Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber8/lect2

Lecture 2

Latin	English
lib. 8 l. 2 n. 1 Postquam philosophus inquisivit in substantiis sensibilibus materiale principium, inquirit de principio formali. Et primo continuat se ad praecedentia; dicens, quod, quia substantiam quae est ut materia et subiectum, confitentur omnes, cum etiam antiquissimi materialium substantiam rerum ponerent esse materiam, huiusmodi vero substantia est in potentia; restat igitur de forma, quae est sensibilium per modum actus, dicere quid sit.	1691. Having investigated the material principle in sensible substances, the Philosopher examines their formal principle. First (699)C 1691), he links up this discussion with the foregoing one, saying that, since all recognize substance in the sense of matter and subject (for even the oldest philosophers held that matter is the substance of material things), and this kind of substance is something potential, it now remains to explain what form is, which is the actuality of sensible things.
lib. 8 l. 2 n. 2 Secundo ibi, Democritus quidem prosequitur suam intentionem: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo investigat differentias in rebus sensibilibus, quae formale principium demonstrant. Secundo quaedam corollaria concludit, ibi, palam itaque ex his quia actus. Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat quasdam differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit comparationem earum ad substantiales differentias, ibi, palam igitur ex his quia si substantia. Circa primum duo facit. Primo investigat differentias accidentales rerum sensibilium. Secundo ostendit qualiter praedictae differentiae se habent ad ea quorum sunt, ibi, quare palam quia. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ponit opinionem Democriti de differentiis rerum, dicens quod Democritus similis est existimanti tres esse differentias rerum; idest secundum ea quae ponit, videtur existimare quod omnes differentiae rerum ad tria genera rerum reducantur. Ponebat enim principia rerum materialia esse corpora indivisibilia, quae, cum sint eiusdem naturae, convenientia sunt adinvicem. Diversitatem autem rerum constituunt propter differentiam positionis, figurae et ordinis. Et sic videtur ponere, quod corpus, quod est subiectum, quasi materiale principium unum et idem existens secundum naturam, quamvis sit in infinita divisum secundum numerum, differt, idest diversificatur in diversas res propter differentiam figurae, positionis, aut ordinis. Differentia enim figurae est secundum rectum et circulare; positionis autem secundum sursum et deorsum, dextrorsum et sinistrorsum; ordinis autem secundum prius et posterius.	1692. Now Democritus is like one (700). Then he carries out his intention; and in regard to this he does two things. First (700:C 1692), he examines the differences in sensible things which indicate a formal principle. Second (705:C 1699), he draws some conclusions (“From these instances”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he examines certain accidental differences of sensible things. Second (704:C 1696), he shows how these differences are related to substantial differences (“It is evident”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he investigates the accidental differences of sensible things. Second (702:C 1694), he shows how these differences are related to those things whose differences they are (“For this reason”). In regard to the first he does two things. First (700), he gives Democritus’ opinion about the differences of things. He says that Democritus is like one who thinks “that there are three differences in things,” i.e., according to the principles which he gives he seems to think that all differences of things are reduced to three classes. For he held that the material principles of things are indivisible bodies, which, being of the same nature, are similar to each other; but that they constitute a diversity of things because they differ in position, shape and arrangement. Thus he seems to hold that the underlying body, as a material principle, is one and the same in nature even though it is divided into an infinite number of parts, and that it differ’s, i.e., is divided into different things, because of differences in shape, position and arrangement. For things differ in figure by being straight or curved; in position by being above or below, right or left; and in arrangement by being before or after.
lib. 8 l. 2 n. 3 Secundo ibi, videntur autem ostendit positionem Democriti esse insufficientem; quia multae aliae videntur esse rerum differentiae quae in praedictas non reducuntur. Quaedam enim differunt secundum diversum modum compositionis partium materialium. In quibusdam enim partes materiae componuntur per modum mixtionis, sicut mellicratum: in quibusdam vero, quia ligantur aliquo vinculo, sicut est ligatura capitis mulieris: in quibusdam etiam coniunguntur aliqua colla vel visco, sicut fit in libris: in quibusdam vero adunantur partes clavo, sicut fit in arca: in quibusdam vero fit adunatio partium pluribus praedictorum modorum. Alia vero differunt abinvicem sicut positione, sicut liminare superius et liminare inferius; quae quidem differunt abinvicem, ex eo quod sic ponuntur, scilicet supra vel infra. Quaedam vero differunt tempore, ut coena, quae est comestio serotina, et prandium quod est comestio matutina. Alia differunt loco, ut spiritus, idest venti, quorum Aquilo a Septentrione flat, Favonius ab occidente, Auster a meridie, subsolanus ab oriente. Alia vero differunt sensibilium passionibus, idest duritie et mollitie et aliis huiusmodi; et quaedam in aliquibus horum, et quaedam his omnibus. Alia per superabundantiam et defectum. Hoc autem addit, quia secundum antiquos philosophos omnes huiusmodi sensibilium passiones ad superabundantiam et defectum reducuntur.	1693. However, there seem to be (701). Second, he shows that the position of Democritus is unsatisfactory, because there seem to be many other differences of things which are not reducible to the foregoing ones. For some things differ by reason of the different way in which their material parts are combined: in some things the material parts are combined by being mixed, as honey-water; in others, by being tied together by some bond, as the binding around a woman’s’ head; in others by glue or birdlime, as occurs in books; in others by a nail, as occurs in a chest; and in others the parts are united in several of the aforesaid ways. On the other hand, some things differ from each other by their position, as a lintel and a threshold, which differ because they are placed in such and such a way-one being above and the other below. Again, some differ in point of time, as dinner, which is the late meal, from breakfast, which is the early morning meal. Others differ with respect to place, as “the air currents,” i.e., the winds, of which the Aquilonian comes from the north, the Favonian from the west, the Austerian from the south, and the Subsolian from the east. Others differ “by reason of the qualities of sensible bodies,” i.e., by hardness or softness and other characteristics of this kind; and some things differ in several of these ways, and others in all of them. And some differ by excess and some by defect. He adds this because the ancient philosophers held that all qualities of sensible bodies are reduced to excess or defect.
lib. 8 l. 2 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit quare palam ostendit qualiter praedictae differentiae se habent ad ea quorum sunt. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit, quod in his differentiis consistit esse eorum quorum sunt differentiae constitutivae. Secundo concludit, quod ad cognoscendum principia essendi, oportet reducere differentias in aliqua prima genera, ibi, sumenda igitur sunt. Dicit ergo primo, quod quia praedictae differentiae sunt constitutivae rerum de quibus supra dictum est, manifestum quod ipsum esse praedictarum rerum toties dicitur quot sunt differentiae. Differentia enim complet definitionem significantem esse rei. Limen enim est huiusmodi, quia ita ponitur. Et ipsum sic poni est esse ipsius, idest propria eius ratio. Et similiter esse crystalli, est ipsum taliter inspissari. Et ex omnibus praedictis differt esse quarumdam rerum: hoc quidem in eo quod commiscentur, alia quidem in eo quod complectuntur, et alia aliis differentiis utuntur, sicut manus et pes, et aliae huiusmodi partes, quae habent proprias differentias secundum quod ordinantur ad determinatas operationes.	1694. For this reason (702). He shows the way in which these differences are related to those things whose differences they are. In regard to this he does two things. First (702), he shows that these differences constitute the being of the things whose differences they are. Second (703:C 1695), he concludes that in order to grasp the principles of being we must reduce these differences to certain primary classes of differences (“Further, we must consider”). First, then, he says that, because these differences are constitutive of the things we have mentioned above, it is evident that the being of the aforesaid realities is diversified according to these differences; for a difference completes the definition, which signifies the being of a thing. Thus a threshold is this particular thing “because it is placed in such and such a position,” and its being, i.e., its proper intelligible structure, consists in being placed in such and such a position. Similarly, being ice is being condensed in such and such a way. And by each of the differences mentioned the being of things of a certain type is differentiated: some by being mixed; others by being combined; and others by other differences, as a hand and a foot and other parts of this kind which have peculiar differences of their own inasmuch as they are directed to certain definite operations.
lib. 8 l. 2 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit sumenda autem concludit, quod ex quo in differentiis consistit esse rerum, et sic intendenda est earum cognitio, utile est sumere genera differentiarum, reducendo scilicet posteriores differentias generis in primas, quia differentiae huiusmodi communes et propriae erunt principia esse totius generis, ut patet in differentiis quae sunt secundum magis et minus, et secundum rarum et spissum, et alia huiusmodi: nam rarum et densum et similia reducuntur ad magnum et parvum: omnia enim haec significant superabundantiam et defectum. Et similiter si quid pertinet ad figuram, aut asperitatem et lenitatem, omnia reducuntur ad rectum et curvum quae sunt primae differentiae ad figuram pertinentes. Et similiter oportet, quod aliqua reducantur ad esse mixtum vel non esse mixtum; quia quaedam sunt quorum esse est in eo quod miscetur, non esse vero eorum, in eo quod opposito modo se habent.	1695. Further, we must consider (703). He concludes that, since the being of things consists in their differences and has to be known in this way, it will be worth our while to grasp the classes of differences by reducing the secondary differences of a class to the primary differences; because common and proper differences of this kind will be the principles of being of a whole class. This is evident in differences of degree, of rarity and density, and in other things of this kind; for density and rarity and the like are reduced to the class of the great and small, because all these signify excess and defect. Similarly, if things differ in figure or in roughness or smoothness, these are reduced to differences of straightness and curvature, which are the primary differences of figure. Again, it is necessary that some be reduced to being mixed or not being mixed; for the being of some things consists in the fact that they are mixed, and their non-being in just the opposite state.
lib. 8 l. 2 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit palam itaque ostendit quomodo praedictae differentiae se habeant ad substantias: et dicit: ex praedictis iam manifestum est, quod in praedictis differentiis est quaerendum, quae sit causa formalis essendi cuiuslibet praedictorum, quorum sunt differentiae, si ita est quod substantia formalis vel quod quid est, est causa cuiuslibet essendi, ut in septimo manifestum fuit. Praedictae enim differentiae significant formam, et quod quid est praedictarum rerum. Nulla autem differentiarum praedictarum est substantia, neque aliquid substantiae affine, quasi pertinens ad genus substantiae. Sed eadem proportio invenitur in eis, quae est in substantia.	1696. It is evident, then (704). He shows how these differences are related to the substances of things. He says that it is now evident from the foregoing that we must try to discover in these differences the formal cause of the being of each thing, if it is in this way that substance in a formal sense, or the whatness of a thing, is the cause of the being of each thing, as was clear in Book VII (682-90:C 1648-80). For these differences signify the form or whatness of the above-mentioned things. However, none of these differences are substance or anything akin to substance, as though belonging to the genus of substance; but the same proportion is found in them as in [the genus of] substance.
lib. 8 l. 2 n. 7 Sicut enim in genere substantiae, differentia, quae praedicatur de genere, et advenit ei ad constitutionem speciei, comparatur ad ipsum ut actus et forma, ita etiam in aliis definitionibus. Non enim est intelligendum, quod differentia sit forma, aut genus sit materia, cum genus et differentiae praedicentur de specie, materia autem et forma non praedicentur de composito: sed hoc dicitur, quia genus sumitur ab eo quod est materiale in re, differentia vero ab eo quod est formale. Sicut genus hominis est animal, quia significat aliquid habens naturam sensitivam; quae quidem materialiter se habet ad naturam intellectivam, a qua sumitur rationale, quae est differentia hominis. Rationale vero significat aliquid habens naturam intellectivam. Et inde est quod genus habet differentias potestate, et quod genus et differentia proportionantur materiae et formae, ut Porphyrius dicit. Et propter hoc etiam hic dicitur quod actus, idest differentia, praedicatur de materia, idest de genere; et similiter est in aliis generibus.	1697. For just as in the genus of substance the difference, which is predicated of the genus and qualifies it in order to constitute a species, is related to the genus as actuality or form, so also is this true in other definitions. (~) For we must not understand that difference is form or that genus is matter, since genus and difference are predicated of the species but matter and form are not predicated of the composite. (+) But we speak in this manner because a thing’s genus is derived from its material principle, and its difference from its formal principle. The genus of man, for example, is animal, because it signifies something having a sensory nature, which is related as matter to intellectual nature from which rational, the difference of man, is taken. But rational signifies something having an intellectual nature. It is for this reason that a genus contains its differences potentially, and that genus and difference are proportionate to matter and form, as Porphyry says . And for this reason too it is said here that “actuality,” i.e., difference, is predicated “of matter,” i.e., of the genus; and the same thing occurs in other genera.
lib. 8 l. 2 n. 8 Si quis enim velit limen definire, dicet, quod est lapis vel lignum taliter positum: in qua definitione lapis vel lignum est ut materia, positio vero ut forma. Et similiter in definitione domus, lapides et ligna sunt materia, et talis modus compositionis est ut forma. Et etiam ulterius in quibusdam additur finis, a quo necessitas formae dependet. Et similiter in definitione crystalli, aqua est sicut materia, congelatio vero ut forma. Et in definitione symphoniae acutum et grave ut materia, et modus commixtionis ut forma; et ita est in omnibus aliis.	1698. For if one wishes to define a threshold, he shall say that it is a piece of stone or wood placed in such and such a position; and in this definition stone or wood is as matter and position as form. Similarly, in the definition of a house stones and timbers are as matter, and being combined in such and such a way as form. And again in the definitions of some things there is also added its end, on which the necessity of the form depends. And similarly in the definition of ice, water is as matter and being frozen is as form. So too in the definition of a harmony the high and low notes are as matter and the way in which they are combined is as form. The same thing applies in all other definitions.
lib. 8 l. 2 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit palam itaque concludit ergo ex praedictis duo corollaria: quorum primum est quod diversarum materiarum diversi sunt actus et formae. In quibusdam enim est actus compositio, in quibusdam commixtio, aut aliquid dictorum.	1699. From these instances (705). He draws two additional conclusions from the above. First, there are different actualities or forms for different matters. For in some things the actuality consists in being combined; in others in being mixed, or in some of the aforesaid differences.
lib. 8 l. 2 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit propter quod secundum ponit. Et est, quod, cum in definitione unum comparetur ad aliud ut actus ad materiam, quidam definientes res per materiam tantum insufficienter definiunt. Sicut definientes domum per caementum et lapides et ligna, quae sunt materia domus; quia talis definitio non notificat domum in actu, sed in potentia. Qui vero dicunt, quod domus est coopertura pecuniarum et corporum, dicunt formam domus sed non materiam. Qui vero dicunt utrumque, definiuntur compositam substantiam. Et ideo eorum definitio est perfecta ratio. Ratio vero, quae sumitur ex differentiis, pertinet ad formam. Quae vero ex partibus intrinsecis, pertinet ad materiam.	1700. Therefore, among those who (706). He states the second conclusion; since in a definition one part,is related to the other as actuality to matter, some people in defining things give an inadequate definition by stating only their matter, as those who define a house by means of cement, stones and timbers, which are the material of a house; because such a definition does not signify an actual house but a potential one. Those who say that a house is a shelter for goods and living bodies state the form of a house but not its matter. However, those who state both define the composite substance, and therefore their definition is a complete definition. But the conceptual element which is derived from the differences pertains to the form, whereas that which is derived from the intrinsic parts pertains to the matter.
lib. 8 l. 2 n. 11 Et similes his definitionibus sunt illae, quas Archytas approbat. Sicut nenemia, quod significat dispositiones aeris, quando est sine vento, est quies in multo aere: non enim si modicum de aere in aliquo vase incluso quiescat, dicitur serenitas. In hac autem definitione, aer est ut materia, et quies ut forma. Similiter cum dicitur, tranquillitas est planities maris, mare est materia, et planities ut forma. Materia autem in his definitionibus est substantia, forma vero est accidens. In definitione autem domus materia sunt partes, actus autem forma totius.	1701. The definitions which Archytas accepts are similar to these. E.g., stillness, which signifies the state of the atmosphere when it is windless, is rest in a large expanse of air; for if only the smallest amount of air in a vessel is at rest we do not speak of stillness. In this definition air is as matter and rest as form. Similarly, when a calm is defined as the smoothness of the sea, the sea is as matter and smoothness as form. Now in these definitions the matter is substance and the form is an accident; but in the definition of a house the matter is its parts and the actuality is the form of the whole.
lib. 8 l. 2 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit palam itaque epilogat quae de forma dicta sunt. Et est planum in litera.	1702. From what (707). He summarizes the things said about form. The text is clear here.