Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 19

Latin	English
CAP. 19. DE REGULIS PER QUAS INFERTUR ALIQUID ESSE PROPRIUM ALTERIUS.	Chapter 19. On the rules by which it is inferred that some thing is a property of another.
Post haec dicendum est de regulis deservientibus consequentiis per quas infertur aliquid esse proprium alterius.	After this we must discuss the rules governing the consequences by which it is inferred that something is the property of another.
Et primo videndum est de quibusdam distinctionibus proprii, quia aequivoce accipitur hoc nomen `proprium' in diversis locis. Est autem una distinctio talis quod proprium quoddam est per se et quoddam ad aliud. Proprium per se dicitur quod non est respectivum, sicut `immortale', `susceptibile disciplinae' est proprium; proprium ad aliud est aliquid respectivum, sicut `imperativum' est proprium animae respectu corporis. ƿ Alia divisio est quod proprium quoddam est quod semper praedicatur, quoddam quod non semper praedicatur sed quandoque.	And first of all we must see about certain distinctions of properties, because this name `property' is taken equivocally in different places. Now there is one such distinction as that which is a property of one thing per se (by itself) and something else of another. What is said to be a property per se is that which is not relative, as `immortal', `susceptible to discipline' are proper; what is proper to another is something relative, just as the `imperative' is proper to the soul in relation to the body. Another division is that there is a kind of property which is always predicated, and another which is not always predicated but sometimes.
Alia divisio quod quoddam proprium est per se et semper, quoddam quod non est per se et semper. Proprium per se et semper est quod inest omni contento sub illo cuius est proprium et semper.	Another division is that something is a property per se (by itself) and always, and something else that is not by itself and always. What is a property in itself and always is that which is in every content under that of which it is a property and always.
Quod est intelligendum quando de subiecto verificatur esse exsistere. Alia divisio est quod quoddam proprium est quod soli competit et semper, aliud est proprium per quod evidenter illud cuius est proprium separatur ab omni alio, hoc est per quod tamquam per notius potest inferri distinctio illius ab omni alio. Primum est sicut `risibile'; secundum est sicut `animal rationale susceptibile disciplinae'. Ponatur hoc esse proprium hominis. Alia divisio est quod proprium idem est quod `convertibile', et sic potest vocari definitio proprium.	This is to be understood when the subject is verified to exist. Another division is that there is a certain property which belongs in itself and always; there is another property by which that of which it is a property is evidently separated from everything else; The first is like `laughable'; the second is like a rational animal susceptible to discipline. This is supposed to be the property of man. Another division is that property is the same as 'convertible', and this can be called the definition of a property.
Aliud est proprium quod praedicatur secundo modo dicendi per se de subiecto, et vocatur propria passio subiecti. Aliae distinctiones possent poni, sed ad praesens istae sufficiant. Est autem primo sciendum quod proprium non est aliqua res realiter inhaerens subiecto, sed est quoddam praedicabile de subiecto; et ista est distincta animae intentio vel terminus distinctus a subiecto. Secundo sciendum quod Philosophus in IV Topicorum non accipit proprium pro illo quod distinguitur a definitione, sed in multis locis accipit proprium pro illo per quod evidenter, tamquam per notius, potest inferri illud cuius est proprium distingui ab omni alio, sive tale proprium sit definitio explicans quid nominis sive quid rei, sive sit aliqua oratio includens definitionem et proprias passiones, sive quodcumƿque aliud.	Another thing is a property that is predicated by itself (per se) in the second mode of speaking of the subject, and is called the proper attribute of the subject. Other distinctions might be made, but these will suffice for the present. But first of all it must be known that the property is not some thing really inherent in the subject, but is something that can be predicated of the subject; and this is the distinct intention of the soul or distinct boundary from the subject. Secondly, it must be known that the Philosopher in Topics 4 does not take the property for that which is distinguished from the definition, but in many places he takes the property for that by which it is evidently, as if by a better known way, it can be inferred that the thing associated with the property is distinguished from everything else, whether such a property is a definition explaining what is a name or what is a thing, or whether it is some speech including definition and property attributes, or something else.
Et de tali proprio loquuntur multae considerationes Philosophi. Sciendum tamen quod aliquando proprium accipitur magis stricte, pro oratione scilicet composita ex genere et differentiis accidentalibus, per quam evidenter et sufficienter potest inferri differentia illius cuius est proprium ab omni alio. Et de tali proprio intelliguntur multae considerationes Philosophi in V Topicorum, sicut patebit in prosequendo.	And many considerations of the Philosophers speak of such a property. It must be known, however, that sometimes the property is taken more strictly, that is, as speech composed of kind and accidental differences, by which the difference of that which is a property from everything else can be clearly and sufficiently inferred. And of such a property many considerations of the Philosopher in Topic 5 are meant, as will be clear in what follows.