Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber4/lect14

Lecture 14

Latin	English
lib. 4 l. 14 n. 1 Hic incipit procedere contra ipsam rationem de veritate apparentium: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo improbat hanc opinionem. Secundo inducit conclusionem intentam, ibi, igitur quia cunctorum. Circa primum duo facit. Primo disputat contra illos, qui praedictam positionem propter aliquam rationem vel dubitationem posuerunt. Secundo contra protervientes, ibi, sunt autem quidam. Circa primum ponit septem rationes. Circa primam sic dicit. Ostensum est, quod non omnia sunt mutabilia, sed de veritate quod non omne apparens sit verum, ista consideranda sunt: quorum primum est quod sensus non est proprie causa falsitatis, sed phantasia, quae non est idem sensui: quasi dicat: diversitas iudiciorum, quae dantur de sensibilibus, non provenit ex sensu, sed ex phantasia, ad quam propter aliquod impedimentum naturae proveniunt deceptiones sensuum. Phantasia autem non est eadem sensui, ut probatur tertio de anima, sed est motus factus a sensu secundum actum. Unde quod ipsi attribuerunt sensui istam diversitatem iudiciorum, per quam unus iudicatur falsum sentire de hoc, de quo alius verum sentit, non convenienter faciunt. Alia translatio melius habet, et primum quidem quia nec sensus falsus proprii est. Sed phantasia non idem est sensui: quasi dicat, quod nullus sensus de proprio obiecto decipitur, sicut visus non decipitur de coloribus. Ex quo patet quod iudicium sensus de sensibili proprio est determinatum. Unde oportet determinatam veritatem esse in rebus.	692. Here he begins to argue dialectically against the opinion that truth if equivalent to appearances; and in regard to this he does two things. First (369)C 718), he rejects this opinion. Second (381:C 718), he draws his intended conclusion (“Let this suffice”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he argues dialectically against those who held this opinion because of some theory or difficulty. Second (376:C 708), he argues against those who held this opinion because of insolence (“Now there are some”). In regard to the first part (369) he gives seven arguments. The first of these is as follows: it has been shown (367:C 690) that not all things are changeable, and “concerning the truth that not everything which appears is true,” these points must be considered. First, the proper cause of falsity is not the senses but the imagination, which is not the same as the senses. That is to say, the diversity of judgments made about sensible objects is not attributable to the senses but to the imagination, in which errors are made about sensory perceptions because of some natural obstacle. Now imagination is not the same as perception, as is proved in Book III of The Soul, but is a motion produced as a result of actual sensing. Therefore in attributing to the senses this diversity of judgments by which one person is considered to have a false perception of a particular object about which another has a true perception, they do not proceed as they should. Another translation states this better, saying, “And, first, it must be understood that a sense is not false with regard to its proper object,” implying that no sense makes a mistake about its own proper object; for example, sight is not mistaken about colors. From this it is evident that the judgment which a sense makes about its proper sensible object is a definite one, so that there must be some definite truth in the world.
lib. 4 l. 14 n. 2 Et si obiiciatur quod aliquando etiam circa sensibilia propria error accidit, respondet quod hoc non est ex sensu, sed ex phantasia, per cuius indispositionem aliquando contingit quod id quod per sensum accipitur, aliter ad ipsam perveniat quam sensu percipiatur, sicut patet in phreneticis in quibus organum phantasiae est laesum.	693. And if someone raises the objection that error sometimes arises even with regard to proper sensibles, his answer is that this is attributable not to the senses but to the imagination; for when the imagination is subject to some sort of abnormality, it sometimes happens that the object apprehended by a sense enters the imagination in a different way than it was apprehended by the sense. This is evident, for example, in the case of madmen, in whom the organ of imagination has been injured.
lib. 4 l. 14 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit deinde dignum secundam rationem ponit, circa quam sic dicit. Dignum est admirari si aliqui de hoc quaerunt, vel dubitant, secundum aliam literam, utrum magnitudines tales sint quales videntur a remotis, vel quales videntur a propinquis. Quasi enim per se verum est quod sensus propinquas magnitudines iudicat tales esse quales sunt, remotas autem minores quam sint, quia quod a remotiori videtur, videtur minus, ut in perspectiva probatur.	694. Second, that it is (370). Then he gives his second argument, and it runs thus: it is surprising if some “should raise the question,” or “be puzzled,” as another text says, whether continuous quantities are such as they appear to those who are at a distance or to those who are close at hand. For it is just about self-evidently true that a sense judges quantities which are close at hand to be such as they are, and those which are far away to be smaller than they are, because what seems farther away appears small, as is proved in the science of optics.
lib. 4 l. 14 n. 4 Et simile est si quis dubitat utrum colores sint tales quales videntur a remotis, vel quales videntur a propinquis. Constat enim quod virtus agentis quanto plus in remotis porrigitur in agendo, tanto deficientior eius invenitur effectus. Ignis enim minus calefacit quae distant, quam quae sunt propinqua. Unde et color corporis perfecti sensitivi non ita immutat perfecte in remoto ut in propinquo diaphanum. Et propter hoc verius est iudicium sensus de coloribus sensibilibus in propinquo quam in remoto.	695. The same thing applies if someone raises the question whether colors are such as they appear to those who are close at hand; for it is evident that the farther an agent’s power is extended when it acts, the more imperfect is its effect; for fire heats those things which are far away to a lesser degree than those which are close at hand. And for the same reason the color of a perfect sensible body does not change that part of the transparent medium which is far away from it as completely as it changes that part which is close to it. Hence the judgment of a sense is truer about sensible colors in things close at hand than it is about those in things far away.
lib. 4 l. 14 n. 5 Et simile est etiam si quis dubitat utrum aliqua talia sint qualia videntur sanis, aut qualia videntur laborantibus, idest infirmis. Sani enim habent organa sensuum bene disposita, et ideo species sensibilium in eis recipiuntur prout sunt, et propter hoc verum est iudicium sanorum de sensibilibus. Organa vero infirmorum sunt indisposita. Unde non convenienter immutantur a sensibilibus. Et propter hoc eorum iudicium de eis non est rectum, ut patet in gustu: cuius organum quia in infirmis corruptis humoribus est infectum, ea quae sunt boni saporis eis insipida videntur.	696. The same thing is also true if someone asks whether things are such as they appear to those who are healthy or “to those who are ailing,” i.e., those who are ill. For healthy people have sensory organs which are well disposed, and therefore the forms of sensible things are received in them just as they are; and for this reason the judgment which healthy people make about sensible objects is a true one. But the organs of sick people are not properly disposed, and therefore they are not changed as they should be by sensible objects. Hence their judgment about such objects is not a true one. This is clear with regard to the sense of taste; for when the organ of taste in sick people has been rendered inoperative as a result of the humors being destroyed, things which have a good taste seem tasteless to them.
lib. 4 l. 14 n. 6 Et simile iterum est utrum pondera sint ita gravia sicut videntur debilibus, vel sicut videntur robustis. Constat enim quod robusti de ponderibus iudicant secundum quod sunt. Non autem ita est in debilibus in quibus difficultas ad sustinendum pondus, non solum provenit ex magnitudine ponderis, quemadmodum in robustis, sed etiam ex paucitate virtutis. Unde etiam parva pondera eis magna videntur.	697. The same thing also applies regarding the question whether things having weight are as heavy as they seem to those who are weak or to those who are strong; for it is clear that the strong judge about heavy things as they really arc. But this is not the case with the weak, who find it difficult to lift a weight not only because of the heaviness of it (and this sometimes happens even with the strong) but also because of the weakness of their power, so that even less heavy things appear heavy to them.
lib. 4 l. 14 n. 7 Simile est si aliqui dubitant utrum veritas sic se habeat sicut videtur dormientibus aut sicut videtur vigilantibus. In dormientibus enim ligati sunt sensus, et ita iudicium eorum de sensibilibus non potest esse liberum, sicut est iudicium vigilantium, quorum sensus sunt soluti. Supra autem dictum est quod mirandum est si dubitant, quia ex eorum actibus apparet quod non dubitant, nec existimant omnia praedicta iudicia aequaliter esse vera. Si enim aliquis existens in Lybia in somnis videat se esse Athenis, vel aliquis existens Parisiis videat se esse in Hungaria in somnis, a somno surgens non talia operatur, qualia operaretur si in vigilia hoc percepisset. Iret enim ad Odion, idest ad locum quemdam qui est Athenis, si in vigilia se Athenis esse videret, quod non facit si hoc somniavit. Ergo patet quod putat similiter esse verum, quod videtur dormienti et vigilanti.	698. The same thing again applies if the question is raised whether the truth is such as it appears to those who are asleep or to those who are awake. For the senses of those who are asleep are fettered, and thus their judgment about sensible things cannot be free like the judgment of those who are awake and whose senses are unfettered. For it has been pointed out above that it would be surprising if they should be perplexed, because it appears from their actions that they are not perplexed, and that they do not think that all of the above-mentioned judgments are equally true. For if someone in Lybia seems in his dreams to be in Athens, or if someone in Paris seems in his dreams to be in Hungary, he does not when he awakens act in the same way that he would if he were to perceive this when he is awake. For, if he were awake in Athens, he would go to the Odeon, i.e., a building in Athens; but he would not do this if he had merely dreamed it. It is clear, then, that he does not think that what appears to him when he is asleep and what appears when he is awake are equally true.
lib. 4 l. 14 n. 8 Similiter potest argui de aliis quaestionibus praedictis. Licet enim oretenus de talibus quaerant, tamen de eis in mente non dubitant. Unde patet rationem, esse nullam, qua ponebant omne quod videtur esse verum. Hoc enim ponebant, quia diversarum opinionum non potest accipi quae verior sit, sicut supra dictum est.	699. We can argue in the same way with regard to the other issues mentioned above; for even though men often raise questions about these issues, they are not in their own mind perplexed about them. Hence it is clear that their reason for holding to be true everything which appears, is invalid; for they held this position because of the impossibility of deciding which of several opinions is the truer, as has been stated above (353:C 663).
lib. 4 l. 14 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem tertiam rationem ponit; dicens quod de futuris, sicut Plato dicebat, non similiter est propria, idest principalis firma et vera et digna credi opinio medici, et ignorantis medicinam, sicut de hoc futuro quod est infirmatum sanari vel non sanari. Nam medicus, qui scit causam sanitatis, potest aliqua signa sanitatis futurae praescire, quae nescit artis medicinalis ignarus. Unde patet quod stulta est opinio, qua creditur omnes opiniones aequaliter esse veras.	700. Again, concerning future (371). Here he gives his third argument. He says that in the case of future events, as Plato points out, the opinion of a physician and that of a person who is ignorant of the art of medicine are not “of equal value,” i.e., equally important, certain, true or acceptable, as to the future possibility of some sick person being cured or not. For, while a physician knows the cause of health, this is unknown to someone who is ignorant of the art of medicine. It is clear, then, that the opinion which some held that all opinions are equally true is a foolish one.
lib. 4 l. 14 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem quartam rationem ponit, quia in sensibilibus non similiter est propria, idest vera et credibilis iudicatio sensus de alieno sensibili, et de proprio. Sicut visus non similiter iudicat de coloribus et gustus. Sed credendum est de coloribus iudicio visus. Et de chymis, idest saporibus, iudicio gustus. Unde si visus iudicet aliquid dulce esse, et gustus percipit idem esse amarum, credendum est magis gustui quam visui.	701. Again, in the case (372). He gives his fourth argument, which runs thus: in the case of sensible objects the judgment which a sense makes about some sensible object foreign to it and that which it makes about its proper sensible object are not of equal “value,” i.e., equally true and acceptable; for example, sight and taste do not make the same sort of judgment about colors and flavors, but in the case of colors the judgment of sight must be accepted, “and in the case of flavors,” or savors, the judgment of taste must be accepted. Hence, if sight judges a thing to be sweet and taste judges it to be bitter, taste must be accepted rather than sight.
lib. 4 l. 14 n. 11 Et similiter etiam non est aequalis ponderis iudicium sensus de proprio sensibili, et de eo quod est proprio propinquum. Propinqua autem propriis sensibilibus hic dicuntur sensibilia communia, ut magnitudo, numerus, et huiusmodi, circa quae magis decipitur sensus quam circa sensibilia propria, minus tamen quam circa sensibilia alterius sensus, vel circa ea quae sunt sensibilia per accidens. Et ita patet quod stultum est dicere omnia iudicia aequaliter esse vera.	702. And in the same way too the judgment which a sense makes about its proper sensible object and the one which it makes about something akin to its proper object are not of equal value. Now those things which are said here to be akin to proper sensible objects are called common sensibles, for example, size, number and the like, about which a sense is deceived to a greater degree than it is about its proper sensible object, although it is deceived about them to a lesser degree than it is about the sensible objects of another sense or about things which are called accidental sensible objects. Hence it is clearly foolish to say that all judgments are equally true.
lib. 4 l. 14 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit quorum unusquisque quintam rationem ponit; dicens, quod nullus sensus in eodem tempore simul dicit circa idem ita se habere et non habere. In eodem enim tempore non dicit visus aliquid esse album et non album, nec bicubitum et non bicubitum, nec dulce et non dulce. Sed quamvis in diversis temporibus videatur iudicium sensus opposita de eodem iudicare, nunquam tamen dubitatio accidit ex iudicio circa passionem ipsam sensibilem, sed circa passionis subiectum, verbi gratia, de eodem subiecto, scilicet vino, gustui quandoque videtur quod est dulce, et quandoque quod non est dulce. Quod provenit vel propter mutationem corporis sensibilis, vel instrumenti quod est infectum amaris humoribus; et sic quicquid gustat ei non dulce videtur; vel propter mutationem ipsius vini. Sed nunquam gustus mutat iudicium suum quin ipsam dulcedinem talem iudicet esse qualem perpendit in dulci, quando iudicavit eam esse dulcem; sed de ipsa dulcedine semper verum dicit, et semper eodem modo. Unde si iudicium sensus est verum, sicut ipsi ponunt, sequitur etiam quod natura dulcis ex necessitate sit talis, et sic aliquid erit determinate verum in rebus. Sequitur etiam quod nunquam affirmatio vel negatio sunt simul vera, quia nunquam sensus simul dicit aliquid esse dulce et non dulce, ut dictum est.	703. And no one (373). He now gives his fifth argument. He says that no sense affirms at one instant of time that a thing is simultaneously both so and not so. For sight does not at the same moment affirm that something is white and not white or that it is two cubits and not two cubits or that it is sweet and not sweet. But while a sense’s power of judging may seem at different times to form opposite judgments about the same thing, still from this judgment no difficulty ever arises about the sensible modification itself, but only about the subject of this modification. For example, if we take the same subject, wine, sometimes it appears to the sense to taste sweet and sometimes not. This happens either because of some change in the sentient body, i.e., in the organ, which is infected by bitter humors, so that whatever it tastes does not seem sweet to it, or else because of some change in the wine itself. But the sense of taste never changes its judgment without judging sweetness itself to be such as it considered it to be in the sweet thing when it judged it to be sweet; but about sweetness itself it always makes a true affirmation, and always does this in the same way. Hence, if the judgment of a sense is true, as these men claimed, it also follows that the nature of sweetness is necessarily such as it is; and thus something will be definitely true in reality. And it also follows that both an affirmation and a negation can never be true at the same time, because a sense never affirms that something is both sweet and not sweet at the same time, as has been stated.
lib. 4 l. 14 n. 13 Deinde cum dicit quamvis et sextam rationem ponit, dicens, quod praedictae rationes omnes vel opiniones sicut auferunt omnia substantialia praedicata, ut supra ostensum est, ita auferunt omnia praedicata necessaria. Sequitur enim quod nihil de altero praedicatur substantialiter aut necessario. Et quod non substantialiter, ex supra dictis patet. Quod autem non necessario, sic probatur. Quia necessarium est, quod non contingit aliter se habere. Si ergo omne quod est, est sic vel aliter, secundum eos qui dicunt contradictoria simul esse vera, et oppositas opiniones, sequetur quod nihil sit necessarium in rebus.	704. Yet all these (374). He gives the sixth argument. He says that, just as all of the above-mentioned theories or opinions destroy substantial predicates, as has been shown above (341:C 625), in a similar way they destroy all necessary predicates. For it follows that nothing could ever be predicated of anything else either substantially or necessarily. That nothing could be predicated of anything else substantially is clear from what has been stated above. That nothing could be predicated of anything else necessarily is proved as follows. That is necessary which cannot be otherwise than it is; therefore, if everything which is can exist in one way or in another way, as is held by those who say that contradictories and opposite opinions are true at the same time, it follows that nothing is necessary in the world.
lib. 4 l. 14 n. 14 Deinde cum dicit et ex toto septimam rationem ponit, dicens. Si omne apparens est verum, nec aliquid est verum nisi ex hoc ipso quod est apparens sensui, sequetur quod nihil est nisi inquantum sensibile est in actu. Sed si solum sic aliquid est, scilicet inquantum est sensibile, sequetur quod nihil sit si non erunt sensus. Et per consequens si non erunt animata vel animalia. Hoc autem est impossibile.	705. And in general (375). Then he gives the seventh argument. He says that, if everything which appears is true, and a thing is true only insofar as it appears to the senses, it follows that a thing exists only insofar as, it is actually being sensed. But if something exists only in this way, i.e., insofar as it is being sensed, then it follows that nothing would exist if the senses did not exist; and this would follow if there were no animals or living things. But this is impossible.
lib. 4 l. 14 n. 15 Nam hoc potest esse verum quod sensibilia inquantum sensibilia non sunt, idest si accipiantur prout sunt sensibilia in actu, quod non sunt sine sensibus. Sunt enim sensibilia in actu secundum quod sunt in sensu. Et secundum hoc omne sensibile in actu est quaedam passio sentientis, quae non potest esse si sentientia non sunt. Sed quod ipsa sensibilia quae faciunt hanc passionem in sensu non sint, hoc est impossibile. Quod sic patet. Remoto enim posteriori, non removetur prius: sed res faciens passiones in sensu non est ipsemet sensus, quia sensus non est suimet, sed alterius, quod oportet esse prius sensu naturaliter, sicut movens moto naturaliter est prius. Visus enim non videt se sed colorem.	706. For this can be true, that sensibles under the aspect of their sensibility do not exist; i.e., if they are considered under the aspect of sensibles actualized, they do not exist apart from the senses, for they are sensibles actualized insofar as they are present in a sense. And according to this every actualized sensible is a certain modification of the subject sensing, although this would be impossible if there were no sensory beings. But that the sensible objects which cause this modification in a sense should not exist is impossible. This becomes clear as follows: when some subsequent thing is removed it does not follow that a prior thing is removed. But the thing producing the modification in a sense is not the perception itself, because a perception is not the perception of itself but of something else, and this must be naturally prior to the perception just as a mover is prior to the thing which is moved. For sight does not see itself but sees color.
lib. 4 l. 14 n. 16 Et si contra hoc dicatur quod sensibile et sensus sunt relativa adinvicem dicta, et ita simul natura, et interempto uno interimitur aliud; nihilominus sequitur propositum; quia sensibile in potentia non dicitur relative ad sensum quasi ad ipsum referatur, sed quia sensus refertur ad ipsum, ut in quinto huius habetur. Patet igitur quod impossibile est dici quod ex hoc sunt aliqua vera, quia sensui apparent. Quod ponunt illi qui ponunt omnia apparentia esse vera, ut ex praedictis patet.	707. And even if someone were to raise the objection that a sensible object and a sense are correlative and thus naturally simultaneous, so that when one is destroyed the other is destroyed, Aristotle’s thesis is still true; for what is potentially sensible is not said to be relative to a sense because it is referred to a sense, but because the sense is referred to it, as is stated in Book V of this work (496:C 1027)- It is dearly impossible, then, to say that some things are true because they appear to the senses; yet this is what those men maintain who claim that all appearances are true, as is evident from the foregoing statements.