Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 1

 

Latin	English
Cap. 1 De divisionibus et definitionibus syllogismorum
Completis primis duobus tractatibus, nunc ad tertium tractatum, de argumentis videlicet, est accedendum. Et quia inter omnes species argumentorum syllogismus obtinet principatum, ideo de syllogismo est primo dicendum. Praemittendae autem sunt quaedam distinctiones ad propositum necessariae.	Having completed the first two treatises, we must now approach the third, namely about arguments. And because, of all species of arguments, the syllogism is the principal one, therefore we must speak first of the syllogism.  But there are certain preliminary distinctions that are necessary in order to do this.
Unde sciendum est quod syllogismus aliquando accipitur pro uno communi omni syllogismo, ita quod in propositione supponat pro uno communi et non pro aliquo significato. Et sic accipiendo syllogismum haec est falsa 'syllogismus est oratio' etc., et haec similiter 'syllogismus componitur ex tribus terminis' etc. Aliquando autem accipitur syllogismus significative pro oratione, 'in qua quibusdam positis' etc.	Hence, it should be known that 'syllogism' is sometimes understood as one thing common to every syllogism, so that in a proposition it supposits form one common thing, and not for some significate.  And in understanding 'syllogism' this way 'a syllogism is a a discourse' etc. and similarly 'a syllogism is composed from three terms' etc.  But sometimes 'syllogism' is understood significatively for a discourse 'in which certain things are posited' etc.
Secunda distinctio est quod syllogismorum quidam sunt demonstrativi, quidam topici, quidam nec topici nec demonstrativi. Syllogismus demonstrativus est ille in quo ex propositionibus necessariis evidenter notis potest adquiri prima notitia conclusionis.	The second distinction is that some syllogisms are demonstrative, some topical, and some are neither topical or demonstrative.  A demonstrative syllogism is one where from necessary propositions evidently known, can be acquired prima knowledge of the conclusion.
Syllogismus topicus est syllogismus ex probabilibus. Et sunt "probabilia quae videntur vel omnibus vel pluribus vel sapientibus, et de his quae videntur vel omnibus vel pluribus vel maxime sapientibus". Et est ista descriptio sic intelligenda quod probabilia sunt illa, quae cum sint vera et necessaria, non tamen per se nota, nec ex per se notis syllogizabilia, nec etiam per experientiam evidenter nota, nec ex talibus sequentia; tamen propter sui veritatem videntur esse vera omnibus vel pluribus etc., ut sic brevis descriptio sit ista: probabilia sunt necessaria, nec principia nec conclusiones demonstrationis, quae propter sui veritatem videntur omnibus vel pluribus etc.	A topical syllogism is a syllogism from 'probables'. And probables are propositions which are accepted by every one or by the majority or by the philosophers - i.e. by all, or by the majority, or by the greatest of them". And this description is to be understood as follows: that probables are those which, while they are true or necessary, are nevertheless not known per se, nor syllogisable from things known per se, nor even evidently known from experience, nor from what follows from these.  Still, because of their truth they are accepted as true by all, or by the majority etc., so as a brief description might be: probables are necessary, but not principles or conclusions of demonstration, which because of their truth are accepted by all, or by the majority.
Per primam particulam excluduntur omnia contingentia et omnia falsa; per secundam omnia principia et conclusiones demonstrationis; per tertiam excluduntur quaedam necessaria, quae tamen omnibus apparent falsa vel pluribus etc. Et sic articuli fidei nec sunt principia demonstrationis nec conclusiones, nec sunt probabiles, quia omnibus vel pluribus vel maxime sapientibus apparent falsi. Et hoc accipiendo sapientes pro sapientibus mundi et praecise innitentibus rationi naturali, quia illo modo accipitur 'sapiens' in descriptione probabilis.	Through the first condition are excluded all contigent truths and all falsehoods. Through the second, all principles and conclusions of demonstration. Through the third are excluded certain necessary propositions which seem false to all or to many etc.  And so there are no principles of demonstration of an article of faith, or conclusions, nor are they 'probables', for they appear false to all or to many or the greatest of the wise.  And this is by understanding 'wise' as the wise of the world, and precisely as those leaning on natural reason, for 'wise' is understood in this way in the description of 'probable'.
Ex istis sequitur quod syllogismus topicus nec peccat in materia nec in forma. Sequitur etiam aliud, quod nullus secundum communem cursum potest evidenter et demonstrative cognoscere de aliquo syllogismo topico ipsum esse topicum, quamvis possit habere fidem quod est syllogismus topicus. Sequitur etiam aliud, quod non omnis syllogismus topicus facit semper praecise dubitationem et formidinem, sed etiam frequenter facit firmam fidem, sine omni dubitatione, quia ita aliquando adhaeremus probabilibus sicut evidenter notis.	From this it follows that a topical syllogism neither errs in material nor in form.  Another thing also follows, that no one in the common course of things can evidently and demonstratively cognise of a topical syllogism that it is topical, although he or she could have faith that it is a topical syllogism.  Another thing also follows, that not every topical syllogism makes always precise doubtet formidinem, but also frequently makes for firm faith, without any doubt, for sometimes we adhere to probables as though evidently known.
Syllogismus qui nec est demonstrativus nec topicus potest dividi, quia quidam est ex improbabilibus, quidam non ex improbabilibus. Similiter, quidam syllogismus peccat in materia, quidam non peccat in materia.	A syllogism which is neither demonstrative nor topical can be divided, for some are from improbables, some from probables. Similarly, some syllogisms err in material, some do not err in material.
Alia distinctio. quidam est syllogismus uniformis, quidam mixtus. Et uniformis quidam est uniformis ex propositionibus de inesse, quidam ex propositionibus modalibus. Et isti sunt diversi, [secundum quod diversitas invenitur in propositionibus modalibus].	Another distinction [is that] some are uniform syllogisms, some are mixed.  And of uniform syllogisms, some are uniformly composed of assertoric propositions, some from modal propositions.  And these are as diverse as there is diversity in modal propositions.
Mixtus syllogismus quidam est mixtus ex necessario et inesse, quidam ex necessario et contingenti. Et sic de aliis, de quibus omnibus dicetur inferius. Similiter, syllogismus uniformis ex propositionibus de inesse quidam est uniformis ex propositionibus de praesenti, quidam ex omnibus de praeterito, quidam ex omnibus de futuro, quidam ex una de praesenti et alia de praeterito vel de futuro.	Some syllogisms are mixed from the necessary and assertoric, some from the necessary and contingent.  And so for the others, all of which will be discussed below.  Similarly, some uniform syllogisms from assertoric propositions are present tense, some all from past tense, some from future tense, some from one present tense proposition, another a past or future tense proposition.
Sciendum est tamen quod definitio communis omnibus praedictis est ista: Syllogismus est oratio in qua ex duabus praemissis, dispositis in modo et in figura, de necessitate sequitur conciusio. Et ad istam definitionem nihil refert an praemissae sint verae vel falsae.	Nevertheless, it should be known that a definition common to all the above is as follows: a syllogism is a form of speech in which from two premisses, disposed in mode and figure, the conclusion follows by necessity.  And it does not matter in that definition whether the premisses are true or false.
Hoc tamen est generale quod numquam praemissae sunt verae et conclusio falsa, quamvis possit esse e converso. Unde in tota parte sequenti, usque ad partem in qua tractabitur de syllogismo demonstrativo, vel semper vel frequenter volo loqui de conditionibus syllogismi requirentis particulas praedictae definitionis, et non amplius.	And this is nevertheless a general [truth]: that the premisses are never true when the conclusion is false - although it could be the other way round.  Hence, in the whole of the following part, up until the part where we deal with the demonstrative syllogism, I will always, or for the most part, wish to speak of the conditions of the syllogism requiring the particles of the previous definition, and no more.