Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 33

Latin	English
CAP. 33. DE INDUCTIONE PROPOSITIONUM UNIVERSALIUM DE MODO.	Chapter 33. On the induction of Universal Propositions of Mode.
Circa inductionem propositionum universalium de modo est primo sciendum quod si propositiones universales accipiuntur in sensu divisionis vel aequivalentes eis, eodem modo inducuntur sicut universales de inesse. Et ideo omnes tales inductiones sunt bonae: iste homo contingenter est animal, et ille homo contingenter est animal, et sic de singulis, igitur omnis homo contingenter est animal; iste homo non de necessitate est animal, ille homo non de necessitate est animal, et sic de singulis, ergo nullus homo de necessitate est animal.	Regarding the induction of universal propositions, it must first be known that if universal propositions are taken in the sense of division or equivalent to them, they are induced in the same way as universal propositions of existence. And therefore all such inductions are good: this man is tangentially an animal, and that man is tangentially an animal, and so on about individuals, therefore every man is tangentially an animal; This man is not of necessity an animal, that man is not of necessity an animal, and so on of individuals, therefore no man is necessarily an animal.
Et est aliud intelligendum, quod sicut in illis de inesse, ita in talibus de modo ad veritatem inductionis non refert in singularibus ponere pro subiectis vel pronomina demonstrativa praecise, vel pronomina demonstrativa cum subiecto propositionis universalis, vel nomina propria significatorum illius termini communis.	And there is another thing to be understood, that, as in those concerning being, so in such matters of the mode of induction to the truth it does not matter in the particulars to put either precise demonstrative pronouns for subjects, or demonstrative pronouns with the subject of a universal proposition, or the proper names of the signifieds of that common term.
Unde sicut omnes istae tres inductiones sunt bonae: iste homo currit et ille homo currit, et sic de singulis, igitur omnis homo currit; iste currit et ille currit, et sic de singulis, igitur omnis homo currit; Sortes currit, Plato currit, et sic de singulis, igitur omnis homo currit; --- et eodem modo est de quacumque universali de inesse ---; ita omnes tales inductiones sunt bonae: iste contingenter est animal, denotato aliquo homine, et ille contingenter est ƿ animal, et sic de singulis, igitur omnis homo contingenter est animal; iste homo contingenter est animal et ille homo contingenter est animal, et sic de singulis, igitur omnis homo contingenter est animal; Sortes contingenter est animal, Plato contingenter est animal, et sic de singulis, igitur omnis homo contingenter est animal.	Hence, just as all these three inductions are good: this man runs and that man runs, and so on about individuals, therefore every man runs; this one runs and that one runs, and so on with respect to each, therefore every man runs; Socrates runs, Plato runs, and so on about individuals, therefore every man runs; --- and in the same way it is about any universal being ---; so all such inductions are good: this one is contingently an animal, denoted by some man, and that one is contingently an animal, and so about individuals, therefore every man is contingently an animal; This man is tangentially an animal, and that man is tangentially an animal, and so on with regard to individuals, therefore every man is tangentially an animal. Socrates is contingently an animal, Plato is contingently an animal, and so on individuals, therefore every man is contingently an animal.
Ex isto patet quod omnes tales inductiones sunt bonae: hoc per se est animal, demonstrato aliquo albo, et illud per se est animal, et sic de singulis, igitur omne album per se est animal.	From this it is clear that all such inductions are good: this is in itself an animal, when it is pointed out to some white thing, and that is in itself an animal, and so of each, therefore every white thing is in itself an animal.
Et ex isto et ista regula, quae vera est, `quando singulares sufficienter sumptae inferunt aliquam universalem, una singularis per se sumpta infert particularem vel indefinitam illius universalis' sequitur quod omnes tales consequentiae sunt bonae: iste per se aedificat, demonstrato aliquo qui in rei veritate est albus, igitur album per se aedificat; iste, demonstrato Deo, necessario est Deus, igitur creans de necessitate est Deus, et hoc quando Deus est creans; iste, demonstrato Filio Dei, per se est Deus, igitur homo per se est Deus.	And from this and that rule, which is true, 'when particulars taken sufficiently lead to some universal, one particular taken by itself leads to the particular or indefinite of that universal', it follows that all such consequences are good: the latter builds by itself, by pointing to something that is in the thing it is white in truth, therefore it builds up white by itself; this, being pointed to God, is necessarily God, therefore the creator is of necessity God, and this when God is the creator; this, being shown to be the Son of God, is in himself God, therefore man is in himself God.
Immo, generaliter, ex tali singulari in qua subicitur pronomen demonstrativum vel pronomen demonstrativum sumptum cum quocumque termino communi, qui praedicatur de illo pronomine demonstrante illud quod prius, vel etiam in qua subicitur nomen proprium, ad talem particularem est bona consequentia.	Nay, in general, from such a singular in which a demonstrative pronoun is submitted, or a demonstrative pronoun taken with any common term, which is predicated of that pronoun demonstrating that which preceded it, or even in which a proper noun is submitted, there is a good consequence to such a particular.
Et ideo omnes tales consequentiae sunt bonae: haec res per se aedificat, demonstrato aliquo quod in rei veritate est album, igitur album per se aedificat; iste homo non est aggregatum per accidens, demonstrato aliquo homine qui in rei veritate est albus, igitur homo albus non est aggregatum per accidens; iste homo albus est aggregatum per accidens, ergo homo est aggregatum per accidens.	And therefore all such consequences are good: this thing builds up by itself, by showing something that is white in truth of the thing, therefore it builds up white by itself; This man is not aggregated by accident, when it is pointed out to some man who in truth is white, therefore the white man is not aggregated by accident. This white man is aggregated by accident, therefore man is aggregated by accident.
Et sic de multis aliis.	And so for many others.
Hic tamen est advertendum quod tales consequentiae non sunt semper simplices, sed frequenter sunt ut nunc solum. Unde ista consequentia `Sortes per se est animal, igitur album per se est animal' non est consequentia simplex sed tantum ut nunc, quia numquam valet ƿ nisi dum Sortes est albus; quando enim Sortes non est albus, tunc non valet consequentia. Similiter ista consequentia `Filius Dei de necessitate est Deus, igitur homo de necessitate est Deus' est solum bona ut nunc, quia non valet nisi dum Filius Dei est homo.	Here, however, it must be noted that such consequences are not always simple, but are frequently for now only. Whence this conclusion `Socrates is in himself an animal, therefore white is in itself an animal' is not a simple consequence, but only for now, because it is never valid except while Socrates is white; for when Socrates is not white, then the consequence does not hold. Similarly, this conclusion, `The Son of God is necessarily God, therefore man is necessarily God' is only good as it is now, because it is valid only while the Son of God is man.
Unde ante incarnationem consequentia non valuit; similiter, si Filius Dei deponeret naturam assumptam, non valeret.	Hence, before the incarnation, the consequence was not valid; in the same way, if the Son of God were to lay aside the nature he assumed, it would not be valid.
Similiter talis consequentia est bona `haec res potest assumi a Verbo, denotando naturam humanam quae est Ioannes, igitur homo potest assumi, immo, igitur suppositum potest assumi', quia per istam `suppositum potest assumi' non plus denotatur nisi quod illa res, quae est modo suppositum, potest assumi.	Similarly, such a conclusion is good: `this thing can be assumed from the Word, denoting the human nature which is John, therefore a man can be assumed, yes, therefore a supposition can be assumed', because by this `supposition can be assumed' nothing more is denoted than that thing which is only supposed, that it can be assumed.
Et hoc est verum, sicut est verum quod `album potest esse nigrum'. Et ideo sicut haec est vera `album potest esse nigrum', non obstante quod haec sit impossibilis `album est nigrum', sic haec est vera `suppositum potest assumi', non obstante quod haec sit impossibilis `suppositum assumitur'; ita si haec sit vera `aedificator per se aedificat', haec est vera `album per se aedificat', si idem sit aedificator et albus, non obstante quod haec esset per se `aedificator aedificat' et haec per accidens `album aedificat'. Aliud etiam est advertendum quod omnes praedictae consequentiae et consimiles sunt verae quando termini accipiuntur personaliter et significative; quia si aliquis terminus acciperetur simpliciter vel materialiter, possent deficere, sicut frequenter dictum est prius de aliis regulis.	And this is true, just as it is true that 'white can be black'. And therefore, just as this is true, `white can be black', despite the fact that this is impossible: `white is black', so this is true: `the supposition can be assumed', despite the fact that this is impossible: 'the supposition is assumed'; so if this is true, `the builder builds by himself,' this is true, `the white builds by himself,' if the builder and the white are the same, despite the fact that this was essentially the `the builder builds,' and this incidentally, `the white builds.' It is also another thing to notice that all the aforesaid and similar consequences are true when the terms are taken personally and meaningfully; for if any term were accepted simply or materially, they might fail, as has frequently been said before of other rules.
Et ideo tales consequentiae non valent `iste homo albus significat aggregatum per accidens, igitur homo significat aggregatum per accidens', quia antecedens non est verum nisi sumpto subiecto antecedentis materialiter vel simpliciter.	And therefore such inferences are not valid: `this white man signifies an aggregate by accident, therefore man signifies an aggregate by accident', because the antecedent is not true unless the subject of the antecedent is taken materially or simply.
Similiter non sequitur `de isto albo praedicatur per accidens aedificare, igitur de homine vel de aedificatore praedicatur per accidens aedificare'. Et ita est de multis aliis.	Similarly, it does not follow that `it is predicated of this white person to build by accident, ' therefore it is predicated of man or a builder to build by accident.' And so it is with many others.
Et ista de inductione propositionum universalium de modo sumptarum in sensu divisionis et eis aequivalentium ad praesens sufficiant.	And these things about the induction of universal propositions taken in the sense of division and their equivalents suffice for the present.