Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber4/lect11

Lecture 11

Latin	English
lib. 4 l. 11 n. 1 Postquam philosophus solvit dubitationem, ex qua inducebantur antiqui ad ponendum contradictoria simul esse vera, hic removet illa, ex quibus aliqui inducebantur ad ponendum omne, quod apparet, esse verum. Dividitur autem pars ista in duas. Primo ponit dubitationes, ex quibus aliqui movebantur ad praedictam positionem ponendam. Secundo removet dubitationes praedictas, ibi, nos autem et ad hanc orationem. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit rationem eorum, ex qua movebantur ad ponendum omne, quod apparet, esse verum. Secundo assignat causam praedictae rationis, ibi, omnino vero propter existimare. Dicit ergo primo, quod sicut opinio, quae ponebat contradictoria simul esse vera, veniebat ex quibusdam sensibilibus, in quibus contingit contradictoria fieri ex aliquo uno, similiter et veritas quae est circa apparentia, idest opinio de veritate apparentium, venit ex quibusdam sensibilibus, illis scilicet qui non protervientes, sed dubitantes in hanc positionem incidunt. Et hoc quia de eisdem sensibilibus inveniuntur contrariae opiniones diversorum. Et hoc tripliciter. Primo, quia quibusdam gustantibus videtur dulce, quod aliis videtur amarum esse. Et sic homines de omnibus sensibilibus contrariam opinionem habent. Secundo, quia multa animalia contraria iudicant de sensibilibus nobis. Illud enim quod videtur sapidum bovi vel asino, mali saporis ab homine iudicatur. Tertio, quia idem homo in diversis temporibus diversimode iudicat de sensibilibus. Quod enim nunc videtur sibi dulce et sapidum, alio tempore sibi videtur amarum et insipidum.	669. Having solved the difficulty which led the ancient philosophers to maintain that contradictories are true at the same time, the Philosopher now dispels the difficulty which led some thinkers to maintain that every appearance is true. This part is divided into two. First (351:C 669), he gives the difficulties which led some thinkers to hold the position mentioned above. Second (363:C 685), he dispels these difficulties (“But in reply”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the reason which led these men to maintain that every appearance is true. Second (358:C 672), he explains why they reasoned in this way (“In general”). He therefore says, first (357), that, just as the opinion which maintained that contradictories are true at the same time came from certain sensible things in which it happens that contradictories come from the same thing, so too “the theory that truth consists in appearances,” or the opinion about the truth of appearances, is derived from certain sensible things; that is, by those who are not perverse but are drawn into this position because of difficulties. This occurs because they find that different men hold contrary opinions about the same sensible things; and they give three reasons in support of their position. First, they point out that the same thing appears to taste sweet to some atid bitter to others, so that men have contrary opinions about all sensible things. Second, they note that many animals make judgments about sensible things which are contrary to ours; for what seems tasty to the ox or to the ass is judged by man to be unpalatable. Third, they say that the same man at different times makes different judgments about sensible things; for what now appears to be sweet and palatable to him at another time seems bitter or tasteless.
lib. 4 l. 11 n. 2 Nec potest assignari ratio certa per quam fiat manifestum, quae opinionum istarum sit vera, aut quae sit falsa; quia non magis una earum videtur vera uni, quam alteri altera. Ergo oportet quod aequaliter sint verae, vel aequaliter falsae. Et ideo dixit Democritus, quod aut nihil est determinate verum in rebus; aut si quid est verum, non est nobis manifestum. Cognitionem enim rerum accipimus per sensus. Iudicium autem sensus non est certum, cum non semper eodem modo iudicet. Unde nulla certitudo videtur nobis esse de veritate, ut possimus dicere, quod haec opinio determinate est vera et contraria determinate est falsa.	670. And no certain reason can be given that clearly indicates which of these opinions is true or which is false, because one of these seems no truer to one person than the other does to another person. Therefore they must be equally true or equally false. Hence Democritus said that either nothing is definitely true or, if anything is true, it is not evident to us; for even though we acquire our knowledge of things through the senses, their judgment is not certain since they do not always judge in the same way. Hence we do not seem to have any certainty regarding the truth so that we can say that this opinion is definitely true and its contrary definitely false.
lib. 4 l. 11 n. 3 Sed quia posset aliquis dicere, contra hanc opinionem, quod aliqua regula potest sumi per quam discernitur inter contrarias opiniones quae earum sit vera, ut videlicet dicamus quod illud est verum iudicium de sensibilibus quod dant sani, non quod dant aegrotantes; et de veritate hoc est verum iudicium, quod dant sapientes et intelligentes, non autem quod dant insipientes vel stulti: ideo in principio removet istam responsionem per hoc, quod iudicium certum de veritate non convenienter potest sumi ex multitudine et paucitate, ut scilicet dicatur esse verum quod multis videtur, falsum autem quod videtur paucis; cum quandoque illud quod est pluribus opinabile, non sit simpliciter verum. Sanitas autem et aegritudo, sive sapientia et stultitia, non videntur differre nisi secundum multitudinem et paucitatem. Si enim omnes vel plures essent tales quales sunt illi qui nunc reputantur desipientes vel stulti, illi reputarentur sapientes. Et qui nunc reputantur sapientes, reputarentur stulti. Et similiter est de sanitate et aegritudine. Non ergo credendum est magis iudicio sani et sapientis de falsitate et veritate, quam iudicio infirmi et insipientis.	671. But someone could say, in opposing this position, that some rule can be adopted whereby a person can discern among contrary opinions the one that is true. That is, we might say that the judgment which healthy people make about sensible things is right, and the one which sick people make is not; and that the judgment which wise and intelligent people make in matters of truth is right, and the one which foolish or ignorant people make is not. He rejects this reply at the very start on the grounds that no certain judgment about the truth of any theory can be fittingly based on the number, large or small, of persons who hold it, according to which that would be said to be true which seems so to many, and that to be false which seems so to a few; for sometimes what many believe is not simply true. Now health and sickness or wisdom and foolishness do not seem to diff er only by reason of the greater or smaller number of people involved. For if all or most persons were like those who are now thought to be ignorant or foolish, they would be considered wise, and those who are now thought to be wise would be considered foolish. The same applies in the case of health and sickness. Hence the judgment regarding truth and falsity of one who is healthy and wise is no more credible than the judgment of one who is ill and foolish.