Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-4/Chapter 13

Latin	English
CAP. 13. DE FALLACIA SECUNDUM QUID ET SIMPLICITER.	Chapter 13. On the fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter (accordingly and simply).
Sequitur videre de fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, quae est quando arguitur sophistice ab aliquo sumpto cum determinatione ad aliquid per se sumptum, vel e converso.	It follows to see about the fallacy secundum quid and simplice (accordingly and simply), which is when it is sophisticly argued from something taken with determination to something taken per se, or vice versa.
Causa apparentiae istius fallaciae est similitudo alicuius per se sumpti ad ipsum sumptum cum alio. Causa non-exsistentiae est eorum diversitas. Oportet autem scire quod `secundum quid' vocatur hic aliquis terminus sumptus cum addito, `simpliciter' autem vocatur terminus per se sumptus, sine tali addito. Sunt autem huius fallaciae duo modi principales. Unus est quando arguitur ab esse quod est secundum adiacens ad ipsum quando est tertium adiacens, sive affirmative sive negative.	The cause of the appearance of this fallacy is the similarity of something taken per se to the same taken with another term. The cause of their non-existence is their diversity. It is necessary to know, however, that `according to what' is here called some term taken with an addition, while `simply' is called a term taken per se, without such an addition. There are two principal modes of this fallacy. One is when it is argued from being that which is secondly adjacent to itself when there is a third term adjacent, whether affirmatively or negatively.
Secundus modus est quando a parte eiusdem extremi arguitur ab aliquo sumpto cum addito ad ipsum, vel ad suum superius vel convertibile, sine addito vel e converso. Penes primum modum peccant talia sophismata `Antichristus non est, igitur Antichristus non est possibilis'; `Antichristus non est, ergo Antichristus non est cognitus a te'. Hic in secundo argumento nulla est fallacia consequentis, quia non sequitur e converso, quamvis in primo argumento simul sit fallacia consequentis et fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter.	The second way is when, from the side of the same extreme, it is argued from something taken with an addition to it, or to its superior or convertible, without an addition or vice versa. According to the first way, such sophisms fall foul of `Antichrist is not, therefore Antichrist is not possible'; `Antichrist is not, therefore Antichrist is not known by you'. Here in the second argument there is no fallacy of the consequent, because it does not follow conversely, although in the first argument there is at the same time a fallacy of the consequent and a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter.
Est autem ibi fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, quia arguitur ab esse per se sumpto ad ipsum cum praedicato sequente, quod praedicatum ita potest competere termino supponenti pro non ente sicut pro ente.	But there is a fallacy there secundum quid et simpliciter, because it is argued from being taken per se to itself with the predicate following it, which predicate can just as well apply to a term suppositing for non-being as for being.
Et quandocumque sic arguitur, est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter arguendo negative, et e converso arguendo affirmative. Sicut hic est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter `a est producibile a Deo, igitur a est', et similiter hic `a non est, igitur a non est producibile a Deo'.	And whenever it is argued in this way, it is a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter by arguing negatively, and conversely by arguing affirmatively. Just as this is a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter: `a is producible by God, therefore a is', and similarly here `a is not, therefore a is not producible by God'.
Similiter hic `Antichristus non est, igitur Antichristus non est praescitus a Deo', et e converso `Antichristus est praescitus a Deo, igitur Antichristus est'. Unde quia illud quod non est, potest praesciri sicut illud quod est, ideo in talibus est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter.	Similarly this: `Antichrist is not, therefore Antichrist is not foreknown by God', and conversely `Antichrist is foreknown by God, therefore Antichrist is'. Hence, because that which is not can be foreknown like that which is, therefore in such things there is a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter.
Et ista est una regula generalis pro isto modo istius fallaciae. Sed scire in particulari quando praedicatum potest competere termino pro non ente sicut pro ente ad praecise logicum scire non pertinet, sed hoc pertinet ad scientem logicam et alias scientias particulares. Alia regula pro isto modo est quod quando praedicatum non est commune omnibus, semper est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, vel affirmative vel negative arguendo.	And this is one general rule for this mode of this fallacy. But knowing in particular when a predicate can correspond to a term for non-being as for being does not pertain to precisely logical knowledge, but this pertains to one who knows logic and other particular sciences. Another rule for this mode is that when a predicate is not common to all, it is always a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter, either by affirmative or negative argument.
Sicut hic est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter `Sortes non est asinus, igitur Sortes non est'; `homo est, igitur homo est asinus'. Unde generaliter quando arguitur negative, est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter. Similiter arguendo ex consequente, est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter affirmative. Secundus modus principalis est quando a parte eiusdem extremi arguitur ab aliquo sumpto cum addito ad ipsum, vel suum convertibile vel superius, per se sumptum, vel e converso.	As this is a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter: `Socrates is not an ass, therefore Socrates is not'; `a man is, therefore a man is an ass'. Hence generally when it is argued negatively, it is a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter. Similarly, when arguing from a consequent, it is a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter affirmatively. The second principal mode is when it is argued from the part of the same extreme from something taken with something added to it, either its convertible or above, taken by itself, or vice versa.
Et tunc videndum est an illud additum et illud cui additur se habent sicut adiectivum et substantivum vel non. Si primo modo, aut praedicatio unius de alio est impossibilis, aut praedicatio unius de alio universaliter sumpto est necessaria aut contingens.	And then we must see whether the thing added and the thing to which it is added are related as adjective and substantive or not. If in the first way, either the predication of one of the other is impossible, or the predication of one of the other, taken universally, is necessary or contingent.
Si sit impossibilis, semper arguendo affirmative a tali sumpto cum alio ad ipsum, vel convertibile, est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, non tamen semper arguendo ad quodlibet suum superius.	If it is impossible, always arguing affirmatively from such a thing taken with another to itself, or convertible, is a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter, but not always arguing to any of its above.
Sicut hic est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter `Sortes est homo mortuus, igitur Sortes est homo', quia haec est impossibilis `homo est mortuus'. Similiter, propter idem, hic est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter `Sortes est homo mortuus, igitur Sortes est rationalis vel risibilis'.	Just as here it is a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter: `Socrates is a dead man, therefore Socrates is a man', because this is impossible `a man is a dead thing'. Similarly, for the same reason, here it is a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter: `Socrates is a dead man, therefore Socrates is rational or able to laugh'.
Similiter hic `a est syllogismus sophisticus, igitur a est syllogismus', quia haec est impossibilis `aliquis syllogismus est sophisticus'. Similiter hic `hoc est falsum argumentum, igitur hoc est argumentum'. Similiter hic `iste est bonus latro, igitur iste est bonus'.	Similarly here `a is a sophistic syllogism, therefore a is a syllogism', because this is impossible `some syllogism is sophistic'. Similarly here `this is a false argument, therefore this is an argument'. Similarly here `this is a good thief, therefore he is good'
Similiter hic `iste est perfectus latro, igitur iste est perfectus'. Verumtamen quamvis ad unam partem sit fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, non tamen semper arguendo ad aliam est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter.	Similarly here `this is a perfect thief, therefore this is perfect.' However, although on one side it is a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter, it is not always by argument on the other side a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter.
Sicut hic nulla est fallacia `Sortes est homo mortuus, ergo Sortes est mortuus'. Nec hic `Sortes est perfectus latro, igitur est latro'. Nec hic `iste est bonus sutor, ergo iste est sutor'. Nec hic `a est syllogismus sophisticus, igitur a est sophisticus'. Ad sciendum autem ad quam partem arguendo est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter et ad quam non, oportet definire totum compositum, vel aliquod nomen cum eo convertibile, definitione exprimente quid nominis. Et si in illa definitione ponatur una pars affirmative, vel aliquod convertibile cum una parte et non cum altera, semper arguendo ad illam partem est bonum argumentum et arguendo ad aliam est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter.	Just as here there is no fallacy `Socrates is a dead man, therefore Socrates is dead'. Nor here `Socrates is a perfect thief, therefore he is a thief'. Nor here `this is a good shoemaker, therefore he is a shoemaker'. Nor here `a is a sophistical syllogism, therefore a is sophistical'. But to know to which part it is a fallacy to argue in secundum quid et simpliciter and to which it is not, it is necessary to define the whole composite, or some name convertible with it, with a definition expressing the quid of the name. And if in that definition one part is affirmatively put, or something convertible with one part and not with the other, always arguing in that part is a good argument and arguing the other is a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter.
Verbi gratia definiatur hoc totum `homo mortuus' vel aliquod nomen cum eo convertibile. Et dabitur talis definitio `quod non est homo, sed fuit homo'. Hic ponitur `homo' negative, ideo ad hominem arguendo est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, et ad aliam partem est bonum argumentum.	For example, let this whole thing be defined as `a dead man' or some name interchangeable with it. And such a definition will be given as `that which is not a man, but was a man'. Here `man' is used negatively, so to argue regarding a man is a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter, and on the other side it is a good argument.
Similiter definiatur hoc totum, vel aliquod nomen cum eo convertibile, `perfectus latro', et dicetur sic `latro, sciens perfecte artem latrocinandi'. Hic ponitur `latro' et non `perfectus', nec aliquod convertibile cum perfecto, et ideo hic non est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter `iste est perfectus latro, igitur est latro', sed hic est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter `iste est perfectus latro, igitur iste est perfectus'.	Similarly, let this whole thing be defined, or some name convertible with it: `a perfect thief', and it will be stated thus: `a thief, knowing perfectly the art of robbery'. Here `thief' is used and not `perfect', nor anything convertible with perfect, and therefore here it is not a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter: `this is a perfect thief, therefore he is a thief', but here it is a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter: `this is a perfect thief, therefore he is perfect'.
Similiter, bonus sutor est sutor habens perfecte artem suendi, ideo hic non est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter `iste est bonus sutor, igitur est sutor', sed hic `iste est bonus sutor, igitur iste est bonus'.	Similarly, a good tailor is a tailor who has perfectly the art of sewing, so here it is not a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter: `this is a good tailor, therefore he is a tailor', but it is here: `this is a good tailor, therefore he is good'.
Et sicut dicitur de istis, ita dicendum est de aliis.	And as is said of these, so must it be said of others.
Nam si esset aliquod nomen convertibile cum hoc toto `albus monachus', deberet taliter definiri `monachus utens ex professione alba veste'. Et propter hoc hic non est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter `iste est albus monachus, igitur iste est monachus', sed hic `iste est albus monachus, igitur iste est albus'.	For if there were any name interchangeable with this whole: `white monk', it would have to be defined in this way `a monk who wears white robes by profession'. And for that reason this is not a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter: `this is a white monk, therefore this is a monk', but it is here: `this is a white monk, therefore this is white'.
Si autem praedicatio unius partis vel totius de alia sit necessaria, semper ad utramque partem est bonum argumentum sine fallacia, saltem in creaturis. Forsan in divinis propter aliquid proprium Deo, qui est una essentia simplex et tres personae, talis modus arguendi non valet `essentia est Pater generans, igitur essentia est generans'. Si autem praedicatio unius partis vel totius de alia sit contingens, tunc, utendum est illa arte quae exprimit definitionem alicuius nominis convertibilis cum illo toto.	But if the predication of one part or the whole from another is necessary, there is always a good argument on both sides without fallacy, at least in creatures. Perhaps in divine things, because of something proper to God, who is one simple essence and three persons, such a way of arguing is not valid `the essence is the Father generating, therefore the essence is generating'. But if the predication of one part or the whole from another is contingent, then, that technique must be used which expresses the definition of some name convertible with that whole.
Et si in illa definitione ponitur utraque pars, vel cum utraque parte aliquod convertibile, semper tunc a toto ad utramque partem est bonum argumentum sine fallacia. Sicut si esset aliquod nomen convertibile cum hoc toto `homo albus' et deberet definiri ultimata definitione exprimente quid nominis, deberet tali modo definiri `homo habens albedinem'.	And if in that definition both parts are included, or something convertible with both parts, then there is always a good argument from the whole to both parts without fallacy. For example, if there were some name convertible with this whole, `a white man', and it should be defined by a final definition expressing what the name is, it should be defined in this way `a man having whiteness'.
Et hic ponitur `homo', et hic ponitur `habens albedinem' quod convertitur cum `albo', et ideo sequitur `Sortes est homo albus, igitur Sortes est homo et Sortes est albus'. Si autem non utraque pars vel aliquod convertibile ponitur in tali definitione ultimate exprimente quid nominis sed una tantum, tunc ad unam esset fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter et non ad aliam.	And here `man' is placed, and here `having whiteness' is placed, which is convertible with `white', and therefore it follows `Socrates is a white man, therefore Socrates is a man and Socrates is white'. But if not both parts or some convertible part are placed in such a definition ultimately expressing the quid of the name, but only one, then it would be a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter to one and not to the other.
Et per istam regulam patet quod talia argumenta non peccant per fallaciam secundum quid et simpliciter `homo albus est aggregatum per accidens, igitur homo est aggregatum per accidens'; `lapis intellectus est ab aeterno, igitur lapis est ab aeterno'; `Caesar opinabilis est, igitur Caesar est' et huiusmodi.	And by this rule it is clear that such arguments do not err by the fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter: `a white man is an aggregate by accident, therefore man is an aggregate by accident'; `a stone of intellect is from eternity, therefore a stone is from eternity'; `Caesar is conceivable, therefore Caesar is' and the like.
Potest tamen in talibus et consimilibus assignari aliqua multiplicitas penes aequivocationem vel amphiboliam, et in uno sensu erunt consequentiae bonae et in alio non valebunt.	However, in such and similar things, some complexity can be assigned due to equivocation or amphiboly, and in one sense the consequences will be good and in another they will not be valid.
Ista quae dicta sunt intelligenda sunt quando ex talibus arguitur affirmative. Ex quibus faciliter patere potest quid de eis est dicendum quando arguitur negative, quia quando affirmative arguendo est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, arguendo negative ex opposito consequentis erit similiter fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter.	The things that have been said are to be understood when they are argued affirmatively from such things. From which it can easily be seen what is to be said about them when they are argued negatively, because when arguing affirmatively is a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter, arguing negatively from the opposite of the consequent will likewise be a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter.
Si autem additum et illud cui additur non se habent sicut adiectivum et substantivum, tunc vel totum ex addito et illo cui additur potest esse indifferenter praedicatum et subiectum propositionis, --- cuiusmodi sunt talia `album secundum dentes', `intellectio lapidis', `servus hominis' et huiusmodi ---, vel non.	But if the added thing and that to which it is added are not related as an adjective and a substantive, then either the whole of the added thing and that to which it is added can be indifferently the predicate and subject of a proposition, --- of which are such things as `white according to teeth', `the understanding of a stone', `the servant of a man' and the like --- or not.
Si sic, videndum est an pars praedicetur de toto necessario posita constantia subiecti --- quod potest sciri per definitionem exprimentem quid nominis --- vel non. Si sic, semper a toto ad illam partem est bonum argumentum, et ideo bene sequitur `intellectio lapidis est prior Filio, igitur intellectio est prior Filio'.	If so, we must see whether the part is necessarily predicated of the whole, given the constancy of the subject --- which can be known by a definition expressing the quid of the noun --- or not. If so, there is always a good argument from the whole to that part, and therefore it follows well that `the understanding of the stone is prior to the Son, therefore the understanding is prior to the Son'.
Similiter bene sequitur `intellectio qua Deus intelligit lapidem est posterior Patre, igitur intellectio creaturae est posterior Patre'. Similiter ista consequentia est bona `intellectio qua Deus intelligit creaturam est posterior Patre, igitur intellectio qua Deus intelligit est posterior Patre'.	Similarly, it follows well that `the understanding by which God understands a stone is posterior to the Father, therefore the understanding of a creature is posterior to the Father.' Similarly, this consequence is good `the understanding by which God understands a creature is posterior to the Father, therefore the understanding by which God understands is posterior to the Father.'
Et ideo sicut consequens est falsum, ita antecedens est falsum. Propter quod tales propositiones sunt falsae `intellectio creaturarum praesupponit suppositum divinum'; `intellectio creaturarum praesupponit emanationem personarum';	And therefore, just as the consequent is false, so the antecedent is false. Because of this, such propositions are false as `the understanding of creatures presupposes the divine suppositum'; `the understanding of creatures presupposes the emanation of persons';
'persona praesupponit intellectionem creaturarum'; `persona praesupponit essentiam' et huiusmodi. Si autem non oportet quod totum praedicetur de parte nec e converso, etiam posita constantia subiecti, semper a tali cum addito ad ipsum per se sumptum est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter. Sicut hic `album secundum dentes currit, igitur album currit'; `iste est pater tuus, igitur est tuus'; `hoc est opus tuum, ergo est tuum'.	'person presupposes the intellection of creatures'; 'person presupposes essence' and the like. But if it is not necessary that the whole be predicated of the part nor vice versa, even given the constancy of the subject, it is always a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter to take such a thing by itself with what is added to it. As here `a white thing according to teeth runs, therefore a white thing runs'; `this is your father, therefore he is yours'; `this is your work, therefore it is yours'.
Ad sciendum autem quando est talis fallacia et quando non in tali modo arguendi, utile est resolvere propositiones in propositiones priores, quantum possibile est, vel exprimendo definitiones exprimentes quid nominis terminorum, vel aliquo alio convenienti modo, et videre an ex propositionibus in quas fit resolutio valeat talis modus arguendi.	But to know when there is such a fallacy and when there is not in such a way of arguing, it is useful to resolve propositions into prior propositions, as far as possible, either by expressing definitions expressing what the name of the terms means, or in some other suitable way, and to see whether from the propositions into which the resolution is made such a way of arguing are valid.
Verbi gratia ista propositio `Aethiops est albus secundum dentes' aequivalet isti `aethiops habet dentes albos'; et ideo sicut manifestum est quod non sequitur `Aethiops habet albos dentes, igitur est albus', ita non sequitur `Aethiops est albus secundum dentes, igitur est albus'.	For example, the proposition `An Ethiopian is white according to his teeth' is equivalent to `An Ethiopian has white teeth'; and therefore, just as it is clear that `An Ethiopian has white teeth, therefore he is white' does not follow, so `An Ethiopian is white according to his teeth, therefore he is white' does not follow.
Oportet autem scire quod praedicta intelligenda sunt de propositionibus mere categoricis quae non aequivalent condicionalibus, quia in talibus non semper valent tales consequentiae, quamvis pars praedicetur de toto.	But it is necessary to know that the above is to be understood of purely categorical propositions which are not equivalent to conditionals, because in such propositions such consequences do not always hold, even though the part is predicated of the whole.
Propter quod talis modus arguendi ex aliquibus verbis non valet et ex aliis valet. Unde bene sequitur `Sortes est in luto cum centum marcis, igitur Sortes est in luto'. Et tamen non sequitur `Sortes vellet esse in luto cum centum marcis, igitur Sortes vellet esse in luto'. Nam ista `Sortes est in luto cum centum marcis' non aequivalet alicui condicionali, sed ista	Because of which such a way of arguing from some words is not valid and from others it is valid. Whence it follows well `Socrates is in mud with a hundred marks, therefore Socrates is in mud'. And yet it does not follow `Socrates would want to be in mud with a hundred marks, therefore Socrates would want to be in mud'. For this `Socrates is in mud with a hundred marks' is not equivalent to any conditional, but this
'Sortes vellet esse in luto cum centum marcis' aequivalet isti condicionali `Sortes vellet esse in luto si deberet per hoc lucrari centum marcas'. Similiter ista consequentia est bona `non vendo tibi equum, igitur non vendo tibi equum pro centum marcis'; et tamen non sequitur `nollem tibi vendere equum, igitur nollem tibi vendere equum pro centum marcis'. Si autem illud quod additur et illud cui additur non possunt esse indifferenter subiectum vel praedicatum propositionis, tunc est adverbium illud quod additur, vel praepositio cum suo casuali, vel aliquid simile talibus.	'Socrates would like to be in mud with a hundred marks' is equivalent to the conditional 'Socrates would like to be in mud if he should gain a hundred marks by doing so'. Similarly, the following is a good consequence: 'I will not sell you a horse, therefore I will not sell you a horse for a hundred marks'; and yet it does not follow that 'I do not want to sell you a horse, therefore I do not want to sell you a horse for a hundred marks'. But if that which is added and that to which it is added cannot be indifferently the subject or predicate of a proposition, then that which is added is an adverb, or a preposition with its case, or something similar to such things.
Quantum ad talia et in talibus est difficile vel impossibile dare regulam generalem propriam illis, quia aliquando negative est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter arguendo a determinabili cum addito ad ipsum per se sumptum, et aliquando est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter arguendo affirmative.	As for such things and in such things, it is difficult or impossible to give a general rule proper to them, because sometimes there is a fallacy in a negative sense and simply by arguing from a determinable with an addition to it taken per se, and sometimes there is a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter by arguing affirmatively.
Sicut hic est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter `homo non est necessario animal, igitur homo non est animal; `Deus non fuit semper creans, igitur Deus non fuit creans'; `homo non currit velociter, igitur homo non currit'.	Just as here is a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter: `man is not necessarily an animal, therefore man is not an animal; `God was not always creating, therefore God was not creating'; `man does not run quickly, therefore man does not run'.
Similiter affirmative arguendo est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, arguendo in talibus ab aliquo per se sumpto ad ipsum sumptum cum determinatione tali, sicut hic `homo est animal, igitur homo necessario est animal'.	Similarly, arguing affirmatively is a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter, arguing in such things from something taken per se to something taken with such determination, as here `man is an animal, therefore man is necessarily an animal'.
Oportet autem scire pro ista fallacia quod quando arguitur ab aliquo sumpto cum determinatione ad ipsum per se sumptum, vel e converso, accipienda est propositio qua expressa talis consequentia in syllogismum reducitur, et videndum est an illa propositio, vel condicionalis illi categoricae correspondens, sit necessaria vel non.	But it is necessary to know against this fallacy that when an argument is made from something taken with determination to something taken per se, or vice versa, the proposition by which such an expressed consequence is reduced to a syllogism must be accepted, and it must be seen whether that proposition, or the conditional corresponding to that categorical one, is necessary or not.
Si sic, non est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter.	If so, it is not a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter.
Si nec illa categorica nec condicionalis sibi correspondens est necessaria, est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter. Verbi gratia si arguatur sic `Sortes est albus secundum pedem, igitur Sortes est albus' addenda est ista propositio `omne album secundum pedem est album', qua expressa completur forma syllogistica, sic arguendo `omne album secundum pedem est album; Sortes est albus secundum pedem; igitur Sortes est albus'.	If neither that categorical nor the corresponding conditional is necessary, it is a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter. For example, if it is argued thus `Socrates is white according to his foot, therefore Socrates is white', the proposition `every white thing according to its foot is white' must be added, by which the expressed syllogistic form is completed, thus arguing `every white thing according to its foot is white; Socrates is white according to his foot; therefore Socrates is white'.
Et si ista propositio, vel ista condicionalis, `si aliquid est album secundum pedem, ipsum est album' sit necessaria, prima consequentia erit bona. Sed quia neutra illarum propositionum est necessaria, ideo est ibi fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter.	And if that proposition, or that conditional, `if something is white according to its foot, it itself is white' is necessary, the first consequence will be good. But because neither of those propositions is necessary, therefore in both there is a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter.
Et consimiliter est de aliis.	And it is similar with the others.