Authors/Ps-Aquinas/Summa Totius Logicae/TRACTATUS 1/Caput 3

Latin	English
CAPUT 3
Species est quae praedicatur de pluribus differentibus numero in eo quod quid. Licet autem haec praedicta descriptio speciei ex dictis possit intelligi; tamen ad maiorem declarationem aliquorum quae supra dicta sunt, sciendum est, quod licet principium individuationis proprium sit a materia signata, ut supra dictum est; non tamen est intelligendum quod aliqualiter non sit a forma.	Species is what is predicated of many things differentiated by number in respect of what kind of thing they are. But although this aforesaid description of species can be understood from what was said before, still for a better clarification of the things which were discussed above, it should be known that although the proper principle of individuation is from signified matter, as was said above, yet it should not be understood that it may not also in some way be by a form.
Ubi nota, quod aliquid distingui ab aliquo per formam, dupliciter potest esse. Uno modo quod talis distinctio sit per formam ratione formae, secundum quod in formis diversi gradus inveniuntur: et quae sic distinguuntur necesse est ut differant specie, ut supra dictum est. Alio modo potest aliquid distingui ab alio per formam, non secundum absolutam rationem formae, sed secundum quod est haec forma: et sic differunt numero duae quantitates separatae, sive sint separatae per intellectum, ut in mathematicis: sive sint separatae a materia secundum rem virtute divina, ut quantitas duarum hostiarum consecratarum: quantitas enim quaedam forma est.	Note here that being distinguished from something 'by form', can be understood in two ways. In one way, that such a distinction is 'by form' by reason of the form, according as there are found diverse degrees of form. And it is necessary that what are distinguished in this way differ by species, as was said above. In the other way, something can be distinguished from another 'by form', not according to absolute reason of the form, but according as it is this form: and in this way two separate quantities differ by number, whether they are separated through the understanding, as in mathematics, or are separated by matter according to a thing by divine power, as in the quantity of the two consecrated hosts - for quantity is a certain form.
Et sic etiam differunt animae separatae numero: non enim differunt per materiam quam non habent, nec ei coniunguntur; nec per relationem ad materiam cui coniungibiles sunt, cum relatio sit posterior ipsi relato. Ubi nota, quod omnis forma sub se habens multa, idest, quae universaliter sumitur, habet quamdam latitudinem: nam invenitur in pluribus, et dicitur de pluribus.	And so also separate souls differ in number - for they do not differ through the matter which they do not have, neither are they conjoined; nor through a relation to matter to which the are conjoinable, since the relation may be posterior to the relatum itself.  (Note here that every form subsuming many things under it, that is, which is understood universally, has a certain latitude: for it is found in several things, and it is predicated of several.
Duplex autem potest esse latitudo in formis. Una secundum gradus formales, quorum unus secundum se nobilior et perfectior est altero; et haec, ut dictum est, latitudo generis est, sub quo sunt diversi gradus formales specifice differentes. Alia latitudo est secundum plurificationem numeralem in eodem gradu.	But latitude can be in forms in two ways. One way according to formal degrees, of which one thing is according to itself more noble and perfect than another, and this, as we said, is the latitude of the genus, under which there are diverse formal degrees specifically differing. Another latitude is according to numeric plurification in the same degree.
Et quia ista latitudo non est secundum absolutam rationem formae, oportet quod forma, in qua est talis latitudo, importet in sua ratione aliquid per quod conveniat sibi talis latitudo, quod sit aliud ab absoluta ratione formae. Et si loquamur de illa forma quae est pars compositi, puta de anima rationali; illud propter quod sibi talis latitudo convenit, est imperfectio quaedam: secundum, scilicet, quod nata est habere rationem partis alicuius totius: non solum quod sit pars secundum rationem, quia etiam formae specificae sunt partes secundum rationem; sed quod sit pars secundum rem: nam anima rationalis est pars realis hominis; et albedo est pars realis hominis albi.	And because that latitude does not exist according to the absolute nature [ratio] of the form, the form, in which such latitude exists, has to carry in its own nature [ratio] something through which such latitude agrees with it, which may be different from the absolute nature of the form. And if we speak of that form which is a part of the composite, for example of rational animal, that on account of which such a latitude agrees with it, is a sort of imperfection, namely according to which it is suited by nature to have the nature of a part of some whole. (Not only what is a part according to nature, because specific forms are also parts according to nature, but what is a part according to reality. For a rational soul is a real part of a man; and whiteness is a real part of a white man.
Unde ad hoc quod tales formae multiplicentur sub specie, oportet quod habeant illam potentialitatem quae facit partes reales: et secundum hoc illa potentialitas per quam anima rationalis per essentiam suam nata est esse pars compositi, dat ei quamdam latitudinem multiplicationis secundum eumdem gradum, non obstante quod sit separata, et actu non informet materiam.	Hence in order for such forms to be multiplied under a species, they must have that potentiality which makes real parts, and according to this, that potentiality, by which a rational soul through its own essence is suited to be a part of a composite, gives to them a certain latitude of multiplication according to the same degree, notwithstanding that they are separated, and it may not actually inform matter.
Et quia talis potentialitas non competit essentiae Angelorum, ideo Angeli non differunt inter se numero, sed quilibet Angelus facit speciem per se: non enim est apta nata natura seu essentia Angeli esse pars compositi, ex qua compositione consequatur speciem, sicut anima humana. Potentialitas ergo formae quam forma habet, scilicet ut iungatur materiae, facit sub ea multiplicari individua: et sic debet intelligi quod supra dictum est, quod scilicet humanitas quae est forma sequens totum compositum, si consideretur ut est determinata ad hanc materiam signatam, facit singulare: humanitas enim, ut dictum est, dicit animam et corpus: unde dicendo hoc corpus et hanc animam, dicit singulare.	And because such potentiality is not relevant to the essences of the angels, therefore angels do not differ among themselves by number. Rather, any angel makes a species by itself, for the nature or essence of an angel is is not suited be a part of a composite, from which composition a species follows, as with the human soul. Therefore the potentiality of form which a form has, namely that it may be joined to matter, causes individuals to be multiplied beneath it. And thus ought to be understood what was said above, namely that humanity which is a form following a whole composite, if considered as determined by this signified matter, makes a singular. For humanity, as was said, means spirit and body, hence saying 'this body and this soul', means the singular.
Et quia anima in eodem gradu existens non posset dividi in plura, ut dictum est, nisi propter potentialitatem quam habet ut uniatur materiae signatae; ideo dicendum est quod materia signata est principium individuationis, forma autem non nisi per materiam ad quam habet naturalem potentiam ut sibi uniatur.	And because a soul existing in the same degree cannot be divided into several, as was said, except because of the potentiality which it has to be united to signified matter. Therefore it should be said that signified matter is a principle of individuation, but form is not, except through matter to which it has a natural potential to be united with it.
Et sic patet quid est species.	And so it is clear what a species is.
Sciendum tamen est, quod licet forma specifica, ut dictum est, de se plurificabilis sit propter potentialitatem quam habet ut materiae uniatur, tamen aliquando talis plurificatio accidentaliter impeditur: puta si omnes homines morerentur, et unus solus remaneret, tunc humanitas non esset in pluribus materiis. Vel potest impediri propter conditionem materiae; sicut modo est unus tantum sol; non quod repugnet naturae solari esse in pluribus secundum considerationem formae, sed quia est alia materia non susceptiva talis formae: unde sol est species in uno individuo.	Yet it should be known that although a specific form, as was said, is plurifiable of itself because of the potentiality which it has to be unified to matter, yet sometimes such plurification is accidentally prevented. For example, if all men died, and one alone remained, then humanity would not be in several matters. Or it can be prevented because of the condition of matter, just as there is now only one sun: not because it is repugnant to the nature of the sun to be in several according to consideration of form, but because it is another material not susceptible of such a form, hence the sun is a species in one individual.