Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber4/lect2

Lecture 2

Latin	English
lib. 4 l. 2 n. 1 Hic procedit ad ostendendum quod ad considerationem unius scientiae pertinent considerare huiusmodi communia, scilicet unum et multa, idem et diversum: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit hoc de singulis per proprias rationes. Secundo de omnibus simul per quasdam rationes communes, ibi, et philosophi est de omnibus posse speculari. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod de omnibus hic considerare debet philosophus. Secundo docet modum considerandi, ibi, quare quoniam unum multipliciter et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quod ad hanc scientiam pertineat considerare de uno et de speciebus unius. Secundo quod ad eamdem scientiam pertineat considerare de omnibus oppositis, ibi, quoniam autem unius est opposita considerare. Circa primum duo facit. Primo enim ostendit quod huius scientiae est considerare de uno. Secundo quod eius sit considerare de speciebus unius, ibi, quare quotcumque unius. Dicit ergo primo, quod ens et unum sunt idem et una natura. Hoc ideo dicit, quia quaedam sunt idem numero quae non sunt una natura, sed diversae, sicut Socrates, et hoc album, et hoc musicum. Unum autem et ens non diversas naturas, sed unam significant. Hoc autem contingit dupliciter. Quaedam enim sunt unum quae consequuntur se adinvicem convertibiliter sicut principium et causa. Quaedam vero non solum convertuntur ut sint idem subiecto, sed etiam sunt unum secundum rationem, sicut vestis et indumentum.	548. Here he proceeds to show that the study of common attributes such as one and many and same and different belongs to the consideration of one and the same science; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows that this is true of each attribute taken separately by arguing from proper or specific principles. Second (570), he shows that this is true of all attributes taken together by arguing from common principles. In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that the philosopher ought to investigate all these attributes. Second (568), he tells us how to investigate them. In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that it is the office of this science to consider unity and its species. Second (564), he shows that it is the office of one and the same science to consider all opposites. In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that it is the office of this science to consider unity. Second (561), he shows that it also, belongs to it to examine the species of unity. He therefore says, first, that being and unity are the same and are a single nature. He says this because some things are numerically the same which are not a single nature but different natures, for example, Socrates, this white thing, and this musician. Now the terms one and being do not signify different natures but a single nature. But things can be one in two ways: (1) for some things are one which are associated as interchangeable things, like principle and cause; and (2) some are interchangeable not only in the sense that they are one and the same numerically [or in subject] but also in the sense that they are one and the same conceptually, like garment and clothing.
lib. 4 l. 2 n. 2 Unum autem et ens significant unam naturam secundum diversas rationes. Unde sic se habent sicut principium et causa, sed non sicut tunica et vestis, quae sunt nomina penitus synonyma. Nihil tamen differt ad propositum, si similiter accipiamus ea dici, sicut illa quae sunt unum et subiecto et ratione. Sed hoc erit magis prae opere, idest magis utile ad hoc quod intendit. Intendit enim probare quod unum et ens cadunt sub eadem consideratione, et quod habent species sibi correspondentes. Quod manifestius probaretur si unum et ens essent idem re et ratione, quam si sint idem re et non ratione.	549. Now the terms one and being signify one nature according to different concepts, and therefore they are like the terms principle and cause, and not like the terms tunic and garment, which are wholly synonymous. —Yet it makes no difference to his thesis if we consider them to be used in the same sense, as those things which are one both numerically and conceptually. In fact this will “rather support our undertaking,” i.e., it will serve his purpose better; for he intends to prove that unity and being belong to the same study, and that the species of the one correspond to those of the other. The proof of this would be clearer if unity and being were the same both numerically and conceptually rather than just numerically and not conceptually.
lib. 4 l. 2 n. 3 Quod autem sint idem re, probat duabus rationibus, quarum primam ponit ibi, idem enim, quae talis est. Quaecumque duo addita uni nullam diversitatem afferunt, sunt penitus idem: sed unum et ens addita homini vel cuicumque alii nullam diversitatem afferunt: ergo sunt penitus idem. Minor patet: idem enim est dictum homo, et unus homo. Et similiter est idem dictum, ens homo, vel quod est homo: et non demonstratur aliquid alterum cum secundum dictionem replicamus dicendo, est ens homo, et homo, et unus homo. Quod quidem probat sic.	550. He proves that they are the same numerically by using two arguments. He gives the first where he says, “For one man,” and it runs as follows. Any two things which when added to some third thing cause no difference are wholly the same. But when one and being are added to man or to anything at all, they cause no difference. Therefore they are wholly the same. The truth of the minor premise is evident; for it is the same thing to say “man” and “one man.” And similarly it is the same thing to say “human being” and “the thing that is man;” and nothing different is expressed when in speaking we repeat the terms, saying, “This is a human being, a man, and one man.” He proves this as follows.
lib. 4 l. 2 n. 4 Idem enim est generari et corrumpi hominem, et id quod est homo. Quod ex hoc patet, quia generatio est via ad esse, et corruptio mutatio ab esse ad non esse. Unde nunquam generatur homo, quin generetur ens homo: nec unquam corrumpitur homo, quin corrumpatur ens homo. Quae autem simul generantur et corrumpuntur sunt unum.	551. It is the same thing for man and the thing that is man to be generated and corrupted. This is evident from the fact that generation is a process toward being, and corruption a change from being to non-being. Hence a man is never generated without a human being being generated, nor is a man ever corrupted without a human being being corrupted; and those things which are generated and corrupted together are themselves one and the same.
lib. 4 l. 2 n. 5 Et sicut dictum est quod ens et homo non separantur in generatione et corruptione, similiter apparet de uno. Nam cum generatur homo, generatur unus homo: et cum corrumpitur, similiter corrumpitur. Unde manifestum est quod appositio in istis ostendit idem; et per hoc quod additur vel unum vel ens, non intelligitur addi aliqua natura supra hominem. Ex quo manifeste apparet, quod unum non est aliud praeter ens: quia quaecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem, sibiinvicem sunt eadem.	552. And just as it has been said that being and man are not separated either in generation or in corruption, so too this is evident of what is one; for when a man is generated, one man is generated, and when a man is corrupted, one man is also corrupted. It is clear, then, that the apposition of these [i.e., of one or being to man] expresses the same thing, and that just because the term one or being is added to man it is not to be understood that some nature is added to man. And from this it is clearly apparent that unity does not differ from being, because any two things which are identical with some third thing are identical with each other.
lib. 4 l. 2 n. 6 Patet autem ex praedicta ratione, non solum quod sunt unum re, sed quod differunt ratione. Nam si non differrent ratione, essent penitus synonyma; et sic nugatio esset cum dicitur, ens homo et unus homo. Sciendum est enim quod hoc nomen homo, imponitur a quidditate, sive a natura hominis; et hoc nomen res imponitur a quidditate tantum; hoc vero nomen ens, imponitur ab actu essendi: et hoc nomen unum, ab ordine vel indivisione. Est enim unum ens indivisum. Idem autem est quod habet essentiam et quidditatem per illam essentiam, et quod est in se indivisum. Unde ista tria, res, ens, unum, significant omnino idem, sed secundum diversas rationes.	553. It is also evident from the foregoing argument that unity and being are the same numerically but differ conceptually; for if this were not the case they would be wholly synonymous, and then it would be nonsense to say, “a human being,” and “one man.” For it must be borne in mind that the term man is derived from the quiddity or the nature of man, and the term thing from the quiddity only; but the term being is derived from the act of being, and the term one from order or lack of division; for what is one is an undivided being. Now what has an essence, and a quiddity by reason of that essence, and what is undivided in itself, are the same. Hence these three—thing, being, and one—signify absolutely the same thing but according to different concepts.
lib. 4 l. 2 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem hic ponit secundam rationem ad idem; quae talis est. Quaecumque duo praedicantur de substantia alicuius rei per se et non per accidens, illa sunt idem secundum rem: sed ita se habent unum et ens, quod praedicantur per se et non secundum accidens de substantia cuiuslibet rei. Substantia enim cuiuslibet rei est unum per se et non secundum accidens. Ens ergo et unum significant idem secundum rem.	554. Further, the substance (303). Then he gives the second argument, which has to do with sameness or identity of subject. This argument is as follows. Any two attributes which are predicated essentially and not accidentally of the substance of each thing are the same in subject, or numerically. But unity and being are such that they are predicated essentially and not accidentally of the substance of each thing; for the substance of a thing is one in itself and not accidentally. Therefore the terms being and one signify the same thing in subject.
lib. 4 l. 2 n. 8 Quod autem ens et unum praedicentur de substantia cuiuslibet rei per se et non secundum accidens, sic potest probari. Si enim praedicarentur de substantia cuiuslibet rei per aliquod ens ei additum, de illo iterum necesse est praedicari ens, quia unumquodque est unum et ens. Aut ergo iterum de hoc praedicatur per se, aut per aliquid aliud additum. Si per aliquid aliud, iterum esset quaestio de illo addito, et sic erit procedere usque ad infinitum. Hoc autem est impossibile: ergo necesse est stare in primo, scilicet quod substantia rei sit una et ens per seipsam, et non per aliquid additum.	555. That the terms being and one are predicated essentially and not accidentally of the substance of each thing can be proved as follows. If being and one were predicated of the substance of each thing by reason of something added to it [i.e., accidentally], being would have to be predicated also of the thing added, because anything at all is one and a being. But then there would be the question whether being is predicated of this thing (the one added) either essentially or by reason of some other thing that is added to it in turn. And if the latter were the case, then the same question would arise once again regarding the last thing added, and so on to infinity. But this is impossible. Hence the first position must be held, namely, that a thing’s substance is one and a being of itself and not by reason of something added to it.
lib. 4 l. 2 n. 9 Sciendum est autem quod circa hoc Avicenna aliud sensit. Dixit enim quod unum et ens non significant substantiam rei, sed significant aliquid additum. Et de ente quidem hoc dicebat, quia in qualibet re quae habet esse ab alio, aliud est esse rei, et substantia sive essentia eius: hoc autem nomen ens, significat ipsum esse. Significat igitur (ut videtur) aliquid additum essentiae.	556. But it must be noted that Avicenna felt differently about this; for he said that the terms being and one do not signify a thing’s substance but something added to it. He said this of being because, in the case of anything that derives its existence from something else, the existence of such a thing must differ from its substance or essence. But the term being signifies existence itself. Hence it seems that being, or existence is something added to a thing’s essence.
lib. 4 l. 2 n. 10 De uno autem hoc dicebat, quia aestimabat quod illud unum quod convertitur cum ente, sit idem quod illud unum quod est principium numeri. Unum autem quod est principium numeri necesse est significare quamdam naturam additam substantiae: alioquin cum numerus ex unitatibus constituatur, non esset numerus species quantitatis, quae est accidens substantiae superadditum. Dicebat autem quod hoc unum convertitur cum ente, non quia significat ipsam rei substantiam vel entis, sed quia significat accidens quod inhaeret omni enti, sicut risibile quod convertitur cum homine.	557. He spoke in the same way of one, because he thought that the one which is interchangeable with being and the one which is the principle of number are the same. And the one which is the principle of number must signify a reality added to the substance, otherwise number, since it is composed of ones, would not be a species of quantity, which is an accident added to substance. He said that this kind of one is interchangeable with being, not in the sense that it signifies the very substance of a thing or being, but in the sense that it signifies an accident belonging to every being, just as the ability to laugh belongs to every man.
lib. 4 l. 2 n. 11 Sed in primo quidem non videtur dixisse recte. Esse enim rei quamvis sit aliud ab eius essentia, non tamen est intelligendum quod sit aliquod superadditum ad modum accidentis, sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae. Et ideo hoc nomen ens quod imponitur ab ipso esse, significat idem cum nomine quod imponitur ab ipsa essentia.	558. But in regard to the first point he does not seem to be right; for even though a thing’s existence is (+) other than its essence, it should not be understood to be something added to its essence after the manner of an (~) accident, but (+) something established, as it were, by the principles of the essence. Hence the term being, which is applied to a thing by reason of its very existence, designates the same thing as the term which is applied to it by reason of its essence. [Existence is later clarified as the act of essence.]
lib. 4 l. 2 n. 12 De uno autem non videtur esse verum, quod sit idem quod convertitur cum ente, et quod est principium numeri. Nihil enim quod est in determinato genere videtur consequi omnia entia. Unde unum quod determinatur ad speciale genus entis, scilicet ad genus quantitatis discretae, non videtur posse cum ente universali converti. Si enim unum est proprium et per se accidens entis, oportet quod ex principiis causetur entis in quantum ens, sicut quodlibet accidens proprium ex principiis sui subiecti. Ex principiis autem communibus entis inquantum est ens, non intelligitur causari aliquod particulariter ens sufficienter. Unde non potest esse quod ens aliquod determinati generis et speciei sit accidens omnis entis.	559. Nor does it seem to be true that the one or unity which is interchangeable with being and that which is the principle of number are the same; for nothing that pertains to some special class of being seems to be characteristic of all beings. Hence the unity which is limited to a special class of being—discrete quantity—does not seem to be interchangeable with universal being. For, if unity is a proper and essential accident of being, it must be caused by the principles of being as being, just as any proper accident is caused by the principles of its subject. But it is not reasonable that something having a particular mode of being should be adequately accounted for by the common principles of being as being. It cannot be true, then, that something which belongs to a definite genus and species is an accident of every being.
lib. 4 l. 2 n. 13 Unum igitur quod est principium numeri, aliud est ab eo quod cum ente convertitur. Unum enim quod cum ente convertitur, ipsum ens designat, superaddens indivisionis rationem, quae, cum sit negatio vel privatio, non ponit aliquam naturam enti additam. Et sic in nullo differt ab ente secundum rem, sed solum ratione. Nam negatio vel privatio non est ens naturae, sed rationis, sicut dictum est. Unum vero quod est principium numeri addit supra substantiam, rationem mensurae, quae est propria passio quantitatis, et primo invenitur in unitate. Et dicitur per privationem vel negationem divisionis, quae est secundum quantitatem continuam. Nam numerus ex divisione continui causatur. Et ideo numerus ad scientiam mathematicam pertinet, cuius subiectum extra materiam esse non potest, quamvis sine materia sensibili consideretur. Hoc autem non esset, si unum quod est principium numeri, secundum esse a materia separaretur in rebus immaterialibus existens, quasi cum ente conversum.	560. Therefore the kind of unity which is the principle of number differs from that which is interchangeable with being; for the unity which is interchangeable with being signifies being itself, adding to it the notion of undividedness, which, since it is a negation or a privation, does not posit any reality added to being. Thus unity differs from being in no way numerically but only conceptually; for a negation or a privation is not a real being but a being of reason, as has been stated (540). However, the kind of unity which is the principle of number adds to substance the note of a measure, which is a special property of quantity and is found first in the unit. And it is described as the privation or negation of division which pertains to continuous quantity; for number is produced by dividing the continuous. Hence number belongs to mathematical science, whose subject cannot exist apart from sensible matter but can be considered apart from sensible matter. But this would not be so if the kind of unity which is the principle of number were separate from matter in being and existed among the immaterial substances, as is true of the kind of unity which is interchangeable with being.
lib. 4 l. 2 n. 14 Quare quotcumque hic concludit quod philosophi est considerare de partibus unius, sicut de partibus entis. Et primo hoc ostendit. Secundo etiam ostendit, quod secundum diversas partes entis et unius, sunt diversae partes philosophiae, ibi, et tot partes. Dicit ergo primo, quod ex quo unum et ens idem significant, et eiusdem sunt species eaedem, oportet quod tot sint species entis, quot sunt species unius, et sibiinvicem respondentes. Sicut enim partes entis sunt substantia, quantitas et qualitas etc., ita et partes unius sunt idem, aequale et simile. Idem enim unum in substantia est. Aequale, unum in quantitate. Simile, unum in qualitate. Et secundum alias partes entis possent sumi aliae partes unius, si essent nomina posita. Et sicut ad unam scientiam, scilicet ad philosophiam, pertinet consideratio de omnibus partibus entis, ita et de omnibus partibus unius, scilicet eodem et simili et huiusmodi. Et ad hoc principium, scilicet unum, reducuntur omnia contraria fere.	561. Hence there are (304). Then he concludes that it is the business of the philosopher to consider the parts of unity, just as it is to consider the parts of being. First, he proves this; and second (563), he shows that there are different parts of philosophy corresponding to the different parts of being and unity. He says, first, that since being and unity signify the same thing, and the species of things that are the same are themselves the same, there must be as many species of being as there are of unity, and they must correspond to each other. For just as the parts of being are substance, quantity, quality, and so on, in a similar way the parts of unity are sameness, equality and likeness. For things are the same when they are one in substance, equal when they are one in quantity, and like when they are one in quality. And the other parts of unity could be taken from the other parts of being, if they were given names. And just as it is the office of one science, philosophy, to consider all parts of being, in a similar way it is the office of this same science to consider all parts of unity, i.e., sameness, likeness and so forth. And to this “starting point,” i.e., unity, “almost” all contraries may be referred.
lib. 4 l. 2 n. 15 Et hoc addit, quia in quibusdam non est ita manifestum. Et tamen hoc esse necesse est; quia cum in omnibus contrariis alterum habeat privationem inclusam, oportet fieri reductionem ad privativa prima, inter quae praecipue est unum. Et iterum multitudo, quae ex uno causatur, causa est diversitatis differentiae et contrarietatis, ut infra dicetur. Et haec dicit esse considerata in ecloga, idest in electione contrariorum, idest in tractatu, quae est pars electa ad tractandum de contrariis, scilicet in decimo huius.	562. He adds this qualification because in some cases this point is not so evident. Yet it must be true; for since one member of every pair of contraries involves privation, they must be referred back to certain primary privatives, among which unity is the most basic. And plurality, which stems from unity, is the cause of otherness, difference and contrariety, as will be stated below. He says that this has been treated “in our selection,” or extract, “of contraries,” i.e., a treatise which is the part selected to deal with contraries, namely, Book X (2000-21) of this work.
lib. 4 l. 2 n. 16 Et tot partes hic ostendit partes philosophiae distingui secundum partes entis et unius; et dicit, quod tot sunt partes philosophiae, quot sunt partes substantiae, de qua dicitur principaliter ens et unum et de qua principalis est huius scientiae consideratio et intentio. Et, quia partes substantiae sunt ordinatae adinvicem, nam substantia immaterialis est prior substantia sensibili naturaliter; ideo necesse est inter partes philosophiae esse quamdam primam. Illa tamen, quae est de substantia sensibili, est prima ordine doctrinae, quia a notioribus nobis oportet incipere disciplinam: et de hac determinatur in septimo et octavo huius. Illa vero, quae est de substantia immateriali est prior dignitate et intentione huius scientiae, de qua traditur in duodecimo huius. Et tamen quaecumque sunt prima, necesse est quod sint continua aliis partibus, quia omnes partes habent pro genere unum et ens. Unde in consideratione unius et entis diversae partes huius scientiae uniuntur, quamvis sint de diversis partibus substantiae; ut sic sit una scientia inquantum partes praedictae sunt consequentes hoc, id est unum et ens, sicut communia substantiae. Et in hoc philosophus est similis mathematico. Nam mathematica habet diversas partes, et quamdam principaliter sicut arithmeticam, et quamdam secundario sicut geometriam, et alia consequenter se habent his, sicut perspectiva, astrologia et musica.	563. And there are (305). Here he shows that the parts of philosophy are distinguished in reference to the parts of being and unity. He says that there are as many parts of philosophy as there are parts of substance, of which being and unity chiefly are predicated, and of which it is the principal intention or aim of this science to treat. And because the parts of substance are related to each other in a certain order, for immaterial substance is naturally prior to sensible substance, then among the parts of philosophy there must be a first part. (1) Now that part which is concerned with sensible substance is first in the order of instruction, because any branch of learning must start with things which are better known to us. He treats of this part in Books VII (1300) and VIII of this work. (2) But that part which has to do with immaterial substance is prior both in dignity and in the aim of this science. This part is treated in Book XII (2488) of this work. Yet whatever parts are first must be continuous with the others, because all parts have unity and being as their genus. Hence all parts of this science are united in the study of being and unity, although they are about different parts of substance. Thus it is one science inasmuch as the foregoing parts are things which correspond to “these,”i.e., to unity and being, as common attributes of substance. In this respect the philosopher resembles the mathematician; for mathematical science has different parts, one of which is primary, as arithmetic, another secondary, as geometry, and others following these in order, as optics, astronomy and music.