Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book II/Chapter 19

Latin	English
[2.19 DE PROPOSITIONIBUS IN QUIBUS PONUNTUR HAEC VERBA 'INCIPIT' ET 'DESINIT']	Chapter 19. On Propositions in which the Verbs 'Begin' and 'Cease' Occur.
Omnis propositio in qua ponitur aliquod istorum verborum 'incipit', 'desinit' habet duas exponentes, quia quaelibet aequivalet uni copulativae. Tamen ab aliquibus diversimode assignantur exponentes respectu diversorum. Unde dicunt quod aliter exponuntur respectu successivorum et respectu permanentium.	Every proposition in which any of these words, 'begins' or 'ends' is used has two exponents, because each is equivalent to one copulative. However, some assign exponents differently with respect to different things. Hence they say that they are explained differently with respect to successive things and with respect to permanent things.
Sed quamvis sic posset esse ad voluntatem utentium, non tamen videtur multum rationabile.	But although this could be done according to the will of the users, it still does not seem very reasonable.
Ideo dico quod respectu cuiuslibet possunt habere easdem exponentes, sed aliae sunt ubi ponitur hoc verbum 'incipit' et ubi ponitur hoc verbum 'desinit'. Unde propositio ubi ponitur hoc verbum 'incipit' habet duas exponentes, quarum una est de praesenti affirmativa et alia de praeterito negativa; sicut exponentes istius 'Sortes incipit esse albus' sunt istae 'Sortes est albus' et 'Sortes non fuit immediate ante albus'. Non enim exponens sua negativa de praeterito est talis 'Sortes non fuit albus', quia talis propositio in qua ponitur 'incipit' potest esse vera et illa negativa de praeterito falsa; sicut si Sortes sit primo albus et postea niger et tertio fiat albus, tunc in aliquo instanti est haec vera 'Sortes incipit esse albus' et tamen haec est falsa 'Sortes non fuit albus', quia positum est quod prius fuit albus. Sic etiam dicimus quod haec arbor incipit modo florere, et tamen floruit anno praecedenti.	Therefore I say that with respect to any, they can have the same exponents, but there are different ones where the word 'begins' is used and where the word 'ends' is used. Hence the proposition where the word 'begins' is used has two exponents, one of which is affirmative of the present and the other negative of the past; just as the exponents of 'Socrates begins to be white' are 'Socrates is white' and 'Socrates was not immediately before white'. For its negative exponent is not such as 'Socrates was not white', because such a proposition in which 'begins' is used can be true and that negative exponent of the past false; just as if Socrates is first white and then black and thirdly becomes white, then at some instant this is true 'Socrates begins to be white' and yet this is false 'Socrates was not white', because it is posited that it was white before. Thus we also say that this tree is just beginning to bloom, and yet it bloomed the previous year.
Verumtamen sciendum quod hoc verbum 'incipit' dupliciter accipi potest, scilicet stricte et proprie, et sic exponitur sicut dictum est. Aliter potest accipi large et improprie, et tunc sic exponitur 'sic est, et non diu ante fuit'. Sicut dicimus quod haec arbor incipit florere, quando nunc floret, et non multum ante, isto anno floruit, et tamen heri floruit; sicut etiam dicimus uulgariter 'iste incipit missam', quamvis dixerit Introitum. Et ista est distinctio similis illi quam ponit Philosophus, IV Physicorum, de 'nunc', quod potest accipi pro indivisibili et potest accipi pro tempore paruo, propinquo praesenti.	However, it should be known that this word 'begins' can be taken in two ways, namely strictly and properly, and in this way it is explained as has been said. Otherwise it can be taken broadly and improperly, and then it is explained thus 'it is so, and not long ago it was'. Just as we say that this tree begins to bloom, when it is blooming now, and not long ago, it bloomed this year, and yet it bloomed yesterday; just as we also say vulgarly 'this person begins the mass', although he said the Introit. And this is a distinction similar to that which the Philosopher makes, in Physics IV, about 'now', which can be taken for an indivisible and can be taken for a small time, close to the present.
Intelligendum est etiam quod quamvis propositio talis secundum veritatem sermonis habeat tales exponentes, tamen aliquando secundum usum loquentium non habet tales exponentes, sed ponitur pro alia, quae talibus exponentibus caret. Et tunc est talis propositio distinguenda secundum amphiboliam.	It should also be understood that although such a proposition according to the truth of the discourse has such exponents, yet sometimes according to the usage of speakers it does not have such exponents, but is put for another which lacks such exponents. And then such a proposition is to be distinguished according to amphiboly.
Et per hoc potest videri quid dicendum sit de talibus propositionibus 'Deus incipit beatificare omnem hominem beatum quem beatificat', 'Deus incipit punire omnem hominem quem punit', 'Deus incipit beatificare istas', demonstratis aliquibus quorum unum ante beatificavit et alium non ante beatificavit. Nam tales secundum proprietatem sermonis et lacutionis, hoc est secundum regulas generales per quas tales et consimiles iudicari debent, concedi passunt. Sicut ista 'Deus incipit beatificare istos' concedi potest, quia utraque istarum est vera 'Deus beatificat istas' et 'Deus non immediate ante beatificavit istos'. Tamen alium sensum habere potest, ut istae sint expanentes 'Deus beatificat istos' et 'nullum istorum prius beatificavit', et iste sensus falsus est. Similiter unus sensus istius 'Deus incipit beatificare omnem quem nunc beatificat' est iste 'Deus beatificat omnem quem nunc beatificat et Deus non prius immediate beatificavit omnem quem nunc beatificat'; et iste sensus verus est.	And by this it can be seen what is to be said about such propositions as 'God begins to beatify every blessed man whom He beatifies', 'God begins to punish every man whom He punishes', 'God begins to beatify these', having demonstrated some of which He has previously beatified one and not previously beatified another. For such propositions are allowed to be granted according to the property of speech and expression, that is, according to the general rules by which such and the like should be judged. Just as 'God begins to beatify these' can be granted, because both of these are true: 'God beatifies these' and 'God did not immediately beatify these'. However, it can have another sense, so that these are expanded as 'God beatifies these' and 'He did not beatify any of these before', and this sense is false. Similarly, one sense of 'God begins to beatify everyone whom He now beatifies' is this: 'God beatifies everyone whom He now beatifies and God did not immediately beatify everyone whom He now beatifies'; and this sense is true.
Alius sensus est iste 'Deus beatificat omnem quem nunc beatificat et nullum quem nunc beatificat prius immediate beatificavit'; et iste sensus falsus est. Et consimiliter potest dici de ista 'Deus incipit punire hominem quem nunc punit'. Similiter debet dici de talibus 'Petrus incipit esse talis qualis est Paulus', ponatur quod uterque sit primo infidelis et postea uterque fiat fidelis. Tunc ista propositio 'Petrus incipit esse talis qualis est Paulus' patest simpliciter concedi, quia nunc primo est talis qualis est Paulus et ante non fuit talis qualis est Paulus. Tamen haec est falsa de virtute sermonis 'Petrus incipit esse similis Paulo', quia prius erat similis Paulo. Improprie tamen accipi potest sub hoc sensu 'Petrus est simiiis Paulo, et non erat similis Paulo secundum aliquam qualitatem secundum quam est nunc similis'.	Another meaning is this: 'God beatifies everyone whom He now beatifies and none whom He now beatifies He has immediately previously beatified'; and this meaning is false. And similarly it can be said of this: 'God begins to punish the man whom He now punishes'. Similarly it should be said of such things: 'Peter begins to be such as Paul', let it be assumed that both are at first unbelievers and later both become believers. Then this proposition 'Peter begins to be such as Paul' is clear to be granted simply, because now he is at first such as Paul and before he was not such as Paul. However, this is false literally speaking: 'Peter begins to be like Paul', because before he was like Paul. However, it can be improperly taken in this sense: 'Peter is like Paul, and was not like Paul according to some quality according to which he is now like'.
Sic igitur patet quod propositio in qua ponitur hoc verbum 'incipit' habet duas exponentes, et per consequens aequivalet uni copulativae.	Thus, it is clear that the proposition in which this word 'begins' is used has two exponents, and consequently is equivalent to one copulative.
Et similiter propositio in qua ponitur hoc verbum 'desinit' habet duas exponentes. Una exponens est una propositio de praesenti affirmativa et alia est una negativa de futuro, non qualiscumque sed cum hoc addito 'non erit immediate post'. Sicut ista 'Sortes desinit esse albus' habet istas exponentes 'Sartes est albus' et 'immediate post non erit albus'. Et sicut dictum est de propositionibus in quibus ponitur hoc verbum 'incipit', quod quandoque possunt distingui secundum amphiboliam, eo quod possunt accipi proprie et improprie, ita possunt multae propositiones in quibus ponitur hoc verbum 'desinit' distingui secundum amphiboliam, eo quod possunt accipi proprie et improprie.	And similarly, the proposition in which the word 'ends' is used has two exponents. One exponent is an affirmative proposition about the present and the other is a negative one about the future, not just any kind but with this added 'will not be immediately after'. Just as the statement 'Socrates ceases to be white' has these exponents 'Socrates is white' and 'immediately after he will not be white'. And just as it was said about propositions in which the word 'begins' is used, which can sometimes be distinguished according to amphiboly, because they can be taken properly and improperly, so many propositions in which the word 'ends' is used can be distinguished according to amphiboly, because they can be taken properly and improperly.
Circa suppositiones terminorum in talibus propositionibus est sciendum quod subiectum talium propositionum eodem modo supponit sicut in suis praeiacentibus, sed difficultas est de suppositione praedicati.	Regarding the supposition of terms in such propositions, it should be known that the subject of such propositions supposits in the same way as its antecedents, but the difficulty is about the supposition of the predicate.
Et est dicendum quod praedicatum in tali propositione universali affirmativa supponit confuse tantum, quia non contingit descendere nec copulative nec disiunctive. Non enim sequitur 'omnis homo desinit esse albus, ergo omnis homo desinit esse hoc album, vel omnis homo desinit esse illud album'; nec per consequens contingit descendere copulative. Similiter etiam in universali negativa stat confuse et distributive, sed in propasitione non universali stat determinate.	And it must be said that the predicate in such a universal affirmative proposition supposits only confusedly, because it does not happen to descend either copulatively or disjunctively. For it does not follow that 'every man ceases to be white, therefore every man ceases to be this white, or every man ceases to be that white'; nor does it consequently happen to descend copulatively. Similarly, in a universal negative it stands confusedly and distributively, but in a non-universal proposition it stands determinately.
Verumtamen duo sunt hic scienda. Primum est quod suppositio determinata, et similiter confusa et distributiva, duplex est. Una, quando contingit descendere ad illa pro quibus terminus supponit, vel supponere potest, per pronomina demonstrativa praecise, sicut in ista 'homo currit' li homo supponit pro hoc homine et pro illo, et sic de aliis; et bene sequitur 'homo currit, igitur hoc currit', demonstrando istum hominem, 'uel illud currit', demonstrando illum hominem, et sic de aliis. Aliquando autem contingit descendere non praecise per pronomina demonstrativa sola, sed per pronomina demonstrativa sumpta simul cum illo termino communi sub quo debet esse descensus.	However, two things must be known here. The first is that determinate supposition, and similarly confused and distributive, is twofold. One, when it happens to descend to those for which a term supposits, or can supposit, precisely by means of demonstrative pronouns, as in 'a man runs' man supposits for this man and for that man, and so on; and it follows well 'a man runs, therefore this man runs', demonstrating this man, 'or that man runs', demonstrating that man, and so on. Sometimes, however, it happens to descend not precisely by means of demonstrative pronouns alone, but by means of demonstrative pronouns taken together with that common term under which the descent should be.
Primo modo non supponit praedicatum in propositione ubi ponitur 'incipit' vel 'desinit' determinate. Non enim sequitur 'Sortes incipit esse albus, igitur Sortes incipit esse hoc vel incipit esse illud', quocumque demonstrato. Nam si Sortes mutetur a nigredine in albedinem, haec est vera 'Sortes incipit esse albus', et tamen quocumque demonstrato haec est falsa 'Sortes incipit esse hoc', quia altera istarum est falsa 'Sortes est hoc' et 'Sortes non prius fuit hoc'. Secundo modo praedicatum supponit determinate, nam bene sequitur 'Sortes incipit esse albus, igitur incipit esse hoc album vel incipit esse illud album', et sic de aliis. Unde haec est vera 'Sortes incipit esse hoc album', demonstrando Sortem, quia Sortes modo est hoc album et numquam prius fuit hoc album.	In the first way it does not supposit the predicate in a proposition where 'begins' or 'ends' is placed determinately. For it does not follow that 'Socrates begins to be white, therefore Socrates begins to be this or begins to be that', no matter which way it is demonstrated. For if Socrates changes from blackness to whiteness, this is true 'Socrates begins to be white', and yet this is false no matter which way it is demonstrated, 'Socrates begins to be this', because the other of these is false 'Socrates is this' and 'Socrates was not this before'. In the second way the predicate supposits determinately, for it follows well that 'Socrates begins to be white, therefore Socrates begins to be this white or begins to be that white', and so on. Hence this is true 'Socrates begins to be this white', demonstrating Socrates, because Socrates is now this white and has never been this white before.
Nec valet 'Sortes incipit esse hoc album, igitur Sortes incipit esse hoc', demonstrando semper idem, sed est fallacia figurae dictionis, commutando 'quale quid' in 'hoc aliquid'. Nam in talibus arguendo frequenter ab aliquo termino connotativo, sive sit praedicatum totale sive sumptum cum pronomine demonstrativo, ad pronomen demonstrativum per se sumptum est fallacia figurae dictionis.	Nor is it valid to say, 'Socrates begins to be this white, therefore Socrates begins to be this', always demonstrating the same thing, but it is a fallacy of figure of speech, changing 'what kind of something' into 'this something'. For in such cases, frequently arguing from some connotative term, whether it is a total predicate or taken with a demonstrative pronoun, to a demonstrative pronoun taken by itself is a fallacy of figure of speech.
Et si dicatur quod 'hoc' et 'hoc album' -- demonstrando idem -- convertuntur, igitur ab uno ad reliquum est consequentia bona, dicendum quod ista regula 'ab uno convertibilium ad reliquum est bona consequentia' habet multas instantias, quando scilicet termini non supponunt personaliter; quandoque etiam quando additur aliquod syncategorema verbo, sicut non sequitur 'homo est per se secundo modo risibilis, igitur homo est per se secundo modo homo'. Maxime autem non valet in multis propositionibus de praeterito et de futuro, quando illa convertibilia sunt convertibilia ut nunc et non simpliciter, qualiter est de istis duobus 'hoc' et 'hoc album', nam quando 'hoc' non est album, tunc non convertuntur.	And if it is said that 'this' and 'this white' -- demonstrating the same thing -- are convertible, therefore from one to the rest there is a good consequence, it must be said that this rule 'from one of the convertibles to the rest there is a good consequence' has many instances, namely when the terms do not supposit personally; sometimes also when some syncategorematic term is added to the verb, as it does not follow that 'a man is per se able to laugh in the second mode, therefore a man is per se man in the second way'. But it is especially not valid in many propositions about the past and the future, when those convertibles are convertible for now and not simply, as is the case with these two 'this' and 'this white', for when 'this' is not white, then they are not convertible.
Secundo sciendum est quod quandoque est suppositio determinata, ita quod contingit descendere ad inferiora et e converso contingit ascendere, aliquando autem non. Unde bene sequitur 'homo currit, ergo iste homo currit vel ille homo currit', et sic de aliis; et e converso bene sequitur 'iste homo currit, ergo homo currit'. Sed non semper sic est de termino supponente determinate a parte praedicati in propositione in qua ponitur 'incipit' vel 'desinit'. Unde bene sequitur 'Sortes incipit esse hoc coloratum, igitur incipit esse albus vel niger', et sic de aliis. Sed non sequitur e converso; non enim sequitur 'Sortes incipit esse albus, igitur Sortes incipit esse coloratus', et hoc quia negativa exponens antecedentis non infert negativam exponentem consequentis; non enim sequitur 'Sortes non fuit albus, ergo Sortes non fuit coloratus'. Et est regula generalis quod quando antecedens et consequens habent exponentes, si una exponens consequentis non sequatur ad aliam exponentem antecedentis, consequentia non valet inter antecedens et consequens.	Secondly, it should be known that sometimes there is a determinate supposition, so that it is possible to descend to inferior things and conversely it is possible to ascend, but sometimes not. Hence it follows well that 'a man runs, therefore this man runs or that man runs', and so on for others; and conversely it follows well that 'that man runs, therefore this man runs'. But it is not always so with a term supposing determinately on the part of the predicate in a proposition in which 'begins' or 'ends' is placed. Hence it follows well that 'Socrates begins to be this color, therefore he begins to be white or black', and so on for others. But the converse does not follow; for it does not follow that 'Socrates begins to be white, therefore Socrates begins to be colored', and this because the negative exponent of the antecedent does not infer the negative exponent of the consequent; for it does not follow that 'Socrates was not white, therefore Socrates was not colored'. And it is a general rule that when an antecedent and consequent have exponents, if one exponent of the consequent does not follow from another exponent of the antecedent, the consequence is not valid between the antecedent and consequent.
Ex praedictis colligi potest quod ab inferiori ad superius cum hoc verbo 'incipit' vel 'desinit' non valet consequentia, sicut non sequitur 'Sortes incipit esse albus, ergo Sortes incipit esse coloratusi'. Similiter non sequitur 'Filius Dei incipit esse homo, ergo Filius Dei incipit esse aliquid'. Nec talis discursus valet 'omnis homo est aliquid; Filius Dei incipit esse homo; igitur Filius Dei incipit esse aliquid', sed est fallacia accidentis. Sicut enim semper est fallacia accidentis quando in prima figura maior est affirmativa et minor negativa, ita semper est fallacia accidentis quando in prima figura maior est affirmativa et minor habet aliquam exponentem negativam;	From the above it can be concluded that the consequence from inferior to superior with this word 'begins' or 'ends' is not valid, just as it does not follow 'Socrates begins to be white, therefore Socrates begins to be colored'. Similarly, it does not follow 'The Son of God begins to be man, therefore the Son of God begins to be something'. Nor is such a discourse valid as 'every man is something; the Son of God begins to be man; therefore the Son of God begins to be something', but it is a fallacy of accident. For just as it is always a fallacy of accident when in the first figure the major is affirmative and the minor negative, so it is always a fallacy of accident when in the first figure the major is affirmative and the minor has some negative exponent;
sicut hic 'omnis homo est animal; tantum risibile est homo; igitur tantum risibile est animal'. Sic autem est in proposito, nam ista minor 'Filius Dei incipit esse homo' habet istam negativam exponentem 'Filius Dei non fuit immediate ante homo', et ideo in tali discursu est fallacia accidentis. Similiter potest studioso patere quod ista consequentia non valet 'Filius Dei incipit esse homo, igitur aliquis homo incipit esse Filius Dei'.	as here: 'every man is an animal; only something that can laugh is man; therefore, only something that can laugh is animal'. But this is the case in the proposition, for the minor 'the Son of God begins to be man' has the negative exponent 'the Son of God was not immediately before man', and therefore in such a discourse there is a fallacy of accident. Similarly, it may be clear to the student that the consequence 'the Son of God begins to be man, therefore some man begins to be the Son of God' is not valid.
Verumtamen sciendum est quod quandoque Sancti talem propositionem concedunt, non accipiendo eam proprie et de virtute sermonis, sed secundum verum intellectum quem ipsi habebant.	However, it should be known that sometimes the Saints grant such a proposition, not taking it literally and by the power of speech, but according to the true understanding that they themselves had.
Verumtamen advertendum est quod quandocumque aliqua inferiora incompossibilia non possunt verificari successive de aliqua cum verificatione superioris de eodem, semper arguendo a tali inferiori ad tale superius est consequentia bona. Sicut bene sequitur 'Sortes incipit esse homo, igitur incipit esse animal' et hoc quia impossibile est quod aliquid, dum est animal, sit primo homo et postea animal, et postea non sit homo, vel e converso. Similiter, secundum mentem Aristotelis, bene sequitur 'Sortes incipit esse rationalis, igitur Sortes incipit esse sensibilis'. Eodem modo bene sequitur 'asinus incipit esse homo, igitur incipit esse animal' et tamen non sequitur 'asinus incipit esse niger, igitur incipit esse coloratus'.	However, it should be noted that whenever some inferior incompatibles cannot be verified successively about something with the verification of a superior one about the same, always arguing from such an inferior one to such a superior one is a good consequence. Just as it follows well: 'Socrates begins to be a man, therefore he begins to be an animal' and this because it is impossible for something, while it is an animal, to be first a man and then an animal, and then not a man, or vice versa. Similarly, according to Aristotle's mind, it follows well: 'Socrates begins to be rational, therefore Socrates begins to be sensible'. In the same way it follows well 'A donkey begins to be a man, therefore he begins to be an animal' and yet it does not follow 'A donkey begins to be black, therefore he begins to be colored'.