Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 23

Latin	English
CAP. 23. QUOT MODIS DICITUR DEFINITIO.	Chapter 23. In how many modes a definition is stated.
Viso in generali quid est definitio, videndum est quot modis dicatur, ponendo scilicet aliquas distinctiones de definitione. ƿ Est autem una distinctio talis, quod definitionum quaedam exprimit quid rei et quaedam quid nominis.	Having seen in general what a definition is, it is necessary to see in how many modes it is said, namely by putting some distinctions about the definition. Now there is one such distinction, that some of the definitions express what is the thing and some (express) what is the name.
Definitio exprimens quid rei non potest competere nisi definito quod importat veras res, cuiusmodi sunt definitiones hominis et asini et sic de aliis. Definitio exprimens quid nominis est quando exprimitur significatum vocabuli, quid scilicet debemus per vocabulum intelligere.	A definition expressing what a thing is cannot be appropriate unless it is defined as conveying true things, such as the definitions of a man and a donkey and so on. A definition expressing what the name is when the meaning of the term is expressed, that is, what we must understand by the term.
Et talis definitio potest competere definitis de quibus nihil vere praedicatur; et isto modo `vacuum', `infinitum', `chimaera' et huiusmodi definiuntur. Et non solum talia, sed etiam illa quae aliquid significant et aliquid connotant, cuiusmodi sunt `motus', `tempus', `pater', `album', `populus', `exercitus' et huiusmodi. Alia divisio definitionum est quod quaedam est proprie dicta, illa scilicet quae datur per genus et differentiam essentialem, sive illa quae datur per talia quorum nullum importat vel connotat aliquid extrinsecum illi quod importatur per definitum. Alia est definitio data per additamentum, quae scilicet habet aliquam partem importantem aliquid extrinsecum illi quod importatur per definitum; sicut definitur anima, quod est `actus corporis' etc.. Patet enim quod corpus importat aliquid extrinsecum animae.	And such a definition may belongs to those defined about which nothing is really predicated; and in this way 'empty', 'infinite', 'chimera' and the like are defined. And not only such things, but also those which signify something and connote something, such as 'motion', 'time', 'father', 'white', 'people', 'exercise' and the like. Another division of definitions is that some are properly so called, that is, that which is given by genus and essential difference, or that which is given by such things as none of which implies or connotes anything external to that which is implied by the defined thing. There is another definition given by addition, which, of course, has some important part, something external to that which is implied by what is defined; as the soul is defined, which is the 'act of the body', etc. For it is clear that the body implies something external to the soul.
Ita etiam est de ista definitione albedinis `albedo est color disgregativus visus'. Alia divisio est quod definitionum non indicantium aliquid extrinsecum rei quaedam datur per genus et differentias essentiales, quaedam per genus et nomina exprimentia partes essentiales, quaedam per genus et nomina exprimentia partes integrales.	This is also the case with the definition of whiteness, 'whiteness is the color of disintegrative vision'. Another division is that of the definitions which do not indicate anything external to the thing, some are given by genus and essential differences, some by genus and nouns expressing essential parts, some by genus and nouns expressing integral parts.
Exemplum primi `animal rationale' est definitio hominis; exemplum secundi `substantia composita ex corpore et anima intellectiva' est definitio hominis; exemplum tertii `figura tribus lineis contenta' est definitio trianguli.	An example of the first: 'rational animal' is the definition of man; an example of the second is the definition of man, 'a substance composed of body and intellectual soul'; A third example is the definition of a triangle as a figure consisting of three lines.
Alia divisio, quod definitionum quaedam data est per aliqua quoƿrum unum est magis commune et aliud minus commune; ita tamen quod unum illorum sit convertibile cum definito, sicut hic `animal rationale'.	Another division, that some definitions are given by some of which one is more common and another less common; so, however, that one of them is convertible with the thing defined, as here: 'rational animal.'
Quaedam est definitio data per aliqua quorum quodlibet est in plus quam illud definitum, et nullum est superius ad reliquum, et aliqua illorum sunt talia quod nullum eorum est sub reliquo et tamen totum est convertibile cum definito.	There is a certain definition given by some, each of which is defined in more than that, and none is above the rest, and some of them are such that none of them is below the rest, and yet the whole is convertible with the defined.
Sicut si homo definiatur sic `homo est animal intelligibile', ut videlicet `intelligibile' sit commune homini et angelo, nam hoc totum `animal intelligibile' est convertibile cum homine et tamen nec `animal' nec `intelligibile' est convertibile cum homine.	Just as if man is defined as 'man is an intelligible animal,' that is to say, 'intelligible' is common to man and angel, for this whole 'intelligible animal' is convertible with man, and yet neither 'animal' nor 'intelligible' is convertible with man.
Ex omnibus praedictis patet quod quando aliquid concluditur esse definitio vel non esse definitio alicuius, subiectum talis propositionis non supponit personaliter et significative sed simpliciter vel materialiter.	From all the above it is clear that when something is concluded to be the definition or not to be the definition of something, the subject of such a statement does not supposit personally and significantly but simply or materially.
Sicut si probetur quod `substantia animata sensibilis' non est definitio hominis, hoc subiectum `substantia animata sensibilis' non supponit pro re sed pro intentione animae vel pro signo ad placitum instituto.	Just as if it is proved that 'sensible animate substance' is not the definition of man, this subject 'sensible animate substance' does not supposit as a thing but as an intention of the soul or as a sign established by convention.
Similiter si probetur ista propositio `animal rationale est definitio hominis', subiectum non supponit personaliter sed simpliciter vel materialiter, et hoc si consequentia sit bona. Tamen de virtute sermonis quaelibet propositio talis est distinguenda penes tertium modum aequivocationis.	Similarly, if this proposition, 'a rational animal is the definition of man', is proved, the subject does not presuppose personally but simply or materially, and this if the consequence is good. However, with regard to the power of speech, any proposition of this kind is to be distinguished under the third mode of equivocation.