Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 22

Latin	English
CAP. 22. DE DEFINITIONE: QUID SIT?.	Chapter 22. On definition: What is it?
Ad sciendum de aliquo an sit definitio alicuius vel non, oportet primo videre quid sit definitio et quot modis dicatur. Secundo videndum est de principali proposito.	In order to know about something whether there is a definition of it or not, it is necessary first to see what a definition is and how many ways it is said. Secondly, we must look at the principal proposition.
ƿ Circa primam sciendum est quod omnis definitio vel est conceptus mentis vel oratio ad placitum significativa; ita scilicet quod omnis definitio vel est oratio in mente, hoc est unum compositum ex multis naturaliter significativis, vel est oratio ad placitum instituta.	With regard to the first, it must be known that every definition is either a mental concept or a speech signifying by convention; so, of course, that every definition is either a speech in the mind, that is, one composed of many naturally significant terms, or it is a sspeech established by convention.
Hoc patet per Aristotelem in diversis locis, scilicet in I Topicorum et in VII, et in VIII Metaphysicae, et in II Posteriorum, qui ubique, definiens definitionem, dicit quod est oratio indicans quidditatem rei.	This is clear from Aristotle in different places, namely in Topics 1 and 7, and in Metaphysics 8, and in Posterior Analytics 2, who everywhere, defining definition, says that it is a speech indicating the reality of a thing.
Ex isto sequitur quod definitio non est idem realiter cum definito, quia sicut vox, quae est oratio ad placitum instituta, non est realiter unum nomen, sicut haec oratio `animal rationale mortale' non est hoc nomen `homo', ita unum compositum in mente ex multis conceptibus sive intentionibus quarum una est communis omnibus illis quibus definitum est commune et pluribus, non est realiter illa intentio quae est praecise communis omnibus illis quibus est tota definitio communis.	From this it follows that the definition is not really the same as the defined, because just as a word, which is a speech established by convention, is not really a single name, just as this speech 'rational mortal animal' is not this name 'man,' so one compound in the mind from many concepts or intentions, one of which is common to all those to whom the definition is common and shared by many, is not really that intention which is exactly common to all those to whom the whole definition is common.
Tamen non obstante quod definitio et definitum non sint idem realiter, tamen significant idem realiter. Similiter, de definitione et definito, supponentibus personaliter et significative, vere praedicatur `esse idem realiter'.	However, despite the fact that the definition and the defined are not really the same thing, they really mean the same thing. Similarly, of the definition and the defined, which stand personally and meaningfully, it is truly predicated 'to be the same in reality'.
Unde quamvis haec definitio `animal rationale' et hoc definitum `homo' non sint idem realiter, tamen haec est vera `homo et animal rationale sunt idem realiter'; sed per istam `homo et animal rationale sunt idem realiter' non denotatur quod haec definitio et hoc definitum sint idem realiter, sed denotatur quod eadem res importatur per istam definitionem et per illud definitum.	Therefore, although this definition 'rational animal' and this defined term 'man' are not really the same thing, yet this is true: 'man and rational animal are really the same thing'; but by this 'man and rational animal are really the same' it is not denoted that this definition and this defined are really the same, but it is denoted that the same thing is implied by this definition and by that defined.
Et sic intelligendae sunt omnes auctoritates quae dicunt ƿ quod definitio et definitum sunt idem realiter; quia semper per talem propositionem, quae secundum proprietatem sermonis est actus exercitus, intelligunt unum actum signatum, scilicet quod de definitione et de definito vere praedicatur esse idem realiter; quae non debet sic exerceri `definitio et definitum sunt idem realiter', sed debet sic exerceri `homo et animal rationale sunt idem realiter' et `animal et substantia animata sensibilis sunt idem realiter', et sic de aliis.	And thus are to be understood all the statements by authorities which say that the definition and the defined are really the same thing; because always by such a proposition, which according to the property of speech is an act of exercise, they understand one settled act, namely, that the definition and the defined are truly predicated of being the same in reality; which should not be applied as 'definition and defined are really the same', but should be applied as 'man and rational animal are really the same' and 'animal and sensible animate substance are really the same', and so on.
Sic igitur patet quod definitio est oratio.	It is clear, then, that a definition is a speech.
Et sicut triplex est oratio, scilicet concepta tantum, sive exsistens in mente tantum, et prolata et scripta, sic triplex est definitio: una exsistens in mente tantum, quae praecise componitur ex intentionibus sive conceptibus mentis; alia prolata, scilicet composita ex vocibus; tertia scripta, composita ex scriptis.	And just as speech is threefold, that is, conceived only, or existing only in the mind, and spoken and written, so is the definition threefold: one existing only in the mind, which is precisely composed from the intentions or concepts of the mind; others are pronounced, that is to say, composed of words; the third in writing, composed of written text.
Sed differentia est inter istas definitiones, quia definitio exsistens in mente tantum est naturaliter definitio, sicut naturaliter importat quidditatem rei; aliae definitiones non sunt definitiones nisi ad placitum, sicut nec significant quidditatem rei nisi ad placitum.	But there is a difference between these definitions, because only a definition existing in the mind is naturally a definition, as it naturally conveys the reality of a thing; other definitions are not definitions except by convention, just as they do not signify the identity of a thing except by convention.
Aliud est sciendum: quod definitio, quamvis sit oratio, tamen non est propositio vel enuntiatio. Est etiam sciendum quod cum dicitur `definitio est oratio indicans quidditatem rei', li definitio non supponit pro se, scilicet pro uno communi omnibus definitionibus, sed supponit pro ipsis definitionibus, quarum nulla est hoc commune `definitio', sicut nullus homo est hoc commune `homo'.	Another thing to know is that a definition, although it is a speech, is not a proposition or a statement. It must also be known that when it is said that 'a definition is an expression indicating the reality of a thing', the definition does not stand for itself, that is, for one common to all definitions, but it stands for the definitions themselves, of which there is no common 'definition', just as no man is this common 'man'.