Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 34

Latin	English
CAP. 34. QUOMODO SINGULARES DE MODO IN SENSU COMPOSITIONIS SE HABENT AD UNIVERSALES DE MODO IN SENSU COMPOSITIONIS.	Chapter 34. How the Particulars in the sense of Composition are related to the Universals in the sense of Composition.
His visis videndum est quomodo singulares de modo sumptae in sensu compositionis et eis aequivalentes se habent ad universales de modo sumptas in sensu compositionis et eis aequivalentes.	With these views it is to be seen how the particulars taken in the sense of composition and their equivalents relate to the universals taken in the sense of composition and their equivalents.
Et quia aliter est de diversis, ideo dicendum est de eis separatim. Et primo circa illas de necessario. Et est sciendum quod non semper singulares de necessario tales inferunt tales universales de necessario, nisi in singularibus subiciantur pronomina demonstrativa sumpta cum subiecto propositionis universalis. Unde posito quod quaelibet persona divina assumpsisset naturam humanam et quod nullus alius homo esset exsistens, ista consequentia non valeret `istum esse Deum est necessarium, demonstrando Patrem, qui in rei veritate esset homo; et illum esse Deum est necessarium, demonstrando Filium; et illum esse Deum est necessarium, demonstrando Spiritum Sanctum; igitur omnem hominem esse Deum est necessarium', quia antecedens esset verum, illo casu posito, et consequens falsum.	And because it is different in different cases, it must be determined about them separately. And first of all about them of necessity. And it must be known that singulars do not necessarily imply such universals, unless in singulars demonstrative pronouns taken with the subject of a universal proposition are posited. Hence, supposing that every divine person had assumed a human nature and that no other man existed, this conclusion would not be valid: `It is necessary for him to be God, showing the Father, who in the truth of the matter was man; and it is necessary for him to be God, by pointing out the Son; and it is necessary for him to be God, showing the Holy Spirit; Therefore it is necessary for every man to be God', because truth would be antecedent, given that case, and falsity consequent.
Et tamen, illo posito, ista consequentia esset bona `istum hominem esse Deum est necessarium', denotando Patrem; `et illum hominem esse Deum est necessarium', denotando Filium; `et illum hominem esse Deum est necessarium', denotando Spiritum Sanctum; `igitur omnem hominem esse Deum est necessarium', ex inductione.	And yet, assuming that, the following conclusion would be good: `it is necessary for this man to be God', denoting the Father; `and it is necessary for that man to be God', denoting the Son; `and it is necessary for that man to be God', denoting the Holy Spirit; `therefore it is necessary for every man to be God', by induction.
Et hoc, si non possent esse plures homines.	And this would be true, if there could not be more people.
Quandocumque enim possunt plura contineri sub subiecto universalis quam continentur in inductione, non valet talis consequentia virtute talis inductionis. Sic igitur patet quod raro vel numquam singulares de necessario, habentes praecise pronomina demonstrativa pro subiectis, sumptae in sensu compositionis, inferunt universalem sumptam in sensu compositionis. Et hoc, quia ista regula non est generaliter vera `omnes singulares sunt necessariae, igitur universalis est necessaria'.	For whenever more things can be contained under the universal subject than are contained in the induction, such a conclusion is not valid by virtue of such an induction. It is therefore clear that singulars of necessity, having precisely demonstrative pronouns for subjects, taken in the sense of composition, imply a universal taken in the sense of composition. And this, because this rule is not generally true, `all particulars are necessary, therefore the universal is necessary.'
Similiter, talis universalis de necessario non infert tales singulares; et hoc, quia ista regula non est generalis `universalis est necessaria, igitur singulares sunt necessariae'. Unde ista universalis est necessaria `omne verum contingens est verum', et tamen nulla singularis est necessaria, immo quaelibet est contingens, ƿ quia quocumque vero contingenti demonstrato haec est contingens `hoc verum contingens est verum', quia eo ipso quod est verum contingens, potest esse falsum, et per consequens potest non esse verum, et ita non est illa prima necessaria.	Similarly, such a universal does not necessarily entail such particulars; and this is because this rule is not general, `the universal is necessary, therefore the particulars are necessary.' Wherefore this universal is necessary, `every contingent truth is truth,' and yet no singular is necessary, indeed every one is contingent, because for whatever contingent truth is demonstrated, this is contingent, `this contingent truth is truth,' because by that very fact that truth is contingent, it may be false, and consequently it may not be true, and thus it is not the first necessity.
Similiter, secundum intentionem Philosophi, haec est necessaria `omne album est coloratum', et tamen quaelibet singularis est contingens; quocumque enim demonstrato haec est contingens `hoc album est coloratum', quia poterit esse falsa illo destructo.	Similarly, according to the intention of the Philosopher, this is necessary: ​​`everything white is colored,' and yet each individual is contingent; for whatever is demonstrated, this is contingent, `this white thing is colored,' because it may be false if it is destroyed.
Tamen sciendum est quod aliqualis diversitas est inter universalem affirmativam et negativam, nam ex hoc quod universalis affirmativa est necessaria non potest inferri quod singulares, sive de subiectis quae sunt pronomina demonstrativa sive aliae, sint necessariae.	However, it must be known that there is some difference between the universal affirmative and the negative, for from the fact that the universal affirmative is necessary it cannot be inferred that particulars, whether of subjects which are demonstrative pronouns or others, are necessary.
Sed si universalis negativa sit necessaria, quamvis non oporteat quod illae singulares quae habent pro subiectis pronomina demonstrativa tantum vel nomina propria sint necessariae, tamen oportet quod illae singulares quae habent pro subiectis pronomina demonstrativa sumpta cum subiecto propositionis universalis sint necessariae.	But if the universal negative is necessary, although it is not necessary that those singulars which have for subjects only demonstrative pronouns or proper nouns be necessary, yet it is necessary that those singulars which have for subjects demonstrative pronouns taken with the subject of the universal proposition be necessary.
Sicut haec est necessaria `nullum album est nigrum', et tamen nulla talis singularis est necessaria `hoc non est nigrum', denotato quocumque albo, nec aliqua talis `Sortes non est niger', `Plato non est niger'; sed quaelibet talis est necessaria `hoc album non est nigrum', `illud album non est nigrum', et sic de aliis.	Just as this is necessary, `no white is black,' and yet there is no such singular necessity, `this is not black,' denoted by anything white, nor any such, `Socrates is not black,' `Plato is not black.' but every such is necessary: `this white is not black', `that white is not black', and so on.