Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 30

Latin	English
CAP. 30. DE REGULIS DESERVIENTIBUS CONSEQUENTIIS QUAE SUNT DE EODEM ET DIVERSO.	Chapter 30. On the rules governing consequences that are the same and different.
Istis visis ponendae sunt aliquae regulae Aristotelis de `eodem'. Et est una talis: si principale est idem principali, et coniugatum est idem coniugato, et casus casui.	As these have been seens, some of Aristotle's rules about `the same' must be put in place. And there is one such: if the principal is the same as the principal, the conjugate is the same as the conjugate, and the case is (the same as) the case.
Ista regula tenet e converso sicut sic, quamvis ista regula non sit ita generalis sicut `si coniugatum de coniugato et principale de principali'. Nam non sequitur `album est dulce, ƿ igitur albedo est dulcedo', sed bene sequitur `album et dulce sunt idem, hoc est, habent eandem definitionem vel unum est definitio alterius; igitur albedo et dulcedo sunt idem, hoc est, habent eandem definitionem'.	This rule holds the other way around, even though this rule is not as general, as 'if the conjugate of the conjugate and the principal of the principal'. For it does not follow that `a white thing is sweet, therefore whiteness is sweet', but it follows well that `white and sweet are the same,' that is, they have the same definition, or one is the definition of the other; Therefore whiteness and sweetness are the same, that is, they have the same definition.
Sciendum est tamen quod ista regula non valet nisi quando coniugatum non mutat significationem principalem.	It must be known, however, that this rule is valid only when the conjugate does not change the main meaning.
Alia regula est: si oppositum est idem opposito, et propositum est idem proposito. Alia regula est: si sint eaedem generationes et corruptiones, effectiva et corruptiva sunt eadem, hoc est, nomina eis correspondentia habent eandem definitionem.	Another rule is: if the opposite is the same as the opposite, and the purpose is the same as the purpose. Another rule is: if there are the same generations and corruptions, the productive and the corruptive are the same, that is, the names corresponding to them have the same definition.
Alia regula est: si aliquid dicitur de duobus per superabundantiam, oportet illa esse idem numero vel oportet unum contineri sub altero.	Another rule is: if something is said about two by superabundance, they must be the same in number, or one must be contained under the other.
Sciendum quod aliter accipit hic Philosophus `idem numero' et in I Topicorum. Accipit enim `idem numero' hic pro synonymis, ibi autem accipit `unum numero' pro uno quod non est multa.	It should be noted that the Philosopher takes this 'same number' differently in Topic 1. For he takes `the same number' here for synonyms, but there he takes `one number' for one, which is not many.
Pro quo est intelligendum quod aliqua esse idem, hoc est, aliqua habere eandem definitionem, contingit dupliciter: vel quod habeant eandem definitionem convertibilem cum utroque, et illa dicuntur esse `unum numero' in proposito, et sunt synonyma.	For which it is to be understood that some things are the same, that is, some things have the same definition, it happens in two ways: either that they have the same definition which is convertible with both, and otherwise they are said to be 'one in number' in the proposition, and are synonymous.
Vel possunt aliqua habere eandem definitionem, ita tamen quod est convertibilis cum uno et non cum reliquo; sicut `homo' et `animal' habent eandem definitionem, ita tamen quod est convertibilis cum uno et non cum reliquo, et talia sunt ordinata secundum superius et inferius.	Or some things may have the same definition, yet so that it is convertible with one and not with the rest; just as `man' and `animal' have the same definition, yet so it is convertible with one and not with the other, and such are ordered according to the superior and the inferior.
Alia regula est: quae non sunt eadem eidem, non sunt eadem inter se.	Another rule is that things which are not the same in relation to the same thing are not the same among themselves.
Alia regula est: quando illa quibus aliqua accidunt non sunt idem vel e converso, ipsa non sunt eadem inter se. Alia regula est: quae non sunt in eodem praedicamento, ipsa non ƿ sunt eadem; sicut `homo' et `albedo' non sunt idem, quia non sunt in eodem praedicamento. Notandum est hic quod quamvis illa quae sunt in diversis praedicamentis de se mutuo praedicentur, sicut tales sunt verae `homo est pater', `animal est quantitas', `Sortes et Plato sunt duo', et sic de aliis, tamen numquam talia sunt idem, hoc est, numquam habent eandem definitionem. Quamvis enim homo sit pater et similiter paternitas, si paternitas supponat pro aliqua una re, tamen alia est definitio hominis et patris sive paternitatis. Et ita ista regula est generalis, quod numquam illa quae sunt in diversis praedicamentis sunt idem, non obstante quod unum talium vere praedicetur de reliquo et universaliter sumpto. Ex quo sequitur quod ex ista regula non potest argui quod unum praedicamentum non praedicetur de reliquo. Unde sicut homo et album non sunt idem, loquendo de `eodem' sicut accipitur in proposito, et tamen hoc non obstante homo vere est albus, nec album est alia res ab homine, ita non obstante quod substantia et quantitas non sunt idem accipiendo `idem' sicut hic accipitur, quia scilicet non habent eandem definitionem, tamen substantia vere et realiter est quantitas, secundum principia Aristotelis. Ita est etiam de linea, superficie et corpore quod non sunt idem, et tamen vere linea est corpus et superficies et e converso. Notandum est etiam quod ista regula intelligenda est de illis quae sunt in praedicamento. Si enim aliqua non sunt in praedicamento, tunc non sequitur `non sunt in eodem praedicamento, igitur non sunt idem'. Alia regula est: illa quae non habent idem genus proximum, non sunt idem.	Another rule is: when those things to which things happen are not the same, or vice versa, they are not the same with each other. Another rule is: things which are not in the same category are not the same; just as `man' and `whiteness' are not the same, because they are not in the same category. It must be noted here that although those things which are in different categories are mutually predicated of each other, such as such truths as `man is the father', `an animal is quantity', `Socrates and Plato are two', and so on of others, yet such things are never the same, that is, they never have the same definition. For although a man is a father and so is paternity, if paternity presupposes a single thing, yet the definition of man and father or paternity is different. And so this is a general rule, that things which are in different categories are never the same, notwithstanding that one such thing is truly predicated of the rest and taken universally. From which it follows that from this rule it cannot be argued that one category is not predicated of the rest. Hence, just as man and white are not the same, speaking of the same thing as it is taken in the purpose, and yet notwithstanding this man is truly white, and the white thing is not a different thing from the man, so notwithstanding that substance and quantity are not the same by taking `the same' as here understood, because of course they do not have the same definition, yet substance is truly and really quantity, according to the principles of Aristotle. It is the same with line, surface, and body, that they are not the same, and yet really line is body and surface, and vice versa. It must also be noted that this rule is to be understood in terms of what is in the category. For if some are not in a category, then it does not follow that they are not in the same category, therefore they are not the same. There is another rule: those things which do not have the same neighboring species are not the same.
Et debet ista regula intelligi sicut prior. Alia regula est: illa quae non habent eandem differentiam, non sunt idem. Et intelligitur sicut duae praecedentes. Alia regula est: illa quorum unum suscipit magis et minus et reliquum non suscipit magis et minus, non sunt idem. ƿ Notandum quod ista regula intelligenda est sicut praecedentes, videlicet quando unum suscipit magis et minus et non reliquum non sunt idem, hoc est, non habent eandem definitionem. Hoc tamen non obstante unum poterit vere praedicari de reliquo. Nam album suscipit magis et minus et homo non suscipit magis et minus, et tamen homo vere est albus. Similiter ignis non suscipit magis et minus et calidum suscipit magis et minus, et tamen omnis ignis est calidus; sed ignis et calidum non sunt idem, hoc est, non habent eandem definitionem. Per istud patet quod talia argumenta non valent `homo non est magis et minus substantia et est magis et minus quantus, igitur homo est alia res a quanto'; sed sequitur `igitur homo et quantum non sunt idem, hoc est, non habent eandem definitionem'. Alia regula est: quando aliqua suscipiunt magis et minus sed non simul, non sunt idem; sicut album et simile suscipiunt magis et minus sed tamen non simul, quia aliquando ex hoc quod aliquid fit albius, fit minus simile minus albo, ideo album et simile non sunt idem.	And this rule must be understood as before. Another rule is that things that do not have the same difference are not the same. And it is understood like the two preceding ones. Another rule is: those of which one receives more and less and the other does not receive more and less, they are not the same. It should be noted that this rule is to be understood like the previous ones, that is to say, when one receives more and less and not the rest, they are not the same, that is, they do not have the same definition. Yet notwithstanding this, the one may truly be predicated of the rest. For white receives more and less, and man does not receive more and less, and yet man is truly white. Similarly, fire does not receive more and less, and heat receives more and less, and yet all fire is hot; but fire and heat are not the same, that is, they do not have the same definition. From this it is clear that such arguments are not valid: 'man is not more or less substance and is more or less a quantity, therefore man is a different thing from a quantity'; but it follows that `man and quantity are not the same, that is, they do not have the same definition. Another rule is: when some things receive more and less but not at the same time, they are not the same; just as white and similar receive more and less, but still not at the same time, because sometimes from the fact that something becomes white, it becomes less similar to a less white thing, therefore white and similar are not the same.
Et est ista regula intelligenda sicut priores, scilicet quod non habent eandem definitionem; tamen cum hoc stat quod unum vere praedicetur de reliquo et quod nulla res importetur per unum quin importetur per reliquum.	And this rule is to be understood like the previous ones, namely that they do not have the same definition; yet when this stands, that one thing is truly predicated of the rest, and that no thing is imported by one without being imported by the other.
Sed in tali casu requiritur quod aliquid significetur vel consignificetur per unum quod non eodem modo importetur per reliquum; sicut se habent `album' et `simile' sive `quale' et `simile'.	But in such a case it is required that something be signified or connoted by one thing which is not in the same way imported by the rest; just as `white' and `similar' or `such' and 'similar' are related.
Nam nihil importatur per `quale' quin importetur per `simile' et e converso. Non tamen eodem modo; nam `quale' importat omne subiectum qualitatis praecise in recto, `simile' importat subiectum tam in recto quam in obliquo, et hoc saltem aequivalenter. Quod patet per definitionem `similis'. Nam `simile' definitur sic, vel est definitio aequivalens suae definitioni: simile est quale coexsistens, hoc est simul tempore exsistens, cum alio habente qualitatem eiusdem speciei specialissimae. Hoc patet, quod ƿ in ista definitione ponitur unum nomen in recto, significans subiectum qualitatis, et aliud in obliquo, similiter significans subiectum qualitatis.	For nothing is implied by `such' (quale) without being implied by `like' (simile) and vice versa. However, not in the same way; for "like" implies every subject of quality precisely and directly, "like" implies a subject both directly and obliquely, and this at least equivalently. This is clear from the definition of 'like'. For 'like' (simile) is defined as follows, or is a definition equivalent to its own definition: like is coexisting with such, that is, existing at the same time, with another having the quality of the same very special species. This is clear, because in this definition one noun is placed directly, signifying the subject of quality, and another obliquely, similarly signifying the subject of quality.
Ex isto patet quod per istam regulam non potest probari quod `simile' importet aliam rem a re importata per `quale', et ita non potest probari per istam regulam quod relatio est alia res ab absoluto.	From this it is clear that it cannot be proved by this rule that 'like' imports another thing from the thing imported by 'such', and so it cannot be proved by this rule that a relation is another thing from the absolute.
Per idem etiam patet quomodo linea, superficies et corpus sunt idem realiter, hoc est, quod realiter linea est superficies et corpus et e converso. Et tamen aliquando eadem linea est maior et superficies minor et corpus minus, sine additione omnis novae rei inhaerentis vel facientis unum cum priori, et e converso contingit similiter.	By the same thing it is also clear how line, surface and body are really the same, that is, that really line is surface and body and vice versa. And yet sometimes the same line is larger and the surface smaller and the body smaller, without the addition of any new thing inherent in or forming one with the former, and the reverse is likewise the case.
Unde si aliqua res, puta corpus, trahatur in longum et non in latum, linea est modo maior quam prius et superficies non est maior, sed poterit esse minor, et tamen eadem res est linea et superficies.	Hence, if a thing, such as a solid body, is drawn lengthwise and not in breadth, the line is only greater than before, and the surface is not greater, but may be smaller, and yet the line and the surface are the same thing.
Nec aliqua res est addita, nec aliqua res quae fuit pars est deperdita, sed solum dicitur ista linea maior quia illud corpus modo coexsistit corpori longiori, vel coexsisteret si aliud corpus illud ambiret.	Neither is any thing added, nor is any thing that was a part lost, but that line is said to be greater only because that body merely coexists with a longer body, or would coexist if another body surrounded it.
Dicitur autem superficies minor, quia coexsistit corpori minus lato; nam quamvis sequatur `latitudo a est minor latitudine b, igitur latitudo a non est latitudo b', non tamen sequitur `latitudo a fuit minor latitudine b, igitur latitudo a non fuit latitudo b', quia eadem latitudo aliquando fuit maior, aliquando minor.	Now the surface is said to be smaller, because it coexists with a less wide body; for although it follows that the latitude of a is less than the latitude of b, therefore the latitude of a is not the latitude of b, it does not follow that the latitude of a was less than the latitude of b, therefore the latitude of a was not the latitude of b, because the same latitude was sometimes greater, sometimes less.
Et ita patet quod idem aliquando est latius, aliquando brevius et quandoque longius, et tamen longitudo non est alia res a latitudine; sed non habent eandem definitionem, et ad hoc sufficit diversitas connotatorum.	And so it is clear that the same thing is sometimes wider, sometimes shorter, and sometimes longer, and yet length is not a different thing from width; but they do not have the same definition, and for this the diversity of the connotatives is sufficient.
Et ideo notandum est quod Aristoteles et alii philosophi et etiam Sancti frequenter quando dicunt aliqua non esse idem vel distingui vel esse distincta, non intendunt unum removere ab alio, ita quod unum non praedicetur vere de reliquo, sed intendunt dicere quod habent diversam definitionem et quod frequenter vere poterit unum removeri ƿ a reliquo.	And therefore it is to be noted that Aristotle and other philosophers and also the Saints frequently when they say that something is not the same or is distinguished or distinct, they do not intend to remove one from another, so that one cannot be truly predicated of the rest, but they intend to say that they have a different definition and that frequently one can truly be removed from the rest.
Quod potest frequenter contingere sine mutatione ipsius de quo praedicatur, propter mutationem alicuius alterius. Et etiam potest hoc aliquando contingere propter solum motum localem, per quem nihil adquiritur inhaerens, quamvis frequenter locus ambiens adquiratur.	This can often happen without a change in the thing about which it is predicated, because of a change in something else. And this may also sometimes happen because of a local movement alone, by which nothing inherent is acquired, although the surrounding place is frequently acquired.
Et sic dicit Philosophus quod motus et tempus non sunt idem, nec punctus et linea, nec homo et album, nec Deus et creare sunt isto modo idem; et ita est de multis aliis auctoritatibus, quae praedicto modo glossari debent.	And so the Philosopher says that motion and time are not the same, nor point and line, nor man and white, nor God and creation are in this way the same; and so it is with many other authorities, which must be glossed in the manner aforesaid.
Alia regula est: illa non sunt idem quae non faciunt idem ex hoc quod apponuntur eidem. Alia regula est: illa non sunt idem quando remanent idem quocumque istorum ablato.	Another rule is: those things are not the same which do not make the same thing because they are attached to the same thing. Another rule is: they are not the same when they remain the same no matter where they are removed.
Alia regula est: si ex quacumque positione sequatur interemptio unius et non alterius, illa non sunt idem realiter. Verbi gratia posito quod nihil esset albedo, sequeretur quod albedo non esset, et tamen non sequeretur ex hoc quod homo non esset, et ideo homo et albedo non sunt idem.	Another rule is: if from any position the destruction of one and not the other follows, they are not really the same. For example, supposing that there was nothing white, it would follow that there was no white thing, and yet it would not follow from the fact that man was not, and therefore man and white are not the same.
Et est ista regula intelligenda sicut priores. Nam ex hoc quod aliqua positione facta sequitur quod esse negatur ab uno et non ab alio, non sequitur quod unum vere negetur a reliquo, sed sequitur quod non sunt idem definitione. Verbi gratia per hoc quod aliqua positione facta sequitur quod quantitas non sit, et tamen ex eadem positione non seƿquitur quod substantia non sit, et tamen ex hoc non potest inferri quod substantia non sit quantitas, sed potest inferri quod substantia et quantitas non habent eandem definitionem.	And this rule is to be understood like the previous ones. For from the fact that in a given position it follows that a thing is denied by one and not by another, it does not follow that one is really denied by the other, but it follows that they are not the same by definition. For example, from the fact that in a given position it follows that quantity is not, and yet from the same position it does not follow that substance is not, and yet it cannot be inferred from this that substance is not quantity, but it can be inferred that substance and quantity do not have the same definition.
Et si hoc sequatur ex positione possibili, potest inferri quod haec sit possibilis `substantia non est quantitas', cum quo tamen stat quod substantia vere et realiter sit quantitas, sicut ex aliqua positione sequitur quod creans non sit, et tamen ex tali positione non sequitur quod Deus non sit.	And if this follows from a possible position, it can be inferred that this is possible: `substance is not quantity', with which it stands that substance is truly and really quantity, just as it follows from a certain position that there is no creator, and yet it does not follow from such a position that God is not.
Et propter hoc potest inferri quod alia est definitio Dei et creantis, sed ex hoc non potest concludi quod Deus sit alia res a creante. Sed quia hoc potest inferri ex positione possibili, puta ponendo quod nulla creatura sit, ideo bene contingit inferre quod haec est possibilis `Deus non est creans' et e converso.	And for this reason it can be inferred that there is a different definition of God and the creator, but it cannot be concluded from this that God is a different thing from the creator. But since this can be inferred from a possible position, for example by positing that there is no creature, it is therefore possible to infer that this is possible, `God is not a creator' and vice versa.
Similiter ex hoc quod aliqua positione facta sequitur formaliter quod Deus non est iustus, et tamen ex eadem positione non sequitur ita formaliter quod Deus non est intelligens, non potest inferri quod iustitia Dei non est intelligentia Dei; nec etiam potest inferri quod iustitia Dei non sit formaliter intelligentia Dei sive sapientia Dei, sed bene potest inferri quod iustitia et sapientia non sunt idem, hoc est, quod isti termini non habent eandem definitionem.	Similarly, from the fact that it formally follows from a given position that God is not just, and yet from the same position it does not follow formally that God is not intelligent, it cannot be inferred that God's justice is not God's intelligence. Nor can it be inferred that the justice of God is not formally the intelligence of God or the wisdom of God, but it may well be inferred that justice and wisdom are not the same, that is, that these terms do not have the same definition.
Quod verum est.	Which is true.
Et tamen iustitia et sapientia Dei, sumptis terminis personaliter et significative, sunt idem omnibus modis. Alia regula est: si unum praedicetur de aliquo et non aliud, vel e converso, illa non sunt idem.	And yet the justice and wisdom of God, taken in personal and significant terms, are the same in all ways. Another rule is: if one thing is said about someone and not another, or vice versa, they are not the same.
Alia regula est quod illa non sunt idem quorum unum potest esse sine altero sive altero non exsistente. Sciendum quod ista regula valet semper ad probandum aliqua non esse idem, hoc est non habere eandem definitionem, sed non valet semper ad probandum unum vere negari ab alio, ipsis terminis personaliter et significative acceptis.	Another rule is that those things are not the same, one of which can exist without the other or if the other does not exist. It should be known that this rule is always valid for proving that some things are not the same, that is, that they do not have the same definition, but it is not always valid for proving that one thing is really denied by another, when the terms are taken in themselves personally and meaningfully.
Pro quo sciendum quod quamvis talis modus arguendi valeat `omne a est; b non est; igitur b non est a'; et similiter talis modus arguendi valet `hoc a est; hoc b non est; igitur hoc b non est hoc a', arguendo sic ex ƿ singularibus.	For which reason it must be known that although such a method of reasoning is valid, `every a exists'; b does not exist; therefore b is not a'; and similarly this mode of reasoning is valid: `this a exists; this b does not exist; therefore this b is not this a', arguing thus from particulars.
Tamen talis modus arguendi non valet `possibile est quod haec sit vera: hoc a est, dum haec est vera: hoc b non est; igitur hoc b non est hoc a'. Sicut non sequitur, posito quod Sortes sit albus, `possibile est quod haec sit vera: Sortes est, dum haec est vera: hoc album non est; igitur hoc album non est Sortes'.	However, such a way of arguing is not valid: it is possible that this is true: this a exists, while this is true: this b does not exist; therefore this b is not this a'. As it does not follow, supposing that Socrates is white, 'it is possible that the following may be true: Socrates exists, while this is true: this white thing does not exist; So this white thing is not Socrates'.
Sed bene sequitur ista conclusio quod `haec est possibilis: hoc album non est Sortes'; quod est verum, quia posito quod Sortes non sit albus, tunc haec est vera `hoc album non est Sortes'; et bene sequitur etiam quod `hoc album' importat sive connotat aliquid quod non est eodem modo connotatum vel importatum per `Sortes' vel e converso.	But it follows well that 'this conclusion is possible: this white thing is not Socrates'; which is true, because if we assume that Socrates is not white, then this is true: `this white thing is not Socrates'; and it also follows that 'this white thing' implies or connotes something which is not connoted or implied in the same way by 'Socrates' or vice versa.
Per ista patet quod talis modus arguendi non valet `possibile est quod album sive albedo sit, et tamen quod nulla similitudo sit, igitur similitudo est alia res ab albedine'. Immo etiam non sequitur ex hoc quod similitudo non sit albedo; sicut non sequitur `possibile est quod album sit et tamen quod simile non sit, igitur simile non est album'.	From these it is clear that such a method of reasoning is not valid: `it is possible that a white thing or whiteness exists, and yet that there be no similarity, therefore similarity is a different thing from whiteness'. Nay, it also does not follow from this that there is no similarity to whiteness; just as it does not follow that `it is possible that a white thing exists and yet that it is not similar, therefore similar is not white'.
Eodem modo non sequitur `possibile est quod substantia exsistente quantitas vel figura triangularis non sit, igitur quantitas vel figura triangularis non est substantia'; sed bene sequitur quod `haec est possibilis: quantitas non est substantia'.	In the same way it does not follow that `it is possible that for an existing substance either a quantity or a triangular figure does not exist, therefore a quantity or a triangular figure is not a substance'; but it follows well that 'this is possible: quantity is not substance'.
Et tamen in rei veritate quantitas est substantia, secundum principia Aristotelis. Sed numquid ista forma arguendi valet: quandocumque aliqua sic se habent quod unum illorum manet altero non exsistente, illa sunt distincta realiter; sed albedo potest manere similitudine non exsistente sive non manente; igitur album et similitudo distinguuntur realiter? Dicendum quod talis forma arguendi non valet generaliter. Unde non sequitur: quandocumque aliqua sic se habent etc.; sed Deus potest manere sive exsistere chimaera non exsistente; igitur chimaera et Deus distinguuntur realiter. Sed numquid ex talibus praemissis sequitur quod non sunt idem realiter? Dicendum quod non sequitur, quia non seƿquitur: quandocumque aliqua sic se habent etc.; sed Deus potest esse creante non existente; igitur Deus et creans non sunt idem realiter.	And yet in the truth of the matter quantity is substance, according to the principles of Aristotle. But nevertheless this form of argument is valid: whenever things are in such a way that one of them remains when the other is non-existent, they are really distinct; but whiteness can remain when a similarity does not exist or does not remain; so are a white thing and similarity really distinct? It must be said that this form of argument does not apply in general. Hence it does not follow: whenever things behave like this, etc.; but God can remain whether or not a chimera exists; therefore the chimera and God are really distinct. But does it follow from such premises that they are not really the same? It must be said that it does not follow, because it does not follow: whenever things behave like this, etc.; but God can be by creating not by existing; therefore God and the creator are not really the same.
Sed numquid adhuc ex talibus praemissis sequitur quod possunt distingui vel non esse idem realiter? Dicendum quod nulla talis conclusio de inesse vel de possibili sumpta in sensu divisionis vel aliqua aequivalens ei sequitur ex talibus praemissis generaliter. Aliquando tamen sequitur tam conclusio de inesse quam conclusio de possibili, et ideo in tali modo arguendi aliquando est figura dictionis et aliquando non.	But does it still follow from such premises that they can be distinguished or really not the same? It should be said that no such conclusion about existence or the possibility taken in the sense of division or something equivalent to it generally follows from such premises. Sometimes, however, there follows both a conclusion about existence and a conclusion about the possible, and therefore in such a way of reasoning there is sometimes a figure of speech and sometimes not.
Pro quo sciendum quod quandocumque sub tali maiore accipiuntur sub in minore aliqua non connotativa, nec relativa, nec duo ordinata secundum superius et inferius, semper sequitur conclusio de praesenti: quod non sunt idem realiter, et per consequens quod possunt non esse idem realiter.	For which reason it is to be known that whenever something not connotative, not relative, or two ordered according to superior and inferior under such a greater one are taken under a lesser one, the conclusion always follows from the present: that they are not really the same, and consequently that they cannot really be the same.
Et ideo bene sequitur: illud absolutum quod est scientia illius conclusionis potest esse sine absoluto quod est scientia alterius conclusionis; igitur illud absolutum quod est scientia istius et illud absolutum quod est scientia alterius non sunt idem realiter.	And therefore it follows well: that absolute which is the knowledge of that conclusion can be without the absolute which is the knowledge of another conclusion; therefore the absolute which is the knowledge of this and the absolute which is the knowledge of another are not really the same.
Sed si sumantur sub connotativa vel relativa vel ordinata secundum superius et inferius, est frequenter fallacia figurae dictionis. Patet in exemplo de relativis; nam hic est fallacia figurae dictionis: quandocumque aliqua sic se habent quod unum potest esse alio non exsistente, illa sunt distincta realiter; sed Deus potest esse creante non exsistente, --- istae enim duae possunt esse simul verae `Deus est' et `nullum creans est' ---; igitur Deus et creans possunt non esse idem realiter.	But if they are taken under the connotative or relative or ordered according to superior and inferior, there is frequently a fallacy of the figure of speech. It is clear in the example of relatives; for here is the fallacy of the figure of speech: whenever things are in such a way that one thing can exist in another that does not exist, they are really distinct; but God can be existing without creating, --- for these two can be true at the same time: `God is' and `there is no creator' ---; therefore God and the creator may not be really the same.
Quia praemissae sunt verae conclusione exsistente falsa, sicut manifeste patet. De connotativis etiam patet exemplum, quia non sequitur: quandocumque aliqua sic se habent etc.; sed homo potest esse musico non exsistente; igitur homo et musicus possunt distingui realiter vel non sunt idem realiter. De aliis ordinatis secundum superius et inferius patet exemplum; nam posito quod nullum animal sit nisi homo, non sequitur: quandocumque aliqua sic se habent etc.; sed animal potest esse nullo homine exsistente; ƿ igitur homo et animal non sunt idem realiter vel possunt distingui realiter.
Sciendum est quod aliquando sequitur conclusio de possibili, sumpto subiecto pro eo quod potest esse, vel altero termino sumpto pro eo quod potest esse, et hoc respectu huius `non esse idem realiter' et aliquando respectu huius `distingui realiter'.
Sciendum quod ista propositio `quandocumque' etc. potest habere bonum intellectum et malum. Accipio tamen eam in proposito secundum bonum intellectum, sive ille intellectus sit de virtute sermonis sive non, non curo ad praesens.
Sciendum est etiam quod aliquando sumendo sub connotativa vel relativa, est fallacia figurae dictionis et aliquando non. Quando autem hoc sit et quo modo praedicta propositio debeat intelligi, et quando sequitur una conclusio et non alia, ostendetur quando tractabitur de fallacia figurae dictionis.
Hoc autem sufficiat scire ad praesens quod talis modus arguendi non valet: possibile est quod album sit et quod nulla similitudo sit, igitur album et similitudo distinguuntur realiter; possibile est quod substantia sit et quod nulla quantitas si, igitur quantitas et substantia distinguuntur realiter; possibile est quod absolutum sit et quod nulla relatio sit, igitur relatio et absolutum distinguuntur realiter; possibile est quod Deus sit dum haec est vera: creatio non est, igitur Deus et creatio non sunt idem realiter.
Sicut non sequitur, secundum omnes: possibile est quod album sit dum simile non est, hoc est dum haec est vera: simile non est, igitur simile non est album; et per consequens non sequitur: igitur simile et album distinguuntur realiter.
Verumtamen ista conclusio sequitur: haec est possibilis `album non est realiter simile' vel e converso quod `simile non est realiter album'.
Quod dico propter cavillationem quae posset fieri. Et eodem modo ex antecedentibus aliarum consequentiarum sequuntur istae conclusiones, videlicet quod: haec est possibilis `similitudo ƿ non est album' vel e converso; et quod haec est possibilis `quantitas non est substantia' vel e converso; et quod haec est possibilis `relatio non est absolutum' vel e converso; et quod haec est possibilis `creatio non est Deus' vel e converso, saltem si propositiones possunt esse talibus rebus non exsistentibus.
Et sicut ex isto antecedente `possibile est quod haec sit vera: album est, dum haec est vera: nullum simile est', sequitur quod `simile' aliquid connotat vel significat quod non eodem modo connotat vel significat `album' vel e converso, --- nam `simile' connotat tam qualitatem quam subiectum et `album' non connotat eodem modo illud subiectum et illam qualitatem; quod potest patere ex definitionibus exprimentibus quid nominis ipsius `albi' et ipsius `similis' ---, ita ex isto antecedente `possibile est quod substantia sit et quod nulla quantitas sit, hoc est, possibile est quod istae duae sint simul verae: substantia est, et: nulla quantitas est' sequitur quod iste terminus `quantitas' aliquid significat vel connotat vel consignificat quod non significat hoc nomen `substantia' vel non consignificat eodem modo.
Quod verum est; nam hoc nomen `quantitas' connotat partes, quod non connotat
'substantia' nec `qualitas'. Et propter hoc ista habent diversas definitiones; cum hoc tamen stat quod unum vere praedicatur de alio, sicut `homo' et `album' diversas habent definitiones et `album' aliquid connotat vel significat quod non connotat vel significat `homo'.