Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber4/lect10

Lecture 10

Latin	English
lib. 4 l. 10 n. 1 Postquam determinavit philosophus et posuit rationes contra negantes primum principium, hic ostendit quomodo diversimode est procedendum, quo ad diversos, qui ex diversis viis in praedictum errorem devenerunt: et dividitur in duas partes. Primo ostendit quod diversimode est procedendum contra diversos. Secundo incipit procedere alio modo quam supra, ibi, venit autem dubitantibus. Dicit ergo primo, quod non est idem modus homiliae, idest popularis allocutionis, vel bonae constructionis, secundum aliam translationem, idest ordinatae dispositionis vel intercessionis, sicut in Graeco habetur, idest persuasionis, ad omnes praedictas positiones, scilicet de veritate contradictionis et veritate eorum quae apparent. Dupliciter enim aliqui incidunt in praedictas positiones. Quidam enim ex dubitatione. Cum enim eis occurrunt aliquae sophisticae rationes, ex quibus videantur sequi praedictae positiones, et eas nesciunt solvere, concedunt conclusionem. Unde eorum ignorantia est facile curabilis. Non enim obviandum est eis vel occurrendum ad rationes quas ponunt, sed ad mentem, ut scilicet solvatur dubitatio de mentibus, per quam in huiusmodi opiniones inciderunt. Et tunc ab istis positionibus recedunt.	663. Having raised arguments against those who deny the first principle, and having settled the issue, here the Philosopher indicates how one must proceed differently against various men who adopted different versions of the above-mentioned error. This is divided into two parts. In the first (353)C 663) he shows that one must proceed differently against different men. In the second (354:C 665) he begins to proceed in a different way than he did above (“Those who”). He accordingly says, first (353), that the same method “of discussion,” i.e., of popular address (or “of good grammatical construction,” according to another translation, or of well ordered argument “or intercession,” as is said in the Greek, i.e., of persuasion) is not applicable to all of the foregoing positions; that is, to the position that contradictories can be true, and to the position that truth consists in appearances. For some thinkers adopt the foregoing positions for two reasons. Some do so because of some difficulty; for since certain sophistical arguments occur to them, from which the foregoing positions seem to follow, and they do not know how to solve them, they accept the conclusion. Hence their ignorance is easily cured. For one must not oppose them or attack the arguments which they give, but must appeal to their thought, clearing up the mental difficulties which have led them to form such opinions; and then they will give up these positions.
lib. 4 l. 10 n. 2 Alii vero praedictas positiones prosequuntur non propter aliquam dubitationem eos ad huiusmodi inducentem, sed solum causa orationis, idest ex quaedam protervia, volentes huiusmodi rationes impossibiles sustinere propter seipsas, quia contraria earum demonstrari non possunt. Et horum medela est argumentatio vel arguitio quae est in voce orationis et in nominibus, idest per hoc quod ipsa vox orationis aliquid significat. Significatio autem orationis a significatione nominum dependet. Et sic oportet ad hoc principium redire, quod nomina aliquid significant; sicut supra philosophus usus est.	664. Others adopt the foregoing positions, not because of any difficulty which leads them to such positions, but only because they want to argue “for the sake of argument,” i.e., because of a certain insolence, inasmuch as they want to maintain impossible theories of this kind for their own sake since the contrary of these cannot be demonstrated. The cure for these men is the refutation or rejection “of what they express in speech and in words,” i.e., on the grounds that the word in a statement has some meaning. Now the meaning of a statement depends on the meaning of the words, so that it is necessary to return to the principle that words signify something. This is the principle which the Philosopher used above (332:C 611).
lib. 4 l. 10 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit venit autem quia superius obviavit super hoc ex significatione nominum, hic incipit obviare dubitantibus solvendo eorum dubitationes. Et primo quantum ad illos, qui ponebant contradictoria esse simul vera. Secundo quantum ad illos qui ponebant omnia apparentia esse vera, ibi, similiter autem. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit dubitationem quae movet quosdam ad concedendum contradictoria esse simul vera. Secundo solvit, ibi, igitur ex his. Dicit ergo, quod opinio de hoc quod contradictio simul verificetur, quibusdam venit per modum dubitationis ex sensibilibus, in quibus apparet generatio et corruptio et motus. Videbatur enim quod ex aliquo uno fiebant contraria, sicut ex aqua fit et aer qui est calidus, et terra quae est frigida. Sed omne quod fit, fit ex prius existente. Quod enim non est, non contingit fieri, cum ex nihilo nihil fiat. Oportet ergo quod res fuerit simul in se habens contradictionem; quia si ex uno et eodem fit calidum et frigidum, fit per consequens calidum et non calidum.	665. Those who (354). Since the Philosopher met the difficulties above on this point by considering the meaning of words, he begins here to meet those who are in difficulties by solving their problems. First (354), he deals with those who held that contradictories are true at the same time; and second (357:C 669), he deals with those who held that everything which appears so is true (“And similarly”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he sets forth the difficulty which led some men to admit that contradictories are true at the same time. Second (355:C 667), he clears up this difficulty (“Concerning those”). He says, then, that the opinion on this point, that the parts of a contradiction may be true at the same time, was formed by some men as a result of a difficulty which arose with regard to sensible things, in which generation and corruption and motion are apparent. For it seemed that contraries were generated from the same thing; for example, air, which is warm, and earth, which is cold, both come from water. But everything which is generated comes from something that existed before; for non-being cannot come into being, since nothing comes from nothing. A thing therefore had to have in itself contradictories simultaneously, because if both the hot and the cold are generated from one and the same thing, then it turns out to be hot and not-hot itself.
lib. 4 l. 10 n. 4 Propter hanc autem rationem Anaxagoras dixit quod omnia in omnibus miscentur. Ex hoc enim quod videbat quodlibet ex quolibet fieri, putabat quod nihil posset fieri ex alio nisi ante fuisset ibi. Et huic rationi videtur acquievisse Democritus. Posuit enim vacuum et plenum in qualibet parte corporis coniungi. Quae quidem se habent sicut ens et non ens. Nam plenum se habet sicut ens, vacuum vero sicut non ens.	666. It was because of such reasoning that Anaxagoras claimed that everything is mixed in everything else. For from the fact that anything at A seemed to come from anything else he thought that one thing could come from another only if it already existed in it. Democritus also seems to have agreed with this theory, for he claimed that the void and the full are combined in any part of a body. And these are like being and non-being, because the full has the character of being and the void the character of non-being.
lib. 4 l. 10 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit igitur ex solvit praedictam dubitationem dupliciter. Primo sic, dicens quod sicut dictum est, illis qui ex dubitatione opinantur praedicta inconvenientia, obviandum est ad mentem. Igitur ad suscipientes, idest opinantes contradictoria simul verificari, ex his, idest praedicta ratione dicimus, quod quodammodo recte dicunt, et quodammodo ignorant quid dicunt, inconvenienter loquentes. Ens enim dupliciter dicitur; ens actu, et ens in potentia. Cum igitur dicunt quod ens non fit ex non ente, quodammodo verum dicunt, et quodammodo non. Nam ens fit ex non ente actu, ente vero in potentia. Unde etiam aliquo modo idem potest esse simul ens et non ens, et aliquo modo non potest. Contingit enim quod idem sit contraria in potentia, non tamen perfecte, idest in actu. Si enim tepidum est in potentia calidum et frigidum, neutrum tamen in actu.	667. Concerning those (355). Here he solves the foregoing difficulty in two ways. First, he says that the opinion of those who have adopted the foregoing absurd views because of some difficulty must be met by appealing to their thought, as has been stated (353:C 663). Therefore “concerning those who base their opinions,” i.e., those who think that contradictories are true at the same time, “on these grounds,” i.e., on the reasoning mentioned above, we say that in one sense they speak the truth and in another they do not know what they are saying since their statements are absurd. For being has two meanings: actual being and potential being; and therefore when they say that being does not come from non-being, in one sense they are right and in another they are not. For being does not come from actual being but from potential being. Hence in one sense the same thing can be at the same time both being and non-being, and in another sense it cannot; for the same thing can be contraries potentially, but it cannot be both “in complete actuality,” i.e., actually. For if something warm is potentially both hot and cold, it still cannot be actually both.
lib. 4 l. 10 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem secundam solutionem ponit ibi, dicens, quod dignum dicimus, quod ipsi suscipiant vel opinentur aliquam substantiam esse cui nec insit motus, nec generatio, nec corruptio, quod probatum est octavo physicorum. Tali autem substantiae non poterit concludi ex ratione praedicta, quod insint contraria, quia ex ea non fit aliquid. Et haec solutio videtur procedere secundum Platonicos, qui propter mutabilitatem sensibilium coacti sunt ponere ideas immobiles, scilicet de quibus dentur definitiones, et fiant demonstrationes, et certa scientia habeatur; quasi de his sensibilibus propter eorum mutabilitatem et admixtionem contrarietatis in eis certa scientia esse non possit. Sed prima solutio sufficientior est.	668. Further, we shall (356). Then he gives the second solution. He says that we deem it fitting that they should accept or think that there is some kind of substance to which neither motion nor generation nor corruption belongs, as is proved in Book VIII of the Physics. Now one could not conclude to the existence of this kind of substance by reason of what has been said above, namely, that contraries belong to it, because nothing is generated from them. This solution seems to be like the one reached by the Platonists, who, because of the changeable character of sensible things, were compelled to posit unchangeable separate Forms (i.e., those of which definitions are given, and demonstrations made, and certain knowledge is had) on the grounds that there could be no certain knowledge of sensible things because of their changeableness and the mixture of contrariety which they contain. But the first solution is a better one.