Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 20

Latin	English
CAP. 20. DE REGULIS PER QUAS INFERTUR ALIQUID ESSE VEL NON ESSE PROPRIUM ALICUIUS.	Chapter 20. On the rules by which it is inferred that something is or is not a property of something else.
Istis visis ponendae sunt aliquae regulae quibus potest probari aliquid esse proprium vel non esse proprium alicuius. Et primo ad probandum proprium de aliquo, accipiendo proprium pro illo quod convenit omni et soli et semper et distinguitur ab omni genere, differentia et definitione et accidente et composito ex his; secundo circa proprium quod componitur ex genere et differentia etc..	Having seen these, some rules must be laid down by which it can be proved that something is a property or not a property of something else. And first, to prove a property of something, by taking the property for that which belongs to each and every thing and always and is distinguished from every genus, difference, definition and accident and is composed from them; secondly, about a property which is composed of genus and difference, etc.
Est igitur una regula ad probandum aliquid non esse proprium alicuius, talis: quod non est convertibile cum aliquo, non est proprium illius; sicut sequitur `posse movere se non est convertibile cum homine, igitur posse movere se non est proprium hominis'.	There is therefore one rule for proving that something is not a property of something, such that what is not convertible with something is not its property; as it follows, 'to be able to move oneself is not interchangeable with man, therefore, to be able to move oneself is not a property of man.'
Sciendum quod in isto consequente `posse movere se non est proprium hominis' subiectum non supponit personaliter, sed supponit pro uno praedicabili, sive illud sit intentio animae sive vox vel aliud signum ad placitum institutum, ideo vel supponit simpliciter vel materialiter.	It should be known that in this consequence, 'it is not the property of a man to be able to move himself,' the subject does not supposit personally, but it supposits as one predicable, whether it be the intention of the soul or the voice or some other sign established by convention, therefore it supposits either simply or materially.
Potest tamen inferri ex antecedente in quo omnes termini supponunt personaliter et significative, sic `aliud ab homine potest movere se, igitur ƿ posse movere se non est proprium hominis'; et sic `non omnis homo potest movere se, igitur posse movere se non est proprium hominis'.	It may, however, be inferred from the antecedent in which all the terms supposit personally and meaningfully, thus 'something other than man can move itself, therefore being able to move itself is not a property of man'; and thus 'not every man can move himself, therefore, to be able to move himself is not a property of man.'
Et etiam potest inferri ex antecedente in quo idem supponit simpliciter vel materialiter, sicut dictum est, <sic> `posse movere se non est convertibile cum homine, igitur posse movere se non est proprium hominis'.	And it can also be inferred from the antecedent in which the same thing supposits simply or materially, as it has been said, 'to be able to move oneself is not interchangeable with man, therefore to be able to move oneself is not the property of man.'
Et tenet quaelibet praedictarum consequentiarum per istam regulam `quod non est convertibile cum aliquo, non est proprium ipsius'. Et sicut est de ista regula, ita est de omnibus aliis circa proprium, quod quaelibet potest deservire uni consequentiae in qua omnes termini antecedentis supponunt personaliter et significative, et alteri in qua idem termini supponunt simpliciter vel materialiter in consequente sicut in antecedente.	And every one of the aforesaid consequences holds by this rule, 'that which is not convertible with something, is not a property of it.' And as it is with this rule, so it is with all others concerning property, that each may serve one consequence in which all the terms of the antecedent supposit personally and significantly, and another in which the same terms supposit simply or materially in the consequent as in the antecedent.
Alia regula est: illud quod significat vel consignificat vel connotat pauciora non est proprium illius quod significat vel connotat plura; sicut sequitur `homo connotat vel significat pauciora quam risibile, igitur homo non est proprium risibilis'.	Another rule is: that which signifies or consigns or connotes fewer is not a property of that which signifies or connotes more; as it follows, 'man connotes or signifies less than something that can laugh, therefore man is not the characteristic of something that can laugh'.
Ratio istius regulae est quod semper proprium magis natum est praedicari de illo cuius est proprium quam e converso et est magis propria praedicatio illa quam e converso. Nunc autem illud quod pauciora significat, --- accipiendo `significare' communiter, scilicet pro significare principaliter vel connotare vel consignificare ---, magis natum est subici quam illud quod plura significat.	Another rule is: that which signifies or conveys or connotes fewer is not proper to that which signifies or connotes more; as it follows, 'man connotes or signifies fewer than something that can laugh, therefore man is not the characteristic of something that can laugh'.
Et ideo illud quod pauciora significat numquam est proprium illius quod plura significat; et propter hoc `creativum' est proprium Dei, `creabile' est proprium creaturae, et sic de aliis. Alia quae sunt necessaria in scientiis specialibus circa naturam proprii sciri possunt per illas regulas quae dictae sunt, ubi dictum est de regulis deservientibus consequentiis in quibus omnes termini suppoƿnunt personaliter et significative.	And therefore that which signifies fewer is never a property of that which signifies more; and for this reason 'creative' is a property of God, 'creatable' is a property of creatures, and so on. Other things which are necessary in the specialized sciences concerning the nature of a property may be known by those rules which have been said, where it has been said about the rules governing the consequences in which all the terms supposit personally and meaningfully.
Ideo ista ad praesens de proprio, isto modo dicto, sufficiant ad probandum aliquid non esse proprium alicuius. Sed ad probandum aliquid esse proprium sufficit probare quod propositio in qua praedicatur de subiecto sit necessaria, et quod non sit per se primo modo dicendi per se, et quod sit convertibile cum subiecto, et quod praedicatum importet plura quam subiectum.	Therefore, for the present, these things about property, said in this mode, are sufficient to prove that something is not the property of something else. But in order to prove that something is a property, it is sufficient to prove that the proposition in which the subject is predicated is necessary, and that it is not per se in the first mode of saying per se, and that it is convertible with the subject, and that the predicate implies more than the subject.
Ut sic ista possit esse descriptio proprii: proprium est praedicabile necessario de subiecto per se secundo modo, plura importans quam subiectum convertibile cum eodem. Per primam particulam excluditur accidens, quod vocatur contingenter praedicabile; per secundam excluditur tam genus quam differentia; per tertiam excluditur quodlibet subiectum respectu proprii; per quartam excluditur proprium communioris.	So that this can be a description of property: a property is necessarily predicable of the subject in itself in the second mode, importing more than the subject that is convertible with the same. By the first particle an accident is excluded, which is called contingently predicable; by the second both genus and difference are excluded; by the third every subject is excluded with respect to itself; by the fourth the property of a commoner thing is excluded.
Et est notandum quod proprium hic definitum et propria passio convertuntur, et tamen proprium alicuius et passio eiusdem non convertuntur. Unde aliquid est passio hominis, et tamen non est proprium hominis; sicut propria passio animalis est etiam passio hominis, et tamen non est proprium hominis.	And it must be noted that the property defined here and that the properties attribute are converted, and yet a property of something and an attribute of the same are not converted. Hence something is an attribute of man, and yet it is not a property of man; just as the properties attribute of an animal is also the attribute of man, and yet it is not a property of a man.
Et si dicatur quod tunc divisio universalium non est sufficiens in genus, differentiam, speciem, proprium et accidens, quia aliquid est praedicabile de homine quod neque est accidens homini, neque proprium, neque genus, neque species, neque differentia ipsius: Dicendum quod ista divisio bene intellecta est sufficiens.	And if it be said that then the division of universals into genus, difference, species, property, and accident is not sufficient, because there is something predicable of man which is neither accidental to man, nor a property, nor a genus, nor a species, nor his difference: it must be said that this division is well understood and sufficient.
Unde omne praedicabile de homine, commune omnibus hominibus, est genus vel differentia vel species vel proprium vel accidens; non tamen ex hoc sequitur quod omne tale sit genus hominis vel species hominis vel differentia hominis vel proprium hominis vel accidens hominis, quia proprium animalis praedicatur de homine, et est proprium, quamvis non sit proprium hominis, est tamen passio hominis.	Hence everything that can be predicated of man, common to all men, is a genus, or difference, or species, or property, or accident; yet it does not follow from this that every such thing is the genus of man, or the species of man, or the difference of man, or the property of man, or the accident of man, because a property of an animal is predicated of man, and is a property, although it is not a property of man, yet it is an attribute of man.
Et ita proprium et passio convertuntur, et tamen proprium hominis et passio hominis non ƿ convertuntur. Aliter potest dici quod ibi accipitur proprium large pro passione praedicabili per se secundo modo.	And thus property and attribute are converted, and yet a property of a man and an attribute of a man are not converted. In another way it may be said that there property is taken freely for an attribute predicable by itself in the second mode.
Ex praedictis potest patere quod omnia talia sunt propria Dei `creativum', `gubernativum',	From the aforesaid it is clear that all such things are properies of God, 'creative', 'governing',
'redemptivum', `beatificativum' et huiusmodi. Similiter omnia talia `posse peccare', `posse mereri', `posse recipere beatitudinem', `posse damnari' et huiusmodi sunt propria creaturae rationalis.	'redemptive', 'beatificative' and the like. Similarly, all such things as 'able to sin,' 'able to earn,' 'able to receive happiness,' 'able to be damned,' and the like are proper to rational creatures.
Est autem notandum quod ista non dicuntur propria rerum extra, sed sunt propria intentionum seu conceptuum animae vel vocum seu aliorum signorum ad placitum institutorum, quia cum talibus terminis convertuntur et de eis convertibiliter praedicantur, et de quocumque dicitur unum et reliquum.	Now it is to be noted that these are not said to be properties of external things, but are properties of the intentions or concepts of the soul or to words or other signs established by convention, because they are converted with such terms and are reversibly predicated of them, and of whatever is said one and all.
Et hoc est verum quando omnes termini istarum propositionum supponunt personaliter et significative. Ultimo sciendum quod proprium incomplexum aliquando sumitur large, et tunc non requiritur quod necessario praedicetur de suo subiecto, sed sufficit quod non sit possibile simul esse exsistere verificari de suo subiecto et ipsum negari a suo subiecto.	And this is true when all the terms of these propositions supposit personally and meaningfully. Finally, it must be known that a complex property is sometimes taken for granted, and then it is not required that it necessarily be predicated of its subject, but it is sufficient that it is not possible for it to be verified to exist for its subject and at the same time for the same thing to be denied for its subject.
Et sic `creari' potest dici proprium entis ut ens est praecise commune creaturis, quia quamvis haec non sit necessaria `ens creatur', tamen ista non stant simul `ens est' --- accipiendo ens praecise pro creaturis sive aliis a Deo --- et `ens non est creatura'.	And thus 'to be created' can be said to be a property of being, as being is precisely common to creatures, because although this is not necessary, 'a being is created', yet these do not stand at the same time: 'a being is' --- taking a being precisely for creatures or others from God --- and 'a being is not a creature'.
Sic etiam `maius sua parte' potest dici proprium `totius', quia quamvis haec non sit necessaria `omne totum est maius sua parte', quia si nullum totum esset, --- quod est possibile per potentiam divinam ---, nullum totum esset maius sua parte; tamen ista non stant simul `aliquod totum est' et `totum non est maius sua parte'.	Thus also 'greater in its own part' can be called the property 'whole', because although this is not necessary, 'every whole is greater in its own part', because if there were no whole, which is possible through divine power, no whole would be greater in its own part; yet these things do not stand at the same time as 'something is a whole' and 'a whole is not greater than its part.'
Similiter, `habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis' dicitur esse passio trianguli, et tamen haec non est necessaria `triangulus habet tres' etc.. Unde breviter dicendo: frequenter per tales propositiones quae ponuntur necessariae intelliguntur propositiones condicionales vel propositiones de possibili vel aequivalentes eis, quae necessariae sunt.	Similarly, 'having three angles equal to two right angles' is said to be an attribute of a triangle, and yet this is not necessary: ​​'a triangle has three' etc. Hence, briefly speaking, frequently by such propositions which are considered necessary are meant conditional propositions or propositions about the possible or equivalent to those that are necessary.
Aliƿquando autem accipitur proprium stricte, et sic definitur prius, quod est `necessario praedicabile' etc.. Et si quaeratur an proprium sive passio possit esse sine suo subiecto, dicendum est quod de virtute sermonis debet concedi quod subiectum potest esse naturaliter sine sua propria passione et similiter propria passio potest esse sine suo subiecto, quia passio non est nisi intentio sive conceptus animae vel signum ad placitum institutum.	Sometimes, however, property is taken strictly, and is thus defined first, which is 'necessarily predicable', etc. And if it is asked whether a property or an attribute can exist without its subject, it must be said that from the power of speech it must be granted that a subject can naturally exist without its own attribute, and similarly the properties attribute can exist without its subject, because an attribute is nothing but an intention or concept of the soul or a sign instituted by convention.
Et similiter est de subiecto.	And the same is true of the subject.
Et manifestum est quod haec intentio potest esse sine illa et e converso et similiter hoc signum ad placitum institutum potest esse sine illo et e converso. Sed quod auctores dicunt quod subiectum non potest esse sine sua propria passione nec e converso, debet sic intelligi, quod scilicet propositio non potest esse falsa in qua praedicatur proprium vel passio de suo subiecto, omnibus terminis supponentibus personaliter et significative, si sit passio primo modo dicta.	And it is clear that this intention can be without it and vice versa, and similarly this sign can be established at will without it and vice versa. But what the authors say, that the subject cannot be without its own attribute, and vice versa, must be understood in this way, namely, that a proposition cannot be false in which a property or attribute is predicated of its subject, with all the terms suppositing personally and significantly, if the attribute is said in the first mode.
Si autem sit passio secundo modo dicta, tunc non poterit talis propositio esse falsa si esse exsistere verificetur de suo subiecto supponente personaliter. Sicut quamvis haec intentio `rudibilis' possit esse in anima nullo asino exsistente et etiam hac intentione `asinus' non existente in anima et e converso, tamen impossibile est quod haec sit falsa `omnis asinus est rudibilis' dum haec est vera `asinus est'.	But if the attribute is said in the second mode, then such a proposition cannot be false if it is verified that it exists in relation to its suppositing subject personally. Just as although this intention 'tamable' can exist in the soul without a donkey existing and also this intention be 'donkey' does not exist in the soul and vice versa, it is still impossible for this to be false 'every donkey is tamable' while this is true 'a donkey exists'.
Et isto modo debent glossari omnes auctoritates quae dicunt quod subiectum non potest esse sine proprio vel sine sua propria passione et e converso.	And in this way must be glossed all the statements which say that a subject cannot exist without its property attribute or vice versa.