Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 41

 

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[Cap. 41. De mixtione ex propositionibus de inesse et aliis modalibus quae modificantur per 'scitum', 'dubitatum', 'per se primo' et huiusmodi in prima figura]	[Chapter 41. On the mixture of assertoric propositions, and other modal propositions modified by 'known', 'doubted', 'per se in the first mode', and so on, in the first figure]
Post mixtiones ex propositionibus de inesse et propositionibus modalibus quae ab omnibus conceduntur esse modales dicendum est de mixtionibus ex propositionibus de inesse et aliis propositionibus modalibus. Et quia istae mixtiones possunt patere ex mixtionibus praedictis, ideo de eis breviter est dicendum. Et primo in prima figura.	After mixtures of assertoric and modal propositions which are conceded by all to be modal, we should talk about mixtures of assertoric and other modal propositions.  And because such mixtures can be made clear from the previously mentioned mixtures, therefore we should briefly speak about them. And first, in the first figure.
Est autem primo sciendum quod quando accipitur aliquis modus positivus, cuiusmodi sunt 'scitum', 'notum', 'demonstrabile' 'per se notum', 'primo verum' et huiusmodi, raro vel numquam, si maior sumatur in sensu compositionis et minor de inesse, sequitur conclusio de tali modo in sensu compositionis, sive minor sit de inesse simpliciter sive ut nunc.	But it should first be known that when some positive mode is taken, such as 'known' (scitum), 'known' (notum), 'demonstrable', 'known per se', 'primarily true' and so on, if the major is taken in the sense of composition and the minor is assertoric, rarely or never does the conclusion follow in such a mode in the sense of composition, whether the minor be absolutely assertoric, or 'as now'.
Ad sciendum autem quando sequitur et quando non, videndum est an talis modus possit competere propositioni universali, et si competat ƿ cuilibet consequenti ad illam universalem vel non. Si non, tunc numquam talis discursus valet. Huiusmodi autem sunt tales modi 'scitum', 'primo verum', 'per se notum', 'creditum', 'opinatum', 'concessum', 'affirmatum' et huiusmodi. Et ideo tales syllogismi non valent 'omnem triangulum habere tres est scitum a me; iste triangulus est triangulus; igitur istum triangulum habere tres est scitum a me'; 'omnem Deum esse immortalem est scitum a me; Pater est Deus; igitur Patrem esse immortalem est scitum a me'; 'omnem hominem esse risibilem est primo verum; Sortes est homo; igitur Sortem esse risibilem est primo verum'. Et sicut est de istis, ita est de aliis.	But to know when it follows and when not, you should see whether such a mode can belong to a universal proposition, and if it belongs to anything following from that universal proposition or not.  If not, then such a discourse is never valid.  Now of this sort are modes such as 'known' (scitum), 'primarily true', 'believed', 'opined', 'conceded', 'affirmed' and so on.  And therefore the following syllogisms are not valid: "that every triangle has three lines is known by me, that triangle is a triangle, therefore that that triangle has three lines is known by me"; "that God is immortal is known by me, the Father is God, therefore that the Father is immortal is known by me"; "that every man is capable of laughter is primarily true, Socrates is a man, therefore that Socrates is capable of laughter is primarily true".  And so with these, so with the others.
Si autem talis modus non possit competere propositioni universali nisi competat cuilibet consequenti, tunc tenet syllogismus. Talis autem modus est 'verum'. Et ideo iste syllogismus est bonus 'omnem hominem esse animal est verum; album, est homo; igitur album esse animal est verum'; et hoc, quia universalis non potest esse vera nisi quodlibet consequens ad ipsam sit verum.	But if such a mode cannot belong to a universal without belonging to anything following from it, then the syllogism holds. Such a mode is 'true'. And therefore this syllogism is good: "that every man is an animal is true, a white thing is a man, therefore it is true that a white thing is an animal". And this is because a universal proposition cannot be true unless anything following from it is true.
Et si sit aliquis modus alius qui non possit competere universali propositioni nisi competat cuilibet propositioni quae sequitur ad eam, mixtio ex tali propositione et propositione de inesse valet. Si autem modus non sit talis, mixtio non valet generaliter, quamvis in aliquibus terminis et cum aliqua determinata minore valeat. Sed quando valeat et quando non, propter brevitatem relinquo aliis discutiendum. Si autem talis modus sit negativus, sicut 'falsum', tunc non valet mixtio talis.	And if there is some other mode which cannot belong to a universal proposition unless it belongs to any proposition which follows from it, the mixture from such a proposition and from an assertoric proposition, is valid.  But if a mode is not like this, the mixture is not generally valid, although in some terms and with some determinate minor it may be valid.  But when it is valid, and when not, I leave to others to discuss for the sake of brevity. But if such a mode is negative, e.g. 'false', then such a mixture is not valid.
Sed si illa de modo sumatur in sensu divisionis vel aequivalens ei, semper talis mixtio valet respectu conclusionis de consimili modo in sensu divisionis vel acquivalentis. Unde quando talis propositio sumitur in sensu divisionis, ille modus non est determinatio totius propositionis, sed si sumatur adverbialiter vel aequivalenter est determinatio compositionis. Et si non sit determinatio adverbialis, semper aequivalet uni propositioni habenti adverbium correspondens, determinans compositionem.	But if that mode, or something similar to it, is taken in the sense of division, such a mixture is always valid in respect of a conclusion in a similar mode, or an equivalent, in the sense of division. Hence, when such a proposition is taken in the sense of division, that mode is not a determination of the whole proposition, but if it is taken adverbially or equivalently, it is a determination of the composition. And if it is not an adverbial determination, it is always equivalent to a single proposition having a corresponding adverb, determining the composition.
Sicut ista in sensu divisionis 'contingit omnem hominem currere' aequivalet isti 'omnis homo contingenter currit' et ista 'omnis homo potest currere' aequivalet isti 'omnis homo possibiliter currit'. Sed tunc ƿ in ista 'omnis homo contingenter currit' non denotatur quod omnis homo currit, sed quod omnis homo potest currere et omnis homo potest non currere. Et sic est de istis duabus 'omnis homo possibiliter currit' et 'omnis homo potest currere'. Et tunc subiectum in istis 'omnis homo possibiliter currit', 'omnis homo contingenter currit' potest habere consimiles acceptiones quas habet in aliis; alias non aequivaleret.	For example, "it is possible that every man runs" is equivalent, in the sense of division, to "every man contingently runs", and "every man can run" is equivalent to "every man possibly runs".  But then, in "every man contingently runs", it is not denoted that every man runs, but that every man can run and every man can not run.  And so it is with "every man possibly runs" and "every man can run".  And then the subject in "every man possibly runs" and "every man contingently runs" can have similar acceptances as it has in others, otherwise it would not be equivalent.
Utrum autem de virtute sermonis aequipolleant vel non, ad praesens non curo, tamen ad minus posset sic institui. Et tunc propositio talis sine tali adverbio et cum tali adverbio aequivalent. Hoc autem semper est verum, quia illa propositio de modo quocumque, sumpta in sensu divisionis, vel aequivalet uni propositioni habenti adverbialem determinationem, determinantem compositionem, vel aequivalet uni propositioni habenti verbum modale indicativi modi com verbo infinitivi modi sequente. Sicut ista 'omnem hominem esse animal est scitum a me' aequivalet isti 'omnis homo scitur a me esse animal'; et ista 'omnem hominem vivere est scitum a me' aequivalet isti 'omnis homo scitur a me vivere'. Et ita est de aliis.	Now whether, properly speaking, they are equivalent or not, I am not worrying about for the moment, nevertheless at least it could thus be institui.  And then such a proposition without such an adverb and such a proposition with such an adverb are equivalent.  Now this is always true, because that proposition in any mode, taken in the sense of division, is either equivalent to a single proposition having an adverbial determination determining the composition, or it is equivalent to a single proposition having a modal verb following, in the indicative mode.  For example, "that every man is an animal is known by me" is equivalent to "every man is known by me to be an animal", and "that every man lives is known by me" is equivalent to "every man is known by me to live". And it is so in the other cases.
Ex isto potest patere quod idem modus arguendi debet servari ex talibus propositionibus et ex quibuscumque aliis habentibus alia verba indicativi modi sine omni verbo sequente et ex propositionibus habentibus alias determinationes adverbiales, vel acquivalentes eis, determinantes compositionem; et ideo ex tali de quocumque modo et minore de inesse sequitur conclusio de consimili modo in sensu divisionis vel aequivalens, et hoc in prima figura. Et ideo omnes tales syllogismi sunt boni 'omnis homo scitur a me esse animal; homo albus est homo; igitur homo albus scitur a me esse animal'; 'omne animal scitur a me esse sensibile; homo caecus est animal; igitur homo caecus scitur a me esse sensibilis'.
Et si dicatur quod praemissae possunt esse verae conclusione exsistente falsa, puta si sciam omne animal esse sensibile et tamen nesciam ƿ aliquod animal esse caecum, quamvis multi homines sint caeci, sed hoc nesciam:
Dicendum quod omnes tales syllogismi sunt boni, regulati per dici de omni vel de nullo. Unde per istam 'omne animal scitur a me esse sensibile' denotatur quod hoc totum 'scitur a me esse sensibile' convenit cuilibet animali, et ideo si homo caecus sit animal, oportet quod homini caeco conveniat quod denotatur per conclusionem. Et ita talis syllogismus est regulatus per dici de omni.
Nec obstat quod adducitur quod si haec sit vera 'omne animal scitur a me esse sensibile' et haec similiter 'homo caecus est animal' oportet quod haec similiter sit vera 'homo caecus scitur a me esse sensibilis'; sed simul cum hoc stat quod nesciam aliquem hominem esse caecum et quod nesciam istam 'homo caecus est animal'. Sicut enim cum ista 'album potest esse nigrum' stat quod haec sit impossibilis 'album est nigrum', ita cum ista 'homo caecus scitur a me esse sensibilis' stat quod haec non sit scita a me 'homo caecus est sensibilis'.
Et si dicatur: sequitur 'homo caecus scitur a me esse sensibilis, igitur aliquod sensibile scitur a me esse homo caecus', dicendum est quod ista consequentia non valet, sed debet inferri ista 'aliquid, quod scitur a me esse sensibile, est homo caecus'. Hoc patet per dicta in tractatu secundo, in parte de conversione propositionum. Sic igitur dico quod tales syllogismi sunt boni; et similiter tales 'omnis aedificator per se aedificat; homo albus est aedificator; igitur homo albus per se aedificat'; 'omne album per accidens aedificat; aedificator est albus; igitur aedificator per accidens aedificat'; 'omnis anima intellectiva scitur a me esse substantia; intellectus est anima intellectiva; igitur intellectus scitur a me esse substantia'; 'omnis natura specifica scitur a me esse communicabilis; differentia individualis est natura specifica; igitur differentia individualis scitur a me esse communicabilis'.
Similiter, secundum opinionem Aristotelis, qui non ponit aliquam unam rem sim ƿ simplicem esse plures res distinctas realiter, tales syllogismi sunt boni 'omnis Deus scitur a me esse immortalis; Pater est Deus; igitur Pater scitur a me esse immortalis'; 'omnis Deus creditur a philosophis esse aeternus; Filius productus est Deus; igitur Filius productus creditur a philosophis esse aeternus'. Sed qualiter secundum theologos possit impediri talis processus et qualiter non, dictum est prius.
Sic igitur dicendum est quod omnes tales syllogismi sunt boni ac si omnes propositiones essent de inesse, nec est aliter arguendum ex talibus in prima figura quam ex illis de inesse.	So it must therefore be said that all such syllogisms are good, as if all propositions were assertoric, nor is it to be argued otherwise from such propositions in the first figure, than from assertoric propositions.
Sed propter cavillationes est sciendum quod non quaelibet propositio in qua ponitur talis modus est propositio modalis, sed ad hoc quod propositio sit modalis, duo requiruntur, Unum, quod ille modus non sit praecise pars alterius extremi. Et propter hoc tales non sunt modales 'illud, quod scitur a me esse animal, est album'; 'illud, quod per se aedificat, est calidum'; 'illud, quod potest currere, est homo sedens ; 'aliquid, quod potest esse impossibile, est verum'. Aliud requiritur: quod ex forma propositionis denotetur ille modus alicui propositioni de inesse competere, quamvis non semper denotetur competere suae de inesse.
Sicut per istam 'album potest esse nigrum' denotatur quod aliqua propositio sit possibilis in qua praedicatur nigrum de aliquo quod est album, quamvis non denotetur quod ista sit possibilis 'album est nigrum'. Similiter per istam 'homo albus scitur a me esse animal' denotatur quod aliqua propositio sit scita a me, non tamen denotatur quod ista sit scita a me 'homo albus est animal'. Et propter illud secundum tales propositiones non sunt modales 'omnis homo cognoscitur a me', 'omnis homo intelligitur a me', et sic de aliis. Tamen quantum ad modum arguendi non refert accipere tales propositiones vel modales vel illas de inesse. ƿ	For example, by "a white thing can be black", it is denoted that some proposition is possible in which 'black' is predicated of something which is white, although it is not denoted that "a white thing is black" is possible.  Similarly, by "a white man is known by me to be an animal" it is denoted that some proposition is known by me, yet it is not denoted that "a white man is an animal" is known by me. And because of that second point [?], such propositions as "every man is known by me" and "every man is understood by me" etc., are not modal.  Yet as far as the mode of arguing it does not matter to accept such propositions, either modal or assertoric [?].