Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book II/Chapter 4

Latin	English
[CAP. 4. DE PROPOSITIONIBUS UNIVERSALIBUS]	[Chapter 4. On universal propositions]
Tertio dicendum est de propositionibus universalibus.	Third, we should speak of universal propositions.
Et est primo sciendum quod propositiones universales sunt in multiplici differentia secundum diversitatem signorum universalium. Ponitur autem multiplex distinctio signorum universalium. Dicitur enim quod aliqua sunt distributiva indifferenter pro substantia et accidente sicut 'omnis', 'quilibet', 'unusquisque', 'nullus', 'uterque', 'neuter', et sic de aliis. Alia sunt distributiva tantum pro accidentibus, sicut 'qualelibet, 'quotiescumque', et si forte sint alia talia.	It should first be known that there are several types of universal propositions, according to the diversity of universal signs. Now some suppose there is a multiple distinction of universal signs. For it is said that some are distributive indifferently for substance and accident, e.g. 'every', 'any', 'each one', 'no', 'both', 'neither', and so on. Others are distributive only for accidents, e.g. 'any kind of', 'however often' - and perhaps there are other such.
Sed ista distinctio potest intelligi bene et male. Si enim intelligatur quod 'qualelibet' sit simpliciter distributivum pro accidentibus, sicut 'omnis' vel aliquid tale pro substantia et accidente, falsum est, sicut patebit. Si autem intelligatur quod sit aliquo modo distributivum, scilicet sub disiunctione inter species vel copulative, vel aliquo tali modo, concedi potest.	But this distinction can be understood either well or badly. For if it is understood that 'any kind of' is simply distributive for accidents in the same way that 'every' or some such sign is distributive for substance and accident, this is false, as will become clear. But if it is thought that it is distributive in a certain way, namely, disjunctively among species or copulatively, or in some such way, it can be conceded.
Alia ponitur divisio signorum universalium quod quaedam sunt distributiva pro partibus subiectivis et quaedam pro partibus integralibus.	Another supposed division of universal signs is that some are distributive for subjective parts and some for integral parts.
Prima sunt sicut 'omnis', 'nullus', 'uterque', 'neuter', et sic de aliis.	The first are those such as 'every', 'no', 'both', 'neither', and so on. The second type are those like 'whole'. But how this distinction ought to be understood will be said in what follows.
Secunda sunt sicut 'totus'. Sed qualiter hoc debeat intelligi, dicetur in sequentibus. Alia ponitur divisio signorum universalium, quod quaedam possunt distribuere pro quocumque, sicut 'omnis', 'nullus' et huiusmodi, quaedam pro duobus tantum, sicut 'uterque' et 'neuter'.	Another supposed division of universal signs is that some can distribute for any number of things, e.g. 'every', 'no', and others of this type, and some can distribute for two things only, e.g. 'both' and 'neither'.
Primo igitur dicendum est de illis quae distribuunt indifferenter pro substantia et accidente et pro partibus subiectivis et pro quocumque, cuiusmodi sunt talia 'omnis', 'nullus', 'quilibet', 'quidlibet', 'unusquisque' et huiusmodi, et de propositionibus universalibus in quibus talia signa ponuntur.	We should first speak of those signs which distribute indifferently for substance and accident and for subjective parts and for any thing whatsoever, of which sort are such as 'every', 'no', 'anyone', 'anything', 'each one', and so on, and we should discuss the universal propositions in which such signs occur.
Et est primo sciendum quod nullum signum per se significat aliquid nec imponitur ad significandum aliquid determinate, sed sic instituitur ut faciat illud cui additur stare pro omnibus suis significatis et non pro aliquibus tantum, et ideo dicitur 'syncategorema'. Et sic de multis aliis, et universaliter de omnibus quae per se sumpta non possunt esse extrema alicuius propositionis; et hoc si sumantur significative, sicut dictum est prius.	And you should first know that no such sign signifies anything per se or is imposed to signify anything determinately, but rather, it is imposed in order to make the term to 'which it is added stand for all its significates and not for some only, and therefore it is called a syncategorematic term. And so for many other terms and, generally, for all terms which, when taken per se, cannot be extremes of any proposition - if they are understood significatively, as was said before.
Secundo sciendum quod hoc signum 'omnis' differt ab istis signis 'quilibet', 'unusquisque', quia hoc signum 'omnis' non potest addi nisi termino consimilis casus, ita quod terminus cui additur et signum sint consimilis casus, sicut bene dicitur 'omnis homo est animal', 'Sortes videt omnem hominem', 'asinus est omnis hominis'. Sed ista signa 'unusquisque', 'quilibet' possunt addi termino consimilis casus et dissimilis, scilicet genitivo pluralis numeri, sicut bene dicitur 'quilibet homo currit' et bene dicitur 'quilibet et unusquisque istorum currit' et 'quilibet hominum est animal'; non sic autem bene dicitur 'omnis istorum currit'.	Second, you should know that the sign 'every' differs from the signs 'any' and 'each', since the sign 'every' can only be added to a term with a similar case, so that the term to which it is added and the sign are in the similar case. For example, these are well formed: 'every man is an animal', 'Socrates sees every man', 'a donkey belongs to every man'. But the signs 'each' and 'any' can be added to a term of a similar and dissimilar case, namely, to a genitive of plural number. For example, 'Each man is running' is well formed, and 'any and each of them is running' is well formed, and 'any of the men is an animal'. However, 'Every of those is running' is not well formed.
Et si quaeratur quae est causa istius diversitatis, dicendum quod istius, sicut multarum aliarum tam in grammatica quam in logica, non est alia causa nisi voluntas institutentium et sic utentium.	And if anyone seeks the cause for this diversity, it should be said of this case, as in many others in grammar as well as logic, there is no cause other than the wish of those who instituted the terms and those who use them<ref>See book III (where?)</ref>.
Tertio ponendae sunt aliquae regulae communes istis signis 'omnis', 'quilibet', 'unusquisque' et si qua sint similia. Et sunt communes multis propositionibus aequivalentibus propositionibus hypotheticis, sicut sunt istae 'omnis homo est animal', 'omne album currit' et huiusmodi, et etiam aliis non aequivalentibus talibus hypotheticis, cuiusmodi sunt tales 'omnis Deus est', 'omnis angelus est' et huiusmodi.	Third, we should give certain rules which are common to the signs 'every', 'any', 'each', et si qua sint similia. And these rules are also common to many propositions that are equivalent to hypothetical propositions, e.g. 'every man is an animal', 'every white thing is running', and so on, and also to others that are not equivalent to such hypotheticals, such as 'every God exists', 'every angel exists', and so on.
Est igitur primo sciendum quod ad veritatem talis propositionis universalis non requiritur quod subiectum et praedicatum sint idem realiter, sed requiritur quod praedicatum supponat pro omnibus illis pro quibus supponit subiectum, ita quod de illis verificetur. Et si ita sit, nisi aliqua causa specialis impediat, propositio universalis est vera. Et hoc est quod communiter dicitur quod ad veritatem talis propositionis universalis sufficit quod quaelibet singularis sit vera.	It should first be known that for the truth of such a universal proposition it is not required that the subject and predicate be the same thing in reality, but rather, it is required that the predicate supposit for all those things the subject supposits for, so that it is verified of them. And if this is so, then universal proposition is true - unless some specific reason prevents it. And what is commonly said is that for the truth of such a universal proposition it is sufficient that each of its singulars be true.
Ex hoc patet falsitas quorundam quae ponuntur a quibusdam. Unum est quod hoc signum 'omnis' exigit tria appellata. Nam ponatur quod unus solus angelus intelligat et nullus homo, tunc haec est vera 'omne intelligens creatum est angelus', et tamen non sunt tria de quibus verificatur hoc nomen 'intelligens creatum' Quod autem ista sit vera, probo: quia quaelibet singularis est vera. Similiter, praedicatum vere supponit pro quolibet pro quo supponit subiectum et verificatur de quocumque de quo verificatur subiectum, igitur est simpliciter vera.	From this, the falsity of certain claims made by certain persons is clear. One is that the sign 'every' requires three appellata. For suppose that only one angel understands and that no man understands. Then 'every creature which understands is an angel' is true, and yet there are not three things of which the name 'creature which understands' is verified. And that this is true, I prove, for each of its singulars is true. Similarly, the predicate truly supposits for each thing that the subject supposits for and it is verified of each thing that the subject is verified. Therefore, the proposition is absolutely true.
Similiter, si sint tantum duo homines et illi sint albi, haec est vera 'omnis homo est albus', quia nullam habet singularem falsam, et tamen non habet tria appellata. Ex isto patet quod male solvunt aliqui hoc sophisma 'omnis phoenix est', dicentes istam propositionem esse falsam eo quod 'omnis' exigit tria appellata, et quod haec est vera 'aliqua phoenix non est' eo quod 'phoenix' aequaliter supponit pro ente et pro non-ente. Quia quaero: qualiter 'omnis' exigit tria appellata ? Aut in rerum natura, et tunc esset haec falsa 'omne coloratum est' si esset unum tantum coloratum. Quod non potest concedi, nam eius contradictoria est falsa 'aliquod coloratum non est', quia nullam singularem habet veram.	Similarly, if there are only two men and they are white, 'every man is white' is true, for it has no false singular - and yet it does not have three appellata. From this it is clear that some thinkers badly solve the sophism 'every phoenix exists' saying that that proposition is false in that 'every' requires three appellata, and that 'Some phoenix does not exist' is true in that 'phoenix' supposits equally for a being and a non-being. For I ask, in what way does 'every' require three appellata? Either in rerum natura, and then 'every coloured thing exists' would be false if only one thing were coloured. But this cannot be conceded, for its contradictory, 'Some thing is not coloured', is false - for it has no true singular.
Nec potest dici quod 'coloratum' aequaliter supponit pro ente et pro non-ente, quia manifestum est quod non supponit pro non-ente, sicut nec praedicatur de non-ente. Unde sicut haec est falsa 'non-ens est coloratum', ita haec est falsa 'coloratum supponit pro non-ente', quia dictum est prius quod numquam terminus supponit pro aliquo nisi de quo verificatur.	Nor can it be said that 'coloured thing' supposits equally for a being and a non-being, forit is manifest that it does not supposit for a non-being - just as it is not predicated of a non-being. Hence, just as 'a non-being is coloured' is false, so is "'a coloured thing" supposits for a non-being", for it was said before that a term never supposits for anything except for what it is verified of.
Si autem 'omnis' exigit tria appellata ita quod terminus cui additur supponat pro tribus, sic non est haec falsa 'omnis phoenix est' propter hoc quod tantum una phoenix est, quia per istum 'phoenix' aequaliter supponit pro ente et pro non-ente; et non magis pro uno non-ente quam pro duobus,igitur pro tribus supponit ad minus, et ita Praeterea, si 'phoenix' supponeret aequaliter pro ente et pro non-ente, eadem ratione 'animal', et per consequens haec esset falsa 'omne animal est', quod iste alibi negat.	Moreover, if 'every' requires three appellata so that the term to which it is added supposits for three things, then 'every phoenix exists' is not false because of the fact that only one phoenix exists, for according to that person 'phoenix' supposits equally for a being and a non-being - and no more for one non-being than for two. Therefore, it supposits for at least three things, and so 'every' has three appellata in this case. And so, furthermore, if 'phoenix' supposited equally for a being and a non-being, by the same reasoning 'animal', and as a consequence, 'every animal exists' would be false - which that person denies elsewhere.
Et ideo dicendum est quod nec ista propositio 'omnis phoenix est' nec aliqua alia est falsa propter praedictam causam, sicut nec sua contradictoria propter praedictam causam est vera. Unde si nullus homo rideat nisi Sortes, haec non est vera 'aliquod ridens non est homo', immo erit falsa, et per consequens sua contradictoria erit vera 'omne ridens est homo'. Similiter, si nullus homo sit albus nisi Sortes, haec erit falsa 'aliquis homo albus non est homo', et per consequens haec erit vera 'omnis homo albus est homo', et tamen non sunt tres homines albi.	Therefore, it should be said that neither the proposition 'every phoenix exists' nor any other is false for the reason above, just as it is not the case that their contradictories are true for the reason above. Hence, if no man is laughing except Socrates, 'something laughing is not a man' is not true - indeed it will be false, and as a consequence, its contradictory, 'every laughing thing is a man', will be true. Likewise, if no man is white except Socrates, then 'some white man is not a man' will be false and, as a consequence, 'every white man is a man' will be true, and still though there are not three white men.
Nec valet protervire, quod isto posito ista non contradicunt 'omnis homo albus est homo', 'aliquis homo albus non est homo', quia mutatio rei non variat formam propositionum, nec per consequens facit quod propositiones aliquae contradicant uno tempore et non alio.	Nor is it valid to object that, in that case, 'every white man is a man' and 'some white man is not a man' are not contradictories, for a change in reality does not alter the form of propositions or, as a consequence, does it bring it about that some propositions are contradictories at one time and not at another.
Ex istis etiam sequitur quod falsum est quod isti dicunt, quod si sit tantum unum album et tantum unum nigrum et tantum unum medium quod quaelibet istarum est falsa 'omne album est', 'omne nigrum est', 'omne medium est'; et negant istum syllogismum 'omne coloratum est; omne album est coloratum; igitur omne album est'.	From these cases it also follows that it is false what these persons say, that if there is only one white thing and only one black thing and only one gray thing, then each of these is false: "every white thing exists", "every black thing exists", "every gray thing exists". And they deny the syllogism: "every coloured thing exists; every white thing is coloured; therefore every white thing exists".
Similiter, posito quod nullus asinus sit, negant istum syllogismum 'omne animal est homo; omnis asinus est animal; igitur omnis asinus est homo', dicentes quod 'esse' aequivocatur, quia in primis maioribus accipitur 'esse' quod est operatio entis, et hoc est 'esse' eius quod est, in minoribus autem accipitur 'esse' habitudinis sive consequentiae, cuiusmodi 'esse' est cum dicitur 'si est album, est coloratum'.	Similarly, given that there are no donkeys, they deny the syllogism "Every animal is a man; every donkey is an animal; therefore every donkey is a man", saying that the verb 'to be' is equivocal, since in the major premises it is taken for an operation of a being, and this is the 'to be' of what exists, but in the minor premises it is taken for the 'to be' of disposition or consequence. The verb 'to be' in this sense occurs when one says: 'If it is white, then it is coloured'.
Istud est omnino irrationabiliter dictum, nam hoc est destruere omnem formam syllogisticam. Dicam enim quandocumque placet mihi quod 'esse' in propositionibus aequivocatur, et ad placitum assignabo fallaciam aequivocationis in quocumque syllogismo.	This claim is entirely irrational, for this is to destroy every syllogistic form. For I will say, whenever I like, that 'to be' is equivocal in the propositions, and I will ascribe, as I like, the fallacy of equivocation to every syllogism.
Similiter, sicut syllogismus tenet in omnibus terminis, ita tenet quantumcumque res varietur. Sed secundum Aristotelem nunc est bonus syllogismus 'omne coloratum est; omne album est coloratum; igitur omne album est', similiter iste syllogismus est bonus nunc de facto 'omne animal est homo; omnis asinus est animal; igitur omnis asinus est homo', quia quilibet istorum regulatur per dici de omni.	Similarly, just as a syllogism holds for all terms, so it holds no matter how things change. But according to Aristotle this is now a good syllogism: 'every coloured thing exists, every white thing is coloured, therefore every white thing exists'. Similarly, this syllogism is now in fact good: 'every animal is a man, every donkey is an animal, therefore every donkey is a man'. For each of these is governed by dici de omni.
Et certe, qui negat tales syllogismos, ipse est inhabilis ad percipiendum quamcumque veritatem. Ergo quantumcumque omnia alba corrumperentur et omnes asini, adhuc essent boni syllogismi et regularentur per dici de omni ita tunc sicut nunc.	And certainly, one who denies such syllogisms is incapable of perceiving any truth whatever. Therefore, even if every white thing were destroyed, and all donkeys, these would still be good syllogisms, and they would be governed by dici de omni then, just as now.
Et ideo distinctiones tales, quod 'esse' vel est operatio entis vel esse habitudinis, et consimiles, frivolae sunt, et ponuntur ab illis qui nesciunt distinguere inter propositionem categoricam et condicionalem. Unde istae propositiones distinguuntur 'asinus est animal' et 'si asinus est, animal est', quia una est categorica et alia condicionalis et hypothetica, nec convertuntur; sed una potest esse vera, alia exsistente falsa. Sicut haec est modo falsa 'Deus non-creans est Deus', et tamen ista condicionalis est vera 'si Deus non-creans est, Deus est' et 'si hoc est Deus non-creans, est Deus'.	And therefore distinctions such as between the being which is an operation of a being and the being of disposition are frivolous, and they are given by those who do not know how to distinguish between a categorical proposition and a conditional. Hence, these propositions are distinguished: "a donkey is an animal" and "if a donkey exists, an animal exists", for one is categorical and the other conditional and hypothetical, nor are the convertible, but one can be true while the other is false. For example, "a non-creating God is God" is now false, and yet the conditionals "if a non-creating God exists, then God exists" and "if this is a non-creating God, then it is God" are true.
Similiter, nulla potest inveniri ratio quare 'esse' dicat habitudinem vel consequentiam in una propositione categorica magis quam in alia, et ita vel semper vel numquam in consimili propositione dicet habitudinem vel consequentiam. Et ita vel quaelibet erit convertibilis cum condicionali vel nulla; sed non nulla, per istum, igitur quaelibet. Et per consequens, illo casu posito, haec est falsa 'omne animal est homo', quia ista condicionalis est falsa 'si animal est, homo est', per eum. Et ita in eodem passu manifeste dixit contradictoria et videbatur propriam vocem ignorare.	Similarly, no reason can be found why 'to be' means disposition or consequence in one categorical proposition more than in another. And so in an equiform proposition it will either always or never mean disposition or consequence. And so either every such proposition will be convertible with a conditional, or none. But not none, according to that person; therefore, every. And, as a consequence, in the case given above 'every animal is a man' is false, since the conditional 'if an animal exists, a man exists' is false, according to him. And so in the same place he said manifestly contradictory things and seemed to be ignorant of proper speech.
Ex praedictis etiam patet quod omnes tales de virtute sermonis sunt falsae 'omne animal est sanum', posito quod unus leo sit sanus et unus bos et unus homo, et sic de aliis, 'omne animal fuit in arca Noe', et sic de multis aliis, quia habent multas singulares falsas, nec praedicatum competit omnibus illis pro quibus supponit subiectum. Tamen quando ponuntur ab auctoribus vel tales vel consimiles, debent glossari, quamvis de virtute sermonis sint falsae, sicut frequenter sermones authentici falsi sunt in sensu quem faciunt, hoc est de virtute sermonis et proprie loquendo, et tamen veri sunt in sensu in quo fiunt.	From what has been said it is also clear that all propositions like the following are, properly speaking, false: 'every animal is healthy', given that one lion is healthy and one ox and one man, and so on, 'every animal was in Noah's ark'; and so on for many others. For they have many false singulars, nor does the predicate belong to all the things for which the subject supposits. Nevertheless, when such propositions or similar ones are given by authors, they ought to be glossed even though they are, properly speaking, false, just as authentic words are often false in the sense which they produce, i.e. in their literal sense and properly speaking, and yet they are true in the sense in which they are produced.
Et hoc quia auctores frequenter aequivoce et improprie et metaphorice loquuntur. Et ideo in expositione auctoritatum philosophorum principaliter est innitendum rationi et processui eorum et intentioni, et non verbis sicut sonant ad litteram.	And this is because authors frequently speak equivocally and improperly and metaphorically. And therefore in the exposition of philosophical authorities one ought principally to get to their nature [ratio] and process and intention rather than to the words as they sound, literally.
Et pro talibus auctoritatibus valet ista distinctio quae ponitur ab aIiquibus, quod quando hoc signum 'omnis' adiungitur termino communi continenti sub se multas species, quod potest fieri distributio pro singulis generum vel pro generibus singulorum, sive pro partibus propinquis sive pro partibus remotis, sive pro partibus secundum speciem sive secundum numerum, sive pro speciebus sive pro individuis. Quae non debet intelligi de virtute sermonis, quia signum numquam distribuit terminum nisi pro iIlis pro quibus terminus supponit.	And for such authorities the following distinction, which is given by some, is valid, that when the sign 'every' is adjoined to a common term containing many species under it, the distribution can be made for the singulars of the genus or for the genera of the singulars, whether for immediate or remote parts, or for parts according to species or according to number, or for species or individuals. (This ought not be understood literally, for a sign never distributes a term except for those things for which the term supposits).
Nunc autem dictum est quod terminus talis non supponit nisi pro individuis et non pro speciebus, ideo non distribuitur nisi pro individuis et non pro speciebus. Et ideo iIla distinctio debet sic intelligi quod per talem propositionem denotatur praedicatum competere omnibus individuis, et hoc est de virtute sermonis; vel denotatur competere speciebus sumptis particulariter, hoc est denotatur praedicatum praedicari de qualibet specie particulariter sumpta et non de qualibet specie universaliter sumpta, et per consequens non denotatur competere omnibus individuis. Sed hoc non est de virtute sermonis sed secundum intellectum auctoris. Sicut per istam 'omne animal est sanum' de virtute sermonis denotatur quod omnis homo sit sanus et quod omnis bos sit sanus, et sic de aliis, quia aliter iste syllogismus in primo primae [figurae] regulatus per dici de omni, non valeret 'omne animal est sanum; omnis homo est animal; ergo omnis homo est sanus', qui tamen est optimus.	But now it was said that such a term supposits only for individuals and not for species, therefore, it is only distributed for individuals and not for species. And therefore that distinction ought to be understood as follows. By such a proposition it is denoted that the predicate belongs to all the individuals - and this properly speaking - or it is denoted that the predicate belongs to the species taken particularly, that is, it is denoted that the predicate is predicated of each species taken particularly and not of each species taken universally, and as a consequence it is not denoted that the predicate belongs to all the individuals. But this is not properly speaking, rather, but according to the understanding of the author. Thus, properly speaking, by the proposition 'Every animal is healthy' it is denoted that every man is healthy and that every ox is healthy, and so on, for otherwise the syllogism "Every animal is healthy; every man is an animal; therefore every man is healthy", which is in the first mode of the first [figure] and which is governed by dici de omni would not be valid. But it is an optimal syllogism.
Sed tamen secundum intellectum alicuius potest denotari quod valeat istas 'homo est sanus', 'leo est sanus', 'bos est sanus', ita quod 'sanum praedicetur de qualibet specie, non tamen pro se sed pro individuo, quia nulla species est sana, sed tantum individuum est sanum. Sed iste sensus non habetur de virtute sermonis. Et ideo in eodem sensu iste discursus non valet 'omne animal est sanum; omnis homo est animal; ergo omnis homo est sanus'. Nec est inconveniens quod syllogismus qui de virtute sermonis est perfectus, secundum intellectum alicuius non sit bonus, sicut est de veritate propositionis, et est iam dictum.	Nevertheless, according to someone's intention it can be denoted that the following are true: "a man is healthy", "a lion is healthy", "an ox is healthy", so that 'healthy' is predicated of each species, yet not per se but for an individual, since no species is healthy - but only an individual is healthy. But this sense does not hold, properly speaking. And therefore, in this sense, this discourse is not valid: "Every animal is healthy; every man is an animal; therefore every man is healthy". Nor is it inappropriate that a syllogism, which, properly speaking, is perfect, is not good when taken according to the intention of someone - just as this is not inappropriate with respect to the truth of a proposition, as was said earlier.
Secundo sciendum est quod omnis propositio universalis, in qua praedicatum sumitur universaliter, est falsa si praedicatum vel subiectum praedicetur de pluribus contentis. Si autem praedicatum praedicetur praecise de uno contento et similiter subiectum, posset esse propositio vera. Unde si non esset nisi tantum unum animal, puta unus homo, haec esset vera 'omnis homo est omne animal' et similiter ista 'omne animal est omnis homo', sed si essent plures homines vel si essent quaecumque plura animalia haec esset falsa. Et ideo haec est falsa 'omnis phoenix est omne animal', haec tamen est vera 'omnis phoenix est omnis phoenix'. Quandoque tamen potest indefinita vel particularis esse vera in qua praedicatur praedicatum universaliter sumptum, quamvis subiectum habeat multa contenta; sicut si non esset nisi unus homo, quamvis essent plura animalia, haec esset vera 'aliquod animal est omnis homo'.	Second, it should be noted that every universal proposition in which the predicate is taken universally is false if the subject or predicate is predicated of more than one contained under it. But if the predicate were predicated of precisely one thing contained under it and similarly for the subject, then the proposition could be true. Hence, if there were only one animal, e.g. one man, then "every man is every animal" would be true and similarly "every animal is every man", but if there were more than one man or if there were any more animals, these would be false. And therefore, "every phoenix is every animal" is false, yet "every phoenix is every phoenix" is true. Yet sometimes an indefinite or particular proposition, in which a predicate, universally taken, is predicated, can be true, even though the subject has many things contained under it. For example, if there were only one man, "some animal is every man" would be true, although there were several animals.
Tertio sciendum est quod hoc signum 'omnis' quando accipitur in plurali numero potest teneri collective et divisive. Si teneatur divisive, tunc denotatur quod praedicatum vere competit omnibus illis de quibus vere praedicatur subiectum, sicut per istam 'omnes apostoli Dei sunt duodecim denotatur quod hoc praedicatum 'duodecim' vere dicatur de quocumque de quo vere praedicatur hoc subiectum 'apostoli', et ita cum Petrus et Paulus sint apostoli, sequitur quod Petrus et Paulus sunt duodecim. Sed si teneatur collective, tunc non denotatur quod praedicatum conveniat quibuscumque de quibus verificatur subiectum, sed quod competat omnibus simul sumptis de quibus verificatur subiectum; unde denotatur quod isti apostoli, demonstratis omnibus apostolis, sunt duodecim.	Third, it should be known that when the sign 'every' is taken in the plural [i.e. 'all'], it can be held collectively or distributively. If it is held distributively, then it is denoted that the predicate truly belongs to all those of which the subject is truly predicated. For example, by the proposition "all the apostles of God are twelve" it is denoted that the predicate 'twelve' is truly said of each thing of which the subject 'apostles' is truly predicated. And so, since Peter and Paul are apostles, it follows that Peter and Paul are twelve. But if 'all' is understood collectively, then it is not denoted that the predicate agrees with each thing of which the subject is verified, but that the predicate belongs to all the things—taken at together—of which the subject is verified. Hence, it is asserted that these apostles, referring to all the apostles, are twelve.