Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber11/lect6

Lecture 6

Latin	English
lib. 11 l. 6 n. 1 Postquam philosophus disputavit contra ponentes contradictoria simul verificari de eodem, hic ostendit quomodo haec ratio possit ab eorum mentibus removeri. Et dividitur in partes duas. In prima ostendit propositum. In secunda inducit quaedam corollaria ex dictis, ibi, quare manifestum. Prima pars dividitur in partes duas. In prima ostendit quomodo praedicta ratio in aliquibus solvi possit. In secunda ostendit in quibus possit solvi, et in quibus non, ibi, ad habentes quidem igitur. Circa primum, tria facit. Primo proponit modum quo praedicta ratio in aliquibus solvi possit; dicens quod dubitatio praedicta ex qua aliqui moventur ad ponendum contradictoria simul verificari de eodem, poterit solvi, si quis consideret unde principium sumpsit haec positio.	2225. Having argued against those who claim that contradictories may be verified of the same subject at the same time, the Philosopher now shows how these men can be persuaded to abandon this theory. His discussion is divided into two parts. In the first (943)C 2225) he explains his thesis. In the second (953:C 2243) he draws a corollary from what has been said (“It is evident”). The first part is divided into two members. In the first he explains how it is possible in some cases to deal with the above-mentioned theory. In the second (952:C 2241) he indicates in what cases it can be refuted and in what not (“Hence, in the case”). In treating the first (943) he does three things. First, he describes the way in which the foregoing theory can be disqualified in some cases. He says that the above-mentioned difficulty which led some people to adopt the position that contradictories may be verified of the same subject at the same time can. be dispelled if one considers its source.
lib. 11 l. 6 n. 2 Secundo ibi, videtur enim assignat duplex principium praedictae positionis: dicens quod quibusdam videtur quod principium dictae opinionis sit ex opinione naturalium philosophorum, qui posuerunt aliquid non fieri ex non ente. Aliis autem videtur quod principium sumpserit ex hoc quod non omnes eadem iudicant de eisdem. Sed quibusdam videtur hoc esse delectabile, et aliis contrarium. Ex hoc enim sequitur quod opposita sint simul vera, si quis credat quod omne quod videtur alicui sit verum.	2226. For it seems (944). Second, he gives two sources of this position. He says that this position seems to have arisen in some cases from the opinion of the philosophers of nature, who claimed that nothing comes to be from non-being, and in others from the fact that not all men make the same judgments about the same things, but something appears pleasant to some and just the opposite to others. For if one were to believe that whatever appears is true, it would follow from this that opposites are true at the same time.
lib. 11 l. 6 n. 3 Tertio ibi, nihil enim manifestat quomodo ex praemissis duobus principiis dicta opinio sequatur, et quomodo solvatur. Et primo quomodo sequatur ex opinione naturalium physicorum. Secundo quomodo sequatur dicta opinio ex eo quod creditur, quodcumque videtur esse verum, ibi, sed et similiter. Dicit ergo primo, quod fere omnium eorum, qui de natura tractaverunt, commune dogma est, quod nihil fit ex non ente; sed omne quod fit, fit ex ente. Manifestum est etiam, quod aliquid fit non album ex eo quod est perfecte album: non autem fit album ex non albo. Ulterius etiam manifestum est, quod non album, fit ex eo, quod non est non album. Quod exinde patet, quod id quod non est non album fit non album, sicut quod non est nigrum fit nigrum. Sic igitur illud, ex quo fit non album, est album, et non est non album. Quod non potest intelligi tamquam penitus sit non ens non album; quia sic videretur sequi quod aliquid fieret simpliciter ex non ente. Sicut, si diceremus quod ignis fit ex non igne, quomodo intelligebant, quod illud, quo fit ignis, sit penitus non ignis. Sic enim videbatur eis, quod sequeretur, quod fieret aliquid ex non ente. Et propter hoc ponebant quod in eo ex quo fit ignis, erat ignis latens; ut patet ex opinione Anaxagorae, quae ponitur in primo physicorum. Similiter credebant, quod si aliquid fit non album ex eo quod non est non album, quod nihilominus non album praeexisteret in eo ex quo fit non album, ut dictum est. Sequebatur etiam secundum eos, quod illud ex quo fit non album, esset album et non album simul: nisi ponatur quod aliquid fiat ex non ente.	2227. For the view (945). Third, he shows how the abovementioned position might follow from the two sources just given; and he points out how it may be dealt with. First, he shows how it might follow from the opinion of the philosophers of nature; and second (946:C 2227), from the belief that every appearance is true (“But it is also foolish”). He accordingly says, first (945), that the doctrine common to nearly all of the thinkers who have dealt with nature is that nothing comes to be from non-being, but everything from being. It is clear that something becomes not-white from what is actually white; but what is not-white does not come from what is not-white. Further, it is also evident that what is not-white comes from what is not not-white. Consequently, it is evident that what is not not-white becomes not-white, just as what is not-black becomes black. It is clear, then, that that from which the not-white comes to be is the white, and it is not not-white. This cannot be understood in the sense that the not-white is entirely non-being, because it would then seem to follow that something comes to be from non-being absolutely. For example, if we were to say that fire comes from what is not-fire, there would be the question how they think that that from which fire comes to be is entirely not-fire. For it would then seem to follow, according to them, that something comes to be from non-being. Hence they claimed that fire lay hidden in that from which fire comes to be, as is evident from the opinion of Anaxagoras, which is given in Book I of the Physics. Similarly, they believed that, if something comes to be not-white from what is not not-white, the not-white must have preexisted in that from which it comes to be, as has been explained. Thus it would follow, according to them, that that from which the not-white comes to be is both white and not-white at the same time, unless it is assumed that something comes to be from non-being.
lib. 11 l. 6 n. 4 Sed hanc dubitationem, ut ait philosophus, non difficile est solvere. Expositum enim est in primo physicorum, quomodo aliquid fiat ex ente, et quomodo ex non ente. Dictum est enim quod aliquid fit ex non ente in actu, et ente in actu per accidens. Sed ex materia quae in potentia est, fit aliquid per se. Accidit enim factioni quod materia ex qua fit aliquid, fuerit subiecta formae et privationi. Et sic non oportet, quod id ex quo aliquid fit, simul sit ens et non ens in actu; sed quod de se sit potentia ad ens et non ens, idest ad formam et privationem.	2228. But this difficulty is not hard to solve, as the Philosopher points out; for it has been explained in Book I of the Physics how a thing comes to be from being and how from nonbeing; for it has been stated that something comes to be from what is a nonbeing in act, though it is incidentally a being in act. But it comes to be properly from matter, which is in potency; for it is accidental to the process of making that the matter from which a thing comes to be should be the subject of form and of privation. Thus it is not necessary that that from which a thing comes to be should be at the same time both a being and a nonbeing in act, but that it should be of itself in potency both to being and to non-being, i.e., both to form and to privation.
lib. 11 l. 6 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit sed et similiter removet praedictam opinionem secundum quod causatur ex alio principio, quod est, opinari omne, quod videtur, esse verum. Et primo, removet hoc principium. Et secundo causam eius, ibi, totaliter autem. Dicit ergo primo, quod sicut stultum est propter praedicta opinari quod contradictoria simul verificantur de eodem, similiter etiam est stultum attendere, idest assentire praedictis utrisque opinionibus philosophorum dubitantium contra seipsos. Manifestum est enim quod necesse est alterum eorum mentiri.	2229. But it is also foolish (946). Then he rejects the foregoing opinion inasmuch as it might be derived from the other source, i.e., from the view that every appearance is judged to be true. First, he rejects this source; and second (947:C 2232), its cause (“And in general”). He accordingly says, first (946), that, just as it is foolish to think that contradictories may be verified of the same subject at the same time, so too “it is also foolish to occupy oneself with,” i.e., to accept, both of the foregoing opinions of the philosophers who argue against themselves; for it is obvious that one or the other of them must be in error.
lib. 11 l. 6 n. 6 Et hoc palam est ex his, quae apparent secundum sensum. Nunquam enim idem videtur his quidem dulce, aliis amarum, nisi in alteris eorum sit aliqua corruptio, aut privatio secundum organum sensus, et secundum virtutem, quae iudicat de saporibus. Huiusmodi autem corruptione in alteris eorum existente, existimandum est alteros eorum esse mensuram, idest accipiendum est eorum iudicium quasi regulam et mensuram veritatis, illorum scilicet in quibus non est corruptio: non autem hoc putandum est de alteris, in quibus est corruptio.	2230. This is evident from the facts of sensory perception; for the same thing never appears sweet to some and bitter to others, unless in some the sense organ and the power which discriminates between savors, has been impaired or injured. But since this does happen in some cases, “some must be taken as the measure,” i.e., the judgment of those whose senses are not impaired in this way must be taken as the rule and measure of truth. But this should not be understood to apply to those whose senses are impaired.
lib. 11 l. 6 n. 7 Et sicut hoc manifestum est in cognitione sensus, similiter dicendum est in bono et malo, in pulchro et turpi, et huiusmodi omnibus quae per intellectum cognoscuntur. Si enim quibusdam videatur secundum intellectum hoc esse bonum, aliis autem malum, standum est eorum iudicio in quibus non est aliqua corruptio secundum intellectum, nec ex prava consuetudine, neque ex prava affectione, neque ex aliqua huiusmodi causa. Nam si quis dicat quod nihil minus dignum est credere his quam illis, nihil hoc differt quam si diceret, quod ea quae apparent hominibus ponentibus sub visu digitum, idest moventibus oculum digito, et ex hoc facientibus quod id quod est unum videantur duo, quod propter hoc oporteat esse duo, quia apparent tot; et iterum oporteat esse unum, quia quando aliquis non movet oculum, apparet unum id quod est unum. Manifestum est enim, quod iudicandum est de unitate rerum, secundum id quod visus iudicat, nulla extranea passione existente in eo; non autem secundum quod iudicat ex praedicta passione. Sic autem iudicat unum esse duo, quia species unius visibilis duobus modis redditur organo visus quando movetur, et secundum utriusque dispositionem pervenit ad organum sensus communis, quasi essent duo visa.	2231. And what is evident in the case of sensory perception must also be said to apply in the case of good and evil, of beautiful and ugly, and of all attributes of this kind which are apprehended by the intellect. For if some conceive a thing to be good and others evil, the judgment of those whose intellect has not been impaired by some bad habit or by some bad influence or by some other cause of this kind must be the norm. For if someone were to hold that it is not less fitting to believe the one group rather than the other, this would not differ in any way from saying that things are as they appear “to those who push their finger under their eye,” i.e., who move their eye with their finger, and thereby make one thing appear as two, and say that it must be two because it appears to be so many, and again that it must be one because it appears to be one to those who do not move their eye with their finger. For it is obvious that we must base our judgment about the oneness of things on the judgment which the eye makes when it does not receive some strange impression, and not on the judgment which it makes when it receives such an impression. Now a man judges one visible object to be two because the form of the visible object is made to appear as two to the organ of vision when it is moved; and this double impression reaches the organ of the common sense as though there were two visible objects.
lib. 11 l. 6 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit totaliter autem excludit causam, propter quam ponebant omne quod videtur esse verum. Hoc enim ponebant aliqui, quia existimabant res omnes esse in continuo fluxu, et quod nulla natura esset in rebus fixa et determinata. Et sic sequebatur, quod rem esse talem non erat nisi videri.	2232. And in general (947). Then he rejects the basis of the position that every appearance is true. For some held this because they thought that all things are in a state of continuous flux, and that there is nothing fixed and determinate in reality; and thus it would follow that a thing is such only when it is seen.
lib. 11 l. 6 n. 9 Contra hoc ergo ponit quinque rationes. Quarum prima talis est, quod totaliter inconveniens est sumere iudicium de tota veritate ex hoc, quod ista sensibilia quae sunt prope, scilicet vicina nobis, permutantur et nunquam permanent. Oportet autem magis venari verum ex his, quae semper se habent eodem modo, et non patiuntur aliquam permutationem quantum ad substantiam suam, licet appareat in eis motus secundum locum. Talia enim sunt quae continent mundum, scilicet corpora caelestia; ad quae comparata haec corpora corruptibilia, quasi nullius sunt quantitatis, ut mathematici probant. Corpora autem caelestia sunt semper eadem, et non videntur quandoque talia, et alia vice alia; sed nulla permutatione participant, quae scilicet sit in eorum substantia.	2233. He therefore presents five arguments against this position. He says, first, that it is altogether unfitting to base our judgment about the whole truth on the fact that these sensible things which are near or close to us are undergoing change and are never permanent. But the truth must be based rather on those things which are always the same and never undergo any change as regards their substance, though they do appear to be subject to local motion. For such things are those “which contain the world,” i.e., the celestial bodies, to which these corruptible bodies are compared as things that have no quantity, as the mathematicians prove. Now the celestial bodies are always the same and do not at one time appear to be such and at another different, for they admit of no change which affects their substance.
lib. 11 l. 6 n. 10 Secundam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc autem quae talis est. Si motus est in istis inferioribus, oportet quod id quod movetur sit aliquid; et etiam oportet, quod id quod movetur, moveatur ex aliquo, et etiam ad aliquid. Unde oportet id, quod movetur, adhuc esse in eo ex quo movetur, et nondum esse in eo ad quod movetur, sed moveri ad ipsum et continue fieri in ipso. Et sic aliqua affirmatio determinate est vera, et aliqua negatio; et non oportebit quod contradictio verificetur de eodem, quia secundum hoc nihil moveretur. Si enim idem foret esse in termino ad quem, et non esse, nulla ratio esset quare moveretur ad terminum ad quem aliquid quod nondum est in illo, quia iam esset ibi.	2234. Further, if there (948). Then he gives the second argument against this position. The argument runs thus: if there is motion in these lower bodies, there must be something that is moved, and it must also be moved from something and to something. Hence that which is moved must already be in that from which it is moved and yet not be in it, and this must be moved to something else and be continuously coming to be in it. Thus some definite affirmation, as well as some negation, must be true. And it will not be necessary that a contradiction be true of the same subject, b6cause according to this nothing would be moved. For if the same thing might be at the extreme to which it is moved and not be at it, there would be no reason why a thing which has not yet reached an extreme should be moved thereto, because it would already be there.
lib. 11 l. 6 n. 11 Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, et si secundum ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod Heraclitus videns aliquid augeri longo tempore, puta per unum annum secundum aliquam determinatam quantitatem, et modicam, existimavit quod qualibet parte illius temporis aliquod augmentum fieret, sed insensibile propter parvitatem quantitatis, quae augetur. Et ex hoc inductus fuit ad credendum, quod omnes res, etiam quae videntur quiescentes, etiam insensibiliter moverentur continue, sed post longum tempus sensibiliter eorum motus appareret. Est autem hoc falsum quod de augmento opinabatur. Non enim continue fit augmentum, ita quod in qualibet temporis parte aliquid crescat; sed disponitur ad augmentum corpus per aliquod tempus, et tunc crescit, ut Aristoteles expressius manifestat in octavo physicorum.	2235. And if things (949). He gives the third argument; and with a view to making this clear it should be borne in mind that, when Heraclitus saw that a thing increased in size according to some definite and very small quantity over a long period of time (for example, a year), he thought that some addition would be made in any part of that time, and that it would be imperceptible because of the very small quantity involved. And because of this he was led to believe that all things, even those which seem to be static, are also being moved continuously by an imperceptible motion, and that after a long time their motion would become apparent to the senses. But his opinion about increase is false; for increase does not take place continuously in such a way that something grows in any part of time, but a body is disposed to increase during some time and then grows, as Aristotle makes quite clear in Book VIII of the Physics.
lib. 11 l. 6 n. 12 Dicit ergo, quod si corpora praesentia hic apud nos continue fluunt et moventur secundum quantitatem, et si hoc aliquis vellet concedere, licet non verum sit, non est ratio quare non possit aliquid moveri secundum quantitatem. Videtur enim quod non parum haec opinio, quae ponit contradictiones simul esse eiusdem, procedat ex eo quod existimat quod quantum non remanet in corporibus; et sic opinantur quod id sit et non sit simul quadricubitum. Sed substantia rei determinatur secundum quale, idest secundum aliquam formam. Quale autem est determinatae naturae in rebus, etsi quantum sit indeterminatum propter motum, ut dictum est.	2236. Hence he says that, if the bodies around us here are in a continuous state of flux and motion as regards quantity, and one wishes to admit this even though it is not true, there is no reason why a thing cannot be unchanging as to its quality. For the opinion that contradictories are true of the same subject at the same time seems to be based largely on the assumption that the quantitative aspect of bodies does not remain constant; and thus some thought that the same thing is and is not four cubits long. But a thing’s substance is defined in terms of some quality, i.e., some form; and quality is of a determinate nature in things, although quantity is of an indeterminate nature because of change, as has been pointed out.
lib. 11 l. 6 n. 13 Quartam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc propter quae talis est. Si in rebus nihil est fixum, neque quantum ad esse, neque quantum ad non esse, propter quid deferunt hunc cibum, quem medicus iubet, et non alium? Secundum enim dictam opinionem, quid magis est panis, vel non panis? Quasi diceret: non magis praedicatur de eo affirmatio quam negatio. Et sic nihil differt quod comedat vel non comedat. Sed nos videmus quod ipsi offerunt hunc cibum, quem medicus iubet, quasi habentes verum iudicium de ipso cibo, et quasi hic cibus vere sit ille cibus, de quo medicus iubet. Hoc autem non oporteret, si nulla natura sic per certitudinem maneret in sensibilibus, sed omnia semper moverentur et fluerent.	2237. Further, when a physician (950). Then he gives the fourth argument, which runs thus: if there is nothing fixed in the world as regards being or non-being, why do they take this kind of bread which the physician prescribes and not that? For according to the position given above, why is this bread rather than not-bread? He implies that the answer cannot be in the affirmative any more than in the negative. And thus it would make no difference whether one ate the bread or did not. But we see that they take the bread which the physician prescribes, implying that they form a true judgment about bread itself, and that this kind of bread is really the one which the physician prescribes. Yet this would not be the case if no nature remained fixed in the sensible world but all things are always in a state of motion and flux.
lib. 11 l. 6 n. 14 Quintam rationem ponit ibi, adhuc si quae talis est. Cum secundum opinionem praedictam ponatur, quod propter continuam mutationem quae est in rebus, non sit aliqua veritas in rebus fixa; si sit verum esse quod est videri, necesse est dicere quod nos homines qui de rebus aliis iudicamus, aut sumus in motu, aut non.	2238. Again, if we (951). Then he presents the fifth argument: since the above-mentioned position assumes that there is no fixed truth in things because of the continuous change which they undergo, if the truth is identical with appearance it is necessary to say that we men, who make judgments about other things, are either in motion or are not.
lib. 11 l. 6 n. 15 Si enim semper alteramur, et nunquam permanemus eodem modo nos habentes, non est mirabile si res non eodem modo videntur se habere nobis, sicut accidit infirmis. Quia enim transmutati sunt, et non in eadem dispositione se habent sicut quando sani erant, non videntur eis sensibilia quae percipiunt per sensum qualia videbantur eis ante infirmitatem. Nam eis, qui habent gustum infectum, etiam quae sunt dulcia videntur amara vel insipida. Et simile est in aliis sensibilibus. Non tamen propter haec sensibilia sunt permutata; sed faciunt alias impressiones infirmis, propter hoc quod sensus eorum alio modo se habent. Si ergo nos homines in continua transmutatione existentes, de rebus aliis diversimode iudicamus, non est hoc imputandum rebus, sed nobis ipsis.	2239. For if we are always undergoing change and never remain the same, it is not surprising that things never appear the same to us; and this is the case with those who are ill. For since they have been changed and are not in the same state as when they were well, the sensible qualities which they perceive by way of the senses will not seem the same to them as they did before they became ill. For to those whose sense of taste has been impaired sweet things seem bitter or tasteless; and the same is true of other sensible qualities. Yet sensible qualities themselves are not changed for this reason, but they cause different impressions in those who are ill because their senses are differently disposed. Therefore, if we men, who are continuously undergoing change, make different judgments about other things, this should not be attributed to things but to us.
lib. 11 l. 6 n. 16 Si autem nos non permutamur, sed semper permanemus eodem modo nos habentes: ergo in rebus erit aliquid permanens, et per consequens aliqua veritas determinata, de qua possumus praecise diiudicare. Non enim solum iudicamus de rebus aliis, sed etiam de natura humana.	2240. However, if we are not changing but always remain the same, there will therefore be something permanent in the world and consequently some fixed truth about which we can make positive judgments. For we make judgments not only about other things but also about human nature.
lib. 11 l. 6 n. 17 Deinde cum dicit ad habentes ostendit a quibus praedicta opinio removetur, et a quibus non; et dicit, quod si qui incidunt in praedictas opiniones non propter aliquam rationem, ita quod ex pertinacia non concedant aliquid neque inquirant rationem eorum quae dicuntur, sed pertinaciter inhaerent his, quae opinabantur, non facile est eis solvere huiusmodi opinionem. Omnis enim ratio et demonstratio fit hoc modo; scilicet concedendo et exquirendo rationem alicuius dicti. Sed illi qui nihil concedunt, interimunt disputationem et omnem argumentativam rationem. Unde ad eos non potest haberi sententia ratiocinationis, per quam a suo errore tollantur.	2241. Hence, in the case (952). Then he indicates who can be disabused of the above opinion and who can not. He says that, if those who adopt the foregoing opinions do so not because of any reasoning, in the sense that they do not assume anything because they are obstinate, and do not inquire into the reasons for the things that they say but stubbornly adhere to the opinions which they hold, it is not easy for them to give up an opinion of this kind. For every argument and every demonstration comes about in this way, namely, by admitting the truth of some statement and investigating the reason for it. But those who admit nothing destroy discussion and every rational argument; and thus no appeal of reason can be addressed to them whereby they can be dislodged from their error.
lib. 11 l. 6 n. 18 Sed si aliqui sunt, qui dubitant propter aliquos defectus, puta, quia non bene aliqua intelligunt, facile est obviare tali errori, solvendo ea quae faciunt in eis dubitationem. Et hoc palam ex praedictis, in quibus solvit dubitationes, quae poterant ad praedictam positionem inducere.	2242. But if there are any who are perplexed because of certain deficiencies (for example, because they do not understand some things well), it is easy to dispel such an error by removing the difficulties which puzzle them. This is evident from the previous discussion in which he deals with the difficulties that could lead to the above-mentioned opinion.
lib. 11 l. 6 n. 19 Deinde cum dicit quare manifestum inducit tria corollaria ex dictis. Quorum primum est, quod manifestum est ex praedictis, quod oppositae propositiones non verificantur de eodem secundum unum et idem tempus. Et per consequens ex hoc patet, quod neque etiam contraria possunt simul verificari de eodem. Et hoc ideo, quia omnis contrarietas dicitur secundum privationem; semper enim alterum contrariorum est privatio. Et hoc palam est, siquis velit rationes contrariorum reducere ad primum principium. De ratione enim nigri est privatio albi. Cum igitur privatio sit quaedam negatio habens subiectum determinatum, manifestum est, quod si contraria de eodem verificarentur, oporteret quod affirmatio et negatio simul verificarentur de eodem.	2243. It is evident (953). Then he draws three corollaries from what has been said. First, it is evident from the foregoing discussion that opposite statements cannot be verified of the same subject at one and the same time. Consequently it is clear from this that contraries cannot be verified of the same subject at the same time. And this is true because every contrariety involves privation; for one of two contraries is always a privation. This becomes evident if one wishes to reduce the definitions of contraries to their first principle; for contained in the notion of black is the privation of white. Since a privation, then, is a kind of negation having a determinate subject, it is evident that, if contraries were true of the same subject, both an affirmation and a negation would have to be true of the same subject at the same time.
lib. 11 l. 6 n. 20 Non solum autem duo contraria non possunt simul verificari de eodem; sed etiam nullum medium possibile est praedicari de uno et eodem, de quo praedicatur alterum extremorum. Ex his enim quae dicta sunt in decimo, manifestum est quod medium inter contraria est habens privationem utriusque extremorum; sive sit nominatum uno nomine, sive pluribus, sive innominatum. Unde medium inter album et nigrum, ut puta rubeum vel citrinum, habet in sui ratione quod neque sit album neque nigrum. Si quis igitur, aliquo subiecto existente albo, dicat ipsum esse rubeum, simul dicit ipsum esse neque album neque nigrum. Et ita mentitur. Sequitur enim quod id subiectum, simul album sit et non sit. Quod si verum est de illo subiecto, quod sit neque album neque nigrum, oportet quod verificetur de eodem altera pars copulativae, quae contradictoria est eius quod est album esse. Et ita sequitur quod si medium et extremum verificatur de eodem, quod contradictoria de eodem verificentur.	2244. Now, it is not only impossible for two contraries to be true of the same subject at the same time, but it is also impossible for an intermediate to be predicated of one and the same subject of which one of two extremes is predicated; for from what has been said in Book X (880-86-.C 2101-10 it is evident that an intermediate between contraries involves the privation of both extremes, whether it is designated by one word or by many or is nameless. Hence an intermediate between white and black, such as red or yellow, contains in its definition the fact that it is neither white nor black. Therefore, if one says that some subject is red when it is really white, he is saying at the same time that it is neither white nor black. Hence he is in error; for it would follow that that subject is both white and not white at the same time; because if it is true that that subject is neither white nor black, the other part of the copulative proposition may be verified of the same subject, and this is the contradictory of being white. Thus it follows that, if an intermediate and an extreme are true of the same subject, contradictories must be true of the same subject.
lib. 11 l. 6 n. 21 Secundum corollarium ponit ibi neque enim concludit enim quod si affirmatio et negatio non sit simul vera, quod neque opinio Heracliti est vera, neque opinio Anaxagorae. Et quidem de opinione Heracliti patet ex dictis. Unde hoc manifestat de opinione Anaxagorae; dicens, quod si non sit falsa opinio Anaxagorae, sequitur contraria praedicari de eodem. Et per consequens contradictoria. Quod sic patet. Ponebat enim Anaxagoras quodlibet fieri ex quolibet, et omne quod fit, ex aliquo fit. Unde non cogebatur ponere aliquid fieri ex nihilo, et sic ponebat quodlibet esse in quolibet. Cum igitur poneret partem cuiuslibet esse in quolibet, puta partem carnis esse in osse, et partem albi in nigro, et e converso; sequitur quod totum non magis erit dulce quam amarum. Et simile est de aliis contrarietatibus. Et hoc, si pars cuiuslibet est in quolibet toto non solum in potentia, sed in actu et separatim. Hoc autem addidit, quia id quod fit ex aliquo oportet praeexistere in eo potentia, non actu. Et sic contraria praeexistunt in eodem in potentia, non in actu. Et hoc non est esse separatim contraria in aliquo, quia eadem est potentia contrariorum. Sed Anaxagoras nesciebat distinguere inter potentiam et actum.	2245. One cannot (954). He gives the second corollary. He concludes that, if an affirmation and a negation are not true at the same time, neither the opinion of Heraclitus nor that of Anaxagoras is true. That this is so regarding the opinion of Heraclitus is evident from what has been said. Hence he shows that the same thing applies with respect to the opinion of Anaxagoras. He says that, if Anaxagoras’ opinion is not false, it follows that contraries may be predicated of the same subject, and therefore that contradictories may also be predicated of the same subject. This is shown as follows. Anaxagoras claimed that anything at all comes to be from anything at all, and everything which comes to be comes from something. Hence he was not compelled to maintain that something comes to be from nothing, and thus he claimed that everything is present in everything else. Therefore, since he posited that there is a part of everything in everything else (for example, a part of flesh in bone, and a part of whiteness in blackness, and vice versa), it follows that the whole is no more sweet than bitter. The same holds true of other contrarieties. And this is so if a part of anything is present in any whole not only potentially but actually and separately. And he added this because whatever comes to be from something else must pre-exist in it potentially and not actually. Hence contraries must preexist in the same subject potentially and not actually. This does not mean that contraries exist separately in something, because the potency for contraries is the same. But Anaxagoras did not know how to distinguish between potency and actuality.
lib. 11 l. 6 n. 22 Tertium corollarium ponit ibi, similiter autem. Concludit enim ex praedictis falsam esse utramque opinionem: et illorum qui dixerunt omnes propositiones esse veras; et illorum qui dixerunt omnes falsas. Et hoc manifestum est propter multa difficilia et gravia consequentia ad has opiniones quae collectae sunt, et hic, et superius in quarto. Et specialiter propter hoc, quia si omnes propositiones sunt falsae: qui autem dicit - omnis propositio est falsa - quamdam propositionem dicit. Unde non dicet verum. Et similiter, si omnes propositiones sint verae, ille qui dicit omnes esse falsas, non mentietur, sed dicet verum. Propter quod destruitur positio ponentis omnia esse vera.	2246. And similarly (955). He gives the third corollary. He concludes from what has been said that both opinions are false, i.e., the opinion of those who said that all statements are true, and the opinion of those who said that all are false. This is evident because of the many difficult and serious conclusions which result from these opinions which have been brought together here and above in Book IV (332-402:C 611-748); and especially “because if all statements are false,” he who says that every statement is false makes a statement and thus does not speak the truth. And similarly if all statements are true, he who says that all are false will not say what is false but will speak the truth. And for this reason the position of one who claims that all statements are true is destroyed.