Authors/Ps-Aquinas/Summa Totius Logicae/TRACTATUS 1/Caput 4

Latin	English
CAPUT 4	Chapter 4
Differentia, ut hic sumitur, dupliciter describitur. Primo sic. Differentia est quae praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quale. Secundo sic. Differentia est qua species abundat a genere.	Differentia, as is understood here, is described in a two ways. The first as follows. Differentia is what is predicated of several things differenting by species in respect of what kind of thing they are.  The second as follows. Differentia "is how the species flows from the genus".
Ad videndum autem primam descriptionem sciendum est, quod, ut supra dictum est, in aliquibus formis potest esse latitudo in eadem forma secundum gradus formales, quorum unus secundum se est nobilior et perfectior alio: et ab hac forma sumitur genus.	But for considering the first description it should be known that, as was said above, in some forms there can be a latitude in the same form according to formal degrees, of which one according to itself is more noble and more perfect than another: and from this form genus is obtained.
Ubi nota, quod in entibus sunt diversi gradus essendi, sive sint gradus substantiales, sive accidentales: qui gradus licet in aliquibus entibus sint dispersi, tamen aliquando invenitur aliquod unum plures gradus perfectionis substantiales vel accidentales comprehendens.	Note here that there are diverse degrees of being in beings, whether the degrees are substantial or accidental. These degrees, although they may be dispersed in some entities, nevertheless one of them is found comprehending many substantial and accidental grades of perfection.
Verbi gratia, vegetabile, sensibile, rationale, sunt gradus entium substantiales: planta enim substantialiter est vegetabilis: canis vero substantialiter est sensibilis: et homo substantialiter est rationalis; et isti gradus dispersi in multis, aliquando inveniuntur in uno solo, puta in homine: homo namque per suam formam substantialem quae est in una, habet omnes istas tres perfectiones: nam est vegetabilis, et est sensibilis, et est rationabilis: unde Socrates per unam suam essentiam conformatur plantae et cani et Platoni, ut supra dictum est.	For example, vegetative, sensitive, rational are degrees of substantial beings, for a plant is substantially vegetative, but a dog is substantially sensitive: and a man is substantially rational. And these grades are dispersed in many, sometimes they are found in only one, for example in man, for in fact man through his own substantial form which is in one has all these three perfections: for it is vegetative, and it is sensitive, and it is rational. Heence Socrates through his own one essence conforms to plant, and dog, and Plato, as was said above.
Haec autem conformitas quae est Socratis ad plantam, potest esse una duorum: sicut enim similitudo duorum nigrorum est una amborum, quia unius ut subiecti, et alterius ut termini; sic talis conformitas est Socratis ut subiecti, et illius plantae ut termini. Nec propter hoc dico quod talis conformitas sit relatio secundum esse; sed est relatio secundum dici, ut fundamentum relationis secundum esse. Talis autem conformitas quae realiter una est, ut dictum est, movet intellectum nostrum ad unum conceptum, puta vivum, a quo conceptu sumitur genus, vel aliquando species, ut ex supradictis haberi potest. Unde talis conformitas se habet ad genus ut fundamentum remotum.	However this confirmity of Socrates to a plant, can be one of two things, for just as the similitude of two black things is one of two things, because it is of one as of the subject and of the other as of the terminus; thus such a conformity is of Socrates as of a subject, and of that plant as of a terminus. Nor because of this do I say that such conformity is a relation according to being, but it is a relation according to speaking, as the basis of relation according to being. But such conformity which really is one, as was said, moves our understanding to one concept, for example ‘alive’, from which concept a genus is obtained, or sometimes a species, as can be held form what was said above.  Hence such conformity stands to genus as a remote basis.
Conceptus vero vivi ad quem talis conformitas movet intellectum, se habet ad genus ut fundamentum propinquum: et sic licet unitas generis sit unitas rationis, tamen aliquo modo habet fundari in uno secundum rem. Difformitas vero quae est inter Socratem et plantam, est, quia Socrates sentit, non autem planta: a qua difformitate sumitur differentia, quae dividit vivum quod commune est homini et plantae.	But the concept of living to which such conformity moves the understanding stands to the genus as a near basis, and so although unity of genus is unity of reason, nevertheless in some way it has to be based on one thing according to reality. But the disconformity which is between Socrates and a plant is because Socrates feels, but not the plant: from which disconformity a differentia is obtained, which divides the living which is common to man and plant.
Unde per hanc differentiam ostenditur, quod vivum invenitur in habente aliquam aliam perfectionem, quae non est in planta.	Hence through this differentia it is shown that living is found in one having some other perfection which is not in the plant.
Et quia in tali perfectione, puta sensibili, convenit Socrates cum cane; similiter inter eos est una conformitas movens ad unum conceptum; a quo, si sumatur in concreto substantive, ita quod tale concretum de suo significato dicat explicite et vivum et sensibile, sumitur aliud genus, scilicet animal.	And because in such a perfection, for example in the sensitive, Socrates agrees with a dog, similarly between them there is one conformity moving to one concept, from which, if it is taken in a concrete substantive, so that such a concrete of its own significate means explicitly both 'living' and 'sensitive', some genus is taken, namely animal.
Si vero sumatur in concreto adiective, ita quod de suo significato dicat solam illam perfectionem explicite, scilicet sensibile, sumitur differentia, puta in quantum dicatur sensibile: et sic de aliis usque ad ultimam differentiam specificam, infra quam non est perfectio formalis. Cum ergo de tot possit dici sensibile de quot dicitur animal: sed animal quod est genus, praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie: similiter et sensibile quod est differentia, praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie.	But if it is taken in a concrete adjective, so that of its own significate it explicitly means that perfection only (namely, sensitive) then a differentia is taken, for example to the extent it may be called sensitive, and so on concerning the others all the way to the ultimate specific difference, below which there is no formal perfection. Therefore, since ‘sensitive’ can be predicated of as many things as of which ‘animal’ is predicated, but animal which is a genus is predicated of several things differing by species, similarly also ‘sensitive’, which is a differentia, is predicated of several things differing by species.
Notandum quod forma substantialis habet duplex esse. Unum est obiective in intellectu; et secundum hoc esse intellectus attribuit sibi nomen abstractum: considerat enim eam intellectus non considerando materiam in qua est; et propterea dat sibi nomen abstractum, ut humanitas. Aliud esse habet in materia: ad quam habet duplicem habitudinem. Una est, quia inhaeret ei tamquam salvata in ipsa; et sic aliquo modo habet modum accidentis: et sic dat ei intellectus nomen concretum adiectivum, quale est nomen accidentis, ut humanum. Secunda comparatio quam habet ad materiam, ut complens et perficiens ipsam; et sic non habet modum accidentis, sed modum substantiae: et sic dat ei intellectus nomen concretum substantivum, ut homo.	It should be noted that a substantial form has a twofold being. One is objective in the understanding, and according to this being the understanding attributes to it an abstract name, for the intellect considers it not by considering the matter in which it exists, and furthermore it gives to it an abstract name, e.g. ‘humanity’. The other being occurs in matter: by which it has a twofold condition. One is because it inheres in it just as it is saved in it, and so in some way it has the mode of an accident, and so the understanding gives to it a concrete adjectival name, of which kind is the name of an accident, e.g. ‘human’. The second comparision which it has to matter, in order to completing and perfecting it; and in this way it does not have the mode of an accident, but a mode of substance, and thus the understanding gives a concrete substantive name to it, e.g. ‘man’.
Notandum, quod animal differt a sensibili: quia animal dicitur ab anima sensibili; sensibile autem dicitur a sensibilitate.	It should be noted that ‘animal’ differs from ‘sensitive’: because ‘animal’ is so-called from 'sensitive soul', but ‘sensitive’ is so-called from 'sensitivity'.
Et quia anima ad sensibilitatem se habet, sicut potentia ad actum; ideo differentia magis est actualis quam id cuius est differentia, licet tantum ambiant ambo. Dicitur autem differentia praedicari in quale, idest adiective: huius ratio est. Ut enim dictum est, differentia divisiva alicuius generis sumitur a perfectione quam non habent omnia quae sunt sub genere: quae perfectio comparata ad illud unde sumitur genus, se habet ut quoddam perfectum, et per consequens ut formale.	And because soul stands to sensitivity just as power to actuality, so the differentia is more actual then that of which it is differentia, although it they only embrace both. But differentia is said to be predicated In quale, i.e. adjectivally, and the reason of this is [?] for as was said, a dividing differentia of some genus is taken from the perfection which all those under the genus lack, which perfection, compared to that from which the genus is taken, subsists as a sort of perfection, and consequently as something formal.
Et quia adiectiva communiter a formis sumuntur, quae formae habent adiacere; ideo ad designandum quod differentia sumitur a solo formali, et illud solum dicit explicite, perfecta est differentia per modum adiectivum in sui praedicatione.	And because adjectives are commonly taken from forms, which have adjacency, so for designating that a differentia is taken from the formal alone, and that only designates explicitly [?], the differentia is perfected about through an adjectival mode in its predication.
Ad videndum autem secundam definitionem differentiae, sciendum quod impossibile est partem de toto praedicari; sed quidquid de alio vere praedicatur, oportet quod dicat totum.	But for considering the second definition of differentia, it should be known that it is impossible for a part to be predicated of a whole, but whatever is truly predicated of something else, has to designate the whole.
Cum autem de Socrate praedicetur homo et animal et rationale, oportet quod homo dicat totum formale quod est in Petro: et dico formale, loquendo de forma quae sequitur totum compositum. Similiter oportet quod animal dicat totum formale, et similiter rationale dicat totum formale: sed diversimode: nam rationale dicit totum illud quod dicit homo, non tamen explicite, sed implicite: rationale enim dicit habens rationem.	However when ‘man’ and ‘animal’ and ‘rational’ is predicated of Socrates, it must be that ‘man’ designates the formal whole which is in Peter, and I say ‘formal’, speaking of the form which follows the whole composite. Similarly it has to be that ‘animal’ designates the formal whole, and similarly ‘rational’ designates the formal whole, but in different ways, for ‘rational’ designates that whole which means a man, yet not explicitly but implicitly, for ‘rational’ designates one having reason.
Unde de suo principali significato dicit solum rationem. Sed quia dicit habens rationem in hoc quod dicit habens intelligitur implicite homo quicumque sit ille: et sic dicit totum quod dicit homo; aliquid tamen explicite, et aliquid implicite. Similiter etiam animal dicit totum quod dicit homo, non tamen explicite; dicit enim animal habens vitam et sensum; unde de suo principali significato solum dicit vitam et sensum: sed in hoc quod dicit habens implicite intelligitur homo. Homo vero dicit explicite totum formale quod est in Socrate: nam dicit habens humanitatem: quae humanitas dicit explicite motum et sensum, quod dicit animal, et rationem quam dicit rationale.	Hence concerning its principle signification, it designates only reason. But because it designates 'having reason', in saying 'having' there is understood a man implicitly no matter what that man may be: and in this way it designates the whole which 'man' designates; yet it designates one thing explicitly and the other implicitly. Similarly also, ‘animal’ designates the whole which ‘man’ designates, yet not explicitly, for it designates an animal having life and sense, hence concerning its principle significate it designates only life and sense: but in saying having, a man is implicitly understood. But ‘man’ designates explicitly the formal whole which is in Socrates: for it designates having humanity: which humanity designates explicitly motion and sense, which 'animal' designates, and reason, which 'rational' designates.
Unde homo de suo principali significato dicit animal rationale: comparando enim significata istorum explicite: cum genus et differentia, ut dictum est, non significent quodlibet eorum nisi partem, species vero explicite significet illud quod significat. Utrumque ergo significatum explicitum speciei excedit significatum explicitum generis in significato explicito differentiae. Similiter etiam excedit significatum differentiae in significato generis. Bene ergo dicitur in praedicta descriptione, quod differentia est qua species abundat a genere: quia species abundat, idest excedit in suo significato etiam illud quod explicite significat differentia.	Hence 'man', concerning its principle signification designates a rational animal. For by combining their significates explicitly (since genus and differentia, as was said, do not signify any of them except a part, but 'species' may explicitly signify that which it signifies) therefore each explicit significate of a species exceeds the explicit significate of the genus in the explicit significate of the differentia. Similarly it also exceeds the significate of the differentia in the significate of the genus. Therefore it is correctly said in the description above, that differentia is that by which a species flows from a genus, because species flows, that is it exceeds in its significate also that which the differentia explicitly signifies.
Et sic patet quid est differentia secundum sui rationem.	And so it is clear what is a differentia according to its nature [ratio].