Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber7/lect2

Lecture 2

Latin	English
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 1 Postquam ostendit, quod principalis intentio huius scientiae est considerare de substantia, hic incipit de substantia determinare; et dividitur haec pars in duas. In prima ostendit modum et ordinem tractandi de substantia. In secunda prosequitur tractatum substantiae, ibi, et primo dicemus quaedam de eo. Modum autem et ordinem tractandi de substantia ostendit dividendo substantias in suas partes; et docendo de qua partium eius primo et principalius est determinandum, et quae partium ipsius praetermittendae sunt, et quae prius vel posterius considerandae. Unde dividitur prima pars in partes tres, secundum divisiones et subdivisiones, quas ponit de substantia. Secunda incipit ibi, tale vero modo quodam. Tertia vero incipit ibi, confitentur autem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod substantia ad minus dicitur quatuor modis, si non dicatur multiplicius, idest pluribus modis. Sunt enim plures modi, quibus aliqui substantiam nominant; ut patet de dicentibus terminos corporis esse substantias, qui modus hic praetermittitur. Quorum quidem modorum primus est secundum quod quod quid erat esse, idest quidditas, vel essentia, sive natura rei dicitur eius substantia.	1270. Having shown that the chief aim of this science is to study substance, he now begins to establish the truth about substance. This part is divided into two members. In the first (1270) he explains the method and order to be followed in treating of substance. In the second (1306), he goes ahead with his treatment of substance (“And first let us make”). He explains the method and order to be followed in treating of substance by distinguishing its different senses; and by explaining which of these senses must be dealt with primarily and principally, which of them must be omitted, and which must be considered to be prior or subsequent. Hence the first part is divided into three members, according to the divisions and subdivisions of substance which he gives. This second part (1276) begins where he says, “Now in one sense.” The third (1297) begins where he says, “Now some.” Accordingly he says, first, that the term substance is used at least of four things, if not “of more,” i.e., in more senses. For there are several senses in which some speak of substance, as is clear in the case of those who said that the limits of bodies are substances, which sense he dismisses here. (1) Now the first of these senses is that in which a thing’s essence, i.e., its quiddity, essential structure, or nature, is called its substance.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 2 Secundus modus est prout universale dicitur substantia esse, secundum opinionem ponentium ideas species, quae sunt universalia de singularibus praedicata, et sunt horum particularium substantiae.	1271. (2) The second sense is that in which “the universal” is called the substance of a thing, according to the opinion of those who maintain that the Ideas are separate Forms, which are the universals predicated of particular things and the substances of these particular things.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 3 Tertius modus est secundum quod primum genus videtur esse substantia uniuscuiusque. Et per hunc modum unum et ens ponebant substantias esse omnium rerum, tanquam prima omnium genera.	1272. (3) The third sense is that in which “the first genus seems to be the substance of each thing”; and in this sense they claim that unity and being are the substances of all things and their first genera.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 4 Quartus modus est secundum quod subiectum, idest substantia particularis dicitur esse substantia. Dicitur autem subiectum de quo alia dicuntur, vel sicut superiora de inferioribus, ut genera et species et differentiae; vel sicut accidens praedicatur de subiecto, ut accidentia communia et propria; sicut de Socrate praedicatur homo, animal, rationabile, risibile et album; ipsum autem subiectum non praedicatur de alio. Quod est intelligendum per se. Per accidens enim nihil prohibet Socratem de hoc albo praedicari, vel de animali, vel de homine; quia id, cui inest album, aut animal, aut homo, Socrates est. De seipso autem praedicatur per se, cum dicitur, Socrates est Socrates. Patet autem, quod subiectum hic dicitur, quod in praedicamentis nominatur substantia prima, ex hoc, quod eadem definitio datur de subiecto hic, et ibi de substantia prima.	1273. (4) The fourth sense is that in which “the subject,” i.e., a particular substance, is called a substance. Now a subject means that of which other things are predicated, either as superiors are predicated of inferiors, for example, genera, species and differences; or as common and proper accidents are predicated of a subject, for example, as man, animal, rational, capable of laughter and white are predicated of Socrates. However, a subject is not itself predicated of anything else, and this must be understood essentially. For nothing prevents Socrates from being predicated accidentally of this white thing or of animal or of man, because Socrates is the thing of which white or animal or man is an accident. For it is evident that the subject which is spoken of here is what is called first substance in the Categories, for the definition of subject given here and that of first substance given there are the same.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 5 Unde concludit quod determinandum est de hoc, idest de subiecto vel de substantia prima, quia tale subiectum maxime videtur substantia esse. Unde in praedicamentis dicitur quod talis substantia est quae proprie et principaliter et maxime dicitur. Huiusmodi enim secundum se omnibus aliis substant, scilicet speciebus et generibus et accidentibus. Substantiae vero secundae, idest genera et species, substant solis accidentibus. Et hoc etiam non habent nisi ratione primarum. Homo enim est albus inquantum hic homo est albus.	1274. Hence he concludes that it is necessary to establish the truth “about this,” i.e., about this subject or first substance, because such a subject seems in the truest sense to be substance. Therefore in the Categories it is said that such substance is said to be substance properly, principally and chiefly. For substances of this kind are by their very nature the subjects of all other things, namely, of species, genera and accidents; whereas second substance, i.e., genera and species, are the subjects of accidents alone. And they also have this nature only by reason of these first substances; for man is white inasmuch as this man is white.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 6 Unde patet quod fere eadem est divisio substantiae hic posita, cum illa quae ponitur in praedicamentis. Nam per subiectum intelligitur hic substantia prima. Quod autem dixit genus et universale, quod videtur ad genus et species pertinere, continetur sub substantiis secundis. Hoc autem quod quid erat esse hic ponitur, sed ibi praetermittitur, quia non cadit in praedicamentorum ordine nisi sicut principium. Neque enim est genus neque species neque individuum, sed horum omnium formale principium.	1275. Hence it is evident that the division of substance given here is almost the same as that given in the Categories, for by subject here is understood first substance. And what he called the genus and the universal, which seem to pertain to genus and species, are contained under second substances. However, the essence, which is given here, is omitted in that work, because it belongs in the predicamental order only as a principle; for it is neither a (~) genus nor a (~) species nor (~) an individual thing, but is (+) the formal principle of all these things.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit tale vero subdividit quartum modum praemissae divisionis; hoc scilicet quod dixerat subiectum: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo namque ponit divisionem. Secundo comparat partes divisionis adinvicem, ibi, quare si species et cetera. Tertio ostendit quomodo de istis partibus divisionis sit agendum, ibi, attamen eam quae nunc ex ambobus et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod subiectum, quod est prima substantia particularis, in tria dividitur; scilicet in materiam, et formam, et compositum ex eis. Quae quidem divisio non est generis in species, sed alicuius analogice praedicati, quod de eis, quae sub eo continentur, per prius et posterius praedicatur. Tam enim compositum quam materia et forma particularis substantia dicitur, sed non eodem ordine; et ideo posterius inquiret quid horum per prius sit substantia.	1276. Now in one sense (569). Here he subdivides the fourth sense of substance given in his original division, i.e., substance in the sense of a subject; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he gives this subdivision. Second (570:C 1278) he compares the parts of this subdivision with each other (“If, then”). Third (574:C 1294), he shows how the parts of this division must be treated (“Yet that substance”). Accordingly he says, first (569), that a subject in the sense of a first or particular substance is divided into three parts, i.e., into matter, form, and the thing composed of these. This division is not one of genus into species, but of an analogous predicate, which is predicated in a primary and in a derivative sense of those things which are contained under it. For both the composite and the matter and the form are called particular substances, but not in the same order; and therefore later on (573:C 1291) he inquires which of these has priority as substance.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 8 Exemplificat autem hic membra in artificialibus, in quibus aes est ut materia, figura ut forma speciei, idest dans speciem, statua compositum ex his. Quae quidem exemplificatio non est accipienda secundum veritatem, sed secundum similitudinem proportionis. Figura enim et aliae formae artificiales non sunt substantiae, sed accidentia quaedam. Sed quia hoc modo se habet figura ad aes in artificialibus, sicut forma substantialis ad materiam in naturalibus, pro tanto utitur hoc exemplo, ut demonstret ignotum per manifestum.	1277. To clarify this part of his division he draws an example from the field of artifacts, saying that bronze is as matter, the figure as “the specifying form,” i.e., the principle which gives a thing its species, and the statue as the thing composed of these. This example must not be understood to express the situation as it really is but only according to a proportional likeness; for figure and other forms produced by art are not substances but accidents. But since figure is related to bronze in the realm of artifacts as substantial form is to matter in the realm of natural bodies, he uses this example insofar as it explains what is unknown by means of what is evident.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit quare si species comparat partes divisionis praemissae adinvicem: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ostendit quod forma sit magis substantia quam compositum. Secundo ostendit, quod materia sit maxime substantia, quod erat opinio quorumdam, ibi, et adhuc materia substantia sit. Tertio ostendit quod tam forma quam compositum est magis substantia quam materia, ibi, sed impossibile et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod species, idest forma, prior est materia. Materia enim est ens in potentia, et species est actus eius. Actus autem naturaliter prior est potentia. Et simpliciter loquendo prior tempore, quia non movetur potentia ad actum nisi per ens actu; licet in uno et eodem quod quandoque est in potentia, quandoque in actu, potentia tempore praecedat actum. Unde patet, quod forma est prior quam materia, et etiam est magis ens quam ipsa, quia propter quod unumquodque et illud magis. Materia autem non fit ens actu nisi per formam. Unde oportet quod forma sit magis ens quam materia.	1278. If, then (570). Here he compares the parts of the foregoing division with each other; and in regard to this he does three things. First (570), he explains that the form is substance to a greater degree than the composite. Second (571:C 1281), he explains that some men were of the opinion that matter constitutes substance in the truest sense (“And from this”). Third (573:C 1291), he shows that the form and the composite are substance to a greater degree than matter (“But this is impossible”). He accordingly says, first (570), “that the specifying principle,” i.e., the form, is prior to matter. For matter is a potential being, and the specifying principle is its actuality; and actuality is prior to potentiality in nature. And absolutely speaking it is prior in time, because the potential is brought to actuality only by means of something actual; although in one and the same subject which is at one time potential and at another actual, potentiality is prior to actuality in time. Hence it is clear that form is prior to matter, and that it is also a being to a greater degree than matter; because that by reason of which anything is such, is more so, But matter becomes an actual being only by means of form. Hence form must be being to a greater degree than matter.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 10 Et ex hoc ulterius sequitur, quod eadem ratione forma sit prior composito ex utrisque, inquantum est in composito aliquid de materia. Et ita participat aliquid de eo quod est posterius secundum naturam, scilicet de materia. Et iterum patet, quod materia et forma sunt principia compositi. Principia autem alicuius sunt eo priora. Et ita, si forma est prior materia, erit prior composito.	1279. And from this it again follows for the same reason that form is prior to the thing composed of both, inasmuch as there is something having the nature of matter in the composite. Thus the composite shares in something which is secondary in nature, i.e., in matter. And it is also clear that matter and form are principles of the composite. Now the principles of a thing are prior to that thing. Therefore, if form is prior to matter, it will be prior to the composite.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 11 Et quia posset alicui videri, quod ex quo philosophus ponit omnes modos, quibus dicitur substantia, quod hoc sufficeret ad sciendum quid est substantia; ideo subiungit dicens, quod nunc dictum est quid sit substantia solum typo, idest dictum est solum in universali, quod substantia est illud, quod non dicitur de subiecto, sed de quo dicuntur alia; sed oportet non solum ita cognoscere substantiam et alias res, scilicet per definitionem universalem et logicam: hoc enim non est sufficiens ad cognoscendum naturam rei, quia hoc ipsum quod assignatur pro definitione tali, est manifestum. Non enim huiusmodi definitione tanguntur principia rei, ex quibus cognitio rei dependet; sed tangitur aliqua communis conditio rei per quam talis notificatio datur.	1280. And since it might seem to someone, from the fact that the Philosopher gives all the senses in which the term substance is used, that this suffices for a knowledge of what substance is, he therefore adds that “we have now merely sketched” what substance is; i.e., stated only in a universal way that substance is not what is predicated of a subject, but that of which other things are predicated. But one must not merely understand substance and other things in this way, namely, by means of a universal and logical definition; for this is not a sufficient basis for knowing the nature of a thing, because the very formula which is given for such a definition is evident. For the principles of a thing, on which the knowledge of a thing depends, are not mentioned in a definition of this kind, but only some common condition of a thing by means of which such acquaintance is imparted.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit et adhuc ostendit quod materia maxime sit substantia: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit rationem antiquorum per quam ponebant materiam maxime et solum esse substantiam. Secundo notificat quid sit materia, ibi, dico autem materiam quae secundum se. Dicit ergo primo, quod non solum forma est substantia, et compositum, sed et materia sit substantia secundum rationem praedictam. Si enim ipsa materia non sit substantia, fugit a nobis quae sit alia substantia praeter materiam. Quia si removeantur a rebus sensibilibus in quibus manifeste est substantia, alia quae planum est non esse substantiam, nihil remanet, ut videtur, nisi materia.	1281. And from this point (571). He examines the view that matter is in the truest sense substance; and in regard to this he does two things. First (571), he gives the argument by which the ancient philosophers maintained that matter most truly and solely is substance. Second (572:C 1285), he explains what matter is (“And by matter”). Hence he says, first, that not only the form and the composite are substance but so also is matter, according to the argument mentioned above, for if matter itself is not substance, it eludes us to say what other thing besides matter is substance. For if the other attributes, which clearly are not substance, are taken away from sensible bodies, in which substance is clearly apparent, it seems that the only thing which remains is matter.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 13 In istis enim corporibus sensibilibus, quae omnes confitentur esse substantias, quaedam sunt sicut corporum passiones, ut calidum, frigidum et huiusmodi; de quibus manifestum est, quod non sunt substantiae. Sunt etiam in eis quaedam factiones, idest generationes et corruptiones et motus; de quibus etiam planum est quod non sunt substantiae. Sunt etiam in eis potentiae, quae sunt principia praedictarum factionum et motuum; scilicet potentiae, quae sunt in rebus ad agendum et patiendum: has etiam patet non esse substantias, sed magis ponuntur sub genere qualitatis.	1282. For in these sensible bodies, which all men admit to be substances, there are certain attributes such as the affections of bodies, for example, hot and cold and the like, which are evidently not substances. And in these bodies there are also “certain activities,” i.e., processes of generation and corruption and motions, which are clearly not substances. And in them there are also potencies, which are the principles of these activities and motions, i.e., potencies of acting and being acted upon, which are present in things; and it is also clear that these are not substances, but that they rather belong to the genus of quality.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 14 Et post omnia ista inveniuntur in corporibus sensibilibus dimensiones, scilicet longitudo, latitudo et profunditas, quae sunt quantitates quaedam, et non substantiae. Quantitas enim manifestum est quod non est substantia; sed illud cui praedictae dimensiones insunt, ut primum subiectum earum, est substantia. Sed remotis istis dimensionibus nihil videtur remanere nisi subiectum earum, quod est determinatum et distinctum per huiusmodi dimensiones. Haec autem est materia. Quantitas enim dimensiva videtur inesse materiae immediate, cum materia non dividatur ad recipiendum diversas formas in diversis suis partibus, nisi per huiusmodi quantitatem. Et ideo per huiusmodi considerationem videtur necessarium esse non solum quod materia sit substantia, sed quod ipsa sola sit substantia.	1283. And, after all of these, we find dimensions in sensible bodies, namely, length, width and depth, which are quantities and not substances. For it is evident that quantity is not substance, but that substance is that to which the foregoing dimensions belong as their first subject. But when these dimensions are taken away, nothing seems to remain except their subject, which is limited and differentiated by dimensions of this kind. And this subject is matter; for dimensive quantity seems to belong immediately to matter, since matter is divided in such a way as to receive different forms in its different parts only by means of this kind of quantity. Therefore, from a consideration of this kind it seems to follow not only that matter is substance, but that it alone is substance.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 15 Decepit autem antiquos philosophos hanc rationem inducentes, ignorantia formae substantialis. Non enim adhuc tantum profecerant, ut intellectus eorum se elevaret ad aliquid quod est supra sensibilia; et ideo illas formas tantum consideraverunt, quae sunt sensibilia propria vel communia. Huiusmodi autem manifestum est esse accidentia, ut album et nigrum, magnum et parvum, et huiusmodi. Forma autem substantialis non est sensibilis nisi per accidens; et ideo ad eius cognitionem non pervenerunt, ut scirent ipsam a materia distinguere. Sed totum subiectum, quod nos ponimus ex materia et forma componi, ipsi dicebant esse primam materiam, ut aerem, aut aquam, aut aliquid huiusmodi. Formas autem dicebant esse, quae nos dicimus accidentia, ut quantitates et qualitates, quorum subiectum proprium non est materia prima, sed substantia composita quae est substantia in actu: omne enim accidens ex hoc est, quod substantiae inest, ut habitum est.	1284. Now it was their ignorance of substantial form that misled the ancient philosophers into giving this argument; for as yet they had not progressed in knowledge to the point where their mind might be elevated to something over and above sensible bodies. Hence they considered only those forms which are proper or common sensibles; and it is clear that such attributes as white and black, great and small, and the like, are accidents of this kind. But a substantial form is perceptible only indirectly, and therefore they did not acquire g knowledge of it so that they might know how to distinguish it from matter. In fact they said that the whole subject, which we maintain is composed of matter and form, is first matter, for example, air or water or something of the kind. And they called those things forms which we call accidents, for example, quantities and qualities, whose Proper subject is not first matter but the composite substance, which is an actual substance; for it is by reason of this that every accident is something inhering in a substance, as has been explained (562)C 1254-56).
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 16 Deinde cum dicit dico autem. Quia ratio praedicta ostendens solam materiam esse substantiam, videtur processisse ex ignorantia materiae, ut dictum est; ideo consequenter dicit, quid sit materia est secundum rei veritatem, prout declaratum in primo physicorum. Materia enim in se non potest sufficienter cognosci, nisi per motum; et eius investigatio praecipue videtur ad naturalem pertinere. Unde et philosophus accipit hic de materia, quae in physicis sunt investigata, dicens: dico autem materiam esse quae secundum se, idest secundum sui essentiam considerata, nullatenus est neque quid, idest neque substantia, neque qualitas, neque aliquid aliorum generum, quibus ens dividitur, vel determinatur.	1285. And by matter I mean (572). Now since the foregoing argument which shows that matter alone is substance seems to have come from their ignorance of matter, as has been pointed out, be therefore next states what matter really is, as is made clear in Book I of the Physics. For matter can be adequately known by itself only by means of motion, and the study of it seems to belong chiefly to the philosophy of nature. Hence the Philosopher also accepts here the characteristics of matter investigated in his physical treatises, saying that “by matter I mean that which in itself,” i.e., considered essentially, “is neither a quiddity,” i.e., a substance, “nor a quantity nor any of the other categories into which being is divided or by which it is made determinate.”
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 17 Et hoc praecipue apparet motu. Oportet enim subiectum mutationis et motus alterum esse, per se loquendo, ab utroque terminorum motus, ut probatum est primo physicorum. Unde, cum materia sit primum subiectum substans non solum motibus, qui sunt secundum qualitatem et quantitatem et alia accidentia, sed etiam mutationibus quae sunt secundum substantiam, oportet, quod materia sit alia secundum sui essentiam ab omnibus formis substantialibus et earum privationibus, quae sunt termini generationis et corruptionis; et non solum quod sit aliud a quantitate et qualitate et aliis accidentibus.	1286. This is especially evident in the case of motion; for, properly speaking, the subject of change and motion must differ from each of the limits of motion, as is proved in Book I of the Physics. Now matter is the first subject which underlies not only those motions which are qualitative and quantitative, and those which pertain to the other accidents, but also those which are substantial. Hence it must differ essentially from all substantial forms and their privations, which are the limits of generation and, corruption, and not just quantitatively or qualitatively or according to the other accidents.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 18 Attamen diversitatem materiae ab omnibus formis non probat philosophus per viam motus, quae quidem probatio est per viam naturalis philosophiae, sed per viam praedicationis, quae est propria logicae, quam in quarto huius dicit affinem esse huic scientiae. Dicit ergo, quod oportet aliquid esse, de quo omnia praedicta praedicentur; ita tamen quod sit diversum esse illi subiecto de quo praedicantur, et unicuique eorum quae de ipso praedicantur, idest diversa quidditas et essentia.	1287. Yet the Philosopher does not use motion to prove that matter differs from all forms (for this proof belongs to the philosophy of nature); but he uses the method of predication, which is proper to dialectics and is closely allied with this science, as he says in Book IV (311:C 574). Hence he says that there must be some subject of which all terms are predicated, yet in such a way that the being of that subject of which they are predicated differs from the being of each of the things which “are predicated of it”; i.e., they have a different quiddity or essence.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 19 Sciendum autem est, quod id, quod hic dicitur, non potest intelligi de univoca praedicatione secundum quod genera praedicantur de speciebus, in quarum definitionibus ponuntur; quia non est aliud per essentiam animal et homo; sed oportet hoc intelligi de denominativa praedicatione, sicut cum album praedicatur de homine; alia enim quidditas est albi et hominis. Unde subiungit, quod alia genera praedicantur hoc modo de substantia, scilicet denominative, substantia vero praedicatur de materia denominative.	1288. Now it must be noted that what has been said here cannot be understood to apply to univocal predication, according to which genera are predicated of the species in whose definitions they are given, because man and animal do not differ essentially; but this must be understood to apply to denominative predication, as when white is predicated of man, for the quiddity of white differs from that of man. Hence he adds that the other genera are predicated of substance in this way, i.e., denominatively, and that substance is predicated of matter denominatively.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 20 Non est ergo intelligendum, quod substantia actu existens (de qua hic loquimur) de materia praedicetur praedicatione univoca, sive quae est per essentiam. Iam enim supra dixerat, quod materia non est quid, neque aliquid aliorum. Sed intelligendum est de denominativa praedicatione, per quem modum accidentia de substantia praedicantur. Sicut enim haec est vera: homo est albus, non autem haec: homo est albedo, vel: humanitas est albedo, ita haec est vera: hoc materiatum est homo, non autem haec: materia est homo, vel: materia est humanitas. Ipsa ergo concretiva, sive denominativa praedicatio ostendit, quod sicut substantia est aliud per essentiam ab accidentibus, ita per essentiam aliud est materia a formis substantialibus. Quare sequetur quod illud quod est ultimum subiectum per se loquendo, neque est quid, idest substantia, neque quantitas, neque aliquid aliud quod sit in aliquo genere entium.	1289. It must not be understood, then, that actual substance (of which we are speaking here) is predicated of matter univocally or essentially; for he had already said above that matter is neither a quiddity nor any of the other categories. But it must be understood to be predicated denominatively, in the way in which accidents are predicated of substance. For just as the proposition “Man is white” is true, and the proposition “Man is whiteness” or “Humanity is whiteness” is not, in a similar way the proposition “This material thing is a man” is true, and the proposition “Matter is man” or “Matter is humanity” is not. Concretive or denominative predication, then, shows that, just as substance differs essentially from accidents, in a similar fashion matter differs essentially from substantial forms. Hence it follows that the ultimate subject, properly speaking, “is neither a quiddity,” i.e., a substance, nor a quantity nor any of the other things contained in any genus of beings.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 21 Neque ipsae negationes possunt per se praedicari de materia. Sicut enim formae sunt praeter essentiam materiae, et ita quodammodo se habent ad ipsam per accidens, ita et negationes formarum quae sunt ipsae privationes, secundum accidens insunt materiae. Si enim per se inessent materiae, nunquam formae in materia possent recipi salvata materia. Hoc autem dicit philosophus ad removendum opinionem Platonis, qui non distinguebat inter privationem et materiam, ut in primo physicorum habetur. Concludit etiam finaliter quod considerantibus secundum praedictas rationes accidit solam materiam esse substantiam, ut prius inducta ratio concludebat.	1290. Neither can negations themselves be predicated essentially of matter. For just as forms are something distinct from the essence of matter, and thus in a certain measure are related to it accidentally, in a similar way the different negations of forms, which are themselves privations, also belong to matter accidentally. For if they should belong essentially to matter, forms could never be received in matter without destroying it. The Philosopher says this in order to reject the opinion of Plato, who did not distinguish between privation and matter, as is said in Book I of the Physics.’ Last, he concludes that for those who ponder the question according to the foregoing arguments it follows that matter alone is substance, as the preceding argument also concluded.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 22 Deinde cum dicit sed impossibile ostendit contrarium huius conclusionis; dicens, quod impossibile est solam materiam esse substantiam, vel ipsam etiam esse maxime substantiam. Duo enim sunt, quae maxime propria videntur esse substantiae: quorum unum est, quod sit separabilis. Accidens enim non separatur a substantia, sed substantia potest separari ab accidente. Aliud est, quod substantia est hoc aliquid demonstratum. Alia enim genera non significant hoc aliquid.	1291. But this is impossible (573)He now proves the contrary of this conclusion, saying that matter alone cannot be substance or substance in the highest degree. For there are two characteristics which seem to belong most properly to substance. The first is that it is capable of separate existence, for an accident is not separated from a substance, but a substance can be separated from an accident. The second is that substance is a determinate particular thing, for the other genera do not signify a particular thing.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 23 Haec autem duo, scilicet esse reparabile et esse hoc aliquid, non conveniunt materiae. Materia enim non potest per se existere sine forma per quam est ens actu, cum de se sit in potentia tantum; ipsa etiam non est hoc aliquid nisi per formam per quam fit actu. Unde esse hoc aliquid maxime competit composito.	1292. Now these two characteristics—being separable and being a particular thing—do not fit matter; for matter cannot exist by itself without a form by means of which it is an actual being, since of itself it is only potential. And it is a particular thing only by means of a form through which it becomes actual. Hence being a particular thing belongs chiefly to the composite.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 24 Et ideo patet quod species, idest forma, et compositum ex ambobus, scilicet ex materia et forma, magis videtur esse substantia quam materia; quia compositum et est separabile, et est hoc aliquid. Forma autem, etsi non sit separabilis, et hoc aliquid, tamen per ipsam compositum fit ens actu, ut sic possit esse separabile, et hoc aliquid.	1293. It is clear, then, “that the specifying principle,” i.e., the form, and “the thing composed of both,” namely, of matter and form, seem to be substance to a greater degree than matter, because the composite is both separable and a particular thing. But even though form is not separable and a particular thing, it nevertheless becomes an actual being by means of the composite itself; and therefore in this way it can be both separable and a particular thing.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 25 Deinde cum dicit attamen eam ostendit quomodo sit procedendum circa partes huius divisionis substantiae, quam prosecutus est, prout scilicet dividitur in materiam et in formam et compositum: et dicit, quod licet tam species quam compositum sit magis substantia quam materia, tamen ad praesens dimittenda est substantia quae ex ambobus composita, scilicet ex materia et forma. Et hoc propter duas rationes.	1294. Yet that substance (574). He shows how one must proceed to deal with the parts of this division of substance which has been followed, i.e., the division of substance into matter, form and composite. He says that even though both the form and the composite are substance to a greater degree than matter, still it is now necessary to dismiss the kind of substance which “is composed of both,” i.e., of matter and form; and there are two reasons for doing this.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 26 Una ratio est, quia ipsa est posterior secundum naturam utraque, scilicet quam materia et quam forma; sicut compositum est posterius simplicibus, ex quibus componitur. Et ideo cognitio materiae et formae praecedit cognitionem substantiae compositae.	1295. One reason is that it is subsequent to both in nature, namely, to matter and form, just as the composite is subsequent to the simple elements of which it is composed. Hence a knowledge of matter and form precedes a knowledge of the composite substance.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 27 Alia ratio est, quia huiusmodi substantia est aperta, idest manifesta, cum sensui subiaceat. Et ideo circa eius cognitionem non oportet immorari. Materia autem, licet non sit posterior sed quodammodo prior, tamen aliqualiter est manifesta. Dicit autem aliqualiter quia secundum essentiam suam non habet unde cognoscatur, cum cognitionis principium sit forma. Cognoscitur autem per quamdam similitudinem proportionis. Nam sicut huiusmodi substantiae sensibiles se habent ad formas artificiales, ut lignum ad formam scamni, ita prima materia se habet ad formas sensibiles. Propter quod dicitur primo physicorum, quod materia prima est scibilis secundum analogiam. Et ideo restat de tertia perscrutandum, scilicet de forma, quia ista est maxime dubitabilis.	1296. The other reason is that this kind of substance “is open to view,” i.e., evident, since it is the object of sensory perception; and therefore it is not necessary to dwell on the knowledge of it. And even though matter is not subsequent but is in a sense prior, still in a sense it is evident. Hence he says “in a sense,” because it does not of itself have any traits by which it may be known, since the principle of knowing is form. But it is known by means of an analogy; for just as sensible substances of this kind are related to artificial forms, as wood is related to the form of a bench, so also is first matter related to sensible forms. Hence it is said in the Physics, Book I, that first matter is known by an analogy. It follows, then, that we must investigate the third kind of substance, namely, form, because this is the most perplexing.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 28 Deinde cum dicit confitentur autem ostendit modum et ordinem, et quomodo procedendum sit circa partes tertiae divisionis substantiae, prout substantia scilicet dividitur in substantias sensibiles et insensibiles. Et circa hoc tria facit.	1297. Now some admit (575). Here he explains the method and order and way in which the parts of the third division of substance must be dealt with, in which substance is distinguished into those which are sensible and those which are not. In regard to this he does three things.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 29 Primo ostendit, quod de substantiis sensibilibus prius est agendum, quia huiusmodi substantiae sensibiles sunt confessae apud omnes: omnes enim confitentur quasdam sensibiles esse substantias. Substantias autem non sensibiles, non omnes confitentur. Unde prius quaerendum est de substantiis sensibilibus sicut de notioribus.	1298. First, he shows what has to be done at the very beginning with regard to sensible substances, because sensible substances of this kind are admitted by all; for all admit that some sensible things are substances. But not all admit that there are substances which are not sensible. Hence it is first necessary to consider sensible substances as better known.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 30 Secundo ibi, quoniam autem ostendit quid de substantiis sensibilibus sit determinandum: et dicit, quod cum prius divisum sit, quot modis dicatur substantia, inter istos modos unus modus est prout quod quid erat esse, idest quidditas et essentia rei, dicitur substantia. Unde speculandum est de ista primo, ostendendo scilicet quidditates substantiarum sensibilium.	1299. Since we have established (576). Second, he shows what has to be established about sensible substances. He says that since substance has been divided above according to the different senses in which the term is used, of which one is the essence of a thing, i.e., its quiddity or essential structure, it is therefore first necessary to investigate this by showing what it is that constitutes the quiddities of sensible substances.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 31 Tertio ibi, praeopere enim assignat rationem praemissi ordinis; et dicit, quod ideo prius dicendum est de essentiis substantiarum sensibilium, quia hoc est praeopere, idest ante opus sicut praeparatorium et necessarium ad opus, ut ex his substantiis sensibilibus, quae sunt magis manifestae quo ad nos, transeamus ad illud, quod est notius simpliciter et secundum naturam, idest ad substantias intelligibiles, de quibus principaliter intendimus. Ita enim fit disciplina in omnibus rebus, sive omnibus hominibus, per ea quae sunt minus nota secundum naturam, procedendo ad ea quae sunt magis nota secundum naturam.	1300. For this is (577). Third, he gives the reason for the order of treatment mentioned above. He says that we must speak first of the essences of sensible substances, because this is “a preparatory task,” i.e., a work preparatory to and necessary for our undertaking, inasmuch as we pass from sensible substances, which are more evident to us, to what “is more knowable in an unqualified sense and by nature,” i.e., to intelligible substances, in which we are chiefly interested. For knowledge is acquired in all matters, or by all men, by proceeding from those things which are less knowable by nature to those which are more knowable by nature.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 32 Cum enim omnis disciplina fiat per ea quae sunt magis nota addiscenti, quem oportet aliqua praecognoscere ad hoc ut addiscat, oportet disciplinam nostram procedere per ea quae sunt magis nota quo ad nos, quae sunt saepe minus nota secundum naturam, ad ea quae sunt notiora secundum naturam, nobis autem minus nota.	1301. For since all learning proceeds from those things which are more knowable to the learner, who must have some prior knowledge in order to learn, we must proceed to learn by passing from those things which are more knowable to us, which are often less knowable by nature, to those which are more knowable by nature but less knowable to us.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 33 Nobis enim quorum cognitio a sensu incipit, sunt notiora quae sensui propinquiora. Secundum autem naturam sunt notiora, quae ex sui natura sunt magis cognoscibilia. Et haec sunt quae sunt magis entia, et magis actualia. Quae quidem sunt remota a sensu. Formae autem sensibiles sunt formae in materia.	1302. For with regard to the knowledge of those things which begins from the senses, it is those things which are closer to the senses that are more knowable. But those things are more knowable by nature which by reason of their own nature are capable of being known. Now these are the things which are more actual and are beings to a greater degree. And these lie outside the scope of sensation. But sensible forms are forms in matter.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 34 Et ideo in disciplinis oportet procedere ex minus notis secundum naturam ad magis nota, et hoc opus est, idest necessarium est hoc facere sicut in actibus hoc est in actibus vel potentiis activis, in quibus ex bonis uniuscuiusque, idest ex his quae sunt bona isti et illi, fiunt ea quae totaliter sunt, idest universaliter bona, et per consequens unicuique bona. Militaris enim pervenit ad victoriam totius exercitus, quae est quoddam bonum commune ex singularibus victoriis huius et illius. Et similiter aedificativa ex compositione horum lapidum et illorum, pervenit ad constitutionem totius domus. Et similiter oportet in speculativis, ex his quae sunt notiora ipsi, scilicet addiscenti, pervenire oportet ad ea quae sunt naturae nota, quae etiam fiunt ultimo ipsi addiscenti nota.	1303. In matters of learning, then, it is necessary to proceed from things which are less knowable by nature to those which are more knowable. “And one’s task is” the same here, i.e., it is necessary to act in the same way here, “as in practical matters,” i.e., in the arts ‘ and active potencies, in which we go “from things which are good for each individual,” i.e., from things which are good for this person and for that person, so as to reach those things which “are” totally good, or universally good, and therefore good for each individual. For the military art attains the victory of the whole army, which is a certain common good, from the victories of this and of that particular man. And similarly the art of building by combining particular stones succeeds in constructing a whole house. And so too in speculative matters we must proceed from those things which are more knowable to oneself, namely, to the one learning, in order to reach those which are knowable by nature, which also finally become known to the one learning.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 35 Hoc autem non est propter hoc, quod illa quae sunt magis nota huic vel illi, sint simpliciter magis nota, quia illa quae sunt singulis nota, idest quo ad hunc et illum, et prima in cognitione eorum, sunt multoties debiliter nota secundum naturam. Et hoc ideo, quia parum vel nihil habent de entitate. Secundum enim quod aliquid est ens, secundum hoc est cognoscibile. Sicut patet, quod accidentia et motus et privationes parum aut nihil habent de entitate; et tamen ista sunt magis nota quo ad nos quam substantiae rerum, quia sunt viciniora sensui, cum per se cadant sub sensu quasi sensibilia propria vel communia. Formae autem substantiales per accidens.	1304. Now this does not occur because the things which are more knowable to this person or to that person are more knowable in an unqualified sense; for those things which are “knowable to individual men,” i.e., to this or to that particular man, and are first in the process of knowing, are often only slightly knowable by nature. This happens because they have little or nothing of being; for a thing is knowable to the extent that it has being. For example, it is evident that accidents, motions and privations have little or nothing of being, yet they are more knowable to us than the substances of things; for they are closer to the senses, since of themselves they fall under sensory perception as proper or common sensibles. But substantial forms do so only accidentally.
lib. 7 l. 2 n. 36 Dicit autem multoties quia quandoque eadem sunt magis nota et quo ad naturam et secundum nos, sicut in mathematicis, quae abstrahunt a materia sensibili. Et ideo ibi semper proceditur a notioribus secundum naturam, quia eadem sunt notiora quo ad nos. Et licet illa, quae magis sunt nota quo ad nos, sint debiliter nota secundum naturam, tamen ex huiusmodi male notis secundum naturam, quae tamen sunt magis cognoscibilia ipsi discenti, tentandum est cognoscere illa quae sunt omnino, idest universaliter et perfecte cognoscibilia, procedentes ad ea cognoscenda per haec ipsa, quae sunt debiliter nota secundum se, sicut iam dictum est.	1305. And he says “often” because sometimes the same things are more knowable both to us and by nature, for example, the objects of mathematics, which abstract from sensible matter. Hence in such cases one always proceeds from things which are more knowable by nature, because the same things are more knowable to us. And while those things which are more knowable to us are only slightly knowable by nature, still from things of the kind which are only slightly knowable by nature (although they are more knowable to the one learning), one must attempt to know the things which are “wholly,” i.e., universally and perfectly, knowable, by advancing to a knowledge of such things by way of those which are only slightly knowable by nature, as has already been explained.