Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book II/Chapter 18

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[CAP.18. DE PROPOSITIONIBUS EXCEPTIVIS] Chapter 18. On Exceptive Propositions.
Circa propositiones exceptivas est primo videndum quae sunt propositiones exceptivae; secundo, quid requiritur ad veritatem exceptivarum; tertio, de suppositionibus terminorum in exceptivis; quarto, dandae sunt quaedam regulae de propositionibus exceptivis. Regarding exceptive propositions, we must first see what exceptive propositions are; second, what is required for the truth of exceptive propositions; third, about the suppositions of terms in exceptive propositions; fourth, certain rules must be given about exceptive propositions.
Circa primum sciendum quod talia syncategoremata 'praeter', 'nisi' faciunt propositiones in quibus ponuntur esse exceptivas. Regarding the first, it should be known that such syncategorematic terms as 'except' and 'unless' make propositions in which they are placed to be exceptive.
Et primo intelligendum est quod 'nisi' aliquando tenetur consecutive, et tunc facit propositionem hypotheticam, sicut patet de ista 'Sortes non potest currere nisi habeat pedes'. Aliquando autem tenetur exceptive, et tunc non facit propositionem hypotheticam, sicut patet hic 'nullus homo currit nisi Sortes'; et tunc haec dictio 'nisi' habet idem officium cum hac dictione 'praeter', quando haec dictio 'praeter' tenetur exceptive. And first it must be understood that 'unless' (nisi) is sometimes taken consecutively, and then it makes a hypothetical proposition, as is clear from this 'Socrates cannot run unless he has feet'. But sometimes it is taken exceptively, and then it does not make a hypothetical proposition, as is clear here 'no man runs unless Socrates'; and then this expression 'unless' has the same function as this expression 'except', when this expression 'except' is taken exceptively.
Est etiam, secundo, sciendum quod haec dictio 'praeter' aliquando tenetur exceptive, aliquando diminutive. Exceptive, sicut hic 'omnis homo praeter Sortem currit'; diminutive, sicut hic 'decem praeter quinque sunt quinque'. It is also, secondly, to be known that this expression 'except' is sometimes taken in an exceptional sense, sometimes in a diminutive sense. Exceptional, as here 'every man except Socrates runs'; diminutive, as here 'ten besides five are five'.
Circa secundum principale est sciendum quod ad veritatem exceptivae requiritur quod praedicatum removeatur a parte extra capta et quod insit cuilibet alii contento sub subiecto, si sit affirmativa; si sit negativa, requiritur e converso. Et ideo quaelibet talis exceptiva habet duas exponentes: scilicet affirmativam et negativam. Sicut ista omnis homo praeter Sortem currit' habet istas 'Sortes non currit' et 'omnis homo alius a Sorte currit'. Et ista 'nullus homo praeter Sortem currit' habet istas 'Sortes currit' et 'nullus homo alius a Sorte currit'. Ita quod impossibile est aliquam exceptivam esse veram nisi utraque sua expanens sit vera, et idea ad falsitatem exponentis sequitur falsitas exceptivae, quamvis non e converso. Regarding the second principal, it should be known that for the truth of an exceptive proposition it is required that the predicate be removed from the part taken outside and that it be present in any other contained under the subject, if it is affirmative; if it is negative, the converse is required. And therefore, any such exceptional proposition has two exponents: namely, the affirmative and the negative. Just as the statement 'every man except Socrates runs' has the statements 'Socrates does not run' and 'every man other than Socrates runs'. And the statement 'no man except Socrates runs' has the statements 'Socrates runs' and 'no man other than Socrates runs'. So that it is impossible for any exceptional proposition to be true unless both of its exponents are true, and the idea that the exponent is false follows the falsity of the exceptional proposition, although not vice versa.
Circa tertium principale est sciendum quod praedicatum in exceptiva affirmativa habet suppositionem confusam tantum, quia non contingit descendere ad inferiora nec per disiunctivam nec per copulativam; sed subiectum habet suppositionem canfusam et distributivam. Regarding the third principal, it should be known that the predicate in the affirmative exception has only a confused supposition, because it is not possible to descend to lower ones either through the disjunctive or the copulative; but the subject has a clear and distributive supposition.
Tamen distinguendum est de suppositione confusa et distributiva, quia quaedam est absoluta, quando scilicet terminus aequaliter distribuitur pro quolibet suo cantento, ita quod non plus pro uno quam pro alio, et talem suppositionem canfusam et distributivam non habet subiectum in propositione exceptiva. Alia est quasi limitata et arctata, quando scilicet terminus pro aliquo distribuitur et pro alio, ratione alicuius adiuncti, non distribuitur. Et hoc non accidit nisi quando illa propositio categorica aequivalet uni copulativae Compositae ex una affirmativa et alia negativa, quod accidit in propositione exceptiva, sicut dictum est. However, a distinction must be made between a confused and distributive supposition, because one is absolute, namely when a term is equally distributed for each of its members, so that it is not more for one than for another, and the subject does not have such a confused and distributive supposition in an exceptional proposition. Another is as it were limited and restricted, namely when a term is distributed for something and is not distributed for another, by reason of some adjunct. And this does not happen except when that categorical proposition is equivalent to one of the compound copulas composed of one affirmative and another negative, which happens in an exceptional proposition, as has been said.
Si autem exceptiva fuerit negativa, tunc tam subiectum quam prae dicatum suppanit confuse et distributive sed limitate. But if the exception is negative, then both the subject and the thing predicated supposit confusedly and distributively but in a limited way.
Ex praedictis patet quod tales regulae 'a superiori distributo ad suum inferius est bona cansequentia', 'ab universali ad singulare est bona consequentia' non sunt generaliter verae, sed oportet addere quod illud inferius non sit extra captum vel quod universalis non sit aequivalens uni copulativae compositae ex una affirmativa et alia negativa. From the above it is clear that such rules as 'from a superior distributed to its inferior is a good consequence', 'from a universal to a singular is a good consequence' are not generally true, but it must be added that that inferior is not beyond comprehension or that the universal is not equivalent to a single copulative composed of one affirmative and another negative.
Circa quartum sciendum est quod multae regulae dantur de exceptivis. Una est quod si praeiacens exceptivae sit vera, exceptiva est falsa. Hoc patet per praedicta. Regarding the fourth, it should be noted that there are many rules about exceptions. One is that if the predicate of an exception is true, the exception is false. This is clear from what has been said.
Alia est quod numquam exceptiva est propria nisi cuius praeiacens est universalis. Unde haec est impropria 'homo praeter Sortem currit'; unde talis nec est vera nec est falsa. Another is that an exceptive is never proper unless its precedent is universal. Hence this is improper, 'a man runs except Socrates'; hence such a statement is neither true nor false.
Ex ista sequitur alia, scilicet quod non semper ab universali ad suam indefinitam vel particularem est consequentia bona. Unde non sequitur 'omnis homo praeter Sortem currit, igitur aliquis homo praeter Sortem currit', nec sequitur 'igitur homo praeter Sortem currit'. From this follows another, namely that the consequence from the universal to its indefinite or particular is not always good. Hence it does not follow that 'every man runs except Socrates, therefore some man runs except Socrates', nor does it follow that 'therefore a man runs ecxept Socrates'.
Alia sequitur, quod non cuilibet propositioni universali contradicit propositio indefinita nec particularis ei correspondens. Non enim istae cantradicunt 'omnis homo praeter Sortem currit', 'aliquis homo praeter Sortem non currit'; nec istae 'nullus homo praeter Sortem currit' et 'aliqlius homo praeter Sortem currit'. Another follows, that not every universal proposition is contradicted by an indefinite proposition, nor by a corresponding particular proposition. For these do not contradict: 'every man runs except Socrates', 'some man does not run except Socrates'; nor do these: 'no man runs except Socrates' and 'some man runs except Socrates'.
Ex ista sequitur alia, scilicet quod non semper loco istius 'non omnis' licitum est ponere hoc totum 'allquis non'. Istae enim non aequivalent 'non omnis homa praeter Sortem currit', aliquis homo praeter Sortem non currit', quia una est impropria et neque vera neque falsa, et alia est propria et vera vel falsa. From this follows another, namely that it is not always permissible to put this whole 'not every man' in place of 'not every man runs except Socrates'. For 'not every man runs except Socrates' is not equivalent to this, because one is improper and neither true nor false, and the other is proper and true or false.
Alia regula sequens est quod sunt aliquae propositiones universales contrariae, quae tamen non habent aliquas propositiones categoricas subcontrarias quae sunt indefinitae vel particulares, habentes subiecta determinata signis particularibus. Hoc patet per praedicta. Another rule that follows is that there are some universal propositions that are contrary, but which do not have any subordinate contrary categorical propositions that are indefinite or particular, having subjects determined by particular signs. This is clear from what has been said.
Alia regula est quod semper illud quod excipitur in exceptiva, debet esse aliquid contentum sub subiecto. Et ideo quaelibet talis est impropria 'omnis homo praeter animal currit', 'omne animal praeter substantiam est animatum'. Another rule is that what is excepted in an exceptive proposition must always be something contained under the subject. And therefore, any such sentence is improper as 'every man runs except an animal', 'every animal is animate except a substance'.
Alia regula est quod quando illud super quod cadit exceptio est commune, ad veritatem talis exceptivae non requiritur quod praedicatum universaliter insit illi super quo cadit exceptio, si sit exceptiva negativa, vel quod removeatur universaliter, si sit exceptiva affirmativa. Another rule is that when that on which the exception falls is common, for the truth of such an exception it is not required that the predicate be universally present in that on which the exception falls, if it is a negative exception, or that it be universally removed, if it is an affirmative exception.
Sciendum est etiam quod 'praeter' numquam tenetur diminutive nisi quando additur termino numerali vel termino importanti aliquod totum. Quando autem tenetur diminutive et additur termino numerali, tunc non denotatur praedicatum removeri ab illo cui additur sed magis a subiecto. Sicut per istam 'decem praeter quinque sunt quinque' non denotatur quinque removeri a quinque sed a decem. Similiter etiam per talem non denotatur praedicatum inesse illi cui additur haec dictio 'praeter', sicut per istam 'decem praeter quatuor sunt sex' non denotatur quod quatuor sunt sex, sed quod residua a quatuor sunt sex. Et ita est de aliis. Et ista de exceptivis ad praesens dicta sufficiant. It should also be known that 'except' (praeter) is never taken in the diminutive form except when it is added to a numerical term or a term that carries some whole. But when it is taken in the diminutive form and is added to a numerical term, then the predicate is not denoted to be removed from that to which it is added, but rather from the subject. Just as by this 'ten except five are five' five is not denoted to be removed from five but from ten. Similarly, by such a one the predicate is not denoted to be in that to which this expression 'except' is added, just as by this 'ten except four are six' it is not denoted that four are six, but that the remainder of (ten minus) four are six. And so it is with the others. And let what has been said about exceptions suffice for the present.

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