Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book II/Chapter 2

Latin	English
[CAP. 2. QUID REQUIRITUR AD VERITATEM PROPOSITIONIS QUAE EST SINGULARIS ET DE INESSE]	[Chapter 2: What is Required for the Truth of a proposition which is singular and assertoric]
Positis praemissis divisionibus propositionum, quae tamen non sunt subordinatae, videndum est quid ad veritatem propositionum requiritur. Et primo de propositionibus singularibus de inesse et de praesenti et de recto, tam a parte subiecti quam a parte praedicati, et non aequivalentibus propositioni hypotheticae.	Given that the divisions above, which are not subordinated, have been given for propositions, we must see what is required for the truth of propositions. And first, concerning singular assertoric present-tense propositions with nominative terms, not equivalent to hypothetical propositions.
Circa quod dicendum est quod ad veritatem talis propositionis singularis quae non aequivalet multis propositionibus non requiritur quod subiectum et praedicatum sint idem realiter, nec quod praedicatum ex parte rei sit in subiecto vel insit realiter subiecto, nec quod uniatur a parte rei extra animam ipsi subiecto, - sicut ad veritatem istius 'iste est angelus' non requiritur quod hoc commune 'angelus' sit idem realiter cum hoc quod ponitur a parte subiecti, nec quod insit illi realiter, nec aliquid tale, sed sufficit et requiritur quod subiectum et praedicatum supponant pro eodem.	Concerning this, it should be noted that for the truth of such a singular proposition which is not equivalent to many propositions, it is not required that the subject and predicate be the same thing in reality, nor that the predicate in reality inhere the subject or that it really inhere in the subject, nor that it be united to the subject itself in reality, outside the mind. For example, for the truth of 'This is an angel' it is not required that the common term 'angel' be really the same thing as what is given on the side of the subject, or that it be really inhere that subject, or anything of this sort. Rather, it is sufficient and requisite that the subject and predicate supposit for the same thing.
Et ideo si in ista 'hic est angelus' subiectum et praedicatum supponant pro eodem, propositio erit vera. Et ideo non denotatur quod hic habeat angelitatem vel quod in isto sit angelitas vel aliquid huiusmodi, sed denotatur quod hic sit vere angelus; non quidem quod sit illud praedicatum, sed quod sit illud pro quo supponit praedicatum.	And therefore, if in 'This is an angel' the subject and predicate supposit for the same thing, the proposition will be true. And therefore, it is not denoted that this thing has angelhood or that angelhood is in it - or anything of this sort. Rather, it is denoted that this is truly an angel - not, indeed, that it is the predicate, but that it is that for which the predicate supposits.
Similiter etiam per tales propositiones 'Sortes est homo', 'Sortes est animal' non denotatur quod Sortes habeat humanitatem vel animalitatem, nec denotatur quod humanitas vel animalitas sit in Sorte, nec quod homo vel animal sit in Sorte, nec quod homo vel animal sit de essentia vel de quidditate Sortis vel de intellectu quidditativo Sortis, sed denotatur quod Sortes vere est homo et vere est animal. Non quidem quod Sortes sit hoc praedicatum 'homo' vel hoc praedicatum 'animal', sed denotatur quod est aliqua res pro qua stat vel supponit hoc praedicatum 'homo' et hoc praedicatum 'animal', quia pro Sorte stat utrumque illorum praedicatorum.	Also similarly by propositions like 'Socrates is a man' and 'Socrates is an animal' it is not denoted that Socrates has humanity or animality. Nor is it denoted that humanity or animality is in Socrates, or that man or animal is in Socrates, or that animal is part of the essence or quiddity of Socrates. Rather, it is asserted that Socrates is truly a man and is truly an animal. Nor, indeed, is it denoted that Socrates is the predicate 'man' or the predicate 'animal'. Rather, it is denoted that he is some thing for which the predicate 'man' or the predicate 'animal' stands or supposits. For both of these predicates stand for Socrates.
Ex istis patet quod ,omnes tales de virtute sermonis sunt falsae 'homo est de quidditate Sortis', 'homo est de essentia Sortis', 'humanitas est in Sorte', 'Sortes habet humanitatem', 'Sortes est homo humanitate', et multae tales propositiones quae quasi ab omnibus conceduntur. Falsitas istarum patet: nam accipio unam istarum, scilicet istam 'humanitas est in Sorte' et quaero, pro quo stat li humanias? Aut pro re aut pro intentione, hoc est aut denotatur per istam quod res vera extra animam sit in Sorte, vel quod intentio animae sit in Sorte. Si supponat pro re, quaero: pro qua re? Aut pro Sorte, aut pro parte Sortis, aut pro re quae nec est Sortes nec pars Sortis. Si pro Sorte, tunc est falsa, quia nulla res quae est Sortes est in Sorte, quia Sortes non est in Sorte, quamvis Sortes sit Sortes.	From this it is clear that, literally speaking, all propositions such as these are false: 'Man is of the quiddity of Socrates', 'Man is of the essence of Socrates', 'Humanity is in Socrates', 'Socrates has humanity', 'Socrates is a man in virtue of humanity' - and many such propositions which are apparently allowed by everyone. Their falsity is obvious. For I take one of them, namely, 'Humanity is in Socrates', and I ask: what does 'humanity' stand for? Either for a thing or for an intention, i.e. by means of this proposition it is denoted either that a real extramental thing is in Socrates or that an intention of the soul is in Socrates. If it supposits for a thing, then I ask: for which thing? Either for Socrates, or for part of Socrates, or for a thing which is neither Socrates nor part of Socrates. If for Socrates, then it is false, since nothing which is Socrates is in Socrates. For Socrates is not in Socrates, although Socrates is Socrates.
Et eodem modo humanitas non est in Sorte sed est Sortes, si humanitas supponat pro re quae est Sortes. Si autem humanitas stet pro re quae est pars Sortis, hoc est falsum, quia quaelibet res quae est pars Sortis vel est materia vel forma vel compositum ex materia et forma, et una forma hominis et non alia, vel est pars integralis Sortis. Sed nulla talium partium est humanitas, sicut patet inductive: quia anima intellectiva non est humanitas; tunc enim vera humanitas remansisset in Christo in triduo, et vere fuisset humanitas unita Verbo in triduo, et per consequens vere fuisset homo, quod falsum est.	And in the same way humanity is not in Socrates but is Socrates, if 'humanity' supposits for the thing which is Socrates. But if 'humanity' stands for a thing which is a part of Socrates, then the proposition is false, because any thing which is a part of Socrates is either matter or form or a composite of matter and form - and one form of man and not another - or it is an integral part of Socrates. But humanity is no such part, as is clear by example [inductive]. For humanity is not an intellective soul, for then real humanity would have remained in Christ in the triduum, and humanity would have been really united to the Word in the tomb and, as a consequence, he would truly have been a man - which is false.
Similiter nec materia est humanitas, nec corpus Sortis est humanitas, nec pes, nec caput, et sic de aliis partibus Sortis, quia nulla pars Sortis est humanitas sed tantum pars humanitatis, et per consequens 'humanitas' non potest supponere pro parte Sortis. Si supponat pro re quae nec est Sortes nec pars Sortis, cum talis res non sit nisi accidens vel aliqua alia res quae non est in Sorte, 'humanitas' supponeret pro accidente Sortis vel pro aliqua alia re quae nec est Sortes nec pars Sortis, quod manifestum est esse falsum. Si autem 'humanitas' supponat pro intentione animae, tunc est manifeste falsa, quia intentio animae non est in Sorte. Et ita patet quod ista est omnino falsa 'humanitas est in Sorte'.	Similarly, humanity is not matter, nor is humanity the body of Socrates or his foot or his head, and so on for the other parts of Socrates. For no part of Socrates is humanity, rather, it is only a part of humanity. In consequence, 'humanity' cannot supposit for a part of Socrates. If it supposits for a thing which is neither Socrates nor a part of Socrates, then, since such a thing could only be an accident or some other thing which is not in Socrates, 'humanity' would supposit for an accident of Socrates or for some other thing which is neither Socrates nor a part of Socrates, which is manifestly false. But if 'humanity' supposits for an intention of the soul, then the proposition is manifestly false, for an intention of the soul is not in Socrates. And so it is clear that 'Humanity is in Socrates' is altogether false.
Eodem modo potest argui de omnibus illis aliis, quia si homo vel humanias sit de essentia Sortis, quaero: pro quo supponit li homo vel humanitas? Aut pro Sorte, et tunc denotaretur quod Sortes esset de essentia Sortis, quod non est verum. Si supponat pro re alia a Sorte: aut igitur pro parte Sortis, et hoc non, quia nulla pars Sortis est homo vel humanitas, si pro re alia quae nec est Sortes nec pars Sortis, patet quod talis res non est homo nec humanitas, nisi sit Plato vel Ioannes vel alius homo, et manifestum est quod nullus alius homo a Sorte est de essentia Sortis. Si autem supponat pro intentione animae vel pro voce, manifestum est quod tunc non est de essentia Sortis. Et ita patet quod omnes tales falsae sunt de virtute sermonis.	One can argue in the same way about all the other propositions noted above. For if man or humanity is of the essence of Socrates, I ask: what does 'man' or 'humanity' supposit for? Either for Socrates, and then it would be asserted that Socrates is of the essence of Socrates - which is not true. If it supposits for a thing other than Socrates, therefore either for a part of Socrates - but this cannot be, since no part of Socrates is a man or humanity - or for something else which is neither Socrates nor a part of Socrates - but it is clear that no such thing is a man or humanity unless it is Plato or John or some other man. And it is manifest that no man other than Socrates is of the essence of Socrates. But if it supposits for an intention of the soul or for an utterance, it is manifest that then it is not of the essence of Socrates. And so it is clear that all such propositions are literally false.
Et si dicatur quod humanitas est in Sorte et est de essentia Sortis, et tamen nec est Sortes nec materia nec forma nec pars integralis, sed est una natura communis, componens cum differentia individuali Sortis, et ita est pars Sortis sed nec materia nec forma:	And if it is said that humanity is in Socrates and is of the essence of Socrates, and yet it is neither Socrates, nor matter, nor form, nor an integral part, but is a common nature compounding with the individual difference of Socrates, and so is a part of Socrates but neither matter nor form.
Contra istam opinionem arguitur multipliciter in diversis locis, scilicet in primo libro Sententiarrum, in libro Porphyrii et in libro Praedicamentorum, et aliqua argumenta facio ad praesens contra eam.	I argue against this opinion several times in several places, namely, in [my commentaries] on the first book of the Sentences, on the book of Porphyry, and on the Categories.At present I will offer some arguments against it.
Primo sic: quia si humanitas sit alia res a singularibus et sit de essentia rerum singularium, igitur idem non variatum esset in pluribus singularibus, et ita idem non variatum naturaliter, sine miraculo, esset in pluribus locis distinctis; quod manifestum est esse falsum. Similiter, tunc idem, non variatum, esset damnatum in Iuda et salvatum in Christo, et ita esset aliquid miserum et damnatum in Christo; quod est absurdum.	The first is as follows. If humanity were something different from singular things and of the essence of singulars, then the same thing unvaried would be in several singular thing, and so the same thing, unvaried naturally, would be in many distinct places without a miracle, which is manifestly false. Similarly, in that case the same thing, unvaried, would be damned in Judas and saved in Christ. And so there would be something miserable and damned in Christ, which is absurd.
Similiter, tunc Deus non posset adnihilare aliquod individuum nisi adnihilaret vel destrueret omnia individua eiusdem generis, quia quando aliquid adnihilatur nihil eius remanet, et per consequens talis natura communis non remanet, nec per consequens aliquod individuum in quo est remanet, et ita quodlibet individuum adnihilaretur vel destrueretur.	Similarly, then God would not be able to annihilate an individual unless he annihilated or destroyed all individuals of the same genus. For when something is annihilated, nothing of it remains and, in consequence, such a common nature does not remain, nor in consequence does any individual in which it exists remain, and so each individual would be annihilated or destroyed.
Praeterea, accipio illam humanitatem quam ponis in Sorte et in omni alio homine, et asinitatem quam ponis in omni asino, et vocetur illa humanitas a, ita quod a praecise stet pro illa humanitate, et illa asinitas vocetur b, ita quod b praecise stet pro illa asinitate. Tunc quaero: aut a et b sunt praecise duae res, aut plures quam duae, aut non sunt plures res. Non potest dici quod non sunt plures res, quia tunc necessario vel sunt una res, vel nec a nec b est res, vel a non est res, vel b non est res.	Further, I take that humanity which you posit in Socrates and in every other man, and the donkeyhood which you posit in every donkey, and let that humanity be called A, so that A stands precisely for that humanity, and let that donkeyhood be called B, so that B stands precisely for that donkeyhood. Then I ask: are A and B precisely two things, or more than two things, or not more than one thing? It cannot be said that they are not more than one thing, for then necessarily either they are one thing, or neither A nor B is a thing, or A is not a thing, or B is not a thing.
Primum non potest dari, manifestum est, etiam secundum sic ponentes; nec secundum, quia hoc negant, dicentes quod humanitas est vera res et similiter asinitas; nec tertium potest dari, quia non est maior ratio quod b non sit res quam quod a non sit res, nec e converso. Ergo oportet necessario dare quod a et b sunt plures res.	It is manifest that the first cannot be given, even according to those who hold this position. Nor the second, since these persons deny this, saying that humanity is a true thing, and similarly donkeyhood. Nor can the third answer be given, since there is no more reason for claiming that B is not a thing than for claiming that A is not a thing, and conversely. Therefore, we necessarily have to say that A and B are more than one thing.
Et non potest dici quod sint plures res quam duae, quia si sint plures res quam duae, et non sunt plures res universales quam duae, igitur sunt plures res singulares, et per consequens non distinguuntur simpliciter a rebus singularibus. Relinquitur igitur quod sunt duae res et non plures, et per consequens utraque illarum est una numero, quia utraque ita erit una res quod non plures; et hoc est esse unum numero, scilicet esse unam rem et non plures, nam ista debet esse descriptio unius numero. Quia ista negata, dicam ita faciliter quod Sortes non est unus numero quantumcumque sit unum et non plura.	And it cannot be said that they are more than two things, for if they are more than two things and not more than two universal things, then they are several singular things, and in consequence they are not distinguished absolutely from singular things. It therefore remains that they are two things and no more, and in consequence each of them is one in number, since each will be one thing in such a way that it is not many things. And this to be one in number, namely, to be one thing and not many. (For that ought to be the description of being one in number, since if it were denied, I might just as easily say that Socrates is not one thing in number even if he is one thing and not many things.
Unde secundum intentionem Philosophi et secundum rei veritatem, numquam hoc praedicatum 'esse unum specie' vel 'esse unum sive idem genere' dicitur nisi de individuo vel individuis, quorum quodlibet est unum numero. Unde haec est vera 'Sortes et Plato sunt unum specie', 'Sortes et hic asinus sunt unum genere'; et non est alia res praeter individua quae sit una specie vel genere. Constat itaque quod illa humanitas quae ponitur in omni homine est una res et non plures, et per consequens est una numero; ex quo sequitur quod una res numero esset in omni homine.	Hence, according to the opinion of the Philosopher and according the truth of the matter, the predicate 'is one in species' or 'is one or the same in genus 'is never predicated except of an individual or individuals, every one of which is one in number. Hence, 'Socrates and Plato are one in species' and 'Socrates and this donkey are one in genus' are true. And there is no other thing beyond individuals which is one in species or in genus. And so it is plain that the humanity which is given in every man is one thing and not several and, consequently, that it is one in number. From this it follows that numerically one thing would be in every man.
Ad argumenta autem quae videntur esse contra istam opinionem reputo alibi a me sufficienter responsum.	And to the arguments which seem to be against that opinion, I think I have sufficiently replied elsewhere.
Nec valet dicere quod humanitas Sortis distinguitur non realiter a Sorte sed tantum formaliter, quia talis distinctio non est ponenda in creaturis, quamvis possit aliquo modo poni in divinis. Et hoc quia in creaturis impossibile est invenire unam rem numero quae sit realiter plures res et quaelibet illarum, sicut est in Deo; nam in Deo essentia divina est tres personae et est quaelibet istarum personarum, et tamen una persona non est alia. Et non est aliud dicere quod essentia et persona distinguuntur formaliter, secundum verum intellectum, nisi quod essentia est tres personae et persona non est tres personae.	Nor is it valid to say that the humanity of Socrates is not really distinct, but only formally distinct from Socrates. For such a distinction should not be supposed in creatures, although it could in some way be supposed in the divine persons. And this is because among creatures it is impossible to find a thing one in number in which is really several things and is each of those things, as it is in God. For in God the divine essence is three persons and it is each of those persons, and yet one person is not the other. And that is nothing other than to say that the essence and the person are distinguished formally, according to true understanding, except that the essence is three persons and the person is not three persons.
Similiter nihil aliud intelligo per istam 'essentia et paternitas distinguuntur formaliter' nisi istam propositionem 'essentia est filiatio et paternitas non est filiatio, et tamen essentia est paternitas. Similiter, paternitatem et spirationem activam distingui formaliter non est aliud quam dicere quod paternitas non est filiatio et quod spiratio activa est filiatio, et tamen quod paternitas est spiratio activa.	Similarly, I understand nothing other by "the essence and the Paternity are formally distinguished" than"the essence is the filiation and the paternity is not the filiation and yet the essence is the paternity". Similarly, to say that the paternity and the active procession are formally distinguished is nothing other than to say that the paternity is not the filiation and that the active procession is the filiation and yet that the paternity is the active procession.
Et ita, universaliter, de aliquibus verificari 'distingui formaliter' non est aliud quam de uno istorum aliquid vere affirmari et de reliquo vere negari, et tamen unum illorum vere de reliquo affirmari, sine omni variatione vel aequivocatione alicuius vel verificatione pro diversis, sicut contingit in particularibus et indefinitis. Sed hoc non potest unquam contingere nisi quando una res simplex est plures res, sicut unica divina essentia est tres personae, et unica spiratio activa est paternitas et filiatio. Et quia hoc non potest contingere in creaturis, scilicet quod una res sit plures res et quaelibet illarum, ideo in creaturis non debet poni distinctio formalis. Et ita patet quod non debet dici quod humanitas Sortis distinguitur formaliter a Sorte et non realiter; et eodem modo est de talibus 'animalitas distinguitur ab homine', et sic de aliis. Quod autem talis distinctio formalis non sit ponenda in creaturis, probavi in primo libro Sententiarum, distinctione secunda.	And so, generally, verifying 'formally distinguished' of any things is nothing other than to say that something is truly affirmed of the one and truly denied of the other, and yet that one of those things is truly affirmed of the other, without any variation or equivocation or verification for something, or for diverse things, as happens in particular and indefinite propositions. But this cannot ever happen except when one simple thing is several things, just as the single divine essence is three persons and as a single active procession is the paternity and the filiation. And because this cannot happen among creatures (namely that one thing is several things and is each of them), therefore a formal distinction ought not be supposed to exist in creatures. And so it is clear that it ought not to be said that the humanity of Socrates is distinguished formally from Socrates, but not really, and it is the same with propositions like 'animality is distinguished from a man', and so on. And that such a formal distinction must not be posited in creatures, I proved in the commentary on the first book of the sentences, second distinction.