Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-4/Chapter 14

Latin	English
CAP. 14. DE FALLACIA SECUNDUM IGNORANTIAM ELENCHI.	Chapter 14. On the fallacy from ignorance of the list.
Nunc restat dicere de fallacia secundum ignorantiam elenchi, quae est deceptio proveniens ex defectu alicuius illarum quatuor particularum `ad idem', `secundum idem', `similiter', et	Now it remains to speak about the fallacy from ignorance of the list, which is a deception resulting from the lack of any of those four particulars `to the same', `according to the same', `similarly', and
'in eodem tempore'. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est quod istae particulae non debent poni in elencho, sed debent assumi tales propositiones ex quarum forma non denotetur quod fiat verificatio respectu diversorum, vel secundum diversa, vel non similiter, vel non in eodem tempore; et quando aliter denotatur per formam propositionis, est fallacia secundum ignorantiam elenchi.	'at the same time'. To make this clear, it should be known that these particles should not be placed in the list, but such propositions should be assumed from the form of which it is not denoted that verification is made with respect to different things, or according to different things, or not similarly, or not at the same time; and when it is otherwise denoted by the form of the proposition, it is a fallacy from ignorance of the list.
Et potest fieri ista fallacia quatuor modis, secundum istas quatuor particulas.	And this fallacy can be committed in four ways, according to these four particles.
Uno modo ex hoc quod referuntur ad diversa, sic `hoc est duplum respectu a; et hoc non est duplum respectu b; ergo hoc est duplum et non duplum'. Similiter `Sortes est similis Platoni; Sortes non est similis Ioanni; ergo Sortes est similis et non similis'.	In one mode, from the fact that they are referred to different things, thus `this is double with respect to a; and this is not double with respect to b; therefore this is double and not double'. Similarly `Socrates is similar to Plato; Socrates is not similar to John; therefore Socrates is similar and not similar'.
Similiter hic `Sortes est filius Platonis; Sortes non est filius Ciceronis; ergo Sortes est filius et non filius'. Penes secundum modum, scilicet `secundum idem', fiunt tales paralogismi `Sortes est similis Platoni secundum albedinem; Sortes non est similis Platoni secundum musicam; ergo Sortes est similis Platoni et non est similis Platoni'. Similiter hic `a est duplum respectu b secundum longitudinem; a non est duplum respectu b secundum latitudinem; ergo a respectu b est duplum et non duplum'.	Similarly here: `Socrates is the son of Plato; Socrates is not the son of Cicero; therefore Socrates is a son and not a son'. According to the second mode, namely `according to the same', such paralogisms occur: `Socrates is similar to Plato in terms of whiteness; Socrates is not similar to Plato in terms of music; therefore Socrates is similar to Plato and is not similar to Plato'. Similarly here `a is double with respect to b in terms of length; a is not double with respect to b in terms of width; therefore a with respect to b is double and not double'.
Potest etiam fieri sic ignorantia elenchi `a est duplum respectu b; a non est latius b ergo a respectu b est duplum et non duplum'. Secundum tertium modum fiunt tales paralogismi `Sortes currit velociter; Sortes non currit necessario; igitur Sortes currit et non currit'.	It is also possible for ignorant of the list to be made in this way: `a is double with respect to b; a is not wider than b, therefore a with respect to b is double and not double'. According to the third way, such paralogisms arise `Socrates runs quickly; Socrates does not necessarily run; therefore Socrates runs and does not run'.
Similiter hic `iste disputat scientifice; iste non disputat invite; igitur iste disputat et non disputat'. Secundum quartum modum fiunt tales paralogismi `iste curret cras; iste non curret post cras; igitur iste curret et non curret'.	Similarly here: `this one argues scientifically; this one does not argue unwillingly; therefore this one argues and does not argue'. According to the fourth mode, such paralogisms occur: `this one will run tomorrow; this one will not run the day after tomorrow; therefore this one will run and not run'.
Similiter hic `Christus fuit Deus ab aeterno; et fuit homo ex tempore; igitur fuit homo et non fuit homo'. Et peccant omnia praedicta sophismata, quia in praedictis fit verificatio respectu diversorum, vel secundum diversa, vel non similiter, vel non in eodem tempore.	Similarly here: `Christ was God from eternity; and was man from time; therefore he was man and was not man.' And all the aforementioned sophisms are wrong, because in the aforementioned, verification is made with respect to different things, or according to different things, or not similarly, or not at the same time.
Oportet autem scire quod in tali modo arguendi vel infertur contradictio incomplexorum, sicut exemplificatum est, et tunc simpliciter non valet discursus; vel contingit inferre contradictoria incomplexa, et tunc adhuc non valet discursus de virtute sermonis, quamvis secundum usum aliquorum improprium concedendae essent conclusiones.	But it is necessary to know that in such a way of arguing either a contradiction of simple things is inferred, as has been exemplified, and then the discourse is simply not valid; or it happens that contradictory simple things are inferred, and then the discourse is still not valid literally, although according to some improper usage the conclusions would have to be conceded.
Aut inferuntur non contradictoria incomplexa de eodem sed aliqua quae sunt contraria relativa, et tunc possunt absolute concedi discursus sine fallacia. Sicut bene sequitur `Sortes est similis Platoni; Sortes est dissimilis Ciceroni; igitur Sortes est similis et dissimilis'.	Or non-contradictory incomplexes are inferred about the same thing, but some are relative contraries, and then discourses can be absolutely conceded without fallacy. As it follows well that `Socrates is similar to Plato; Socrates is unlike Cicero; therefore Socrates is similar and unlike'.
Similiter in quarto modo contingit inferre contradictoria incomplexa, sic arguendo `Sortes erit albus in a; Sortes erit non-albus in b; igitur Sortes erit albus et non albus'. Sed non sequitur `Sortes erit albus et non albus, ergo Sortes erit albus et non erit albus', propter hoc quod ista consequentia non valet `Sortes erit non-albus, igitur Sortes non erit albus'.	Similarly, in the fourth mode it is possible to infer simple contradictions, thus arguing `Socrates will be white in a; Socrates will be non-white in b; therefore Socrates will be white and not white'. But it does not follow `Socrates will be white and not white, therefore Socrates will be white and will not white', because this consequence is not valid `Socrates will be non-white, therefore Socrates will not be white'.
Tamen si argueretur per verbum de praesenti, esset consequentia bona. Et tunc potest esse ignorantia elenchi sine fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter; et tamen frequenter ubi est ignorantia elenchi, est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, quia tunc frequenter arguitur sophistice ab aliquo sumpto cum addito ad ipsum sumptum per se, et per consequens est ibi fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter.	However, if it were argued by a present tense verb, the consequence would be good. And then there can be ignorance of the list without a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter; and yet frequently where there is ignorance of the list, there is a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter, because then it is frequently argued sophistically from something taken with something added to what is taken per se, and consequently there is a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter.