Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-4/Chapter 17

Latin	English
CAP. 17. DE FALLACIA SECUNDUM `PLURES INTERROGATIONES UT UNAM FACERE'.	Chapter 17. On the fallacy of asking several questions as one.
Ultima fallacia est secundum plures interrogationes ut unam facere. Iuxta quam non peccat aliquod argumentum quantum ad illationem, sed iuxta eam peccat opponens in arguendo contra respondentem, quia accipit unam interrogationem quae est aequivalenter plures, hoc est quae aequivalet pluribus.	The final fallacy is to make several questions into one. According to this, an argument does not err in inference, but according to it, the opponent errs in arguing against the respondent, because he accepts one question which is equivalently several, that is, which is equivalent to many.
Ex qua si postea arguat sophistice, argumentum suum peccabit per aliquam aliam fallaciam. Si tamen proposita interrogatione statim respondens unica responsione respondeat, poterit faciliter decipi, et ideo ista fallacia est inter fallacias connumeranda.	If he then argues sophistically from this, his argument will be flawed by some other fallacy. However, if, having been asked a question, he immediately responds with a single answer, he may easily be deceived, and therefore this fallacy is to be counted among the fallacies.
Intelligendum est autem quod dupliciter potest aliqua interrogatio intelligi plures: vel quia plura enuntiantur de pluribus, vel unum de pluribus, vel e converso, vel quia accipiuntur termini in numero singulari, ita tamen quod propositio, ex qua formatur talis interrogatio, est propositio una unitate sufficiente ad contradictionem.	It must be understood, however, that a question can be understood as many in two ways: either because many are stated about many, or one about many, or conversely, or because the terms are taken in the singular number, yet so that the proposition from which such a question is formed is a proposition with one unity sufficient for contradiction.
Aliter potest aliqua interrogatio esse plures, quia illa oratio non est una.	Otherwise, there can be several questions, because that statement is not one.
Sicut sic dicendo `Sortes est homo asinus' vel `Sortes est musicus albus calidus grammaticus'. Ad interrogationem, quae plures est primo modo, potest dari semper una responsio, concedendo vel negando, nec potest ex tali responsione duci ad contradictionem.	As in saying `Socrates is a donkey man' or `Socrates is a white-hot musician and grammarian'. To a question, which is plural in the first way, there can always be one answer, conceding or denying, nor can such an answer lead to a contradiction.
Cum enim semper altera pars contradictionis sit vera et altera falsa, debet una negari et altera affirmari. Unde demonstratis duobus quorum unum est album et aliud nigrum et interrogetur an ista sint alba vel nigra, debet dici quod nec sunt alba nec nigra. Et eodem modo est de aliis, quod altera pars potest affirmari vel negari.	For since one part of a contradiction is always true and the other false, one must be denied and the other affirmed. Hence, if two things are shown, one of which is white and the other black, and it is asked whether these are white or black, it must be said that they are neither white nor black. And in the same way it is with the others, that the other part can be affirmed or denied.
Tamen si quis in multis talibus vellet affirmative respondere, non debet unam responsionem dare sed multas, dicendo quod hoc est album et illud nigrum, et sic de aliis consimilibus.	However, if someone wanted to answer affirmatively in many such cases, he should not give one answer but many, saying that this is white and that is black, and so on about other similar things.
Ad interrogationem autem quae plures est secundo modo, non debet dari unica responsio, sed si respondens velit respondere, plures debet dare responsiones; ut si quaeratur an Sortes sit musicus albus, non debet responderi concedendo vel negando.	But to a question which is plural in the second way, a single answer should not be given, but if the respondent wishes to answer, he should give several answers; for example, if it is asked whether Socrates is a white musician, he should not answer by conceding or denying.
Sed si velit respondere, debet dare plures responsiones, puta si Sortes est albus et non musicus, debet dicere quod est albus et quod non est musicus. Et sic de consimilibus est dicendum.	But if he wishes to answer, he must give several answers, for example, if Socrates is white and not a musician, he must say that he is white and that he is not a musician. And so it is with similar things.