Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 56

Latin	English
Cap. 56. De mixtione possibilis et contingentis in tertia figura	Chapter 56. On the mixture of possible and contingent in the third figure.
In tertia figura, si utraque propositionum sumatur in sensu compositionis, non valet mixtio. Sicut non sequitur 'omnem hominem esse Deum est possibile; omnem hominem esse humanitatem est contingens; igitur aliquam humanitatem esse Deum est possibile'. Nec etiam valet si maior sit de contingenti et minor de possibili. Patet per eosdem terƿminos. Et per eosdem patet quod non valet mixtio si altera sumatur in sensu compositionis et altera in sensu divisionis.	In the third figure, if both propositions are taken in the sense of composition, the mixture is not valid. Just as it does not follow that 'it is possible for every man to be God; it is contingent for every man to be human; therefore it is possible for some human to be God'. Nor is it valid if the major is de contingenti and the minor de possibili. It is clear from the same terms. And it is clear from the same terms that the mixture is not valid if one is taken in the sense of composition and the other in the sense of division.
Si autem utraque sumatur in sensu divisionis, si subiectum illius de possibili supponat pro his quae possunt esse et sit maior, sequitur conclusio de possibili. Sicut sequitur 'omnis homo potest esse humanitas; omnem hominem contingit esse Deum; igitur Deus potest esse humanitas'. Si minor est de possibili similiter sequitur 'omnem hominem contingit esse humanitatem; omnis homo potest esse Deus; igitur Deus potest esse humanitas, subiecto utriusque sumpto praecise pro his quae possunt esse et pro his quae sunt, aliter non valet.	But if both are taken in the sense of division, if the subject of the latter de possibili supposits for those things that can be and is major, the conclusion de possibili follows. As it follows 'every man can be human; every man can be God; therefore God can be human'. If the minor is de possibili it follows similarly 'every man can be human; every man can be God; therefore God can be human', with the subject of both taken precisely for those things that can be and for those things that are, otherwise it does not hold.