Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 2

Latin	English
ƿ CAP. 2. DE REGULIS GENERALIBUS PER QUAS TENENT CONSEQUENTIAE PER MEDIUM INTRINSECUM ET CONCLUDUNT UNIVERSALEM.	Chapter 2. On the general rules by which consequences hold through an intrensic medium and conclude a universal.
Istis visis dicendum est de regulis generalibus per quas tenent consequentiae. Et primo de regulis per quas tenent consequentiae quae tenent per medium intrinsecum. Circa quod primo dicendum est de regulis per quas tenent consequentiae concludentes conclusionem universalem affirmativam ex affirmativa, in qua termini praecise supponunt significative et personaliter. Est autem prima regula talis `a superiori distributo ad inferius distributum est consequentia bona', sicut sequitur `omne animal currit, igitur omnis homo currit'.	With these views it is necessary to speak of the general rules by which the consequences hold. And in the first place concerning the rules by which the consequences which they hold by internsic means. Concerning the first thing we must say about the rules by which the inferences hold, concluding a universal affirmative conclusion from the affirmative, in which terms they presuppose precisely in a significant and personal way. Now the first rule is as follows: `distributed from the superior to the inferior is a good consequence', as it follows that `every animal runs, therefore every man runs'.
Circa istam regulam est primo sciendum quod ista regula debet intelligi quando illa universalis affirmativa non est exceptiva nec aequivalens ei. Et ideo ista consequentia non valet `omne animal praeter hominem currit, igitur omnis homo currit'.	Regarding this rule it is first to be known that this rule must be understood when the universal affirmative is neither exceptional nor equivalent to it. And therefore this conclusion does not hold: 'every animal runs except man, therefore every man runs'.
Tamen contingit inferre omne aliud inferius praeter partem extra captam et praeter contenta sub parte extra capta; et ideo bene sequitur `omne animal praeter hominem currit, igitur omnis asinus currit'.	However, it is possible to bring everything else below except the part taken outside, and besides the contents under the part taken outside; and therefore it follows well that every animal except man runs, therefore every donkey runs.
Secundo sciendum quod talis consequentia tenens per istam regulam aliquando est consequentia simplex, aliquando consequentia ut nunc. Quando enim praedicatio superioris de inferiori est necessaria, tunc est consequentia simplex; quando autem praedicatio superioris de inferiori est contingens, tunc est consequentia ut nunc solum.	Secondly, it must be known that such a consequence holding by this rule is sometimes a simple consequence, sometimes a consequence for now. For when the predication of the superior from the inferior is necessary, then the consequence is simple; But when the predication of the superior is contingent on the inferior, then the consequence is for now only.
Unus casus excipitur, scilicet quando tam antecedens quam consequens sunt de possibili vel de contingenti, accepto subiecto utriusque pro eo quod potest vel pro eo quod contingit; quia in tali generaliter est consequentia simplex, quia quando illa propositio in qua praedicatur superius de inferiori est vera, ƿ tunc est consequentia bona, quando illa propositio est falsa, tunc consequentia non valet.	One case is accepted, namely, when both the antecedent and the consequent are of the possible or of the contingent, the subject of both being accepted for that which is possible or for that which happens; because in such a case the conclusion is generally simple, because when that proposition in which the superior is predicated of the inferior is true, then the inference is good, when that proposition is false, then the inference is invalid.
Unde tales consequentiae sunt simplices `omne ens est in actu, igitur omnis Deus est in actu'; `omne suppositum est substantia, igitur omne divinum suppositum est substantia', quia omnes tales sunt necessariae `omnis Deus est ens', `omne suppositum divinum est suppositum'.	Whence such simple consequences are, `every being is in act, therefore every God is in act'; `every suppositum is substance, therefore every divine suppositum is substance', because all such things are necessary.
Sed tales consequentiae sunt ut nunc solum `omne animal est substantia, igitur omnis homo est substantia'; `omnis homo currit, igitur omnis homo albus currit', quia tales sunt contingentes `homo est animal', `homo albus est homo' et huiusmodi.	But the consequences are such that now only 'every animal is substance, therefore every man is substance'; `every man runs, therefore every white man runs', because such are the contingents `a man is an animal', `a white man is a man' and the like.
Ex isto sequuntur aliqua.	From this other things follow.
Unum est quod non magis est haec consequentia simplex `omne animal currit, igitur omnis homo currit' quam ista `omne animal currit, igitur omnis homo albus currit', nisi forte quia in pluribus est una bona quam alia.	One thing is that this simple conclusion, `every animal runs, therefore every man runs,' is no more true than that `every animal runs, therefore every white man runs,' unless perhaps because in more there is one good than the other.
Aliud sequitur: quod omnes tales consequentiae sunt bonae `omne animal est ens per se, igitur omnis homo albus est ens per se'; `omnis materia est prior forma, igitur omnis materia informata forma ignis est prior forma ignis'; `omnis homo potest esse sine albedine, igitur omnis homo albus potest esse sine albedine'; `omne ens est per se in genere, igitur omne album est per se in genere' et huiusmodi, quae tamen negantur a multis modernis.	Another thing follows: that all such inferences are good: 'every animal is a being in itself, therefore every white man is a being in itself'; "every matter has a prior form; therefore, every matter formed in the form of fire is a prior form of fire"; `every man can be without whiteness, therefore every man can be white without whiteness'; `every being is by itself in a genus, therefore every white is by itself in a genus' and the like, which, however, are denied by many moderns.
Alia regula est quod a definito distributo ad definitionem distributam est bona consequentia et e converso; sicut sequitur `omne animal rationale mortale est animal, ergo omnis homo est animal', et e converso.	Another rule is that from the defined distributed to the distributed definition there is a good consequence and vice versa; as it follows that every rational animal is a mortal animal, therefore every man is an animal, and vice versa.
Alia regula est quod a descriptione distributa ad descriptum distributum est bona consequentia et e converso; sicut sequitur `omne animal gressibile bipes est substantia, igitur omnis homo est substantia', et e converso.	Another rule is that from the distributed description to the distributed described there are good consequences and vice versa; just as it follows that 'every moving animal is a substance, therefore every man is a substance', and vice versa.
ƿ Alia regula est quod a nominis interpretatione distributa ad nomen distributum est bona consequentia et e converso; sicut sequitur `omnis amator sapientiae est studiosus, igitur omnis philosophus est studiosus'.	Another rule is that from the interpretation of the distributed name to the distributed name there is a good consequence and vice versa; as it follows, `every lover of wisdom is a student, therefore every philosopher is a student'.
Sciendum est quod omnes praedictae regulae intelligendae sunt quando nulla determinatio ponitur in antecedente nisi quae ponitur in consequente et e converso. Aliud est sciendum: quod praedictae regulae intelligendae sunt quando termini supponunt personaliter et significative.	It must be known that all the aforementioned rules are to be understood when no determination is placed in the antecedent except that which is placed in the consequent and vice versa. Another thing is to be known: that the aforesaid rules are to be understood when the terms assume a personal and significant meaning.
Et ideo tales consequentiae non valent `‘‘omne animal est unum compositum ex signo universali et genere', igitur ``omnis homo est unum compositum ex signo universali et genere'; `‘‘omne animal rationale est unum compositum ex signo universali et definitione, igitur ``omnis homo est unum compositum etc.', et sic de consimilibus, si subiecta antecedentium non supponant personaliter et significative sed materialiter vel simpliciter.	And therefore such conclusions are not valid: ``every animal is one composite of universal sign and genus, therefore, ``every man is one composite of universal sign and genus; ``every rational animal is one compound from a universal sign and definition, therefore ``every man is one compound, etc., and so on of the like, if the subjects of the preceding ones do not stand personally and significantly but materially or simply.
Et ideo omnes consequentiae tales non sunt simplices. Alia regula est quod ab uno convertibilium distributo ad relinquunt distributum est bona consequentia et e converso; sicut sequitur `omne creativum est, igitur omnis Deus est' et e converso. Sciendum est quod ista debet intelligi, sicut ceterae, quando scilicet termini supponunt personaliter et significative. Secundo sciendum est quod `proprium' non est nisi unum praedicabile de altero, et tale praedicabile praedicatur aliquando tam de ente quam de non ente; sicut si `risibile' sit idem quod `potens ridere', praedicabitur de homine, sive homo sit sive non sit. Unde sicut haec est vera homine exsistente `homo est risibilis' vel `homo potest ridere', ita erit haec vera homine non exsistente `homo est risibilis', sumpto subiecto pro eo quod potest esse. Aliquando autem proprium non potest praeƿdicari nisi de ente, nec supponere nisi pro ente.	And therefore all such consequences are not simple. Another rule is that from one of the convertibles distributed to the remaining distributed is a good consequenc and vice versa; as it follows, `everything is creative, therefore everything is God' and vice versa. It must be known that these must be understood, like the others, when of course the terms assume a personal and significant meaning. Secondly, it must be known that 'proper' is only one predicate of another, and such a predicate is sometimes predicated both of a being and of a non-being; just as if `laughable' is the same as `able to laugh,' it will be predicated of a man, whether he exists or not. Hence, just as this is true of an existing man, `man is laughable,' or `man can laugh,' so this will be true of a non-existent man, `man is laughable,' taking the subject for what he can be. Sometimes, however, the proper cannot be predicated except of a being, nor can it be supposed except for a being.
Primo modo accipiendo proprium, verum est quod ab uno convertibilium distributo ad aliud distributum est bona consequentia, sed ab uno est consequentia simplex et ab alio consequentia `ut nunc'.	Taking the proper in the first way, it is true that there is a good consequence from the distribution of convertibles from one to another, but from one it is a simple consequence and from another a consequence 'as now'.
Sicut haec est consequentia simplex `omnis homo potest esse, igitur omne risibile potest esse'; haec autem est consequentia ut nunc `omne risibile est possibile, igitur omnis homo est possibilis'.	Just as this is a simple consequence, `everything can be a man, therefore everything can be laughable'; and this is the consequence that now 'everything laughable is possible, therefore every man is possible'.
Tamen omnes consequentiae in quibus praedicatum non potest competere non-enti sed solum enti sunt simplices. Primum autem, quod dictum est, intelligendum est si subiectum in tali propositione non potest accipi nisi pro his quae sunt, aliter non esset verum; sed loquendo de proprio secundo modo dicto, sic est consequentia utraque simplex.	However, all the consequences in which the predicate cannot apply to a non-being but only to a being are simple. But first, which has been said, is to be understood if the subject in such a proposition cannot be taken except for what it is, otherwise it would not be true; but speaking of the proper in the second mode, so the consequence is simple either way.
Sciendum est etiam quod istae regulae habent intelligi in propositionibus de inesse et de modo sumptis in sensu divisionis vel eis aequivalentibus et non in illis de modo sumptis in sensu compositionis.	It must also be known that these rules are to be understood in the propositions of being and of a mode taken in the sense of division or their equivalents, and not in those of a mode taken in the sense of composition.
In talibus enim non sunt generaliter verae; sicut non valet `omne ens esse in actu est necessarium, igitur omnem hominem esse in actu est necessarium'; nec sequitur `omne animal esse asinum est contingens, igitur omnem hominem esse asinum est contingens'; nec sequitur `omne verum esse necessarium est impossibile, igitur omne necessarium esse verum est impossibile'; nec sequitur `omnem hominem esse animal est per se primo modo, igitur omne risibile esse animal est per se primo modo; nec sequitur `omnem figuram planam etc. habere tres etc. est indemonstrabile, igitur triangulum habere tres etc. est indemonstrabile', nam in omnibus praedictis antecedentia sunt vera et consequentia falsa.	For in such cases they are not generally true; just as it does not hold that `every being is necessary to be in an act, therefore it is necessary for every man to be in an act'; nor does it follow that every animal is contingent to be an ass, therefore every man is contingent to be an ass; nor does it follow that 'it is impossible for everything necessary to be true, therefore it is impossible for everything necessary to be true'; nor does it follow that every human being is in itself an animal in the first way, therefore every laughable being is an animal in itself in the first way; nor does it follow that every figure is flat, etc. to have three etc. it is indemonstrable, therefore, that a triangle has three, etc. it is indemonstrable, for in all the aforesaid the antecedents are true and the consequent false.
Verumtamen sciendum est quod aliquando tales consequentiae sunt bonae et aliquando non; ad quod sciendum, videndum est an modus ƿ non possit competere antecedenti nisi competat consequenti.	Nevertheless, it must be known that sometimes such consequences are good and sometimes not; for this to be known, we must see whether the mode cannot be appropriate to the antecedent unless it is appropriate to the consequent.
Et tunc est consequentia talis bona et cum modo veritatis tenet, non autem cum modo necessitatis vel possibilitatis; et hoc quia consequentia ut nunc ex necessario potest sequi contingens et ex possibili impossibile.	And then such a consequence good and holds with the mode of truth, but not with the mode of necessity or possibility; and this is because now, the contingent can follow from the necessary, and the impossible from the possible.
Similiter, videndum est an talis modus possit competere uni convertibilium nisi conveniat reliquo; quia si non, a definitione distributa ad definitum distributum et e converso cum tali modo est bona consequentia.	Similarly, it must be seen whether such a mode can be appropriate to one of the convertibles unless it is appropriate to the rest; for if not, from the distributed definition to the distributed defined and vice versa, and in such a way is a good consequence.
Unde sequitur `omnem hominem esse animal est necessarium, igitur omne animal rationale mortale esse hominem est necessarium'. Si autem possit talis modus competere uni convertibilium ita quod non reliquo, non valet talis consequentia formaliter et universaliter.	Hence it follows that 'it is necessary for every man to be an animal, therefore it is necessary for every rational mortal animal to be a man'. Now, if such a mode can belong to one of the convertibles in such a way that it does not belong to the rest, such a consequence does not hold formally and universally.
Unde per ista duo potest sciri quando tales consequentiae ex talibus modalibus valent et quando non.	Hence by means of these two things it is possible to know when such consequences from such modals are valid and when they are not.
Alia regula est: a differentia superioris distributa ad inferius distributum est bona consequentia; sicut sequitur `omne sensibile est substantia, igitur omnis homo est substantia'.	There is another rule: from the difference of the superior distribution to the inferior distribution is a good consequence; as it follows, `everything sensible is a substance, therefore every man is a substance'.
Alia regula est: a convertibili cum superiori distributo ad inferius distributum est bona consequentia; sicut si vigilans vel dormiens sit convertibile cum animali, ista consequentia est bona `omne vigilans vel dormiens est coloratum, igitur omnis homo est coloratus'.	Another rule is: from the convertible with the superior distribution to the inferior distribution is a good consequence; just as if waking or sleeping is convertible with an animal, this consequence is good: `everything awake or sleeping is colored, therefore every man is colored.'
Alia regula est: a definitione superioris distributa --- et descriptione et nominis interpretatione --- ad inferius distributum est consequentia bona. Alia regula est quod quando contingit inferre definitum vel descriptum vel interpretatum cum distributione, contingit inferre definitionem, descriptionem et nominis interpretationem cum distributione.	Another rule is: from the superior distributed definition---and the description and the interpretation of the name---to the inferior distributed is a good consequence. Another rule is that when it happens to infer the defined or described or interpreted with distribution, it happens to infer the definition, description and interpretation of the name with distribution.
Et sunt istae regulae intelligendae sicut priores, ita scilicet quod omnes termini supponant personaliter et significative.	And these rules are to be understood in the same way as the previous ones, so of course that all the terms assume a personal and significant meaning.