Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 1

GUILLELMI DE OCKHAM SUMMA TOTIUS LOGICAE: PARS III-3

Latin	English
ƿ [CAP. 1. DE MODO ARGUENDI PER CONSEQUENTIAS ET ARGUMENTA QUAE NON HABENT FORMAM SYLLOGISTICAM. ET PRIMO: QUOT MODIS DICITUR CONSEQUENTIA?]	[Chapter 1. Of the mode of arguing by consequences, and arguments which do not have syllogistic form. And first, how many modes are there of so-called consequences?]
Habito de syllogismo in communi et de syllogismo demonstrativo, agendum est de argumentis et consequentiis quae non servant formam syllogisticam. Et primo ponam aliquas distinctiones quae sunt communes aliis consequentiis multis, quamvis non sint enthymemata, ex quibus omnibus faciliter patere poterit studioso quid de omnibus syllogismis non demonstrativis est tenendum.	Having dealt with the syllogism in general, and with the demonstrative syllogism, we should deal with arguments and consequences which do not follow [?] the form of the syllogism. And first, let me give some distinctions which are common to many other consequences, although they are not enthymeme, from all of which one could easily show the student what should be held of all non-demonstrative syllogisms.
Prima distinctio est ista quod consequentiarum quaedam est `ut nunc', quaedam est simplex.	The first distinction is that some consequences are 'as now', others are absolute.
Consequentia `ut nunc' est quando antecedens pro aliquo tempore potest esse verum sine consequente sed non pro isto tempore. Sicut ista consequentia est ut nunc solum `omne animal currit, igitur Sortes currit', quia pro isto tempore pro quo Sortes est animal, non potest antecedens esse verum sine consequente; et tamen pro aliquo tempore poterit antecedens esse verum sine consequente, quia ƿ quando Sortes erit mortuus, poterit antecedens esse verum consequente exsistente falso.	An 'as now' consequence is when the antecedent can be true for some time, without the consequent being true, but not for this time. For example, the consequence 'every animal runs, therefore Socrates runs' is as now only, because [it is true] for the time for which Socrates is an animal, the antecedent cannot be true without the consequent [being true]. And yet for some time the antecedent could be true without the consequent, for when Socrates is dead, the antecedent could be true while the consequent is false.
Consequentia simplex est quando pro nullo tempore poterit antecedens esse verum sine consequente. Sicut ista consequentia est simplex `nullum animal currit, ergo nullus homo currit', quia numquam poterit haec esse vera `nullum animal currit' nisi ista sit vera `nullus homo currit', si formetur.	An absolute consequence is when there is no time for which the antecedent could be true without the consequent. For example, the consequence 'no animal runs, therefore no man runs' is absolute, for 'no animal runs' could never be true unless 'no man runs' were true, if [that proposition] were made.
Alia distinctio est quod aliquando consequentia tenet per medium extrinsecum, aliquando per medium intrinsecum.	Another distinction is that sometimes a consequence holds by an 'extrinsic middle', sometimes by an 'intrinsic middle'.
Illa consequentia tenet per medium intrinsecum quando tenet virtute alicuius propositionis formatae ex eisdem terminis. Sicut ista `Sortes non currit, igitur homo non currit' tenet virtute istius medii `Sortes est homo'; unde nisi haec esset vera `Sortes est homo', non valeret consequentia.	A consequence holds by an intrinsic middle when it holds by virtue of some proposition formed from the same terms. For example, the consequence 'Socrates does not run, therefore a man does not run' holds in virtue of the middle 'Socrates is a man'. Hence, unless 'Socrates is a man' were true, the consequence would not be valid.
Consequentia autem quae tenet per medium extrinsecum est quando tenet per aliquam regulam generalem quae non plus respicit illos terminos quam alios. Sicut ista consequentia `tantum homo est asinus, igitur omnis asinus est homo' non tenet per aliquam propositionem veram formatam ex istis terminis `homo' et `asinus', sed per istam regulam generalem `exclusiva et universalis de terminis transpositis idem significant et convertuntur'.	But a consequence which holds by an extrinsic middle is when it holds by some general rule which does not respect those terms any more than any others. For example, 'only a man is a donkey, therefore every donkey is a man' does not hold by some true proposition formed from the terms 'man' and 'donkey', but rather by the general rule 'an exclusive, and a universal proposition made from the transposed terms signify the same thing, and are convertible'.
Et per talia media tenent omnes syllogismi. Et si dicatur contra istam distinctionem quod ista consequentia `Sortes non currit, ergo homo non currit' tenet per istud medium extrinsecum `a singulari ad indefinitam postposita negatione est bona consequentia', quod est medium extrinsecum: Dicendum est quod tenet per istud medium extrinsecum remote et mediate et insufficienter, quia praeter istam regulam generalem requiritur plus, scilicet quod Sortes sit homo; et ideo magis immediate et ƿ magis sufficienter tenet per istud medium `Sortes est homo', quod est medium intrinsecum.	And all syllogisms hold through such middles. And if it is said, against that distinction, that the consequence 'Socrates does not run, therefore a man does not run' holds through the extrinsic middle 'from a singular to a negation, which negation placed after [the copula] is a good consequence', which is an extrinsic middle, it should be said that it holds by that extrinsic middle remotely, and indirectly, and insufficiently, for beyond that general rule there is more required, namely that Socrates is a man, therefore it more immediately and more sufficiently holds by the middle 'Socrates is a man', which is an intrinsic middle.
Alia distinctio est ista quod consequentiarum quaedam est materialis et quaedam formalis.	Another distinction is that some consequences are material, others formal.
Consequentia formalis est duplex, quia quaedam tenet per medium extrinsecum, quod respicit formam propositionis. Sicut sunt tales regulae `ab exclusiva ad universalem de terminis transpositis est bona consequentia'; `ex maiore de necessario et minore de inesse sequitur conclusio de necessario' et huiusmodi. Quaedam tenet per medium intrinsecum immediate, et mediate per medium extrinsecum respiciens generales condiciones propositionum, non veritatem vel falsitatem, nec necessitatem vel impossibilitatem, cuiusmodi est ista `Sortes non currit, igitur homo non currit'.	A formal consequence is of two sorts, for some hold by an extrinsic middle, which respects the form of the proposition. For example, such rules are 'from an exclusive to a universal with transposed terms is a good consequence'; 'from a major de necessario and a minor de inesse there follows a de necessario conclusion', and so on. Some hold by an intrinsic middle directly, and indirectly by an extrinsic middle respecting the general conditions of propositions, not truth or falsity, nor necessity nor impossibility. For example, 'Socrates does not run, therefore a man does not run'.
Consequentia materialis est quando tenet praecise ratione terminorum et non ratione alicuius medii extrinseci respicientis praecise generales condiciones propositionum; cuiusmodi sunt tales `si homo currit, Deus est'; `homo est asinus, igitur Deus non est' et huiusmodi.	A material consequence is when it holds precisely by reason of the terms, and by reason of some extrinsic middle respecting precisely the general conditions of propositions. Of this sort are 'if a man runs, God exists', 'a man is a donkey, therefore God does not exist', and so on.
ƿ Quarta distinctio est ista quod aliquando concluditur praecise praedicatum de subiecto, non determinando an praedicatum sit genus vel species vel differentia vel proprium vel aliquid huiusmodi respectu subiecti; sicut quando consequens est tale `homo est animal', `Sortes est albus', `homo est animal rationale'.	A fourth distinction is that sometimes the predicate is concluded precisely of the subject, not by determining whether the predicate is genus or species or differentia or property or something of the sort respecting the subject. For examples, when the consequent is such as 'a man is an animal', 'Socrates is white', 'a man is a rational animal'.
Aliquando concluditur cum tali additione; sicut sunt talia consequentia `animal est genus hominis', `risibile est proprium homini', `animal rationale est definitio hominis' et huiusmodi. Alia distinctio potest esse, et multum convenit cum praecedenti, quia aliquando infertur consequens in quo subiectum supponit personaliter et significative et aliquando infertur consequens in quo subiectum supponit simpliciter vel materialiter et non significative.	Sometimes it is concluded with such an addtion. For example, consequences such as 'animal is the genus of man', 'being capable of laughter is a property of a man', 'rational animal is the definition of a man', and so on. Another distinction can be, et multum convenit cum praecedenti, because sometimes a consequent is inferred in which the subject supposits personally and significatively, and sometimes a consequent is inferred in which the subject supposits absolutely and materially, and not significatively.
Alia distinctio est quod aliquando infertur consequens quae est propositio universalis, aliquando particularis.	Another distinction is that sometimes a consequent is inferred which is a universal proposition, sometimes a particlar proposition.
Alia distinctio est quod aliquando infertur consequens quae est propositio negativa, aliquando affirmativa. Alia distinctio est quod consequentiarum quaedam est ex antecedente affirmativo et consequente affirmativo, quaedam ex utroque negativo, quaedam ex antecedente affirmativo et consequente negativo, quaedam e converso.	Another distinction is that sometimes a consequent is inferred which is a negative proposition, sometimes affirmative. Another distinction is that some consequences are from an affirmative antecedent and an affirmative consequent, some with both negative, some from an affirmative antecedent and an negative consequent, sometimes the other way round.
Alia distinctio est quod aliquando consequens est propositio de inesse, aliquando de modo.	Another distinction is that sometimes the consequent is a de inesse proposition, sometimes de modo.