Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-4/Chapter 16

Latin	English
CAP. 16. DE FALLACIA SECUNDUM NON-CAUSAM UT CAUSAM.	Chapter 16. On the fallacy of considering a non-cause as a cause.
Post petitionem principii sequitur fallacia secundum non-causam ut causam, penes quam non peccat aliquis paralogismus in forma quin conclusio sequatur ex antecedente, nisi aliqua alia fallacia illationem impediat. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est quod fallacia secundum non-causam ut causam est tantum in syllogismis ducentibus ad impossibile, hoc est ad falsum, vel secundum veritatem, vel secundum responsionem vel opinionem respondentis.	After begging the question, there follows the fallacy of non-cause as cause, according to which no paralogism in form is guilty of not following the conclusion from the antecedent, unless some other fallacy prevents the inference. To make this clear, it should be known that the fallacy of non-cause as cause is only in syllogisms leading to the impossible, that is, to the false, either according to the truth, or according to the response or opinion of the respondent.
Et accidit in illis syllogismis non-causa ut causa quando ex impossibilitate seu falsitate conclusi infertur aliquid esse falsum, quo posito, hoc est quo exsistente falso vel vero, nihilominus accidit illud falsum conclusum, ita quod sive illud assumptum fuerit verum vel falsum nihilominus conclusum erit falsum, et ideo fallacia secundum non-causam ut causam coincidit cum `non propter hoc accidere falsum', de quo determinat Aristoteles in II Priorum.	And in those syllogisms, non-cause as cause occurs when something is inferred to be false from the impossibility or falsity of the conclusion, which being posited, that is, with the existence of a false or true thing, that false conclusion nevertheless occurs, so that whether it is assumed to be true or false, the conclusion will nevertheless be false, and therefore the fallacy according to non-cause as cause coincides with `not for this reason the false happens', of which Aristotle determines in II Priores.
Sunt autem istius fallaciae duo modi.	But there are two kinds of this fallacy.
Unus est quando accipitur aliqua propositio, superflua etiam ad illationem, quae apparet esse causa falsitatis conclusi, et tamen non est propter eam falsum conclusum. Sicut si detur ista propositio `anima et vita sunt idem realiter', et opponens velit probare eam esse falsam, ducendo ex ista ad impossibile, sic arguendo: anima et vita sunt idem realiter; mors et vita sunt contraria, et mors contrariatur generationi; ergo vita contrariatur corruptioni. Ista conclusio est falsa, igitur ista `anima et vita sunt idem realiter' ex qua sequitur falsum. -Hic est fallacia secundum non-causam ut causam, quia ista conclusio `vita est contraria corruptioni' nihilominus sequitur, sive ista `anima et vita sunt idem realiter' fuerit vera sive falsa.	One is when some proposition is taken, even superfluous to the inference, which appears to be the cause of the falsity of the conclusion, and yet it is not a false conclusion because of it. For example, if this proposition `soul and life are the same in reality' is given, and the opponent wishes to prove it to be false, by leading from it to the impossible, thus arguing: soul and life are the same in reality; death and life are contrary, and death is contrary to generation; therefore life is contrary to corruption. This conclusion is false, therefore this `soul and life are the same in reality' from which falsehood follows. This is a fallacy according to non-cause as cause, because this conclusion `life is contrary to corruption' nevertheless follows, whether this `soul and life are the same in reality' is true or false.
Secundus modus istius fallaciae est quando non accipitur propositio superflua illationi falsi, sed propter eius falsitatem non est conclusio falsa. Sicut si respondens det istam propositionem `nullum album esse nigrum est necessarium', et opponens velit probare eam esse falsam, deducendo ex ea impossibile, sic arguendo: omne quod movetur ab albedine in nigredinem partim est album et partim est nigrum, quia partim est sub albedine et partim est sub nigredine; nullum album esse nigrum est necessarium; igitur necesse est nihil moveri ab albedine ad nigredinem.	The second mode of this fallacy is when a proposition is not accepted that is superfluous to the false inference, but because of its falsity the conclusion is not false. For example, if the respondent gives the proposition `it is necessary that no white be black', and the opponent wishes to prove it to be false, deducing from it the impossibility, thus arguing: everything that is moved from whiteness to blackness is partly white and partly black, because it is partly under whiteness and partly under blackness; it is necessary that no white be black; therefore it is necessary that nothing be moved from whiteness to blackness.
Ista conclusio est falsa, igitur ista ex qua sequitur, `nullum album esse nigrum est necessarium', est falsa. -Respondendum est quod ista conclusio falsa non accidit propter falsitatem istius `nullum album esse nigrum est necessarium', sed propter falsitatem istius `omne quod movetur ab albedine ad nigredinem est partim album et partim nigrum'. Unde sciendum quod in isto casu respondendum est quod conclusio impossibilis concluditur non propter impossibilitatem praeconcessi sed propter impossibilitatem coassumpti. Quandoque autem accidit impossibile non propter impossibilitatem praeconcessi nec propter impossibilitatem coassumpti sed propter incompossibilitatem eorum. Sicut si arguens vellet probare contra respondentem impossibilitatem istius `tu sedes', sic arguendo: tu sedes; tu stas, ergo contradictoria sunt simul vera. Ista conclusio est impossibilis, et haec est possibilis `tu stas', igitur haec est impossibilis `tu sedes'.	This conclusion is false, therefore that from which it follows, `it is necessary that no white be black', is false. The answer is that this false conclusion does not occur because of the falsity of `it is necessary that no white be black', but because of the falsity of `everything that moves from whiteness to blackness is partly white and partly black'. Hence it should be noted that in this case the answer is that an impossible conclusion is concluded not because of the impossibility of the pre-granted but because of the impossibility of the co-assumption. Sometimes, however, the impossible occurs not because of the impossibility of the pre-granted nor because of the impossibility of the co-assumption but because of their incompatibility. For example, if the arguer wanted to prove against the respondent the impossibility of `you sit', thus arguing: you sit; you stand, therefore the contradictory statements are simultaneously true. This conclusion is impossible, and `you stand' is possible, therefore `you sit' is impossible.
-Respondendum est quod haec conclusio impossibilis non sequitur nec propter impossibilitatem unius nec propter impossibilitatem alterius, sed propter eorum incompossibilitatem.	The answer is that this impossible conclusion does not follow either because of the impossibility of one or because of the impossibility of the other, but because of their incompatibility.
Et sic solvuntur talia sophismata: si dicat respondens `possibile est istum damnari', demonstrando aliquem qui in rei veritate est praedestinatus, et opponens probet quod haec sit falsa, sic: si haec sit vera `possibile est istum damnari', ponatur in esse.	And thus such sophisms are resolved: if the answerer says, 'It is possible for this man to be damned,' demonstrating someone who is predestined in the truth of the matter, and the opponent proves that this is false, thus: if this is true, 'It is possible for this man to be damned,' let it be posited as being.
Qua posita in esse sequitur impossibile, sic arguendo `iste est praedestinatus; iste est damnatus; ergo damnatus est praedestinatus'. Conclusio est impossibilis, et maior est vera vel indeterminate vera, igitur minor est impossibilis, et per consequens haec est falsa `possibile est istum damnari'.	Which, when put into being, follows impossibly, thus arguing `this one is predestined; this one is damned; therefore the damned one is predestined'. The conclusion is impossible, and the major is true or indeterminately true, therefore the minor is impossible, and consequently `it is possible for this one to be damned' is false.
-Respondendum est quod sequitur conclusio impossibilis non quia haec est falsa `possibile est istum damnari', nec quia haec ponitur in esse `possibile est istum damnari', sed quia in antecedente accipiuntur duae propositiones incompossibiles. Oportet autem scire quod quamvis primus discursus quo concluditur falsum vel impossibile non peccet in forma vel in materia, tamen in posteriori processu quo sic arguitur `conclusio est falsa, et non illa praemissa, ergo reliqua' vel sic `conclusio est falsa, igitur illa assumpta concessa est falsa' vel est peccatum in forma vel in materia, ita quod consequentia non valet secundum veritatem vel secundum responsionem respondentis, si recte respondeat, vel aliqua propositio quam accipit est falsa.	The answer is that an impossible conclusion follows, not because `it is possible that this man will be damned' is false, nor because `it is possible that this man will be damned' is put in being, but because two incompatible propositions are taken in the antecedent. However, it is necessary to know that although the first discourse in which the false or impossible conclusion is drawn is not flawed in form or in matter, nevertheless in the subsequent process in which it is argued thus `the conclusion is false, and not that premise, therefore the rest' or thus `the conclusion is false, therefore that assumption conceded is false' there is either a flaw in form or in matter, so that the consequence is not valid according to the truth or according to the respondent's response, if he answers correctly, or some proposition that he accepts is false.