Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber4/lect13

Lecture 13

Latin	English
lib. 4 l. 13 n. 1 Disputat contra praedicta. Et primo quantum ad hoc quod ponebant de mutabilitate rerum sensibilium. Secundo quantum ad hoc quod dicebatur de apparentia sensuum, ibi, de veritate vero quod non est. Circa primum, ponit sex rationes; quarum prima talis est. Qui existimat non esse de eo quod non est, veram opinionem habet, et veram orationem profert si hoc enuntiat: sed quod mutatur, dum mutatur non est, nec illud ad quod mutatur, nec illud ex quo mutatur: ergo aliquid vere potest dici de eo quod mutatur. Sic ergo possumus dicere contra praedictam rationem vel orationem, idest opinionem dicentem quod de eo quod mutatur nihil potest verum dici, quia permutans, idest quod mutatur, quando permutat, idest quando permutatur, habet quamdam orationem vel rationem veram in eis, idest secundum praedictorum opinionem non existimari, idest quod non existimetur aliquid ei inesse.	685. He argues against the foregoing opinions. First (363)C 685), he argues against the views that were held about the changeable character of sensible things; and second (369:C 692), against the statements that were made regarding sensory appearances (“Now concerning the truth”). In regard to the first part (363) he gives six arguments. The first of these is as follows: he who thinks that what is not does not exist, has a true opinion and makes a true statement if he expresses this. But what is being changed, while it is being changed, is neither that to which it is being changed nor that from which it is being changed; and thus some true statement can be made about a thing that is undergoing change. Hence, in opposing the foregoing theory or “account” (i.e., the opinion that no true statement can be made about anything which is changing), we can say that there is some ground or valid reason “in their case,” i.e., according to the opinion of the foregoing philosophers, for thinking “that what is changing,” or what is being changed, “when it is changing,” i.e., while it is undergoing change, does not exist; that is, there is some reason for thinking that it has no being.
lib. 4 l. 13 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit est etiam secundam rationem ponit, quae talis est. Omne quod permutatur, habet iam aliquid de termino ad quem permutatur; quia quod mutatur, dum mutatur, partim est in termino ad quem, et partim in termino a quo, ut probatur in sexto physicorum; vel secundum aliam literam abiiciens habet aliquid eius quod abiicitur. Et ex hoc datur intelligi quod in eo quod movetur, sit aliquid de termino a quo: quia quamdiu aliquid movetur, tamdiu terminus a quo abiicitur; non autem abiiceretur nisi aliquid eius inesset subiecto mobili. Et eius quod fit, necesse est iam aliquid esse: quia omne quod fit fiebat, ut probatur sexto physicorum. Patet etiam, quod si aliquid corrumpitur, quod adhuc aliquid sit; quia si omnino non esset, iam esset omnino in corruptum esse, et non in corrumpi. Similiter autem si aliquid generatur, oportet quod sit materia ex qua generatur, et agens a quo generatur. Hoc autem non est possibile procedere in infinitum; quia ut probatur in secundo, nec in causis materialibus, nec in agentibus, in infinitum proceditur. Sic igitur est magna dubitatio contra eos qui dicunt, quod de eo quod movetur nihil potest vere dici: tum quia in eo quod movetur et generatur est aliquid de termino ad quem: tum quia in omni generatione et motu oportet ponere aliquid ingenitum et immobile ex parte materiae et agentis.	686. Yet there is (364). Then he gives the second argument, and it runs thus: everything which is being changed already has some part of the terminus to which it is being changed, because what is being changed, while it is being changed, is partly in the terminus to which it is being changed, and partly in the terminus from which it is being changed, as is proved in Book VI of the Physics (or, according to another text, “that which is casting off some quality retains sdmething of what is being cast off”). And by this statement we are given to understand that anything which is being moved retains some part of the terminus from which it is being moved, because so long as a thing is being moved it is casting off the terminus from which it is being moved; and it is possible only to cast off some quality which belongs to a mobile subject. And something of what is coming to be must already exist, because everything which is coming to be was coming to be, as is proved in Book VI of the Physics. And it is also evident that, if something is ceasing to be, there must be something which is; for if it did not exist in any way at all, it already would have ceased to be and would not be ceasing to be. Similarly, if something is coming to be, there must be a matter from which it is coming to be and an agent by which it is coming to be. But this cannot go on to infinity, because, as is proved in Book II (153:C 301), there cannot be an infinite regress either in the case of material causes or in that of efficient causes. Hence a major problem faces those who say that no true statement can be made about anything which is being moved or generated, both because each thing which is being moved or generated has some part of the terminus to which it is being moved, and because in every process of generation or motion there must be held to be something unproduced and unchangeable both on the part of the matter and on that of the agent.
lib. 4 l. 13 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit sed haec tertiam rationem ponit. Et haec ratio contradicit eis quantum ad causam, ex qua opinionem sumpserunt, quia omnia sensibilia semper moventur. Moti enim sunt ad hoc dicendum ex his quae augentur. Viderunt enim quod aliquid per unum annum crescit secundum modicam quantitatem; et crediderunt quod motus augmenti esset continuus, ita quod quantitas, secundum quam attenditur augmentum divideretur proportionaliter secundum partes temporis, ita quod in qualibet parte fieret augmentum alicuius quantitatis, cuius proportio esset ad totam quantitatem, sicut proportio partis temporis ad totum tempus. Unde, cum iste motus sit insensibilis, existimaverunt similiter quod ea quae videntur quiescere, moventur, sed motu insensibili.	687. But setting aside (365). Then he gives the third argument, and this rejects the very ground on which these thinkers base their opinion that all sensible things are always in motion. For they were led to make this statement because of things which increase as a result of growth. For they saw that a thing increases in quantity to a very small degree during one year, and they thought that the motion of growth was continuous, so that quantity, in which increase is observed, might be divided in proportion to the parts of time. Thus an increase in some part of quantity would take place in some part of time, and this part of quantity would be related to a whole quantity as some part of a period of time to the whole of that period. And since this kind of motion is imperceptible, they also thought that things which appear to be at rest are being moved, although by an imperceptible motion.
lib. 4 l. 13 n. 4 Dicit ergo contra illos, quod praetermissis illis, quae dicta sunt, patet quod non est idem motus secundum quantitatem, et secundum qualitatem vel formam. Et quamvis concedatur eis quod motus secundum quantitatem sit continuus in rebus, et quod omnia hoc motu semper insensibiliter moveantur, tamen secundum qualitatem vel formam non oportet quod propter hoc semper omnia moveantur. Et ita poterit haberi cognitio de rebus determinata; quia res magis cognoscuntur per suam speciem quam per suam quantitatem.	688. In opposing these thinkers, then, he says that, even apart from the considerations which have been made, it is clear that change in quantity and in quality or form are not the same. And although they admit that change in quantity is continuous in reality, and that all things are always being moved imperceptibly by this motion, it is not therefore necessary for this reason that all things should be being moved in quality or form. Hence it will be possible to have a definite knowledge of things, because things are known by their form rather than by their quantity.
lib. 4 l. 13 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem quartam rationem ponit, dicens, quod dignum est renuere sive increpare sic existimantes, idest opinantes, scilicet quod omnia sensibilia sunt semper in motu, propter hoc quod paucorum sensibilium numerum inveniunt sic se habentem, cum tamen plura sensibilia immobilia sint, nisi quantum ad motum localem. Constat enim quod sola sensibilia quae sunt hic circa nos in sphaera activorum et passivorum, sunt in generatione et corruptione. Huiusmodi autem locus est quasi nihil respectu universi. Nam tota terra non habet sensibilem quantitatem respectu supremae sphaerae. Ideo se habet ad eam sicut centrum, sicut astrologi probant per hoc quod semper sex signa zodiaci super terram apparent. Quod non esset, si terra aliquam partem caeli sensu notabilem a nobis occultaret. Stultum enim fuit de tota natura sensibili iudicare propter illa pauciora; immo tolerabilius fuisset quod tota natura sensibilis fuisset diiudicata secundum modum caelestium corporum, quae multum excedunt alia in quantitate.	689. Again, those who (366). Then he gives the fourth argument. He says that “those who think in this way,’,’ i.e., those who entertain the opinion that all sensible things are always being moved because they find a small number of sensible things of which this is true, deserve to be criticized; for there are many sensible things which are capable. of being moved only from the viewpoint of local motion. For it is obvious that it is only the sensible things around us here in the sphere of active and passive things which are in process of generation and corruption. But this sphere or place amounts to nothing, so to speak, in comparison with the whole universe; for the entire earth has no sensible quantity in comparison with the outermost sphere. Hence this place is related to the universe as its central point, as the astronomers prove on the grounds that the six signs of the zodiac always appear above the earth. But this would not be the case if the earth were to hide from us some part of the heavens which are perceived by the senses. For it would be foolish to make a judgment about the whole sensible world in the light of these few things. Indeed, it would have been more acceptable if the whole sensible world had been judged according to the motion of the celestial bodies, which far surpass the others in quantity.
lib. 4 l. 13 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem quintam rationem ponit, dicens, quod contra haec dicenda sunt ea quae supra sunt dicta in hoc eodem libro; scilicet quod sit quaedam natura immobilis, scilicet natura primi motoris, ut probatum est in octavo physicorum. Et hoc est dicendum contra eos, et ipsi debent hoc credere, sicut alibi probatum est. Et ideo non est verum, quod omnia sint semper in motu, et quod nihil vere de aliquo possit dici.	690. Further, it is evident (367). He gives the fifth argument. He says that we must also use the same arguments against these men as were used above in this same book; that is, we must show them that there is a kind of nature which is immobile, namely, that of the primary mover, as is proved in Book VIII of the Physics. And this argument must be used against them, and they ought to accept it, as has been proved elsewhere (356:C 668). It is not true, then, that all things are always in motion, and that it is impossible to make any true statement about anything.
lib. 4 l. 13 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit et etiam sextam rationem ponit, dicens, quod illa positio, qua ponunt omnia moveri, repugnat primae eorum positioni, qua ponuntur contradictoria simul verificari de eodem: quia si aliquid simul est et non est, magis sequitur quod omnia quiescant quam quod omnia moveantur. Nihil enim permutatur ad hoc quod iam inest ei; sicut quod iam est album non mutatur ad albedinem. Si autem idem contingit simul esse et non esse, omnia insunt omnibus, ut supra probatum est, quia omnia sunt unum. Et ita non erit in quod possit aliquid permutari.	691. And those who say (368). He gives the sixth argument. He says that their position that all things are being moved is opposed to their first position, that contradictories are true of the same subject at the same time, because if something is and is not at the same time, it follows that all things are at rest rather than in motion. For nothing is being changed in terms of any attribute which already belongs to it; for example, what is already white is not being changed as regards whiteness. But if it is possible for the same thing both to be and not be at the same time, all attributes will be present in all things, as has been proved above (345:C 639), because all will be one. Hence there will not be anything to which a thing can be changed.