubium quantae sint, sicut de istis: 'Isti currunt'. 'Alter istorum currit'. Similiter de parte copulativae, ubi subicitur aliquod relativum, sicut hic 'Sortes currit, et ille disputat'. Similiter de talibus 'non omnis homo currit', 'non nullus homo est animal' et huiusmodi. Similiter de talibus 'homo est species', 'animal est genus', 'homo est nominativi casus' et huiusmodi. Similiter de talibus 'Deus creat', 'Deus generat', 'Deus est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus'.	Nevertheless, with respect to many propositions it may be doubtful as to their quantity. For example: ‘They are running'. 'One of the two is running'. Similarly, a part of a copulative proposition where some relative pronoun is the subject, as in 'Socrates is running and he is disputing'. Similarly, propositions such as 'It is not the case that every man is running', 'It is not the case that no man is an animal', and so on. Similarly, propositions such as 'Man is a species', 'Animal is a genus', 'Man is in the nominative case', and so on. Similarly, propositions such as 'God creates', 'God generates', 'God is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit'.
Ad primum istorum dicendum quod iste est singularis 'isti currunt', quia supponit tale pronomen demonstrativum. Et si dicatur quod propositioni singulari numquam convenienter additur signum universale, sicut non convenienter dicitur 'omnis Sortes currit' sic non convenienter dicitur 'omnis iste currit' vel 'omnis iste est animal', sed convenienter dicitur 'omnes isti currunt', igitur ista propositio 'isti currunt' non est singularis: Dicendum quod secundum communem modum loquendi termino pluralis numeri, quamvis sit pronomen demonstrativum, convenienter additur tale signum, quamvis forte stricte loquendo non deberet addi sibi, quia istae duae totaliter aequipollent 'isti currunt' et 'omnes isti currunt'.	To the first of these it should be said that ‘they are running’ is singular, for it has a demonstrative pronoun as its subject . And if someone were to object that a universal sign is never appropriately added to a singular proposition, just as we cannot appropriately say ‘Every Socrates is running’, and thus we cannot appropriately say ‘Every this is running’ or ‘Every this is an animal’, yet, we can appropriately say ‘All these are running’, therefore the proposition ‘They are running’ is not singular. Then it should be replied that according to the common mode of speaking, such a sign can appropriately be added to a term in the plural, although perhaps strictly speaking one should not do so, because ‘These are running’ and ‘All these are running’ are entirely equivalent.
Si secunda sit propria non plus importatur per unam quam per aliam. Tamen sicut aliquando eadem dictio replicatur a parte eiusdem extremi propter aliquam causam certam, ita propter maiorem expressionem vel impressionem, vel propter aliquam talem causam additur tali pronomini pluralis numeri signum universale, quamvis de virtute sermonis et de proprietate sermonis non deberet sibi addi.	If the second is appropriate, then it conveys no more than the first. Nevertheless, just as sometimes the same word is repeated on the side of the same extremity for some fixed reason, so for the sake of greater emphasis or for other such reason one may add a universal sign to such a pronoun in the plural number, although by the literal meaning, and propriety of speech, it ought not to be added.
Ad aliud dicendum est quod haec est indefinita 'alter istorum currit, sicut ista est universalis 'uterque istorum currit, quia tale signum universale, distribuens tantum pro duobus, potest addi pronomini in numero plurali et facere propositionem universalem. Et ideo quod dictum est prius, quod illa propositio in qua subicitur pronomen demonstrativum est singularis, debet intelligi quando illud pronomen accipitur in recto; quando autem accipitur in obliquo non oportet, sed poterit esse universalis vel indefinita.	(2) To the second it should be said that 'One of the two is running' is indefinite, just as 'Both of them are running' is universal. For a universal sign of this sort, distributing only for two things, can be added to a plural pronoun and make a proposition universal. And therefore what was said before - that a proposition whose subject is a demonstrative pronoun is singular – ought to be understood to apply when that pronoun is taken in the nominative case. But when it is in an oblique case the proposition does not have to be singular, but could be universal or indefinite.
Et eodem modo quando dicitur quod propositio universalis est illa in qua subicitur terminus communis cum signo universali, debet intelligi: quando [etiam] additur tale signum pronomini in casu genitivo. Et ideo tales sunt universales 'uterque istorum currit', 'quilibet istorum est homo', et sic de aliis. Similiter tales 'aliquis istorum currit', 'aliquod istorum est animal' sunt particulares, quia additur signum particulare pronomini in casu genitivo pluralis numeri, et signum accipitur in recto.	And, in the same way, when it is said that a universal proposition is that in which the subject is a common term with a universal sign, it ought to be understood [also] ‘when such a sign is added to a pronoun in the genitive case’. And therefore, propositions such as these are universal: 'Both of them are running', 'Each of them is a man', and so on. Similarly, propositions such as 'Some of them are running' and 'Some of them are animals' are particular. For the particular sign is added to a pronoun in the genitive plural and the sign taken in the nominative case.
Ad aliud dicendum quod quando relativum refert nomen discretum, tunc reddit propositionem singularem; quando refert nomen commune, tunc reddit propositionem indefinitam. Et ideo in ista 'Sortes currit et ille disputat', si tamen sit propria, secunda pars copulativae est singularis.	(3) To the next, it should be said that when a relative pronoun refers [back] to a discrete name it renders the proposition singular. When refers back to a common name it renders the proposition indefinite. And therefore, in 'Socrates is running and he is disputing'—if it is properly formed—the second part of the copulative is singular.
Sed secunda pars istius copulativae 'homo currit et ille disputat' est indefinita, et hoc quia relativum supponit pro eisdem vel pro eodem pro quo vel pro quibus supponit suum antecedens, ideo debet facere, proportionaliter, propositionem singularem vel indefinitam, secundum quod suum antecedens est nomen discretum sive proprium vel commune.	But the second part of the copulative proposition 'A man is running and he is disputing' is indefinite, and this is because the relative supposits for the same thing or things which its antecedent supposits for. Therefore, it ought to make the proposition singular or indefinite, according as its antecedent is a discrete, or proper or common name.
Ad aliud dicendum est quod tales sunt particulares 'non omnis homo currit', 'non nullus homo est animal', et hoc quia negatio praecedit signum universale. Et ideo quando dicitur quod propositio particularis est illa in qua subicitur terminus communis etc., debet intelligi: si negatio non praecedit signum particulare, et quando subicitur terminus communis cum signo universali, praecedente negatione. Et ideo tales sunt particulares 'non omnis honio currit', 'non nullus homo est animal', et tales sunt universales 'non aliquis homo currit', non quidam homo non currit et huiusmodi.	(4) To the fourth it should be said that propositions like 'It is not the case that every man is running' and 'It is not the case that no man is an animal' are particular, and this is because the negation precedes the universal sign. And therefore, when it is said that a particular proposition is that in which the subject is a common term, etc., it ought to be understood as follows: ". . . so long as negation does not precede the particular sign; and when its subject is a common term with a universal sign preceded by a negation." And therefore propositions such as 'It is not the case that every man is running' and 'It is not the case that no man is an animal' are particular. And propositions such as 'It is not the case that some man is running' and 'It is not the case that a certain man is not running' and so on, are universal.
Ad aliud dubium: de talibus propositionibus 'homo est species', 'animal est genus', 'homo est nominativi casus', et universaliter quando terminus supponit simpliciter vel materialiter, potest dici, quasi ad placitum, vel quod sunt singulares vel indefinitae, quia hoc magis dependet ex voluntate utentium istis terminis 'propositio singularis', 'propositio indefinita' quam ex re.	(5) To the fifth doubt. Concerning propositions like 'Man is a species', 'Animal is a genus', and “‘Man’ is in the nominative case'-and generally when a term supposits simply or materially, it can be said arbitrarily, as it were, either that the propositions are singular or indefinite. For this more depends on the wish of those using the terms 'singular proposition', 'indefinite proposition' than anything real.
Et ideo qui vult dicere quod illa propositio, universaliter, est indefinita in qua subicitur terminus communis sine signo et sine negatione praecedente, debet dicere quod omnes tales sunt indefinitae. Qui autem vult aliter uti, debet aliter dicere; quia debet dicere quod non sufficit quod sic subiciatur terminus communis, sed oportet addere quod terminus talis communis supponat personaliter; et tunc omnes tales ubi termini supponunt simpliciter vel materialiter sunt singulares.	And therefore, one who would say in general that a proposition in which subject is a common term without a sign and without a negation preceding is indefinite, ought to say that all such are indefinite. But whoever wants to use them otherwise, ought to say otherwise. For he ought to say that it is not sufficient that a common term be subject in this way, but he has to add that such a common term supposits personally, and then all such propositions where terms supposit simply or materially are singular.
Ad aliud per idem fere: quia qui vult vocare propositionem indefinitam omnem propositionem in qua subicitur terminus praedicabilis de pluribus suppositis distinctis realiter, debet dicere quod haec est indefinita 'Deus generat', Deus creat' et huiusmodi, et hoc quia 'Deus' est talis terminus praedicabilis de pluribus. Qui autem vult dicere quod propositio non est indefinita nisi praedicetur terminus communis pluribus quae non sunt una res simpliciter, debet dicere quod haec est singularis et non indefinita 'Deus creat' et huiusmodi.	(6) Almost the same thing holds for the last doubt. For one who would say an indefinite proposition is every proposition in which the subject is a term predicable of several really distinct supposita, ought to say that propositions like 'God creates', 'God generates', etc., are indefinite. And this is because 'God' is a such a term, predicable of several. But one who would say that a proposition is not indefinite unless the common term may be predicated of several supposita which are not one thing without qualification, then he should say that 'God creates' is singular and not indefinite, and [also] other propositions of this sort.
Dicendum est igitur quod propositio universalis est illa in qua subicitur terminus communis signo universali determinatus, sine negatione praecedente, propter tales 'non omnis homo currit', 'non nullus homo est animal'; vel in qua subicitur terminus communis sine signo universali, cum negatione praecedente, propter tales non aliquis homo currit', 'non homo est animal', quae sunt universales ; vel in qua subicitur pronomen demonstrativum genitivi casus pluralis numeri cum signo universali, sine negatione praecedente, propter tales 'uterque istorum currit','quilibet istorum est homo'; vel in qua subicitur pronomen relativum referens suum antecedens, stans confuse et distributive, propter tales 'omnis homo currit et ille disputat', quia secunda pars copulativae est universalis sicut prima. Et istis est addendum quod terminus talis supponat personaliter, secundum unam opinionem.	Therefore, it should be said that a universal proposition is that in which the subject is a common term determined by a universal sign without a preceding negation, because of propositions such as 'It is not the case that every man is running' and 'It is not the case that no man is an animal'; or in which the subject is a common term without a universal sign with a preceding negation, because of propositions such as 'It is not the case that some man is running' and 'It is not the case that a man is an animal', which are universal; or in which the subject is a demonstrative pronoun of the genitive plural case with a universal sign without a preceding negation, because of propositions such as 'Both of them are running' and 'Each of them is a man'; or in which the subject is a relative pronoun whose antecedent has confused and distributive supposition, - because of propositions such as 'Every man is running and he is disputing', because the second part of the copulative is universal just as the first part is. And to these it should be added that such a common term supposits personally, according to one view.
Et ideo secundum illam opinionem haec non est universalis 'omnis homo: est terminus communis cum signo universali', nec ista 'omnis homo: componitur ex termino communi et signo universali'. Sed secundum istam opinionem debet concedi de virtute sermonis quod eadem propositio numero est universalis et singularis, quia in eadem propositione numero potest idem terminus supponere simpliciter vel materialiter et personaliter. Et si terminus supponat simpliciter vel materialiter, propositio erit singularis; si personaliter, erit universalis.	And therefore, according to that opinion 'Every man is a common term with a universal sign' and 'Every man is composed of a common term and a universal sign' are not universal. But according to that opinion one ought to concede that, literally speaking, numeri- cally the same proposition is universal and singular, because in numerically the same proposition the same term can supposit simply (or materially) and personally. Anf if the term supposits simply or materially, the proposition will be singular. If it supposits personally, it will be universal.
Verbi gratia ponatur quod sint duo mihi respondentes, et quod uni eorum quando profero istam propositionem 'omnis homo est terminus communis signo universali determinatus' determinem quod volo quod hoc totum 'omnis homo' stet materialiter, tunc iste concederet quod est singularis; alii determinem quod volo quod subiectum stet personaliter, tunc ille concederet quod est universalis. Quo posito unica propositio est prolata, et tamen unus bene respondendo dicet eam esse singularem et alius universalem; et per consequens unica propositio erit singularis et universalis.	For example, suppose there are two persons replying to me, and that to one of them, when when I utter the proposition 'Every man is a common term determined by a universal sign', I specify that I want the expression 'every man' to stand materially. Then he would concede that the proposition is singular. To the other, I specify that I want the subject to stand personally. Then he would concede that the proposition is universal. So in what is supposed, a single proposition is uttered, and yet one person, responding correctly, will say that it is singular, and the other will say that it is universal, and as a consequence, a single proposition will be singular and universal.
Nec est hoc magis inconveniens quam dicere quod eadem propositio numero est nota et ignota, quia nota uni et ignota alteri. Et isto modo debet concedi de virtute sermonis, secundum istam opinionem, quod eadem propositio numero est vera et falsa, necessaria et impossibilis, et idem syllogismus est demonstratio et syllogismus sophisticus et peccans in forma.	But this is no more inappropriate than saying that numerically the same proposition is known and not known because it is known to one person and unknown to another. And in the same way, strictly speaking, according to that opinion, one ought to concede that numerically the same proposition is true and false, necessary and impossible, and that the same syllogism is demonstrative and sophistical and erroneous in form.
Quid tamen dicendum sit de istis, in sequentibus apparebit. Ex praedictis leviter potest sciri quae propositio est universalis et quae indefinita et quae singularis.	But what should be said about these cases will become apparent in what follows. From what has been said it can easily be known which propositions are universal, which are indefinite, and which singular.
Sexta divisio propositionum potest esse ista quod quaedam propositiones sunt de praesenti, sicut istae 'homo est animal', 'homo currit' et huiusmodi; quaedam de praeterito, sicut istae 'Sortes fuit homo', 'Sortes fuit albus' et huiusmodi; quaedam de futuro, sicut ista 'homo erit albus' et huiusmodi. Quaedam secundum formam vocis sunt de praesenti et tamen aequivalent propositionibus de praeterito vel de futuro, sicut tales 'hoc est futurum', 'hoc est praeteritum' et huiusmodi.	A sixth division of propositions can be that some propositions are present-tense, e.g. 'A man is an animal', 'A man is running', etc.; some are past-tense, e.g. 'Socrates was a man', 'Socrates was white', and so on, and some are future-tense, such as 'A man will be white', etc. Some propositions are present-tense according to form yet equivalent to past-tense or future-tense propositions, such as 'This is future' and 'This is past' and others of that sort.
Alia divisio est quod quaedam propositiones sunt in recto et quaedam in obliquo; et quandoque obliquus ponitur a parte subiecti, sicut 'hominem videt asinus', quandoque a parte praedicati, sicut hic 'asinus est hominis'.	Another division is that some propositions are ‘straight’ and others ‘oblique’: sometimes the oblique case [of an oblique proposition] occurs in the subject, as in Hominem videt asinus, and sometimes it occurs on the side of the predicate, as in 'A donkey belongs to a man'.