Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book II/Chapter 17

Latin	English
[2.17 DE PROPOSITIONIBUS EXCLUSIVIS]	On Exclusive Propositions.
Circa propositiones exclusivas est primo sciendum quid facit propositionem exclusivam; secundo, quid requiritur ad veritatem exclusivae; tertio, quomodo termini supponuiit in prapositionibus exclusivis; quarto, dandae sunt regulae quaedam.	Regarding exclusive propositions, it is first necessary to know what makes an exclusive proposition; second, what is required for the truth of an exclusive proposition; third, how the terms are supposited in exclusive propositions; fourth, certain rules must be given.
Circa primum sciendum est quod istae dictiones 'tantum' et 'solus' faciunt propositiones exclusivas. Sciendum est tamen quod haec dictio 'solus' aliquando tenetur syncategorematice, et tunc est dictio exclusiva; aliquando tenetur categorematice, et tunc non est dictio exclusiva, sed tunc impartat illud quod importatur per terminum additum sibi esse solitarium; sicut dicitur quod 'iste est solus', hoc est 'solitarius', quia in loco illo non est cum alio. Similiter si dicatur sic 'solus Sortes currit', si li solus teneatur categorematice, significat quod Sortes, qui est solitarius, currat; et hoc poterit esse verum, quamvis multi alii currant. Si autem teneatur syncategorematice, tunc denotatur quod nullus alius a Sorte currat.	Regarding the first, it should be known that the words 'only' and 'alone' form exclusive propositions. It should be known, however, that this word 'alone' is sometimes taken syncategorematically, and then it is an exclusive word; sometimes it is taken categorematically, and then it is not an exclusive word, but then it imparts that which is conveyed by the term added to it, that it is solitary; just as it is said that 'this one is alone', that is, 'solitary', because it is not with another in that place. Similarly, if it is said thus 'Socrates alone runs', if 'alone' is taken categorematically, it signifies that Socrates, who is solitary, runs; and this may be true, although many others run. But if it is taken syncategorematically, then it denotes that no one else runs besides Socrates.
Secundo sciendum quod quando istae duae dictiones 'tantum' et 'solus' possunt addi eidem, nihil refert addere unam dictionem vel aliam, dummodo li solus teneatur syncategorematice, quia tales propositiones aequivalent; sicut istae propositiones aequivalent 'tantum homo currit' et 'solus homo currit'.	Secondly, it should be known that when these two words 'only' and 'alone' can be added to the same thing, it makes no difference whether one word or the other is added, provided that 'only' is held syncategorematically, because such propositions are equivalent, just as these propositions are equivalent to 'only a man runs' and 'a man alone runs'.
Circa secundum sciendum est quod aliquando dictio exclusiva ponitur a parte subiecti, et aliquando a parte praedicati, sive a parte compositionis, ita quod est determinatio compositionis. Et ideo primo est videndum quando dictio exclusiva ponitur a parte subiecti.	Regarding the second, it should be noted that sometimes the exclusive word is placed on the part of the subject, and sometimes on the part of the predicate, or on the part of the composition, so that it is a determination of the composition. And therefore, we must first see when the exclusive word is placed on the part of the subject.
Et est primo sciendum quod sicut aliquando dictio categorematica significat unum primaria institutione et aliud ex translatione et secundaria institutione, sicut 'homo' primo significat idem quod 'compositum ex corpore et anima intellectiva', secundario significat statuam vel imaginem talis campositi, sic est de dictione exclusiva et alia dictione syncategorematica quod aliquando significat vel habet unum officium ex primaria institutione et aliud ex secundaria, et ita est de dictione exclusiva. Et ideo primo videndum est de eius primaria institutione, secundo de secundaria.	And it must first be known that just as sometimes a categorematic word signifies one thing by primary institution and another by translation and secondary institution, just as 'man' first signifies the same as 'composed of body and intellectual soul', secondarily signifies a statue or image of such, so it is of an exclusive word and another syncategorematic word that sometimes signifies or has one function by primary institution and another by secondary, and so it is of an exclusive word. And therefore, we must first see its primary institution, secondly its secondary one.
Circa primum sciendum quod quandocumque dictio exclusiva tenetur secundum suam primariam institutionem et ponitur a parte subiecti, semper denotatur quod praedicatum vere praedicatur de subiecto, et quod removetur ab omni illo de quo non vere praedicatur suum subiectum; et hoc si sit propositio affirmativa. Et idea quaelibet propositio exclusiva habet duas exponentes: unam affirmativam et aliam negativam. Sicut ista 'tantum homo est animal' habet istas exponentes 'homo est animal' et 'nihil aliud ab homine est animal' Si autem sit negativa, denotatur quod praedicatum vere removetur a subiecto et quod inest omni illi a quo vere removetur subiectum; et ita habet duas exponentes, scilicet suam praeiacentem negativam et aliam affirmativam. Sicut ista 'tantum homo non est asinus' habet istas duas exponentes 'homo non est asinus' et 'omne aliud ab homine est asinus'.	Regarding the first, it should be known that whenever an exclusive statement is held according to its primary institution and is placed on the part of the subject, it always denotes that the predicate is truly predicated of the subject, and that it is removed from everything of which its subject is not truly predicated; and this if it is an affirmative proposition. And the idea of ​​any exclusive proposition has two exponents: one affirmative and the other negative. For example, 'only man is an animal' has these exponents 'man is an animal' and 'nothing else than man is an animal.' But if it is negative, it denotes that the predicate is truly removed from the subject and that it is in everything from which the subject is truly removed; and thus it has two exponents, namely its preceding negative and another affirmative. For example, 'only man is not a donkey' has these two exponents 'man is not a donkey' and 'everything else than man is a donkey.'
Per praedicta patet quod omnes tales sunt falsae et includeiites contradictionem, accipiendo dictionem exclusivam secundum suam primariam institutionem: 'tantum homo est albus', 'tantum aer est hic intus', 'tantum animal est', 'tantum pater est', 'tantum individuum est' et huiusmodi, quia ex illis sequitur praedicata verificari de partibus, a quibus tamen tota vel nomina totorum removentur, et ita omnes tales contradictionem includunt.	From the above it is clear that all such are false and include a contradiction, taking the exclusive statement according to its primary institution: 'only man is white', 'only air is here inside', 'only an animal exists', 'only a father exists', 'only an individual exists' and the like, because from them it follows that predicates are verified about parts, from which however the whole or the names of wholes are removed, and thus all such include a contradiction.
Similiter tales falsae sunt 'solus Pater est Deus', 'solus Pater spirat Spiritum Sanctum', 'solus Pater creat', 'solus Pater est bonus' et huiusmodi. Similiter tales sunt falsae 'tantum omnis homo est rationalis', 'tantum omne animal est sensibile', quia istae exponentes non stant simul, si sint plures homines et plura animalia: 'omnis homo est rationalis' et 'nihil aliud ab omni homine est rationale', quia si nihil aliud ab omni homine est rationale, et iste homo est aliud ab omni homine, igitur iste homo non est rationalis, quae repugnat isti 'omnis homo est rationalis' Et eodem modo est de ista 'tantum omne animal est sensibile'.	Similarly, such false statements are 'the Father alone is God', 'the Father alone breathes the Holy Spirit', 'the Father alone creates', 'the Father alone is good' and the like. Similarly, such false statements are 'only every man is rational', 'only every animal is sensible', because these exponents do not stand together if there are many men and many animals: 'every man is rational' and 'nothing other than every man is rational', because if nothing other than every man is rational, and this man is different from every man, therefore this man is not rational, which is inconsistent this 'every man is rational'. And in the same way it is about this 'only every animal is sensible'.
Secundo videndum est de dictione exclusiva secundum eius secundariaim institutionem. Et est sciendum quod triplex potest esse: una, quando praecise excludit praedicatum ab omni distributo de quo non dicitur subiectum; alia, quando praecise excludit ea quae nec importantur per subiectum nec sunt partes eorum; tertia, quando praecise excludit maiorem pluralitatem quam est expressa per subiectum.	Secondly, we must consider the exclusive word according to its secondary institution. And it should be known that it can be threefold: one, when it precisely excludes the predicate from everything distributed of which the subject is not said; another, when it precisely excludes those things which are neither implied by the subject nor are parts of them; third, when it precisely excludes a greater plurality than is expressed by the subject.
Et secundum hoc dantur tres regulae. Una est quod quando dictio exclusiva additur termino communi distributo, quod potest esse exclusio proprie dicta, et tunc excluditur omne illud de quo non verificatur illud cui additur dictio exclusiva. Aliter potest esse exclusio improprie dicta, secundum quod denotatur praedicatum removeri a quolibet alio communi cum signo particulari, de quo non verificatur subiectum; et potest vocari exclusio communis repugnantis cum signo particulari.	And according to this there are three rules. One is that when an exclusive word is added to a common distributed term, which can be an exclusion properly so called, then everything is excluded of which that to which the exclusive word is added is not verified. Otherwise, it can be an exclusion improperly so called, according as it denotes that the predicate is removed from any other common with a particular sign, of which the subject is not verified; and it can be called a common exclusion incompatible with a particular sign.
Unde ista 'tantum omnis homo currit' est distinguenda penes secundum modum aequivocationis, eo quod li tantum potest teneri proprie, et tunc habet istas exponentes 'omnis homo currit' et 'nihil aliud ab omni homine currit'. Vel potest sumi improprie, ut sit exclusio cuiuslibet communis repugnantis cum signo particulari, ut habeat istas exponentes 'omnis homo currit' et 'aliquis bos non currit' et 'aliquis asinus non currit' et 'aliqua capra non currit', et sic de singulis communibus, ut per talem exclusivam -- improprie sumpta dictione exclusiva denotatur praedicatum verificari de termino communi posito in illa propositione cum signo universali et non verificari de quocumque alio communi universaliter sumpto. Et ista distinctio numquam habet Iocum nisi quando dictio exclusiva additur termino communi universaliter sumpto.	Hence this 'only every man runs' must be distinguished according to the mode of equivocation, because only can either be held properly, and then it has these exponents 'every man runs' and 'nothing else than every man runs'; or it can be taken improperly, so that it is the exclusion of any common that is incompatible with a particular sign, so that it has these exponents 'every man runs' and 'some ox does not run' and 'some donkey does not run' and 'some goat does not run', and so on of each common thing, so that by such an exclusive -- improperly taken exclusive word -- denotes that the predicate is verified of the common term placed in that proposition with a universal sign and not verified of any other common term universally taken. And this distinction never has a joke except when the exclusive word is added to the common term universally taken.
Iuxta secundam -- impropriam -- acceptionem dictionis exclusivae accipitur una alia regula quae est ista, quod quando dictio exclusiva additur termino importanti aliquid habens plures partes, illa propositio est distinguenda, eo quod potest esse exclusio proprie dicta, et tunc denotatur praedicatum competere subiecto et removeri a quolibet a quo removetur subiectum; vel potest esse exclusio improprie dicta, secundum quod excluditur omne illud de quo non verificatur subiectum nec importans partem subiecti, et potest vocari exclusio cuiuslibet importantis extrinsecum. Et secundum hoc ista propositio est distinguenda 'tantum Sortes est albus', eo quod dictio exclusiva potest suae proprie, et tunc includit contradictionem, quia tunc istae sunt suae exponentes 'Sortes est albus' et 'nihil aliud a Sorte est album', quae duae repugnant, quia inferunt repugnantia. Nam sequitur 'Sortes est albus, igitur aliqua pars corporis Sortis est alba'; et sequitur 'nihil aliud a Sorte est album; quaelibet pars Sortis est alia a Sorte; igitur nulla pars corporis Sortis est alba'; quae conclusiones repugnant.	According to the second -- improper -- meaning of the exclusive, another rule is taken, which is this: when the word exclusive is added to a term that implies something having several parts, that proposition is to be distinguished, because it can be an exclusion properly so-called, and then it denotes that the predicate belongs to the subject and is removed from whatever is removed from the subject; or it can be an exclusion improperly so-called, according as everything is excluded of which the subject is not verified nor does it imply a part of the subject, and it can be called the exclusion of any extrinsic import. And according to this, the proposition is to be distinguished 'only Socrates is white', because the exclusive word can be of itself properly, and then it includes a contradiction, because then these are its exponents 'Socrates is white' and 'nothing else than Socrates is white', which two are incompatible, because they infer incompatibilities. For it follows 'Socrates is white, therefore some part of Socrates' body is white'; and it follows 'nothing else from Socrates is white; every part of Socrates is other than Socrates; Therefore, no part of Socrates' body is white'; which conclusions are contradictory.
Si autem sumatur dictio exclusiva improprie, ut fiat exclusio praecise cuiuslibet importantis tantum aliquid extrinsecum Sorti, sic est haec possibilis 'tantum Sortes est albus', quia tunc non denotatur nisi quod Sortes sit albus et quod nihil extrinsecum Sorti sit album; quae duae possunt stare simul, ut sint istae suae exponentes 'Sortes est albus' et 'nihil extrinsecum Sorti est album'. Et ista distinctio numquam habet locum nisi quando dictio exclusiva additur termino importanti aliquod totum habens plures partes, sive sit totum proprie dictum sive improprie dictum.	But if the exclusive expression is taken improperly, so that it excludes precisely any term that only includes something extrinsic to Socrates, then this is possible: 'only Socrates is white', because then it denotes only that Socrates is white and that nothing extrinsic to Socrates is white; which two can stand together, so that these are their exponents: 'Socrates is white' and 'nothing extrinsic to Socrates is white'. And this distinction never takes place except when the exclusive expression is added to a term that includes some whole having several parts, whether the whole is said properly or said improperly.
Et si dicatur quod tunc omnes tales essent simpliciter includentes contradictionem, secundum utramque acceptionem: '‚”antum corpus est album', 'tantum homo est albus', 'tantum ignis calefacit', 'tantum homo est hic intus', 'tantum quantum est in loco', et ceterae huiusmodi. Nam per primum excluditur superficies, cum non sit aliquid intrinsecum corpori, quia non est pars eius; et propter idem excluderetur per secundum; per tertium exemplum excluderetur calor; per quartum omnia accidentia; per ultimum punctus:	And if it were said that then all such would simply include a contradiction, according to both meanings: 'Only the body is white,' ‘only man is white,' ‘only fire heats,' ‘only man is here inside,' ‘only as much as it is in place,' and so on. For by the first, surface is excluded, since it is not something intrinsic to the body, because it is not a part of it; and for the same reason it would be excluded by the second; by the third example, heat would be excluded; by the fourth, all accidents; by the last, the point:
Dicendum quod omnia praedicta de praedictis exemplis, praeterquam de tertio, secundum opinionem Aristotelis procedunt ex falsa imaginatione, scilicet quod superficies, linea, punctus sint quaedam res distinctae realiter a corpore et substantia; quod ostensum est esse contra intentionem Aristotelis in libro Praedicamentorum. Sed pro tertio exemplo, supposito quod ignis non possit calefacere nisi per calorem, est aliter dicendum; quia dicendum est quod -- sumpta dictione exclusiva sive proprie sive secundum istam significationem impropriam -- haec includit contradictionem 'tantum ignis calefacit'. Et ideo si debeat saluari, debet accipi dictio exclusiva aliter quam proprie et quam praedictis tribus significationibus, ut scilicet dictio exclusiva praecise excludat illa quae nec important aliquid extrinsecum nec accidens inhaerens formaliter. Et sub ista acceptione potest haec concedi esse possibilis 'tantum ignis calefacit', quia tunc non excluditur calor, cum formaliter inhaereat igni.	It must be said that all the above examples, except for the third, according to Aristotle's opinion proceed from a false imagination, namely that a surface, a line, a point are certain things really distinct from a body and substance; which was shown to be contrary to Aristotle's intention in the book of the Predicates. But for the third example, supposing that fire cannot heat except through heat, it must be said differently; because it must be said that -- taken with the exclusive expression either properly or according to this improper meaning -- this includes the contradiction 'only fire heats'. And therefore, if it is to be saved, the exclusive expression must be understood differently than properly and in the aforementioned three meanings, namely so that the exclusive expression precisely excludes those which neither imply anything extrinsic nor an accident formally inherent. And under this understanding it can be conceded that 'only fire heats' is possible, because then heat is not excluded, since it formally inheres in fire.
Iuxta tertiam -- impropriam -- acceptionem dictionis exclusivae potest accipi tertia regula ista, quod quando dictio exclusiva additur termino numerali, sive aequivalenti, vel connotanti numerum vel unitatem, illa propositio est distinguenda, eo quod potest esse exclusia proprie vel improprie. Prima modo excluditur omne illud de quo non verificatur subiectum; seundo modo excluditur maior pluratitas quam illa cui denotatur praedicatum competere; et potest vocari exclusia maioris pluralitatis. Et secundum hoc ista propositia est distinguenda 'tantum quatuor homines sunt hic intus', quia supponatur quod quatuar homines sunt hic intus et non plures, tunc si fiat exclusio proprie accipiendo dictionem exclusivam, denotatur quod quatuor homines sunt hic intus, et quod nulla alia a quatuor hominibus sunt hic intus, et per consequens quod Iapides non sunt hic intus, et quod equi non sunt hic intus, nec asini, nec quod duo homines sunt hic intus, quia duo homines sunt alii a quatuor hominibus. - Si autem fiat exclusio maioris pluralitatis, tunc denotatur quod quatuor homines sunt hic intus et non plures quam quatuor. Et tunc sunt istae eius exponentes 'quatuor homines sunt hic intus' et 'non sunt plures homines hic intus quam quatuar'; et sic est vera, posito priori casu.	According to the third -- improper -- meaning of the exclusive word, a third rule can be taken, that when an exclusive word is added to a numerical term, whether equivalent or connoting number or unity, that proposition is to be distinguished, because it can be an exclusion properly or improperly. In the first way, everything of which the subject is not verified is excluded; in the second way, a greater plurality than that to which the predicate is denoted to belong is excluded; and it can be called an exclusion of greater plurality. And according to this, that proposition is to be distinguished 'only four men are here inside', because it is supposed that four men are here inside and not more, then if exclusion is made by taking the word exclusive properly, it is denoted that four men are here inside, and that nothing other than four men is here inside, and consequently that stones are not here inside, and that there are no horses here inside, nor donkeys, nor that two men are here inside, because two men are different from four men. - But if the exclusion of the greater plurality is made, then it is denoted that there are four men inside here and not more than four. And then its exponents are 'four men are inside here' and 'there are not more men inside here than four'; and thus it is true, assuming the former case.
Et sic solvitur istud sophisma 'tantum unum est', nam proprie accepta dictione exclusiva, ista est vera 'tantum unum est', nam utraque exponens est vera, ista videlicet 'unum est' et 'nihil aliud ab uno est'. Similiter est de ista 'tantum unum animal est homo'. Sed si dictio exclusiva accipiatur improprie, secundum quod est exclusiva maioris pluralitatis, tunc est falsa; et tunc sunt istae suae exponentes 'unum est' et 'non sunt plura quam unum', sicut exponentes istius 'tantum unum animal est homo' sunt istae 'unum animal est homo' et 'non plura animalia quam unum sunt homines'. Similiter est de ista 'tantum alterum istorum est', demonstrando duo entia; nam sumpta dictione exclusiva proprie, vera est, quia utraque exponens est vera si non sunt plura quam illa duo, scilicet Deus et angelus. Si sumatur improprie, falsa est, quia tunc denotatur quod alterum istorum est et non utrumque.	And thus is the sophism 'only one is' solved, for properly taken as an exclusive expression, it is true 'only one is', for both exponents are true, namely 'one is' and 'nothing else from one is'. Similarly, it is true of 'only one animal is man'. But if the exclusive expression is taken improperly, insofar as it is exclusive of a greater plurality, then it is false; and then its exponents are 'one is' and 'there are no more than one', just as the exponents of 'only one animal is man' are 'one animal is man' and 'no more animals than one are men'. Similarly, it is true of 'only one of these is', demonstrating two beings; for properly taken as an exclusive expression, it is true, because both exponents are true if there are no more than those two, namely God and an angel. If it is taken improperly, it is false, because then it is denoted that one of these is and not both.
Istis igitur modis potest dictio exclusiva accipi improprie; et forte etiam aliis modis potest accipi improprie, sed quia non sunt ita usitati sicut isti, ideo ipsos studiosis relinquo.	In these ways, therefore, the exclusive word can be taken improperly; and perhaps it can also be taken improperly in other ways, but because they are not as common as these, I leave them to the studious.
Dicto de dictione exclusiva quando ponitur a parte subiecti, dicendum est de ipsa quando ponitur a parte praedicati.	Having said about the exclusive word when it is placed on the part of the subject, we must speak about it when it is placed on the part of the predicate.
Et est primo sciendum quod tunc etiam potest accipi proprie et improprie. Si proprie, tunc denotatur quod praedicatum dicitur de subiecto et quad omne illud removetur ab eo de quo non verificatur praedicatum; sicut per istam 'homo est tantum animal' denotatur quod homo sit animal et quod non sit aliud ab animali. Quando autem accipitur improprie et transumptive, tunc additur verbo, et tunc excludit omne aliud verbum a subiecto quod importat actionem vel passionem distinctam. Sicut per istam 'homo tantum videt' denotatur quod homo videt et quod non audit nec percutit, et sic de aliis. Unde ista propositio 'homo tantum currit' est distinguenda penes secundum modum aequivocationis, eo quod dictio exclusiva potest sumi proprie, et tunc sunt istae duae suae exponentes 'homo currit' et 'homo non est aliud a currente', et cum hoc stat quod homo sit videns et percutiens, et sic de aliis. Si autem sumatur improprie, tunc est falsa, quia tunc denotatur quod homo sit currens et non audiens nec videns, et sic de aliis.	And it must first be known that then it can also be taken properly and improperly. If properly, then it denotes that the predicate is said of the subject and that all that is removed from that of which the predicate is not verified; as by this 'man is only an animal' it denotes that man is an animal and that he is not different from an animal. But when it is taken improperly and transumptively, then it is added to the verb, and then it excludes every other verb from the subject that implies a distinct action or passion. As by this 'man only sees' it denotes that man sees and that he does not hear or strike, and so on. Hence this proposition 'man only runs' is to be distinguished according to the mode of equivocation, because the exclusive expression can be taken properly, and then these are its two exponents 'man runs' and 'man is not different from a running thing', and since this stands that man is seeing and striking, and so on. But if it is taken improperly, then it is false, because then it denotes that a man is running and not hearing or seeing, and so on with the others.
Consimilis distinctio posset poni de talibus 'homo est tantum albus', 'lac est tantum dulce', 'ignis est tantum calidus', 'terra est tantum frigida', et sic de aliis, quia si sumatur dictio exclusiva proprie, tunc est quaelibet illarum vera, quia tunc istae sunt exponentes 'homo est albus' et 'homo non est aliud ab albo'; 'lac est dulce' et 'lac non est aliud a dulci', et sic de aliis. Si autem dictio exclusiva sumatur improprie, tunc excluduntur omnia praedicabilia importantia accidentia distincta ab illo accidente quod importatur per praedicatum. Sicut per istam 'homo est tantum albus' denotatur quod homo sit albus et quod nullum praedicabile importans accidens distinctum ab albedine praedicatur de homine; et ita denotatur quod homo non sit calidus nec humidus nec siccus nec frigidus nec lucidus, et sic de aliis. Et sicut dictum est de ista propositione, ita uniformiter dicendum est de aliis.	A similar distinction could be made about such things as 'man is only white', 'milk is only sweet', 'fire is only hot', 'earth is only cold', and so on, because if the exclusive expression is taken properly, then any of them is true, because then these are the exponents 'man is white' and 'man is not different from a white thing'; 'milk is sweet' and 'milk is not different from a sweet thing', and so on. But if the exclusive expression is taken improperly, then all predicates that import accidents distinct from that accident that is imported by the predicate are excluded. Just as by this 'man is only white' it is denoted that man is white and that no predicate that imports an accident distinct from whiteness is predicated of man; and so it is denoted that man is not hot nor humid nor dry nor cold nor bright, and so on. And as has been said about this proposition, so must be said uniformly about the others.
Circa tertium principale, [scilicet] qualiter termini supponunt in propositionibus exclusivis, est sciendum quod quando dictio exclusiva ponitur a parte subiecti et subiectum sumitur sine distributione, si subiectum sit terminus communis, ipsum supponit confuse tantum, quia sicut dictum est prius, suppositio confusa tantum est quando non contingit descendere ad inferiora nec per disiunctivam nec per copulativam. Nunc autem non sequitur 'tantum homo currit, igitur tantum iste homo currit vel tantum ille homo currit', et sic de singulis aliis. Nec etiam sequitur 'tantum homo currit, igitur tantum iste homo currit et tantum ille homo currit', et sic de singulis. Et ita terminus subiectus in tali propositione supponit confuse tantum, sed praedicatum supponit confuse et distributive, nam contingit descendere ad inferiora per copulativam. Unde bene sequitur 'tantum homo currit, igitur tantum homo est hoc currens', quocumque curreinte demonstrato; nam sequitur 'tantum homo currit, igitur nihil aliud ab homine currit', et ultra 'ergo nullum currens est aliud ab homine', et ultra 'ergo hoc currens non est aliud ab homine'. Et manifestum est quod si currit, est aliquid, igitur est homo, et per consequens homo est hoc currens, igitur tantum homo est hoc currens; quia quando praedicatum est pronomen demonstrativum vel aequivalens, ab indefinita ad exclusivam respectu eiusdem praedicati est bona consequentia.	Regarding the third principal, [namely] how terms supposit in exclusive propositions, it should be known that when the exclusive expression is placed on the subject's part and the subject is taken without distribution, if the subject is a common term, it supposits confusedly only, because as was said before, confused supposition is only when it is not possible to descend to lower things either by the disjunctive or by the copulative. Now, however, it does not follow that 'only a man runs, therefore only this man runs or only that man runs', and so on for each of the others. Nor does it follow that 'only a man runs, therefore only this man runs and only that man runs', and so on for each of the others. And thus the subject term in such a proposition supposits confusedly only, but the predicate supposits confusedly and distributively, for it is possible to descend to lower things by the copulative. Whence it follows well that 'only a man runs, therefore only this man is this running man', regardless of which running is indicated; For it follows that 'only man runs, therefore nothing else runs besides a man', and further 'therefore no running thing is other than a man', and further 'therefore this running thing is not other than a man'. And it is clear that if it runs, it is something, therefore it is man, and consequently man is this running, therefore only man is this running; because when the predicate is a demonstrative or equivalent pronoun, there is a good consequence from the indefinite to the exclusive with respect to the same predicate.
[Immo, qualecumque sit praedicatum consequentia est bona ab indefinita seu particulari ad exclusivam. Nam ista consequentia est bona 'homo tantum est risibilis, igitur tantum animal est risibile', nam tenet per regulam illam 'ab inferiori ad superius sine distributione, sive illud superius supponat confuse tantum sive determinate, est consequentia bona'; sicut sequitur 'omnis homo est homo, igitur omnis homo est animal'].	Indeed, whatever the predicate, the consequence is good from the indefinite or particular to the exclusive. For this consequence is good 'only a man is able to laugh, therefore only an animal is able to laugh', for it holds by that rule 'from inferior to superior without distribution, whether that higher supposits only confusedly or determinately, is a good consequence'; as it follows: 'every man is a man, therefore every man is an animal'
Secundo sciendum est quod quando exclusiva est negativa, subiectum supponit sicut in exclusiva affirmativa, et praedicatum similiter, quia sequitur 'tantum substantia non est accidens, igitur tantum substantia non est hoc accidens'.	Secondly, it should be known that when the exclusive is negative, the subject supposits as in the affirmative exclusive, and the predicate similarly, because it follows that 'only substance is not an accident, therefore only substance is not this accident'.
Tertio sciendum est de suppositione terminorum in exclusiva quando dictio exclusiva ponitur a parte praedicati. Et est dicendum quad subiectum supponit in tali sicut supponit in sua praeiacente; et idem est de praedicato. Et ratio est quia idem de eodem non potest vere affirmari et negari, et ideo semper ex praeiacente sequitur exclusiva quando dictio exclusiva ponitur a parte praedicati.	Thirdly, it is necessary to know about the supposition of terms in the exclusive when the exclusive word is placed on the part of the predicate. And it must be said that the subject supposits in such as it supposits in its antecedent; and the same is true of the predicate. And the reason is that the same thing cannot truly be affirmed and denied of the same thing, and therefore the exclusive always follows from the antecedent when the exclusive word is placed on the part of the predicate.
Quod est intelligendum si sit propositio de recto; nam si sit propositio de obliquo, tunc non est universaliter verum. Immo, si sit propositio de obliquo et dictio exclusiva sit determinatio praedicati et non determinatio compositionis, tunc praedicatum stat confuse tantum. Nam ponatur quod Sortes videatur a multis hominibus et a nullo alio animali quam ab homine, tunc ista propositio est vera 'Sortes videtur a solo homine', quia istae exponentes sunt verae 'Sortes videtur ab homine' et 'Sortes videtur a nullo alio quam ab homine', et tamen non sequitur 'Sortes videtur a solo homine, igitur Sortes videtur a solo isto homine vel a solo illo homine'; immo etiam nec sequitur 'Sortes videtur a solo homine, igitur Sortes videtur ab isto homine'. Et ideo non stat nec confuse et distributive, nec determinate, sed confuse tantum.	Which is to be understood if it is a proposition in the nominative; for if it is a proposition in the oblique, then it is not universally true. Indeed, if it is a proposition in the oblique and the exclusive statement is the determination of the predicate and not the determination of the composition, then the predicate stands only confusedly. For let it be supposed that Socrates is seen by many men and by no other animal than man, then this proposition is true 'Socrates is seen by man alone', because these exponents are true 'Socrates is seen by man' and 'Socrates is seen by no other than man', and yet it does not follow 'Socrates is seen by man alone, therefore Socrates is seen by this man alone or by that man alone'; indeed, it does not even follow 'Socrates is seen by man alone, therefore Socrates is seen by this man alone'. And therefore, it does not stand either confusedly and distributively, nor determinately, but only confusedly.
Si autem dictio exclusiva sit determinatio compositionis, tunc stat praedicatum sicut in praeiacente. Sicut in ista 'homo videtur tantum ab homine', si li tantum sit determinatio compositionis, tunc habet istas exponentes 'homo videtur ab homine' et 'homo non est aliud quam visum ab homine'. Ex quibus patet quod termini non aliter supponunt in exclusiva quam in sua praeiacente, quia semper talis exclusiva et sua praeiacens convertuntur. Si autem subiectum exclusivae in qua ponitur dictio exclusiva a parte subiecti sumatur cum distributione, tunc subiectum supponit confuse et distributive, tam affirmativae quam negativae, quia includit contradictoria. Ideo de ista non plus ad praesens.	But if the exclusive word is the determination of the composition, then the predicate stands as if in the preceding. As in this: 'man is seen only by man', if it is only the determination of the composition, then it has these exponents 'man is seen only by man' and 'man is nothing but seen by man'. From which it is clear that the terms supposit in the exclusive no differently than in their preceding, because such an exclusive and its preceding are always converted. But if the subject of the exclusive in which the exclusive word is placed is taken with distribution on the part of the subject, then the subject supposits confusedly and distributively, both affirmative and negative, because it includes contradictory things. Therefore, I will not discuss this further at present.
Et est notandum quod omnia praedicta intelligenda sunt quando dictio exclusiva proprie accipitur. Quando autem accipitur improprie, non sunt omnia praedicta vera. Sed quae sunt vera et quae non, potest patere leviter inspicienti secundum improprias significationes dictionis exclusivae, de quibus dictum est prius.	And it should be noted that all the above is to be understood when the exclusive term is properly understood. But when it is improperly understood, not all the above is true. But what is true and what is not can be made clear to the casual observer by looking at the improper meanings of the exclusive term, which were mentioned earlier.
Ultimo videndae sunt aliquae regulae circa dictiones exclusivas. Una est quod ab exclusiva ad universalem de terminis transpositis est bona consequentia et e converso, quia semper exclusiva et universalis de terminis transpositis convertuntur. Et est ista regula intelligenda quando praeiacens exclusivae et similiter universalis de terminis transpositis sunt convertibiles, ita quod utraque possit proprie converti. Vel si praeiacens exclusivae sit semper convertibilis, nulla mutatione facta circa terminos praeter solam transpositionem vel aliqua alia mutatione, tunc debet consimilis universalis accipi, cum qua convertatur exclusiva. De quibus conversionibus et de quibus modis convertendi dicetur in sequentibus.	Finally, some rules should be examined regarding exclusive words. One is that from exclusive to universal with transposed terms is a good consequence and vice versa, because exclusive and universal are always converted with transposed terms. And this rule is to be understood when the preceding exclusive and similarly the universal with transposed terms are convertible, so that both can be properly converted. Or if the preceding exclusive is always convertible, with no change made regarding the terms except for the transposition alone or some other change, then a similar universal should be taken, with which the exclusive is converted. Of which conversions and of which methods of conversion will be discussed in the following.
Per ista, et illa quae dicentur infra de canuersionibus, patet quod tales consequentiae non valent 'sola necessaria sunt necessario vera, igitur omnia vera sunt necessario necessaria', quamvis haec consequentia sit bona 'sola necessaria sunt vera, igitur omnia vera sunt necessaria'. Similiter non sequitur 'tantum homo fuit albus, igitur omne album fuit home'. Et ita de consimilibus, de quibus dicetur in suo loco inferius.	By these, and what will be said below about reversals, it is clear that such consequences are not valid, such as 'only necessary things are necessarily true, therefore all truths are necessarily necessary', although this consequence is good, as 'only necessary things are true, therefore all truths are necessary'. Similarly, it does not follow that 'only a man was white, therefore only a white thing was a man'. And so with similar things, which will be said in their proper place below.
Alia regula est quod quaelibet exclusiva habet duas exponentes, unam affirmativam et aliam negativam. Et ideo opposita exclusivae habet duas causas veritatis, quia utriusque exponentis opposita est causa veritatis negationis exclusivae.	Another rule is that every exclusive has two exponents, one affirmative and the other negative. And therefore, the opposite of an exclusive has two causes of truth, because the opposite of each exponent is the cause of the truth of the exclusive negation.
Alia regula est quod quando dictum propositionis exclusivae ponitur respectu alicuius modi facientis propositionem modalem, illa propositio est distinguenda, sicut ista est distinguenda 'tantum hominem esse Sortem est verum', eo quad li tantum potest continve proferri cum hoc toto 'hominem esse Sortem' vel discontinve. Si discontinve proferatur, sic "tantum 'hominem esse Sortem' est verum", tunc est falsa, quia tunc est iste sensus 'tantum haec est vera', demonstrando istam propositionem 'homo est Sortes'. Si continvetur cum hoc toto 'hominem esse Sortem' et partes dicti continventur, tunc est iste sensus 'tantum hominem esse Sortem, est verum' et aequivalet isti 'haec est vera: tantum homo est Sortes'. Si partes dicti non continventur, tunc non denotatur quod haec sit vera 'tantum homo est Sortes', sed quod de aliquo contento sub homine verificatur 'Sortes' cum dictione exclusiva.	Another rule is that when the statement of an exclusive proposition is placed with respect to some mode that makes it a modal proposition, that proposition must be distinguished, just as the statement must be distinguished 'only that a man is Socrates is true', insofar as it can only be stated continuously with this whole 'a man is Socrates' or discontinuously. If it is discontinuously stated, thus "only that 'a man is Socrates' is true", then it is false, because then the sense is 'only this is true', demonstrating the proposition 'a man is Socrates'. If it is contained with this whole 'a man is Socrates' and the parts of the statement are contained, then the sense is 'only that a man is Socrates, is true' and is equivalent to 'this is true: only a man is Socrates'. If the parts of the statement are not contained, then it is not denoted that this is true 'only that a man is Socrates', but that 'Socrates' is verified with the exclusive statement about something contained under man.
Unde simile est de illis et de aliis sumptis sine dictione exclusiva; tamen variatio est quando praedicatum est singulare et quando non. Unde ista 'tantum album currere est passibile', si li 'tantum' cantinvetur cum toto dicto et partes dicti discontinventur, est falsa, quia aliud quam album currere est possibile; si autem continventur, tunc est vera, quia tunc denotatur quod haec sit possibilis 'tantum album currit'. Per aliam autem denotatur quod nulla sit possibilis in qua praedicatur 'currere' de aliquo pronomine demonstrante aliquid quod non est album; quod non est verum.	Hence it is similar for those and for others taken without an exclusive word; however, there is a variation when the predicate is singular and when not. Hence the statement 'only a white thing runs is possible', if 'only' is included with the whole thing said and the parts of the thing said are disjointed, is false, because that something other than a white thing runs is possible; but if they are included, then it is true, because then it is denoted that this 'only a white thing runs' is possible. By another, however, it is denoted that there is nothing possible in which 'runs' is predicated of some pronoun indicating something that is not white; which is not true.