Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber7/lect3

Lecture 3

Latin	English
lib. 7 l. 3 n. 1 Postquam determinavit philosophus ordinem procedendi circa substantias, hic incipit determinare de substantiis sensibilibus, sicut praedixerat; et dividitur in duas partes. In prima determinat de essentia substantiarum sensibilium per rationes logicas et communes. In secunda per principia substantiarum sensibilium in octavo libro, ibi, ex his itaque dictis syllogizare oportet. Prima pars dividitur in duas. In prima ostendit cuiusmodi sit essentia substantiarum sensibilium. In secunda ostendit, quod huiusmodi essentia habet rationem principii et causae, ibi, quod autem oportet. Prima autem pars dividitur in partes duas. In prima determinat de essentia substantiarum sensibilium. In secunda ostendit universalia non esse substantias rerum sensibilium, ut quidam dicebant, ibi, quoniam vero de substantia perscrutatur.	1306. Having settled the issue about the order to be followed in treating of substances, the Philosopher now begins to settle the issue about sensible substances, as he had said he would; and this is divided into two parts. In the first part (578)C 1308) he settles the issue about the essence of sensible substances, by using dialectical and common arguments; and in the second (691:C 101), by considering the principles of sensible substances. He does this in Book VIII (“It is necessary, then”). The first part is divided into two members. In the first he indicates the kind of essence which sensible substances have. In the second (682:C 1648) he shows that this kind of essence has the role of a principle and cause (“But let us state”). The first part is divided into two. In the first he settles the issue about the essences of sensible substances. In the second (650:C 1566) he shows that universals are not the substances of sensible things, as some said (“But since our investigation”).
lib. 7 l. 3 n. 2 Prima autem pars dividitur in duas. In prima ostendit cuiusmodi sit substantia rerum sensibilium. In secunda ex quibus constituatur, sicut ex partibus, ibi, quoniam vero definitio ratio est. Prima dividitur in duas. In prima inquirit cuiusmodi sensibilium sit essentia substantiarum. In secunda inquirit causam generationis earum, ibi, eorum autem quae fiunt natura. Prima dividitur in duas. In prima ostendit quid sit essentia rerum sensibilium. In secunda qualiter se habeat ad ipsa sensibilia; utrum scilicet ut idem, vel ut diversum, ibi, utrum autem idem. Prima dividitur in duas. In prima ostendit quid est quod quid erat esse. Secundo quorum est, ibi, quoniam vero sunt et secundum alias. Circa primum duo facit. Primo removet ab eo quod quid erat esse praedicata per accidens. Secundo ea, quae praedicantur per se, sicut propriae passiones de subiecto, ibi, neque etiam hoc et cetera.	1307. The first part is divided into two. In the first he shows what kind of substances sensible things have. In the second (622:C 1460) he shows what parts constitute their substance (“But since the definition”). The first part is divided into two. In the first he investigates the kind of essence which sensible substances have. In the second (598:C 1381) he inquires into the causes of their generation (“Now of those things”). The first part is divided into two. In the first he shows what constitutes the essence of sensible substances; and in the second (588:C 1356) he shows how essence is related to sensible substances, i.e., whether it is the same as these substances or different (“Moreover, it is necessary”). The first part is divided into two. In the first he shows what essence is. In the second (580:C 1315) he indicates to what things it belongs (“Now since there are”). In regard to the first he does two things. First (578), he dismisses from the essence of a thing any term that is predicated accidentally; and second (579:C 1311), any term that is predicated essentially (per se) in the way that properties are predicated of a subject (“But not even all”).
lib. 7 l. 3 n. 3 Dicit ergo primo, quod de substantiis sensibilibus primo dicendum est, et ostendendum est in eis quod quid erat esse: ideo primum dicemus de eo quod est quod quid erat esse quaedam logice. Sicut enim supra dictum est, haec scientia habet quandam affinitatem cum logica propter utriusque communitatem. Et ideo modus logicus huic scientiae proprius est, et ab eo convenienter incipit. Magis autem logice dicit se de eo quod quid est dicturum, inquantum investigat quid sit quod quid erat esse ex modo praedicandi. Hoc enim ad logicum proprie pertinet.	1308. He says, first (578), then, that it is first necessary to speak of sensible substances and to show what their essence is. Therefore, let us first make some dialectical comments about the essence of a thing; for this science has a connection with dialectics, as was stated above (311:C 574), because both are universal. Hence the dialectical method is proper to this science, and it is fitting that it should begin with the dialectical method. But he says that he is going to treat of essence in a way that is chiefly dialectical inasmuch as [in so doing] he investigates what essence is from the manner of predicating terms of a subject; for this belongs properly to dialectics.
lib. 7 l. 3 n. 4 Hoc autem primo sciendum est de eo quod quid erat esse, quod oportet quod praedicetur secundum se. Illa enim quae praedicantur de aliquo per accidens, non pertinent ad quod quid erat esse illius. Hoc enim intelligimus per quod quid erat esse alicuius, quod convenienter responderi potest ad quaestionem de eo factam per quid est. Cum autem de aliquo quaerimus quid est, non possumus convenienter respondere ea quae insunt ei per accidens; sicut cum quaeritur quid est homo, non potest responderi, quod sit album vel sedens vel musicus. Et ideo nihil eorum, quae praedicantur per accidens de aliquo, pertinent ad quod quid erat esse illius rei: non enim musicum esse, est tibi esse.	1309. Regarding essence it should first of all be borne in mind that it must be predicated of a thing essentially; for those things which are predicated of a thing accidentally do not belong to its essence. For by the essence of a thing we mean the proper answer which can be given to the question asking what it is. And when we ask what a thing is we cannot give a proper answer by mentioning attributes which belong to it accidentally; for when someone asks what man is, one cannot answer that he is white or sitting or musical. Hence none of those attributes which are predicated of a thing accidentally belong to its essence; for being you is not being musical.
lib. 7 l. 3 n. 5 Sciendum autem est, quod in omnibus sequentibus per hoc quod dicit hoc esse, vel huic esse, intelligit quod quid erat esse illius rei; sicut homini esse vel hominem esse, intelligit id quod pertinet ad quod quid est homo. Quod est autem musicum esse, idest hoc ipsum quod quid est musicus, non pertinet ad hoc quod quid es tu. Si enim quaeratur, tu quid sis, non potest responderi quod tu sis musicus. Et ideo sequitur quod musicum esse non est tibi esse; quia ea quae pertinent ad quidditatem musici, sunt extra quidditatem tuam, licet musicus de te praedicetur. Et hoc ideo, quia tu non secundum teipsum es musicus, idest quia musicum non praedicatur de te per se, sed per accidens. Illud ergo pertinet ad quod quid est tui, quod tu es secundum teipsum, idest quia de te praedicatur per se et non per accidens; sicut de te praedicatur per se homo, animal, substantia, rationale, sensibile, et alia huiusmodi, quae omnia pertinent ad quod quid est tui.	1310. Now throughout the whole of the following discussion it must be noted that by the phrase to be this or being this he understands the essence of a thing; for example, by to be man or being man he understands what pertains to the essence of man. Now the whatness of “being musical,” i.e., the very essence of musical, has nothing to do with your whatness. For if one were to ask what you are, one could not answer that you are musical. Hence it follows that being you is not being musical, because those things which pertain to the quiddity of music are extrinsic to your quiddity, although musical may be predicated of you. And this is so because “you are not musical essentially,” since musical is not predicated of you essentially but accidentally. Therefore what you are “essentially” pertains to your whatness, because it is predicated of you essentially and not accidentally; for example, man, animal, substance, rational, sensible, and other attributes of this kind, all of which belong to your whatness, are predicated of you essentially.
lib. 7 l. 3 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit neque etiam. Excludit ab eo quod est quod quid est, quod praedicatur secundum se, sicut passiones de subiectis; dicens: neque etiam hoc omne quod praedicatur secundum se de aliquo, pertinet ad hoc quod quid erat esse eius. Praedicatur enim per se passio de proprio subiecto, sicut color de superficie. Non tamen quod quid erat esse est, quod ita inest alicui secundum se, sicut superficiei inest album; quia non superficiei esse est album esse, idest hoc ipsum quod quid est superficies, non est quod quid est album. Alia enim est quidditas superficiei et albedinis.	1311. But not even (579). He excludes from the quiddity of a thing any attribute that is predicated essentially as properties are predicated of subjects. He says that not even everything that is predicated essentially of a thing belongs to its essence. For a property is predicated essentially of its proper subject as color is predicated of surface. Yet the essence of a thing is not something that is found in a thing essentially in the way that white is found in surface; because “being a surface” is not “being white”; i.e., the quiddity of surface is not that of whiteness; for the quiddity of surface differs from that of whiteness.
lib. 7 l. 3 n. 7 Et non solum hoc quod est esse album non est quod quid est superficiei; sed nec ipsum compositum ex utrisque, scilicet superficie et albedine, quod est esse superficiem albam vel esse superficiei albae. Quidditas enim vel essentia superficiei albae, non est quidditas vel essentia superficiei. Et si quaeratur quare? Responderi potest quia hoc adest ei, idest, quia cum dico superficiem albam, dicitur aliquid quod adhaeret superficiei tamquam extrinsecum, et non tamquam intrans essentiam eius. Unde hoc totum quod est superficies alba, non est de essentia superficiei.	1312. And not only is being white not the quiddity of surface, but neither is the combination of the two, namely, of surface and whiteness, i.e., to be a white surface, or being a white surface. For the quiddity or essence of white surface is not the quiddity or essence of surface. And if we were asked why, we could answer, “Because white inheres in surface,” i.e., because when I say “white surface” I mean something which adheres to surface as extrinsic to its essence and not as intrinsic to its essence. Hence this whole which is white surface is not identical with the essence of surface.
lib. 7 l. 3 n. 8 Praedicantur autem passiones de propriis subiectis ea ratione, quia propria subiecta in earum definitionibus ponuntur, sicut nasus ponitur in definitione simi, et numerus in definitione paris. Quaedam vero ita praedicantur per se, quod subiecta in eorum definitionibus non ponuntur, sicut animal per se de homine; nec homo ponitur in definitione animalis. Cum ergo ea quae praedicantur per accidens non pertineant ad quod quid est, nec illa quae praedicantur per se in quorum definitionibus ponuntur subiecta, relinquitur quod illa pertineant ad quod quid est, in quorum definitionibus non ponuntur subiecta. Et ideo concludit dicens, quod haec erit ratio in singulis, quod quid erat esse, in qua ratione dicente ipsum, idest describente praedicatum non inerit ipsum, idest subiectum; sicut in ratione animalis, non inest homo. Unde animal pertinet ad quod quid est homo.	1313. Now properties are predicated of their proper subjects in this way because their proper subjects are given in their definitions, as nose is given in the definition of snub and number in the definition of equal. And certain attributes are predicated essentially in such a way that subjects are not included in their definitions, as animal is predicated essentially of man, but man is not included in the definition of animal. Therefore since those attributes which are predicated accidentally do not belong to a thing’s quiddity, and neither do those which are predicated essentially in whose definitions subjects are given, it follows that those attributes belong to a thing’s quiddity in whose definitions subjects are not given. Hence he draws his conclusion, saying that the concept “which expresses what each thing is,” i.e., which describes the predicate, “but does not contain the thing itself,” i.e., the subject, will be the concept of the essence in each particular thing. Hence animal belongs to the essence of man.
lib. 7 l. 3 n. 9 Probat autem deducendo ad inconveniens, quod ea quae praedicantur per se de aliquo sicut propria passio de subiecto, non pertineant ad quod quid est. Contingit enim de eodem subiecto plures passiones diversas per se praedicari; sicut per se praedicatur propria passio, coloratum et asperum et leve, quae sunt passiones superficiei. Eiusdem autem rationis est omnia huiusmodi praedicata ad quod quid est subiecti pertinere. Ergo si albedo pertinet ad quod quid est superficiei, pari ratione et levitas. Quae autem uni et eidem sunt eadem, sibiinvicem sunt eadem. Quare si superficiei album esse est superficiei esse semper, idest si semper et universaliter hoc verum est quod quidditas propriae passionis sit idem cum quidditate proprii subiecti, sequitur quod albo esse et levi esse, sit idem et unum, idest quod quidditas albedinis et levitas sit una et eadem. Hoc autem patet falsum esse. Relinquitur ergo quod quod quid erat esse propriae passionis et subiecti non est idem et unum.	1314. By a reduction to absurdity he proves that those things which are predicated essentially of a thing as a property is predicated of a subject, do not pertain to the whatness of a thing. For many different properties may be predicated essentially of the same subject, as the properties colored, rough and smooth, which are proper attributes of surface, are predicated essentially of a subject. And it is for the same reason that all predicates of this kind pertain to the quiddity of their subject. Therefore if whiteness pertains to the quiddity of surface, so also for a like reason will smoothness; for things identical with some third thing are identical with each other. “Hence, if being a white surface is always being a smooth surface,” i.e., if it is true always and universally that the quiddity of a property is the same as that of its proper subject, it follows that being white and being smooth will be “one and the same thing,” i.e., the quiddity of whiteness and that of smoothness will be one and the same. But this is obviously false. Therefore it follows that the essence of a property and that of its subject are not one and the same thing.
lib. 7 l. 3 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit quoniam vero. Inquirit quorum sit quod quid erat esse. Et primo movet quaestionem. Secundo solvit eam, ibi, at vero secundum se dictorum. Dicit ergo primo, quod sunt quaedam composita in aliis praedicamentis, et non solum in substantia. Quod quidem dicit propter hoc, quod substantiarum sensibilium, quae sunt compositae, quidditatem inquirit. Sicut enim in substantiis sensibilibus compositis est materia, quae subiicitur formae substantiali, ita etiam alia praedicamenta habent suum subiectum. Est enim aliquod subiectum unicuique eorum, sicut qualitati et quantitati et quando et ubi et motui, sub quo comprehenditur agere et pati. Unde sicut quoddam compositum est ignis ex materia et forma substantiali, ita est quaedam compositio ex substantiis et accidentibus.	1315. Now since there are (580). He inquires to what things essence belongs. First, he raises the question; and second (581:C 1318) he answers it (“But neither”). He accordingly says, first (580), that there are certain composites in the case of the other categories and not merely in that of substance. He says this because he is investigating the quiddity of sensible substances, which are composite. For just as composite sensible substances have matter, which is the subject of substantial forms, so also do the other categories have their own subject. For there is some subject of each of them, namely, of quality, quantity, when, where, and also of motion, in which are included both action and being acted upon. Hence just as fire is a composite of matter and substantial form, in a similar way there is a kind of composition of substance and accidents.
lib. 7 l. 3 n. 11 Et ideo perscrutandum est, cum aliqua sit definitio substantiarum compositarum ex formis et materiis, si etiam cuiuscumque istorum compositorum ex accidentibus et subiectis est ratio eius quod quid erat esse, idest si habent definitionem quae est ratio significans quod quid erat esse. Et iterum si est in eis hoc ipsum quod quid erat esse quod significat definitio, idest si habent aliquam quidditatem sive aliquid quod potest responderi ad quid. Sicut hoc ipsum quod est albus homo, est quoddam compositum ex subiecto et accidente; utrum scilicet albo homini sit quod quid erat esse ei inquantum huiusmodi.	1316. Therefore, since there is a definition of substances which are composed of matters and forms, we must also inquire whether there is “a concept of the essence” of all those things which are composites of accidents and subjects, i.e., whether they have a definition which is a concept signifying their essence; and also whether “this essence,” which the definition signifies, is intrinsic to them, i.e., whether they have a quiddity or something that can answer the question “What?” For example, white man is a composite of subject and accident. The question, then, is whether there is an essence of white man as such.
lib. 7 l. 3 n. 12 Et quia forte aliquis posset dicere quod albus homo sunt duae res et non una, ideo subiungit, quod hoc ipsum quod dico albus homo, habeat unum nomen quod causa exempli sit vestis. Et tunc quaestio erit de isto uno, scilicet de veste, utrum habeat quod quid est, ut possimus dicere quid est vestem esse? Tunc enim, sicut hoc nomen homo significat aliquid compositum, scilicet animal rationale, ita et vestis significat aliquid compositum, scilicet hominem album. Et ita sicut homo habet definitionem, ita vestis poterit habere definitionem, sicut videtur.	1317. And since someone might perhaps say that white man is two things and not one, he therefore adds that white man might have one name, say, garment. The question about this one thing, then, i.e., garment, will be whether it has any whatness, so that we can ask, “What is the essence of a garment?” For then just as this word man signifies some composite, namely, rational animal, in like manner the word garment signifies some composite, namely, white man. And thus just as man has a definition, in a similar way it seems that garment can have a definition.
lib. 7 l. 3 n. 13 Deinde cum dicit at vero solvit praedictam quaestionem; et dividitur haec pars in duas partes secundum quod duas ponit solutiones. Secunda pars incipit ibi, aut et definitio sicut et quod quid. Dicit ergo primo, quod hoc ipsum quod dico, albus homo, sive vestis quae hoc ponitur significare, non est aliquod eorum quae dicuntur secundum se, immo est aliquid eorum quae dicuntur per accidens. Hoc enim, quod est, homo albus, est unum per accidens, et non per se, ut superius est habitum.	1318. But neither is this (581). Here he answers the preceding question; and this part is divided twofoldly inasmuch as he gives two solutions. The second part (582:C 1331) begins where he says, “Or another solution.” He says, first (581), then, that white man, or garment, which is supposed to stand for “white man,” is not one of those terms which are predicated essentially, but is rather one of those which are predicated accidentally; for the quiddity “white man” is one thing accidentally and not essentially, as was stated above (C 1313-14).
lib. 7 l. 3 n. 14 Quod autem aliquid dicatur alteri esse unum per accidens, est dupliciter, ut uno modo homo est albus, et alio modo album est homo. Horum enim aliud quidem est ex additione, aliud vero non. In definitione enim hominis non est necessarium quod addatur definitio albi, vel nomen eius; in definitione vero albi necesse est quod ponatur homo, vel nomen hominis, vel eius definitio, si homo proprium subiectum eius est, vel aliquid aliud quod est eius proprium subiectum.	1319. Now there are two ways in which a thing is said to be one accidentally or non-essentially: first, in the sense that we say “Man is white,” and second, in the sense that we say “This white thing is man”; because one of these is defined by addition, whereas the other is not. For in the definition of man it is not necessary to include the definition of white or the word white, but in the definition of white it is necessary to include man, or the word man, or his definition, provided that man is the proper subject of white, or whatever its proper subject happens to be.
lib. 7 l. 3 n. 15 Et ideo ad hoc exponendum subiungit, quod istorum duorum, quae dicuntur non secundum se, unum adiungitur alteri, eo quod ipsum accidens additur illi subiecto, quod in accidentis definitione ponitur cum definitur. Sicut si aliquis definiat album, oportet quod dicat rationem hominis albi; quia oportet quod in definitione accidentis ponatur subiectum. Et tunc definitio complectitur hominem album. Et sic erit quasi ratio hominis albi, et non albi tantum. Et hoc intelligendum est, ut dictum est, si homo sit proprium et per se subiectum albi. Hoc autem adiungitur alteri per accidens; non quia ipsum apponatur in definitione alterius, sed quia aliud apponitur ipsi in sua definitione; sicut album adiungitur homini per accidens, non quod ponatur in definitione hominis, sed quia homo ponitur in definitione eius. Unde si hoc nomen vestis significat hominem album, sicut positum est, oportet quod ille, qui definit vestem, eodem modo definiat vestem sicut definitur album. Nam sicut in definitione vestis oportet quod ponatur et homo et album, ita in definitione albi oportet quod ponatur utrumque.	1320. Now in order to explain this he adds that when one thing is predicated of another in a non-essential way, it is added to the other, because an accident is added to the subject given in the definition of that accident when it is defined; for example, if someone were to define white thing, he would have to express the concept white man, because in the definition of an accident it is necessary to include its subject. And then the definition includes white man; and thus it will be, as it were, the concept of white man and not the concept of white alone. This must be understood to be the case, as has already been said, if man is the proper and essential subject of white. But the one is added to the other accidentally, not because it is added to the definition of the other, but because the other is added to it in its own definition, as white is added to man accidentally, not because it is placed in the definition of man, but because man is placed in the definition of white. Hence, if by supposition the word garment signifies white man, then anyone who defines garment must define it in the same way that white is defined; for just as man and white must be given in the definition of garment, so also must each be given in the definition of white.
lib. 7 l. 3 n. 16 Itaque ex dictis patet quod album praedicatur de homine albo. Haec enim est vera, albus homo est albus, et e contrario. Tamen hoc ipsum quod est album esse hominem, non est quod quid erat esse albo. Sed neque vesti, quae significat compositum hoc quod est albus homo, ut dictum est. Sic igitur patet quod non potest esse idem quod quid erat esse eius quod est album, et eius quod est albus homo, sive vestis; per hoc quod album etiam si praedicetur de albo homine, non tamen est quod quid est esse eius.	1321. It is clear, then, from what has been said, that white is predicated of man; for this proposition “A white man is white” is true, and vice versa. Yet the essence of white man is not that of white; and neither is the essence of garment, which signifies the composite white man, as has been stated. Thus it is evident that the essence of white and that of white man, or “garment,” cannot be the same, by reason of the fact that, if white is also predicated of white man, it is still not its whatness.
lib. 7 l. 3 n. 17 Item patet, quod si album habet quod quid erat esse et definitionem, non habet aliam quam illam quae est albi hominis: quia cum in definitione accidentis ponatur subiectum, oportet quod hoc modo definiatur album, sicut albus homo, ut dictum est. Et hoc sic patet: quia hoc quod est album non habet quod quid erat esse, sed solum hoc de quo dicitur, scilicet homo vel homo albus. Et hoc est quod dicit: ergo est quod quid erat esse aliquid aut totaliter, aut non: idest, ergo ex praedictis sequitur quod quod quid erat esse, non est nisi eius quod est aliquid, sive illud aliquid sit totaliter, id est compositum, ut homo albus, sive non totaliter, ut homo. Album autem non significat aliquid, sed aliquale.	1322. It is also evident that, if white has an essence and definition, it does not have a different one from that which belongs to white man; for since a subject is included in the definition of an accident, white must be defined in the same way that white man is, as has been stated. This is made clear as follows: white does not have a quiddity but only the thing of which it is predicated, man or white man. And this is what he means when he says: “Therefore the essence is what a thing of a definite sort is, whether it expresses that thing wholly or not”; i.e., from what has already been said it follows that essence belongs only to some definite thing, whether it expresses “that thing wholly,” i.e., the composite, as white man, or not, as man. But white does not signify that it is sonic definite thing, but that it is of some sort.
lib. 7 l. 3 n. 18 Et quod id quod quid erat esse, non sit nisi eius quod est aliquid, ex hoc patet: quod quidem quid erat esse, est quod aliquid erat esse. Esse enim quid, significat esse aliquid. Unde illa quae non significant aliquid, non habent quod quid erat esse. Sed quando aliquid de aliquo dicitur, ut accidens de subiecto, non est hoc aliquid: sicut cum dico, homo est albus, non significatur quod sit hoc aliquid, sed quod sit quale. Esse enim hoc aliquid convenit solis substantiis. Et ita patet, quod album et similia non possunt habere quod quid erat esse.	1323. The fact that essence belongs only to some definite thing is shown as follows: the essence of a thing is what that thing is; for to have an essence means to be some definite thing. Hence those things which do not signify some definite thing do not have an essence. But when something is predicated of another as an accident is predicated of a subject, this is not some definite thing. For example, when I say “Man is white” I do not signify that it is some definite thing, but that it is of some special sort. For to be some definite thing belongs to substances alone. Hence it is clear that whiteness and the like cannot have an essence.
lib. 7 l. 3 n. 19 Sed, quia aliquis posset dicere, quod sicut inveniuntur aliquae rationes nominum significantium substantiam, ita inveniuntur aliquae rationes nominum significantium accidentia; ideo concludit, quod quod quid erat esse non est omnium quae habent qualemcumque rationem notificantem nomen, sed eorum solum, quorum ratio est definitio.	1324. But because someone might say that there are concepts of words signifying accidents as well as concepts of words signifying substance, he therefore concludes that essence does not belong to all things which have any kind of concept at all that explains their name, but only to those whose concept is a definition.
lib. 7 l. 3 n. 20 Ratio autem alicuius definitiva non est solum, si sit talis ratio, quae significat idem cum nomine; sicut hoc quod dico, arma gerens, significat idem cum armigero; quia sic sequeretur, quod omnes rationes essent termini, idest definitiones. Potest enim poni cuilibet rationi nomen, sicut potest poni huic rationi, quod est homo ambulans, vel homo scribens: nec tamen propter haec sequitur quod illa sint definitiones: quia secundum hoc sequeretur, quod etiam Ilias, idest poema factum de bello Troiano esset una definitio. Est enim totum illud poema una ratio exponens bellum Troianum. Patet igitur, quod non quaecumque ratio significans idem cum nomine est eius definitio, sed solum est definitio si fuerit alicuius primi, idest si significet aliquid per se dictum. Hoc enim est primum in praedicationibus quod per se praedicatur.	1325. Now the concept of a thing is not definitive if it is merely a concept of the sort which signifies the same thing as a name, as one bearing arms signifies the same thing as arms-bearer, because it would then follow that all concepts are “limiting terms,” i.e., definitions. For a name can be given to any concept (for example, a name can be given to the concept walking man or writing man), yet it does not follow for this reason that these are definitions, because according to this it would follow that “even the Iliad,” i.e., the poem written about the Trojan war, would be one definition; for that whole poem is a single account depicting the Trojan war. It is clear, then, that not every concept signifying the same thing as a name is a definition of it, but only if the concept “is of some primary thing,” i.e., if it signifies something that is predicated essentially. For that which is predicated essentially is first in the order of predication.
lib. 7 l. 3 n. 21 Talia vero, scilicet prima, sunt quaecumque praedicantur per se, et non quia aliud de alio dicitur; sicut album praedicatur de homine non per se, quasi sit idem quod album et quod homo; sed praedicantur de seinvicem per accidens. Animal vero praedicatur de homine per se, et similiter rationale de animali. Et ideo hoc quod dico, animal rationale, definitio est hominis.	1326. But such things, i.e., primary ones, are all those which are predicated essentially, and such things do not involve predicating one thing of another; for example, white is not predicated essentially of man as though what white is and what man is are the same; but they are predicated of each other accidentally. For animal is predicated of man essentially, and in a similar way rational is predicated of animal. Hence the expression rational animal is the definition of man.
lib. 7 l. 3 n. 22 Sic ergo patet quod quod quid erat esse non erit alicuius, quod non sit de numero specierum alicuius generis, sed solum his, idest solum speciebus. Species enim sola definitur, cum omnis definitio sit ex genere et differentiis. Illud autem, quod sub genere continetur et differentiis constituitur est species; et ideo solius speciei est definitio. Solae enim species videntur dici non secundum participationem et passionem, nec ut accidens.	1327. Thus it is clear that essence will not be found in any of those things which are not classed among the species of some genus, but “in these alone,” i.e., in the species alone. For species alone may be defined, since every definition is composed of genus and difference. But that which is contained under a genus and is constituted of differences is a species, and therefore definition pertains only to species. For species alone seem not to be predicated according to participation and affection or as an accident.
lib. 7 l. 3 n. 23 In quo removet tria quae videntur impedire quod aliquid non definiatur per aliquod genus. Primo namque ea de quibus genus praedicatur secundum participationem, non possunt definiri per illud genus, nisi sit de essentia illius definiti. Sicut ferrum ignitum, de quo ignis per participationem praedicatur, non definitur per ignem, sicut per genus; quia ferrum non est per essentiam suam ignis, sed participat aliquid eius. Genus autem non praedicatur de speciebus per participationem, sed per essentiam. Homo enim est animal essentialiter, non solum aliquid animalis participans. Homo enim est quod verum est animal. Item subiecta praedicantur de propriis passionibus, sicut nasus de simo; et tamen essentia nasi non est essentia simi. Species enim non se habent ad genus sicut propria generis passio; sed sicut id quod est per essentiam idem generi. Potest etiam album praedicari de homine per accidens; nec essentia hominis est essentia albi, sicut essentia generis est essentia speciei. Unde videtur, quod sola ratio speciei quae ex genere et differentiis constituitur, sit definitio.	1328. In this statement he rejects three things which seem to make it impossible for anything to be defined by a genus. For, in the first place, those things of which a genus is predicated by participation cannot be defined by means of that genus, unless it belongs to the essence of the thing defined; for example, a fiery iron, of which fire is predicated by participation, is not defined by fire as its genus, because iron by its very essence is not fire but only participates to some degree in fire. However, a genus is not predicated of its species by participation but essentially; for man is an animal essentially and not merely something participating in animal, because man is truly an animal. Moreover, subjects are predicated of their properties, as nose is predicated of snub, yet the essence of nose is not the essence of snub; for species are not related to a genus as a property of that genus, but as something essentially the same as that genus. And white can be predicated of man accidentally, but the essence of man is not the essence of white, as the essence of a genus is the essence of its species. Hence it seems that only the concept of the species, which is constituted of genus and difference, is a definition.
lib. 7 l. 3 n. 24 Sed in aliis quidem si est eis nomen positum, potest esse ratio declarans quid significat nomen. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter. Uno modo sicut quando nomen minus notum manifestatur per magis notum quod de eo praedicatur: ut si hoc nomen philosophia notificetur per hoc nomen sapientia. Et hoc est quod dicit quod autem huic inest, scilicet quando ratio exponens nomen accipitur ab aliquo nomine notiori quod praedicatur de eo.	1329. But if a name is given to other things, there can be a concept expressing what that name signifies, and this may occur in two ways. First, this occurs when a name that is less meaningful is explained by one that is more meaningful and is predicated of it, for example, when the name philosophy is explained by the name wisdom. And this is the meaning of his statement that “this accident inheres in this subject,” namely, that sometimes the concept explaining the name is taken from a more meaningful term which is predicated of it.
lib. 7 l. 3 n. 25 Alio modo quando accipitur ad expositionem nominis simplicis aliqua oratio notior; sicut si ad exponendum hoc nomen philosophus, accipitur haec oratio, amator sapientiae. Et hoc est quod dicit, aut pro sermone simplici quasi ad expositionem huius simplicis dictionis, certior oratio accipitur. Tamen talis ratio non erit definitio; nec id quod per eam significatur, erit quod quid erat esse.	1330. And, second, this occurs when a more meaningful phrase is used to explain a simple term; for example, a when the phrase lover of wisdom is taken to explain the term philosopher. And this is what he means when he says “or in place of a simple term,” as if in order to explain a simple term one might take “a more definite one.” Yet such a concept will not be a definition, nor will the thing signified by it be an essence.