Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber7/lect13

Lecture 13

Latin	English
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 1 Postquam determinavit philosophus de substantia secundum quod substantia dicitur quod quid est, hic determinat de substantia secundum quod universale a quibusdam dicitur substantia; et circa hoc duo facit. Primo continuat se ad praecedentia. Secundo prosequitur suam intentionem, ibi, videtur autem impossibile. Dicit ergo primo, quod quia in ista scientia est principalis perscrutatio de substantia, oportet iterum redire ad divisionem substantiae, ut videatur quid est dictum, et quid restat dicendum. Dicitur autem substantia, ut ex praedictis patet, id quod est tamquam subiectum, scilicet materia, quae se habet ad formam substantialem sicut subiectum, quod est substantia completa, ad formam accidentalem. Et alio modo dicitur substantia quod quid erat esse, quod pertinet ad formam. Tertio modo dicitur substantia quod ex his, idest compositum ex materia et forma. Et quarto modo dicitur substantia a quibusdam universale.	1566. Having settled the issue about substance in the sense of quiddity, the Philosopher now comes to certain conclusions about substance insofar as the universal is considered by some thinkers to be a substance; and in regard to this he does two things. First (650)C 1566), he links up this discussion with the preceding one. Second (651:C 1569), he carries out his plan (“For it seems”). He therefore says, first (650), that since this science is chiefly concerned with the study of substance, we must return again to the division of substance in order to see what has been said and what remains to be said. Now it is clear from the preceding discussion that substance has the following meanings. First, it means what has the nature “of a subject,” namely, matter, which is related to substantial form in the same way as a subject, which is a complete substance, is related to accidental form; second, it means the essence of a thing, which refers to its form; third, it means “the composite of these,” i.e., the composite of matter and form; and fourth, it means the universal, according to some thinkers.
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 2 Haec autem divisio substantiae hic posita in idem redit cum divisione posita in principio huius septimi, licet videatur esse diversa. Ibi enim posuit quatuor: scilicet subiectum, quod quid erat esse, et universale, et genus: et subiectum divisit in tria: scilicet in materiam et formam et compositum. Et, quia iam manifestum est quod quod quid erat esse se tenet ex parte formae, ponit quod quid erat esse, loco formae. Item, quia genus commune eadem ratione ponitur substantia qua et universale, ut ostendetur, concludit utrumque sub uno modo: et sic remanent tantum quatuor modi, qui hic ponuntur.	1567. Now the division of substance given here is the same as that given at the beginning of Book VII (568)C 1270), although it seems to differ; for there he gave four senses of substance: the subject, the essence, the universal and the genus. And he divided subject into three meanings: matter, form, and the composite. And since it has already been made clear that essence derives from form, he puts essence in place of form; and again since a common genus is said to be substance on the same grounds as a universal is, as will be shown, he concludes that both belong in the same class; and thus there remain only the four senses in which substance is spoken of here.
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 3 De duobus ergo istorum modorum dictum est. Dictum est enim de quod quid erat esse, et iterum de subiecto, quod dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo sicut id quod est aliquid, et ens actu, sicut animal subiicitur suis passionibus, et quaecumque substantia particularis suis accidentibus. Alio modo sicut materia prima subiicitur actui, idest formae substantiali. De his autem dictum est, ubi ostensum est quomodo partes materiae pertineant ad speciem vel ad individuum. Sed quia non solum materia et quod quid est videntur esse causae, sed etiam universale quibusdam, scilicet Platonicis, videtur maxime esse causa et principium, ideo de hoc, scilicet universali, tractabimus in hoc eodem septimo. De substantiis autem compositis et sensibilibus tractabitur in octavo; quarum ea, quae in hoc septimo tractantur, sunt quasi principia.	1568. Two of these, then, have been discussed already; for essence has been treated (576)C 1299) and also the subject (568:C 1270), which is taken in two senses. For, first, it means a particular thing and an actual being, as animal is the subject of its predicates, and as any particular substance is the subject of its accidents. Second, it means primary matter, which is “the subject of actuality,” i.e., of substantial form. These things were discussed where it was shown (629:C 1501) how the parts of matter pertain to the form and to the individual. But since not only the matter and the quiddity seem to be causes, but also the universal, because “according to some thinkers,” i.e., the Platonists, this seems to be in the fullest sense a cause and principle, we will therefore -treat “of this,” i.e., the universal, in this same seventh book. And in Book VIII (691:C 1681) we will treat of composite and sensible substances, to which the things treated in this seventh book are related as principles.
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit videtur enim incipit inquirere utrum universalia sint substantiae: et dividitur in duas partes. In prima ostendit quod universalia non sunt substantiae, sicut quidam posuerunt. Secundo ostendit quantum ad quid recte dixerunt hoc ponentes, et quantum ad quid erraverunt, ibi, sed species dicentes hic quidem dicunt recte. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit in communi quod universalia non sunt substantiae. Secundo specialiter de uno et ente, quae maxime ponebantur esse substantiae rerum, ibi, quoniam vero unum dicitur. Prima dividitur in duas. In prima ostendit, quod universalia non sunt substantiae. In secunda, quod non sunt separata, ibi, manifestum autem ex his. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit universalia non esse substantias ex ea parte qua universalia praedicantur de multis. Secundo ex ea parte qua species ex universalibus componuntur, sicut ex partibus definitionis, ibi, amplius autem et impossibile et inconveniens. Dixerat enim superius in quinto, quod genus quodammodo est totum, inquantum praedicatur de pluribus, et quodammodo est pars, inquantum ex genere et differentia constituitur species. Circa primum duo facit. Primo enim ostendit, quod universale non est substantia, cum de pluribus praedicetur. Secundo excludit quamdam cavillosam responsionem, ibi, sed an sic quidem non contingit.	1569. For it seems (651). Here he begins to investigate whether universals are substances, and this is divided into two parts. In the first (651) he shows that universals are not substances, as some thinkers claimed. In the second (681:C 1642) he shows to what extent the statements of those making this claim are true and to what extent they are false (“But those who”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows in a general way that universals are not substances. Second (678:C 1637), he shows this in a special way with regard to being and unity, which were assumed to be the substances of thinars in the highest degree (“And since”). The first is divided into two parts. In the first he shows that universals are not substances; and in the second (659:C 1592), he shows that they are not separate entities (“And from these”). in regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that universals cannot be substances on the grounds that they are predicated of many things; and second (654:C 1579), on the grounds that species are composed of universals as parts of their definition (“Furthermore, it is”). For he had said above, in Book V (524:C 1119), that in one sense a genus is a whole inasmuch as it is predicated of several things, and in another sense it is a part inasmuch as a species is composed of a genus and a difference. In regard to the first he does two things. First, he shows that a universal is not a substance on the grounds that it is predicated of many things. Second (653:C 1577), he rejects a captious answer (“But while a universal”).
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 5 Sciendum est autem, ad evidentiam huius capituli, quod universale dupliciter potest accipi. Uno modo pro ipsa natura, cui intellectus attribuit intentionem universalitatis: et sic universalia, ut genera et species, substantias rerum significant, ut praedicantur in quid. Animal enim significat substantiam eius, de quo praedicatur, et homo similiter. Alio modo potest accipi universale inquantum est universale, et secundum quod natura praedicta subest intentioni universalitatis: idest secundum quod consideratur animal vel homo, ut unum in multis. Et sic posuerunt Platonici animal et hominem in sua universalitate esse substantias.	1570. For the clarification of this chapter it must be noted that the term universal can be taken in two senses. First, it can be taken to mean the nature of the thing to which the intellect attributes the aspect of universality, and in this sense universals such as genera and species signify the substances of things inasmuch as they are predicated quidditatively; for animal signifies the substance of the thing of which it is predicated, and so also does man. Second, a universal can be taken insofar as it is universal, and insofar as the nature predicated of a thing falls under the aspect of universality, i.e., insofar as animal or man is considered as a one-in-many. And in this sense the Platonists claimed that animal and man in their universal aspect constitute substances.
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 6 Quod Aristoteles in hoc capitulo intendit reprobare, ostendens quod animal commune vel homo communis non est aliqua substantia in rerum natura. Sed hanc communitatem habet forma animalis vel hominis secundum quod est in intellectu, qui unam formam accipit ut multis communem, inquantum abstrahit eam ab omnibus individuantibus. Ponit ergo ad propositum duas rationes.	1571. This is what Aristotle aims to disprove in this chapter by showing that animal in general or man in general is not a substance in reality, but that the form animal or man takes on this generality insofar as it exists in the mind, which understands one form as common to many inasmuch as it abstracts it from all individuating principles. Hence in support of his thesis he gives two arguments.
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 7 Circa quarum primam dicit, quod videtur ex sequentibus rationibus impossibile esse, quodcumque eorum, quae universaliter praedicantur, esse substantiam, secundum scilicet quod in sua universalitate accipitur. Quod primo probatur ex hoc, quod substantia uniuscuiusque, est propria ei, et non inest alii. Sed universale est commune multis, hoc enim dicitur universale, quod natum est multis inesse et de multis praedicari. Si ergo universale est substantia, oportet quod sit alicuius substantia. Cuius ergo substantia erit? Aut enim oportet quod sit substantia omnium, quibus inest, aut unius. Non est autem possibile quod sit substantia omnium: quia unum non potest esse substantia pluribus. Plura enim sunt quorum substantiae sunt plures et diversae.	1572. Concerning the first of these (651) he says that in the light of the succeeding arguments it seems impossible that any one of those attributes which are predicated universally should be a substance, i.e., insofar as it is taken in its universality. This is proved, first, by the fact that while the substance of each thing is proper to each and does not belong to something else, a universal is common to many; for that is said to be universal which belongs by nature to many things and is predicated of many. Hence, if a universal is substance it must be the substance of some thing. Of what thing, then, will it be the substance? For it must either be the substance of all the things to which it belongs or of one. But it is impossible for it to be the substance of all things, because one thing cannot be the substance of many, since those things are many whose substances are many and distinct.
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 8 Sed si dicatur, quod sit substantia unius eorum quibus inest, sequetur quod omnia alia, quibus inest, sint illud unum, quibus ponitur esse substantia. Oportet enim quod pari ratione, eorum etiam sit substantia, cum et eis similiter insit. Quorum autem substantia est una, et quod quid erat esse unum, oportet et ipsa esse unum. Relinquitur ergo, quod ex quo universale non potest esse substantia omnium, de quibus dicitur, nec unius alicuius, quod nullius sit substantia.	1573. But if it is held to be the substance of one of the things in which it is found, it follows that all other things in which it is found, and of which it is held to be the substance, are that one thing; because it must also be their substance for the same reason, since it is found in all in the same way. Now those things of which the substance and essence are one must also be one themselves. Hence, since a universal cannot be the substance of all the things of which it is predicated or of any one of them, it follows that it is not the substance of anything.
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 9 Sciendum autem quod ideo dicit quod universale est quod natum est pluribus inesse, non autem quod pluribus inest; quia quaedam universalia sunt quae non continent sub se nisi unum singulare, sicut sol et luna. Sed hoc non est quin ipsa natura speciei quantum est de se sit nata esse in pluribus; sed est aliquid aliud prohibens, sicut quod tota materia speciei comprehendatur in uno individuo, et quod non est necessarium multiplicari secundum numerum speciem, quae in uno individuo potest esse perpetua.	1574. Now it should be noted that he describes a universal as what is naturally disposed to exist in many, and not as what exists in many; because there are some universals which contain under themselves only one singular thing, for example, sun and moon. But this is not to be understood in the sense that the very nature of the species, considered in itself, is not naturally disposed to exist in many things; but there is something else which prevents this, as the fact that all the matter of the species is included in one individual, and the fact that it is not necessary that a species which can last forever in a single individual should be numerically many.
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 10 Secundam rationem ponit ibi, amplius substantia dicit quod substantia dicitur, quae non est de subiecto: et dicitur universale semper de aliquo subiecto: ergo universale non est substantia. Videtur autem ratio haec non valere. Dictum est enim in praedicamentis, quod de ratione substantiae est, quod non sit in subiecto. Praedicari vero de subiecto non est contra rationem substantiae. Unde ponuntur ibi secundae substantiae quae praedicantur de subiecto.	1575. Furthermore, substance (652). Here he gives his second reason. He says that substance refers to something which is not predicated of a subject. But a universal is something which is always predicated of some subject. Therefore a universal is not a substance. But this argument seems not to be cogent, for it is said in the Categories ‘ that it belongs to the notion of substance not to exist in a subject. But to be predicated of a subject is not opposed to the notion of substance. Hence in that place second substances are posited, and these are predicated of a subject.
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 11 Sed dicendum quod secundum logicam considerationem loquitur philosophus in praedicamentis. Logicus autem considerat res secundum quod sunt in ratione; et ideo considerat substantias prout secundum acceptionem intellectus subsunt intentioni universalitatis. Et ideo quantum ad praedicationem, quae est actus rationis, dicit quod praedicatur de subiecto, idest de substantia subsistente extra animam. Sed philosophus primus considerat de rebus secundum quod sunt entia; et ideo apud eius considerationem non differt esse in subiecto et de subiecto. Hic enim accipit dici de subiecto, quod est in se aliqua res et inest alicui subiecto existenti in actu. Et hoc impossibile est esse substantiam. Sic enim haberet esse in subiecto. Quod est contra rationem substantiae: quod etiam in praedicamentis est habitum.	1576. But it must be said that in the Categories the Philosopher is speaking from the viewpoint of logic. Now a logician considers things insofar as they exist in the mind, and therefore he considers substances insofar as they take on the character of universality from the way in which the intellect understands them. Hence in reference to predicating, which is an act of reason, he says that substance is predicated “of a subject,” i.e., of a substance subsisting outside of the mind. But the first philosopher considers things insofar as they are beings, and therefore in his view of the matter there is no difference between existing in a subject and being predicated of a subject. For he takes something to be predicated of a subject which is something in itself and belongs to some actually existing subject. And it is impossible that this be a substance, for then it would have to exist in a subject. But this is contrary to the notion of substance, as is also stated in the Categories.
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit sed an sic quidem excludit quamdam cavillosam responsionem, qua posset aliquis obviare primae rationi, in qua dixerat, quod omnia sunt unum, quorum substantia et quod quid est sunt unum. Posset enim aliquis dicere, quod universale non est sicut substantia, ut quod quid erat esse, quod quidem sit proprium uni. Et ideo ad hoc excludendum philosophus dicit sed an. Potest dici obviando rationi primo inductae, quod non contingit universale esse substantiam, sicut quod quid erat esse est substantia; sed tantum est substantia in ipsis particularibus existens, sicut animal in homine et equo. Non enim ita est natura animalis in homine, quod sit propria ei, cum sit etiam equi. Quasi dicat, non potest sic responderi.	1577. But while a universal (653). Here he rejects the captious answer by which someone might oppose his first argument, in which he had said that all things are one whose substance and quiddity are one. For someone might say that a universal is not a substance in the sense of the essence of a thing, which is proper to one thing. Therefore with a view to rejecting this the Philosopher says “But while” it might be said, in opposition to the first argument introduced, that it is impossible for a universal to be a substance in the way in which an essence is, it is substance only as something existing in these particular things, as animal exists in man anti in horse. For the nature of animal is not found in man in such a way that it is proper to him, because it is also found in horse—as if to say that the argument cannot be answered in this way.
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 13 Sequitur enim, si hoc quod est animal commune, sit substantia, quod huius substantiae sit aliqua ratio. Nec differt ad propositum si non est ratio definitiva omnium quae sunt in substantia, idest quae ponuntur in definitione, ne in infinitum procedatur in definitionibus, sed oportet omnes partes cuiuslibet definitionis iterum definiri. Nihil enim minus illa substantia oportet quod sit alicuius, licet non habeat definitionem, quam si haberet. Sicut si dicamus, quod licet hoc ipsum, quod est homo communis, non habeat definitionem, tamen oportet quod sit hominis substantia in quo existit, ipsius scilicet hominis communis. Quare idem accidit quod et prius; quia oportebit quod ista substantia communis, licet non ponatur propria alicui inferiorum, tamen erit propria illius substantiae communis in qua prima existit. Sicut si animal commune sit quaedam substantia, animal per prius praedicabitur de illa communi substantia, et significabit eius substantiam propriam, sive sit definibile, sive non. Unde non poterit, ex quo haec substantia est propria uni, de multis praedicari.	1578. For if animal in common is a substance, it follows that there is an intelligible expression of this substance. And it makes no difference to his thesis if there is no definitive expression of all those things “which are present in substance,” i.e., which are given in the definition, test there be an infinite regress in definitions, but all parts of any definition must be further defined. For this substance must be the substance of something, even though it does not have a definition, no less than if it has. Thus we might say that, although man in common does not have a definition, it must nevertheless be the substance of the man in whom it is present, namely, of man in common. Hence the same conclusion follows as before, because, even though this common substance is not held to be proper to any one of its inferiors, it must still be proper to that common substance in which it is first found. For example, if animal in common is a substance, animal will be predicated primarily of that common substance and will signify its proper substance, whether it be definable or not. Hence, since this substance is proper to one thing, it will be impossible for it to be predicated of many things.
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 14 Deinde cum dicit amplius autem ostendit, quod universale non est substantia, accipiendo rationes ex ea parte, qua universale est pars definitionis et essentiae. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit rationes ad propositum. Secundo excludit quamdam dubitationem, ibi, habet autem quod accidit dubitationem. Circa primum ponit quatuor rationes. Quarum primam ponit dicens, quod impossibile et inconveniens est, id quod est hoc aliquid et substantia, non esse ex substantiis, nec ex his quae sunt hoc aliquid, sed ex his quae significant quale, si tamen est ex aliquibus. Quod dicit propter substantias simplices. Sequitur enim, quod cum ea, ex quibus est aliquid, sint priora, quod prius sit id quod est non substantia, sed quale, eo quod est substantia, et eo quod est hoc aliquid. Quod est impossibile: quia impossibile est passiones et qualitates et accidentia esse priores substantia ratione, aut tempore, aut generatione.	1579. Furthermore, it is (654). He now shows that the universal is not a substance by basing his arguments on the grounds that the universal is part of the definition and essence. In regard to this he does two things. First (654:C 1579), he gives the arguments in support of his thesis. Second (658:C 1590), he disposes of a difficulty (“But the result”). In regard to the first part he gives four arguments. First, he says that it is both impossible and untenable that a particular thing and a substance should not be composed of substances or particular things but of those things which signify quality—if it is composed of anything (which he adds to allow for simple substances). For since those parts of which a thing is composed are prior to it, it follows that what is not substance but quality is prior both to substance and to this particular thing. But this is impossible, because it is impossible for modifications and qualities and accidents to be prior to substance either in intelligibility or in time or in generation.
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 15 Quod enim non sint priores ratione, supra ostensum est, ex eo quod substantia ponitur in definitione accidentium et non e converso. Item quod non sint priores tempore, ex hoc supra probatum est, ex quo etiam hic probatur, quia sequeretur quod passiones essent separabiles a substantiis, quod est impossibile. Esse autem prius generatione continetur sub eo quod est prius tempore. Omne enim quod est prius generatione, est etiam prius tempore, licet non e converso. Ea enim, quae non habent ordinem ad generationem alicuius, licet sint priora tempore, non tamen sunt priora generatione: sicuti equus non est prior generatione leone, qui nunc est, licet sit prior tempore. Partes autem ex quibus aliquid constituitur, sunt priores generatione, et per consequens tempore, et quandoque etiam ratione, sicut supra ostensum est. Unde impossibile est quod ex non substantiis componatur substantia. Universalia autem significant non substantiam et hoc aliquid, sed significant quale quid, ut in praedicamentis dicitur de secundis substantiis. Ergo patet quod ex universalibus, si sunt quaedam res praeter singularia, non possunt componi singularia, quae sunt hoc aliquid.	1580. For it has been shown above (563)C 1253) that they are not prior in intelligibility, because substance is given in the definition of accidents, and not the reverse. And from this it has also been proved above (563:C 1257) that they are not prior in time. From this in turn he further proves here that it would follow that attributes would be capable of existing apart from substances; and this is impossible. And priority in generation comes under priority in time, although the reverse is not true. For even though things which are not related to the generation of something are prior in time, they are’ still not prior in generation; for example, a horse is not prior in generation to a lion which exists at this moment, even though it is prior to it in time. However, the parts of which a thing is composed are prior in the process of generation and therefore in time, and sometimes also in intelligibility, as was shown above (570:C 1278). Hence it is impossible that substances should be composed of things which are not substances. But universals do not signify particular things, but of what sort things are, as was said about second substances in the Categories. It is evident, then, that singular things, which are particulars, cannot be composed of universals if these are some kind of things which exist apart from singulars.
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 16 Sed videtur quod haec ratio inconvenienter procedat. Secundae enim substantiae, quae sunt genera et species in genere substantiae, etsi non significent hoc aliquid, sed quale, non tamen significant hoc modo quale, sicut passiones, quae significant qualitatem accidentalem, sed significant qualitatem substantialem. Ipse autem procedit hic ac si significarent qualitatem accidentalem.	1581. But it seems that this argument is not a satisfactory one; for even though second substances, which are genera and species in the genus of substance, do not signify particular things but of what sort things are, nevertheless they do not signify of what sort things are in the same way in which attributes that signify accidental quality do, but they signify substantial quality. However, he argues here as if they signified accidental quality.
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 17 Sed dicendum est quod, si universalia sint res quaedam, sicut Platonici ponebant, oportebit dicere, quod non solum qualitatem substantialem, sed accidentalem significent. Omnis enim qualitas quae est alia res ab eo cuius est qualitas, est accidentalis. Sicut albedo est alia res a corpore cuius est qualitas, et est in eo cuius est qualitas sicut in subiecto; et ideo est accidens. Si ergo universalia, inquantum universalia sunt, sint res quaedam, oportebit quod sint aliae res a singularibus, quae non sunt universalia. Et ideo, si significant qualitatem eorum, oportet quod insint eis sicut substantiis. Et per consequens quod significent qualitatem accidentalem.	1582. But it must be said that if universals are things, as the Platonists claimed, we shall have to say that they signify not only substantial quality but also accidental quality; for every quality which is distinct from the thing of which it is the quality, is accidental. For example, whiteness differs from the body of which it is a quality, and it inheres in the body of which it is the quality as its subject; and therefore it is an accident. Hence, if universals as universals are things, they must be distinct from singulars, which are not universals. Therefore, if they signify the quality of those things, they must inhere in them as in substances and thus must signify accidental quality.
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 18 Sed ponentibus quod genera et species non sunt aliquae res vel naturae aliae a singularibus, sed ipsamet singularia, sicut quod non est homo qui non sit hic homo, non sequitur quod secundae substantiae significent accidens vel passionem.	1583. However, for those who claim that genera and species are not things or natures distinct from singulars but are the singular things themselves (for example, that there is no man who is not this man), it does not follow that second substance signifies an accident or modification.
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 19 Secundam rationem ponit ibi, amplius Socrati. Dicit, quod si universalia sunt substantiae, sequitur quod Socrati inerit substantiae substantia. Si enim omnia universalia sunt substantiae; sicut homo est substantia Socratis, ita animal erit substantia hominis. Et ita istae duae substantiae, una quae est homo, et alia quae est animal, erunt in Socrate. Et hoc est quod concludit: quare duorum erit substantia, idest: quare sequitur, quod hoc quod dico animal, sit substantia non solum hominis, sed etiam Socratis. Et ita una substantia erit in duobus; cum tamen supra ostensum sit, quod una substantia non est nisi unius.	1584. Furthermore, Socrates (655). He gives the second argument. He says that if universals are substances, it follows that Socrates will have a substance in his substance; for if all universals are substances, then just as man is the substance of Socrates, in a similar fashion animal will be the substance of man; and thus these two substances, one of which is man and the other animal, will exist in Socrates. His conclusion is “and therefore it will be the substance of two things,” i.e., it therefore follows that animal is the substance not only of man but also of Socrates. Hence one substance will belong to two things. Yet it has been shown above that one thing has only one substance.
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 20 Et non solum in Socrate hoc accidit quod dictum est, sed totaliter in omnibus accidit, si homo et alia quae sic dicuntur sicut species, sint substantiae, et quod nihil eorum quae ponuntur in ratione specierum sit substantia, neque quod possit esse sine illis, in quorum definitione ponuntur, vel quod sint in aliquo alio, aut quod sit ipsummet aliud. Sicut quod non erit quoddam animal praeter aliqua animalia, idest praeter species animalis. Et similiter est de omnibus aliis quae ponuntur in definitionibus, sive sint genera, sive differentiae. Et hoc ideo, quia, cum species sint substantiae, si ea etiam quae in definitionibus specierum ponuntur sint substantiae, in singularibus erunt plures substantiae, et una substantia erit plurium, ut de Socrate dictum est. Patet igitur ex dictis, quod nullum universale est substantia; et nullum eorum quae communiter praedicantur, significat hoc aliquid, sed quale.	1585. And the result mentioned applies not only in the case of Socrates but universally in all cases. For if man and the other things which are called species in this way are substances, it also follows that no one of the parts in the intelligible structure of a species is substance, and that it cannot exist without the species in whose definitions it is given or exist in anything else; just as there is no animal “apart from particular animals,” i.e., apart from the species of animal. And the same thing applies to all other predicates which are given in definitions, whether they are genera or differences. And this is true because, if those parts which are given in the definitions of species are substances, then since species are substances there will be many substances in singular things, and many things will have one substance; as was said about Socrates. From what has been said, then, it is evident that no universal is a substance, and that common predicates do not signify a particular thing but of what sort a thing is.
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 21 Tertiam rationem ponit ibi, si autem. Dicit, quod si praedicta conclusio non concedatur, accident multa inconvenientia: inter quae erit unum, quod oportebit ponere tertium hominem. Quod quidem potest exponi dupliciter. Uno modo ut praeter duos homines singulares, qui sunt Socrates et Plato, sit tertius homo, qui est communis. Quod quidem non est inconveniens secundum ponentes ideas, licet secundum rectam rationem inconveniens videatur.	1586. And if this (656). Then he gives the third argument. He says that, if the preceding conclusion is not admitted, many absurdities will follow, and one of these will be the need to posit a third man. This can be explained in two ways. First, it can mean that besides the two singular men, Socrates and Plato, there is a third man, who is common to both. This is not absurd according to those who posit Ideas, although it seems absurd from the viewpoint of right reason.
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 22 Alio modo, ut praeter hominem singularem et communem, ponatur tertius, cum communicent in nomine et ratione, sicut et duo homines singulares, praeter quos ponitur tertius homo communis, et ob hanc causam, scilicet quia communicant in nomine et definitione.	1587. Second, it can be explained as meaning that there is posited a third man besides a singular man and man in common, since they have a common name and intelligible expression, just as do two singular men in addition to whom a third common man is posited; and the reason is that they have a common name and definition.
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 23 Quartam rationem ponit ibi amplius autem. Dicit, quod universalia non sunt substantiae secundum hanc rationem. Impossibile est enim aliquam substantiam esse ex pluribus substantiis, quae sunt in ea actu. Duo enim, quae sunt in actu, nunquam sunt unum actu; sed duo, quae sunt in potentia, sunt unum actu, sicut patet in partibus continui. Duo enim dimidia unius lineae sunt in potentia in ipsa linea dupla, quae est una in actu. Et hoc ideo, quia actus habet virtutem separandi et dividendi. Unumquodque enim dividitur ab altero per propriam formam. Unde ad hoc quod aliqua fiant unum actu, oportet quod omnia concludantur sub una forma, et quod non habeant singula singulas formas, per quas sint actu. Quare patet, quod si substantia particularis est una, non erit ex substantiis in ea existentibus actu; et sic, si est ex universalibus, universalia non erunt substantiae.	1588. Furthermore, it is (657). He gives the fourth argument. He says that universals are not substances for this reason that it is impossible that a substance should be composed of many substances actually present in it; for two actual things are never one actual thing, but two which are in potentiality are one actually, as is clear of the parts of a continuous quantity. The two halves of one line, for instance, exist potentially in the whole line, which is one actually. And this is because actuality has the power of separating and distinguishing; for one thing is distinguished from another by its proper form. Hence in order that many things may become one actual thing, it is necessary that all should be included under one form, and that each one should not have its own form by which it would exist in act. Hence it is evident that if a particular substance is one, it will not be composed of substances actually present in it; and thus if it is composed of universals, universals will not be substances.
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 24 Et secundum hunc modum Democritus recte dicit, quod impossibile est unum fieri ex duobus, et ex uno fieri duo. Est enim intelligendum, quod duo in actu existentia, nunquam faciunt unum. Sed ipse non distinguens inter potentiam et actum, posuit magnitudines indivisibiles esse substantias. Voluit enim, quod sicut in eo quod est unum, non sunt multa in actu, ita nec in potentia. Et sic quaelibet magnitudo est indivisibilis. Vel aliter. Recte, inquam, dixit Democritus, supposita sua positione, qua ponebat magnitudines indivisibiles esse etiam rerum substantias, et sic esse semper in actu, et ita ex eis non fieri unum. Et sicut est in magnitudinibus, ita est in numero, si numerus est compositio unitatum, sicut a quibusdam dicitur. Oportet enim quod vel dualitas non sit unum quid, sive quicumque alius numerus; sive quod unitas non sit actu in ea. Et sic dualitas non erunt duae unitates, sed aliquid ex duabus unitatibus compositum. Aliter numerus non esset unum per se et vere, sed per accidens, sicut quae coacervantur.	1589. And in this sense Democritus is right when he says that it is impossible for one thing to be produced from two, and two from one; for it must be borne in mind that two actual existents never make one. But in failing to distinguish between the potential and the actual, he claimed that indivisible continuous quantities are substances; for he thought that, just as one thing does not contain many things actually, neither does it contain them potentially; and thus any continuous quantity is indivisible. Or this might be explained differently. I mean that Democritus was right if we assume his own position to be true, in which he claimed that indivisible quantities are the substances of things and thus are always actual, and in this way no one thing is produced from them. And just as this is true in the case of continuous quantities, in a similar way it is true in the case of numbers, if number is composed of units, as some thinkers claimed. For either the number two (or any other number) is not one thing, or the unit is not actually present in it. Thus the number two will not be two units, but something composed of units; otherwise a number would not be a unity, essentially and properly, but only accidentally, like a heap.
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 25 Deinde cum dicit habet autem movet dubitationem circa praedicta; dicens, quod id, quod accidit ex praedictis, habet dubitationem. Dictum est enim, quod ex universalibus non potest esse aliqua substantia, propter hoc quod universale non significat hoc aliquid, sed quale. Secundo dictum est, quod ex substantiis in actu non potest esse aliqua substantia. Et sic videtur sequi, quod substantia non potest componi neque ex substantiis: ergo sequitur quod omnis substantia sit incomposita. Et ita, cum definitiones non dentur de substantiis incompositis (quod patet per hoc quod definitio est ratio habens partes, ut supra dictum est), sequitur, quod nullius substantiae sit definitio. Sed omnibus videtur, ut supra ostensum est, quod definitio, vel est solum substantiae, vel eius maxime. Nunc autem conclusum est, quod substantiae non sit definitio: ergo sequitur quod nullius sit definitio.	1590. But the result (658). He poses a difficulty about the above answer. He says that the result of the foregoing discussion gives rise to a difficulty; for first (as was said), a substance cannot be composed of universals, because a universal does not signify a particular thing but of what sort a thing is; and second, a substance cannot be composed of actual substances; and thus it seems to follow that substances cannot be composed or made up of substances. It follows, then, that all substances lack composition. And thus, since no definitions are given of substances which lack composition (and this is clear from the fact that the definition is an intelligible expression having parts, as was shown above [[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l7#jp622|622]]:C 1460]), it follows that no substance has a definition. But it seems to everyone, as was shown above (582:C 1331), that a definition is either of substance alone or chiefly of substance, and it has now been concluded that there is no definition of substance; hence it follows that there is no definition of anything.
lib. 7 l. 13 n. 26 Dicendum est autem ad praedictam dubitationem, quod quodam modo substantia est ex substantiis, quodam modo non. Hoc autem erit manifestum magis ex posterioribus in hoc capitulo, et in octavo. Est enim ex substantiis in potentia, sed non in actu.	1591. Now the answer to the above difficulty is that in one sense substance is composed of substances and in another it is not. But this will become clearer from the following discussions in this book (669)C 1606) and in Book VIII; for substance is composed of potential substances, not of actual ones.