Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book II/Chapter 3

 

Latin	English
[CAP. 3. QUID REQUIRITUR AD VERITATEM PROPOSITIONIS INDEFINITAE ET PARTICULARIS]	[Chapter 3.  What is required for the truth of an indefinite proposition and of a particular proposition]
Viso quid sufficit ad veritatem propositionis singularis, videndum est quid requiritur ad veritatem propositionis indefinitae et particularis.	Having seen what is sufficient for the truth of a singular proposition, it must be seen what is required for the truth of an indefinite proposition and of a particular proposition.
Et est primo sciendum quod si non vocetur propositio indefinita nec particularis nisi quando terminus subiectus supponit personaliter, tunc semper indefinita et particularis convertuntur, sicut istae convertuntur 'homo currit', 'aliquis homo currit'; 'animal est homo', 'aliquod animal est homo'; 'animal non est homo', 'aliquod animal non est homo'. Et ad veritatem talium sufficit quod subiectum et praedicatum supponant pro aliquo eodem, si sit propositio affirmativa et non addatur signum universale a parte praedicati; quod dico propter tales 'aliquod animal est omnis homo', 'aliquis angelus est omnis angelus'.	And it should first be known that if a proposition is not called indefinite or particular except when its subject term supposits personally, then an indefinite and a particular are always convertible. For example, 'A man is running' and 'Some man is running', 'An animal is a man' and 'Some animal is a man', 'An animal is not a man' and 'Some animal is not a man' are convertible. And it is sufficient for the truth of such propositions that the subject and predicate supposit for something that is the same, if the proposition is affirmative and a universal sign is not added on the side of the predicate (which I say because of propositions like 'Some animal is every man' and 'Some angel is every angel').
Sed si talis sit negativa, requiritur quod subiectum et praedicatum non supponant pro omni eodem, immo requiritur quod subiectum pro nullo supponat, vel quod supponat pro aliquo pro quo praedicatum non supponit. Et hoc quia ad veritatem talium sufficit veritas cuiuscumque singularis. Sicut ad veritatem istius 'aliquod animal est homo' sufficit veritas istius 'hoc animal est homo' vel 'illud animal est homo'; similiter ad veritatem istius 'animal non est homo' sufficit veritas istius 'hoc animal non est homo', quocumque demonstrato, et hoc quia semper ab inferiori ad superius est bona consequentia sine distributione. Et hoc debet intelligi quando superius praedicatur de inferiori, quia aliter de virtute sermonis non arguitur ab inferiori ad superius.	But if such a proposition is negative, then it is required that the subject and predicate do not supposit for all the same things. Rather, it is required either that the subject supposit for nothing or that it supposits for something for which the predicate does not supposit. And this is because the truth of any singular is sufficient for the truth of such propositions. For example, for the truth of 'Some animal is a man', the truth of 'This animal is a man' or 'That animal is a man' is sufficient. Similarly, for the truth of 'An animal is not a man', the truth of 'This animal is not a man' - pointing to any animal - is sufficient. And this is because it is always a good consequence - without distribution - from an inferior to a superior. And this ought to be understood when the superior is predicated of the inferior - for otherwise one cannot, properly speaking, argue from an inferior to a superior.
Et ideo si nullus homo nec aliquod animal sit nisi asinus, haec consequentia non valet 'homo non est asinus, igitur aliquod animal non est asinus'. Similiter non sequitur 'homo albus non est animal, igitur homo non est animal' nisi ista propositio sit vera 'homo albus est homo'. Tamen affirmative bene sequitur, sive superius praedicetur de inferiori sive non, quia semper, sive homo sit animal sive non, bene sequitur 'homo currit, igitur animal currit', similiter bene sequitur 'homo albus est animal, igitur homo est animal', sive homo sit albus sive non.	And therefore, if there is no man, and no animal except for a donkey, then the consequence 'A man is not a donkey; therefore some animal is not a donkey' is not valid. Similarly, 'A white man is not an animal; therefore a man is not an animal' does not follow, unless the proposition 'A white man is a man' is true. Yet the affirmative follows well, whether the superior is predicated of the inferior or not. For whether a man is an animal or not, 'A man is running; therefore an animal is running' always follows. Similarly, 'A white man is an animal; therefore a man is an animal' is valid, whether a man is white or not.
Sic igitur patet quomodo indefinita vel particularis est vera si subiectum supponat pro aliquo pro quo non supponit praedicatum. Hoc tamen non semper requiritur, sed quandoque sufficit quod subiectum indefinitae vel particularis negativae pro nullo supponat. Sicut si nullus homo sit albus, haec est vera 'homo albus non est homo', et tamen subiectum pro nullo supponit, quia nec pro substantia nec pro accidente.	And so it is clear how an indefinite or particular proposition is true if the subject supposits for something for which the predicate does not supposit. Yet this is not always required, but rather, it is sometimes sufficient that the subject of an indefinite or particular negative supposits for nothing. For example, if no man is white, then 'A white man is not a man' is true, and yet the subject supposits for nothing, for it supposits for neither a substance nor an accident.
Ex istis patet quod si ista propositio 'Deus generat Deum' sit indefinita, secundum unam opinionem superius dictam , debet simpliciter concedi quod Pater, qui est Deus, generat Deum. Et eodem modo de virtute sermonis posset ista concedi 'Deus non generat Deum', quia haberet unam singularem veram, scilicet 'Filius non generat Deum', similiter Spiritus Sanctus non generat Deum' - Unde hic arguitur ab inferiori ad superius ‚ 'Filius non generat Deum, igitur Deus non generat Deum' sicut hic 'iste angelus non intelligit, igitur angelus non intelligit'.	From these considerations it is clear that if the proposition "God generates God" is indefinite, then according to the view mentioned above it should be conceded absolutely that the Father, who is God, generates God. And in the same way one can concede "God does not generate God", properly speaking, for it has the true singular 'The Son does not generate God' and similarly "The Holy Spirit does not generate God". Hence, there is an argument from an inferior to a superior here in "The Son does not generate God; therefore God does not generate God", just as here in 'This angel does not understand; therefore an angel does not understand'.
Non tamen est intelligendum quod aliquid sit superius in Deo et aliquid inferius, quia ista superioritas et inferioritas non est nisi inter terminos, sive termini sint voces sive conceptus sive intentiones animae.	Yet it should not be understood that something is superior in God and something is inferior, for the this 'superiority' and 'inferiority' only exists among terms, whether the terms are utterances or concepts or intentions of the soul.
Tamen forte aliqui Sancti aliquando negant tales 'Deus non generat', 'Deus non spirat' propter aliquos haereticos, ne scilicet videantur negare istam 'Deus generat Deum'. Tamen de virtute sermonis non oportet secundum istam opinionem; secundum autem aliam opinionem aliter debet dici.	Yet perhaps certain saints sometimes deny such propositions as 'God does not generate' and 'God does not proceed' because of certain heretics, i.e. lest they appear to be denying 'God generates God'. Still, according to the view in question it is not necessary, properly speaking, to agree with this proposition. However, according to the other view something else ought to be said.
Secundo sciendum quod qui ponit quod omnis propositio est indefinita in qua subicitur terminus communis sine signo, sive supponat personaliter sive simpliciter sive materialiter, consequenter debet dicere quod non semper particularis et indefinita convertuntur. Et hoc quando subiectum indefinitae supponit simpliciter et subiectum particularis supponit personaliter; sicut istae duae non convertuntur 'homo est species' et 'aliquis homo est species', quia in ista 'homo est species' potest 'homo' supponere simpliciter, sed in ista 'aliquis homo est species' li homo propter hoc quod sibi additur signum particulare et non comparatur ad aliquid pertinens ad signum, non potest supponere nisi personaliter.	Second, it should be known that if anyone supposes that every proposition is indefinite in which a common term is a subject without a sign, whether it supposits personally or simply or materially, then it follows that he should say that a particular and an indefinite are not always convertible. And this is when the subject of the indefinite supposits simply and the subject of the particular supposits personally. For example, these two propositions are not convertible: 'Man is a species' and 'Some man is a species'. For in 'Man is a species', 'man' can supposit simply, but in 'Some man is a species', the term 'man' – because the particular sign is added to it and it is not compared with something which pertains to a particular sign, can supposit only personally.
Et ideo ista 'homo est species' est distinguenda, eo quod 'homo' potest supponere simpliciter vel personaliter; sed ista 'aliquis homo est species' non est distinguenda, quia li homo, propter hoc quod additur sibi signum particulare, non potest supponere in ista nisi tantum personaliter. Tamen in ista 'aliquis homo: componitur ex termino communi et signo particulari' potest supponere personaliter vel materialiter, et ideo ista et consimiles sunt distinguendae sed aliae non.	And therefore 'Man is a species' should be distinguished, since 'man' can suppositsimply or personally. But 'Some man is a species' should not be distinguished, for the term 'man' can supposit only personally, because the particular sign ['some'] is added to it. However, in 'Some man: is composed of a common term and a particular sign', the term 'man' can supposit either personally or materially. Thus, this proposition and ones just like it should be distinguished, but not the others.
Sed quid sufficit ad veritatem talis indefinitae si sit indefinita? Dicendum quod ad veritatem talis sufficit quod pro eodem supponant subiectum et praedicatum si sit affirmativa, vel quod non supponant pro eodem si sit negativa; sicut hoc sufficit ad veritatem propositionis singularis, quia idem est iudicium de tali propositione et de propositione singulari. Et ideo communiter ponitur quod talis propositio est singularis, et potest poni satis rationabiliter.	But what is sufficient for the truth of such an indefinite proposition—if, indeed, it is indefinite? It should be said that for the truth of such a proposition it is sufficient that the subject and predicate supposit for the same thing if the proposition is affirmative, or that they do not supposit for the same thing if the proposition is negative, in the same way that it is sufficient for the truth of a singular proposition for our judgment about such a proposition and a singular proposition is the same. And therefore it is commonly said that such a proposition is singular—and this can be supposed reasonably enough.
Et si dicatur quod si in tali propositione subiectum et praedicatum supponerent pro eodem, tunc idem praedicaretur de se, dicendum quod non sequitur :quia quamvis idem sit pro quo supponit tam subiectum quam praedicatum, tamen illud quod supponit non est idem. Unde etiam in ista propositione 'Sortes est iste homo'non praedicatur idem de se, quamvis subiectum et praedicatum supponant praecise pro eodem, quia nomen proprium et pronomen demonstrativum cum termino communi non sunt idem. Et unum illorum praecise subicitur et alterum illorum praecise praedicatur, et ideo non praedicatur idem de se, quamvis praecise supponant pro eodem.	And if it is said that if in such a proposition the subject and predicate were to supposit for the same thing, then the same thing would be predicated of itself, it should be said [in reply] that this does not follow. For although both the subject and predicate supposit for the same thing, still that which supposits is not the same. Hence, even in the proposition 'Socrates is this man' the same thing is not predicated of itself, although the subject and predicate supposit precisely for the same thing. For a proper name and a demonstrative pronoun with a common term are not the same thing. And one of them is precisely the subject and the other is precisely the predicate, and so the same thing is not predicated of itself, although the terms supposit precisely for the same thing.
Similiter in ista 'omnis homo est risibilis' subiectum et praedicatum supponunt praecise pro eodem, et tamen non praedicatur idem de se, et hoc quia illud quod subicitur non est idem cum eo quod praedicatur, quia aliud est quod supponit et pro quo supponit. Et ideo quamvis illud pro quo supponit terminus uterque sit idem, non tamen illud quod supponit est idem.	Similarly, in 'Every man is capable of laughter' the subject and the predicate supposit precisely for the same thing, and yet the same thing is not predicated of itself, and this is because what is the subject is not the same as what is predicated, for that which supposits and that for which it supposits are different. And therefore although that for which both terms supposit is the same, it is still not the case that that which supposits is the same thing.
Ultimo sciendum est quod quamvis posuerim exempla de propositionibus aequivalentibus propositionibus hypotheticis, et vera sint de eis, tamen vera sunt etiam de aliis, sicut de talibus 'Deus creat', 'Deus generat', 'angelus est spiritus', 'aliquis angelus est substantia' et huiusmodi.	Finally, it should be known that although I have given examples of propositions equivalent to hypothetical propositions - and these are true of them [all] - still these [examples] are also true of others, for example of propositions such as 'God creates', 'God generates', 'An angel is a spirit', 'Some angel is a substance', and others of this sort.