Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 29

Latin	English
CAP. 29. DE EODEM ET DIVERSO.	Chapter 29. On same and different.
Aristoteles, VII Topicorum, tractat de `eodem' et `diverso', tamquam de annexis problemati de definitione, ideo post definitionem, genus, speciem et differentiam sunt de istis aliqua pauca dicenda. Sed primo videndum est quo modo in proposito accipitur `idem', ex quo patebit quo modo accipitur `diversum'. Et est sciendum quod non accipitur in proposito `idem' pro non-distincto, sed `esse idem' in proposito est idem quod habere eandem definitionem.	Aristotle, in Topic 7, treats of the 'same' and 'different', as annexes to the problem of definition, so after definition, genus, species and difference, there are a few things to be said about these. But first we must see in what way the ``same is taken in the purpose, from which it will be clear in what way the ``different is taken. And it must be known that in the purpose 'the same' is not taken as non-distinct, but 'to be the same' in the purpose is the same as having the same definition.
Unde aliqua in rei veritate sunt plura, et tamen quia habent eandem definitionem dicuntur `idem'; sicut nomina synonyma in rei veritate sunt multa et non unum, nec indistincta, immo in rei veritate sunt distincta, et tamen dicuntur `idem', quia habent eandem definitionem et quia significant idem, vel quia unum est definitio alterius, et ita ƿ hoc nomen `idem' verificatur de illis, sive supponant pro se ipsis sive pro suis significatis.	Hence some things in truth are several, and yet because they have the same definition they are called the same; just as synonymous names are in truth many and not one, nor indistinct, indeed in truth they are distinct, and yet they are called 'the same', because they have the same definition and because they signify the same thing, or because one is the definition of another, and thus this term 'the same' is verified concerning them, whether they assume it for themselves or for the things they signify.
Sed aequivoce accipitur `idem' in illis propositionibus; nam in ista propositione `tunica et vestis sunt idem', si termini supponant personaliter et pro re, tunc importatur quod illa res quae significatur per tunicam et illa quae significatur per vestem sunt una res et non plures.	But 'the same' is taken equivocally in those propositions; for in the statement, `a coat and a garment are the same,' if the terms stand personally and for a thing, then it is implied that the thing signified by the coat and that which is signified by the garment are one thing and not several.
Si autem termini supponant materialiter vel simpliciter, tunc importatur quod termini sunt idem; non quidem quod sint unum et non plura, quia in rei veritate sunt plures termini, sed denotatur quod habent eandem definitionem.	But if the terms supplant materially or simply, then it is implied that the terms are the same; not indeed that they are one and not several, because in truth there are several terms, but it is denoted that they have the same definition.
Et ita patet quod `idem' aequivoce accipitur in diversis locis a Philosopho. Est tamen advertendum quod ex hoc ipso quod de aliquibus verificatur `idem', accipiendo sicut accipitur in proposito et VII Topicorum, sequitur quod de illis verificatur `esse idem' accipiendo `idem' aliter, quando scilicet ista supponunt personaliter. Sed e converso non sequitur. Non enim sequitur `homo et album sunt idem numero, hoc est, sunt unum numero et non multa, ergo isti termini habent eandem definitionem'. Et ideo non sequitur `homo et album sunt idem, sumptis terminis significative, igitur homo et album sunt idem si homo et album non supponunt personaliter sed materialiter vel simpliciter', qualitercumque accipiatur `idem'. E converso autem bene sequitur; nam sequitur: isti termini `tunica' et `vestis' habent eandem definitionem, igitur tunica et vestis sunt idem numero. Quod autem haec sit intentio Aristotelis patet, nam accipiendo `idem' pro `eodem numero', manifestum est quod terminare problema de accidente, est terminare problema de eodem et diverso. Nam sequitur convertibiliter `homo est albus, igitur homo et album sunt idem numero', et e converso.	And so it is clear that 'the same' is taken equivocally in different places by the Philosopher. It must be noted, however, that from the very fact that 'the same' is verified about some, taking it as it is taken in the proposition and Topic 7, it follows that it is verified about them that they are 'the same' by taking the 'same' in a different way, namely when they assume these things personally. But the reverse does not follow. For it does not follow that `a man and a white thing are the same number, that is, they are one number and not many, therefore these terms have the same definition'. And therefore it does not follow that `man and white are the same, taken in significant terms, therefore man and white are the same if man and white do not stand personally but materially or simply', no matter how the `same' is taken. On the other hand, it follows well; for it follows: these terms `coat' and `garment' have the same definition, therefore coat and garment are of the same number. Now that this is Aristotle's intention is clear, for by taking 'the same' for 'the same number', it is clear that to end the problem of accident is to end the problem of the same and different. For it follows reversibly that `a man is a white thing, therefore man and white are of the same number', and vice versa.
Et sequitur `homo non est albus, igitur ƿ homo et album non sunt idem numero', et e converso. Et ita eaedem regulae quae deserviunt uni propositioni, et alteri. Accipiendo autem `idem' pro `eadem specie', regulae deservientes speciei deserviunt	And it follows that `a`man is not a white thing, therefore man and white are not of the same number', and vice versa. And so the same rules which serve one proposition, and another. But by taking `the same' for `the same species,' the rules govern what the species govern
'eodem' taliter accepto. Et manifestum est quod de isto non loquitur Philosophus in VII Topicorum, nam secundum eum, ibidem, quando unum potest esse sine altero, non sunt idem; et tamen manifestum est quod talia sunt idem specie.	when 'the same' taken this way. And it is clear that the Philosopher does not speak of this in the 7th Topics, for according to him, there, when one can exist without the other, they are not the same; and yet it is manifest that such are the same in appearance.
Similiter, accipiendo `idem' pro `eodem genere', manifestum est quod regulae deservientes generi deserviunt `eidem' sic accepto. Et ideo remanet quod `esse idem' in proposito est `habere eandem definitionem', ut regulae deservientes definitioni deserviant huic termino `idem', quamvis non omnes.	Similarly, by taking `the same' for `the same kind', it is clear that the rules that govern the genus govern the `the same' in this way. And therefore it remains that 'to be the same' is intended to 'have the same definition', so that rules that govern definition govern the term 'the same', although not all of them.
Propter quod Philosophus, I Topicorum, problema de `eodem et diverso' reducit ad definitionem, et vult quod ostenso quod aliquid est definitio, ostenditur quoniam est `idem', sed non e converso.	Because of this, the Philosopher, Topics 1, reduces the problem of 'same and different' to definition, and means that when it is shown that something is a definition, it is shown that it is 'the same', but not the other way around.
Et tamen definitio non est eadem res cum definito; igitur praedicto modo accipitur ibi	And yet the definition is not the same thing as the defined; therefore it is accepted there in the manner aforesaid as
'idem'. Et iste est unus modus `eiusdem numero', quia scilicet de talibus, supponentibus significative, praedicatur `idem numero'.	'the same'. And this is one mode of `the same number,' because of such: supposing the significant, it is predicated of `the same number.'