Authors/Thomas Aquinas/metaphysics/liber8/lect4

Lecture 4

Latin	English
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 1 Postquam Aristoteles prosecutus est ea, quae consideranda erant circa formale principium substantiae, nunc determinat de principio materiali: et dividitur in partes tres. Primo enim determinat de principio materiali per comparationem ad ea quae sunt ex materia. Secundo per comparationem ad alias causas, ibi, contingit autem una materia existente. Tertio per comparationem ad transmutationem generationis et corruptionis, cuius subiectum est materia, ibi, quoniam vero quaedam sine generatione. Circa primum duo facit. Primo manifestat, utrum omnium sit una vel plures species materiae. Et dicit, quod oportet non latere circa materiale principium, quia licet omnia sint ex eodem primo materiali principio, quod est materia prima de se nullam habens formam, aut ex eisdem materialibus principiis aut primis (quod dicitur propter quatuor elementa, quae sunt principia materialia communiter omnibus generabilibus et corruptibilibus); et licet sit eadem materia, ut principium his quae fiunt, (quod dicit propter hoc, quod materia non est tantum principium in esse, sed etiam in fieri); licet etiam prima materia et elementa communiter se habeant ad elementata: tamen cuiuslibet rei est aliqua materia propria. Ut materia propria phlegmatis non simpliciter, sed in genere, sunt dulcia et pinguia: haec enim habent quamdam affinitatem cum phlegmate ratione suae humiditatis. Cholerae vero prima materia, sunt amara, aut alia quaedam huiusmodi: in amaris enim videtur calor omnino habere dominium super humiditatem usque ad eius consumptionem. Et sic ratione siccitatis et caliditatis, affinitatem habet cum cholera. Sed hae duae materiae, scilicet amara et dulcia, forsan sunt ex aliquo principio materiali priore. Addidit autem forsan, quia quorumdam est sic diversa materia, quod eorum materiae non reducuntur in aliquam priorem, sicut corpora corruptibilia et incorruptibilia.	1729. Having treated those points which had to be considered about the formal principle of substance, Aristotle now establishes what is true regarding the material principle. This is divided into three parts. First (722:C 1729), he deals with the material principle in relation to the things which come from matter; second (724:C 1733), in relation to the other causes (“Now when there is one matter”); and third (730:C 1746), in relation to the change of generation and corruption, whose subject is matter (“But since some things”). In regard to the first he does two things. First (722), he shows whether there is one or several kinds of matter that there are several matters of the for all things. And in regard to the material principle he says that one must not remain ignorant of the fact that, even though all things come from the same first material principle, namely, first matter, which has no form of its own, or from the same material principles “or first [causes],” (which is added because of the four elements, the material principles common to all generable and corruptible things), and even though the same matter is “the first principle of things which come to be,” (which he adds because of the fact that matter is not only a principle of being but also of coming-to-be), i.e., even though first matter and the elements are universally related to things composed of the elements, there is still some proper matter of each thing. For example, the proper matter of phlegm (not in an absolute sense but generically) is the fat and the sweet, since these have a certain relationship to phlegm by reason of their moistness. But the first matter of bile is bitter things or certain others of this kind; for in bitter things heat seems to have absolute dominion over moistness even to the extent of destroying it. Thus by reason of dryness and warmth the bitter has a relationship to bile. But perhaps these two matters, namely, the bitter and the sweet, come from some prior material principle. He adds “perhaps” because certain things have different matters, since their matters are not reducible to any prior matter, for example corruptible and incorruptible bodies.
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 2 Ex his igitur, quae hic dicuntur, accipitur quod prima materia est una omnium generabilium et corruptibilium; sed propriae materiae sunt diversae diversarum.	1730. From the things which are said here then it is evident that there is one first matter for all generable and corruptible things, but different proper matters for different things.
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 3 Fiunt autem secundo dicit quomodo e contrario unius sunt plures materiae; dicens, quod eiusdem rei sunt plures materiae, quando una earum est alterius materia. Sicut materia phlegmatis sunt pingue et dulce, si pingue est ex dulci. Pinguis enim sapor inter medios sapores computatur; medii autem sapores fiunt ex extremis, qui sunt dulce et amarum. Sed pingue est proximum dulci. Considerandum vero est, quod in istis exemplis materiam alicuius posuit ex quo aliquid fit, licet non sit permanens, sed transiens.	1731. Further, there are several matters (723). Second, he points out how in an opposite sense there are several matters for one and the same thing. He says that there are several matters of the same thing when one of these is the matter of another, as the matter of phlegm is the fat and the sweet, if the fat comes from the sweet. For the savor of fat is reckoned among the intermediate savors, and these are produced from extremes, which are the sweet and the bitter. But the fat is nearest to the sweet. Now in these examples we must bear in mind that he takes as the matter of each thing that from which the thing comes to be, even though it is not permanent but transitory.
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 4 Ne igitur aliquis existimaret, quod semper aliquid fieri diceretur ex materiali principio et non e converso, subiungit, quod etiam ex cholera dicitur aliquid fieri per resolutionem cholerae in primam materiam; et e contra cholera fit ex prima materia. Quia dupliciter dicitur aliquid fieri ex altero: aut quia illud ex quo fit, est ei principium naturaliter in via generationis: huiusmodi enim est materiale principium; aut quia factio est resolutio in principium materiale, ita scilicet quod ex composito per resolutionem, materiale principium fieri dicatur. Fit enim corpus mixtum ex elementis per compositionem; elementa vero ex corpore mixto per resolutionem.	1732. Therefore, lest someone should think that a thing is always said to come from a material principle, and not the reverse, he adds that something is also said to come from bile by the dissolution of bile into its first matter, and in reverse order bile is said to come from first matter. For one thing is said to come from another in two ways: either because the thing from which it comes is naturally its starting point in the process of generation (for this kind of thing is a material principle); or because the process of coming-to-be is the dissolving of a thing into its material principle, namely, in the sense that a material principle is said to come from a composite by dissolution. For a mixed body comes from the elements by the process of composition, whereas the elements come from a mixed body by the process of dissolution.
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit contingit autem determinat de materia per comparationem ad alias causas. Et primo per comparationem ad agentem tantum, qui ex materia aliquid facit: quae quidem comparatio pertinet ad materiam secundum quod est principium fiendi. Secundo per comparationem ad omnes causas, prout materia est principium cognoscendi, ibi, quando itaque aliquis quaesierit. Quia vero superius dixerat, quod una erat prima materia omnium, posset aliquis dubitare quomodo ex materia una omnium, diversitas rerum procederet. Antiqui enim naturales attribuebant hoc casui, tollentes causam agentem, et ponentes per raritatem et densitatem ex una materia rerum diversitatem produci.	1733. Now when there is one matter (724). He establishes what is true of matter in relation to the other causes. First, in relation to the agent cause alone, which produces something from matter; and this relationship pertains to matter according as it is a principle of coming-to-be. Second (725:C 1737), in relation to all the causes, according as matter constitutes a principle of knowing (“Hence, when one asks”). But since he had said above (722:C 1729) that there was one first matter of all things, one can inquire how a diversity of things could come from one common matter. For the ancient Philosophers of nature attributed this to chance when they disregarded the agent cause and claimed that the diversity of things comes from one matter by a process of rarefaction and condensation.
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 6 Hoc ergo removens philosophus dicit primo, quod contingit, una materia existente, fieri diversa propter moventem causam: aut quia est alia et alia causa movens; aut quia eadem causa movens habet se ad operandum diversa diversimode. Quod maxime in artificialibus patet. Videmus enim ex ligno fieri arcam et lectum ab uno artifice, secundum diversas formas artis, quas apud se habet.	1734. Therefore in rejecting this the Philosopher says, first (724), that when there is one matter it is possible for different things to come into being by reason of the cause of motion, either because there are different causes of motion, or because one and the same cause of motion is disposed in a different way for producing different effects. This is most evident in the case of things made by art. For we see that a chest and a bed are made from wood by one craftsman in virtue of the different art-forms which he himself possesses.
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 7 Quia vero, licet materia prima sit communis omnibus, tamen materiae propriae sunt diversae diversorum: ideo ne aliquis totam diversitatem rerum attribueret moventi, et nullo modo materiali principio, subiungit quod in quibusdam diversorum ex necessitate est diversa materia, propria scilicet. Non enim quodlibet natum est fieri ex qualibet materia; sicut serra non fit ex ligno. Neque est in potestate artificis ut hoc faciat, nunquam enim unam materiam attribuit cuilibet operi: non enim potest facere serram ex ligno vel lana, quae propter mollitiem suam non sunt apta ad opus serrae, quod est secare.	1735. But even though there is a first matter common to all things, nevertheless the proper matters of different things are different. Therefore, lest someone should attribute the diversity of things in their entirety to the cause of motion and in no way to the material principle, he adds that in some of the things that are different the matter is necessarily different, namely, the proper matter. For not anything at all is naturally disposed to come into being from any matter, as a saw does not come from wood. Nor is it within the power of the craftsman to bring this about; for he never assigns one matter to each work, because he is unable to make a saw either from wood or from wool, which, on account of their softness, are not suitable for the work of a saw, which is to cut.
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 8 Patet igitur, quod diversitas rerum est ex movente et materia. Si ergo conveniat aliquid idem secundum speciem fieri ex alia materia, sicut phialam ex auro et argento, manifestum est, quod principium movens oportet esse idem, scilicet artem. Si enim materia esset diversa et movens diversum, necesse esset, quod et factum esset diversum.	1736. It is evident, then, that the diversity of things is a result of the efficient cause and of matter. Hence, if it is fitting that something specifically the same should be produced from a different matter, as a bowl from gold and from silver, it is obvious that the efficient principle, i.e., the art, must be the same. For if both the matter and the cause of motion were different, the thing produced would have to be different.
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit quando itaque determinat de materia per comparationem ad alias causas, secundum quod materia est cognitionis principium. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit quod oportet reddere materiam cum aliis causis in generalibus et corruptibilibus. Secundo ostendit quomodo se habet materia in substantiis naturalibus perpetuis, ibi, in naturalibus quidem. Tertio quomodo se habet in accidentibus, ibi, neque quaecumque ita quidem natura. Circa primum tria facit. Primo enim, quia antiqui naturales assignabant tantummodo causam materialem, dicit quod quando aliquis de aliquo quaerit quid est causa eius? Cum pluribus modis dicantur causae, oportet omnes causas assignare contingentes, idest quae contingant esse illius rei. Non enim habent omnes causas omnia. Naturalia tamen, et maxime generabilia et corruptibilia, omnes causas habent. Ut hominis causa quasi materia in generatione ipsius sunt menstrua. Causa movens sperma, in quo est virtus activa. Causa formalis quod quid erat esse, idest illud quod significatur per definitionem eius. Sed finis est cuius causa. Hae autem duae causae, scilicet finis et forma, forte sunt idem numero. Quod quidem dicit, quia in quibusdam sunt idem, in quibusdam non. Finis enim generationis hominis est anima. Finis vero operationis eius est felicitas.	1737. Hence, when one asks (725). He deals with matter in relation to the other causes according as matter is a principle of knowing. In regard to this he does two things. First (725), he shows that in the case of generable and corruptible things we must assign matter along with the other causes. Second (728:C 1740), he shows how matter is found in natural substances which are eternal (“In the case of natural substances”). Third (729:C 1743), he explains how matter is ascribed to accidents (“Thus all those things”). In regard to the first he does three things. For, first (725), since the ancient philosophers of nature assigned only the material cause, he says that when one asks what the cause of anything is, it is necessary to state all the causes “concerned,” i.e., all which contribute to the being of the thing in question, since causes are spoken of in several senses. For not all things have all the causes, although natural beings, and especially generable and corruptible ones, have all the causes. For example, in the generation of man his material cause is the menstrual fluid; his active cause is the seed, in which the active power is contained; his formal cause is his essence, which is signified by the definition; and his final cause is his end [or goal]. But perhaps these two causes, namely, the end and the form, are numerically the same. He says this because in some things they are the same and in some not. For the goal of a man’s generation is his soul, whereas the goal of his operations is happiness.
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 10 Secundo ibi, oportet autem ostendit quod non solum oportet assignare omnes causas, sed oportet etiam dicere causas proximas, ut incipiendo a causis primis perveniamus ad causas proximas. Per causas enim primas habetur cognitio de re aliqua solum in universali et imperfecte. Per causas autem proximas habetur cognitio rei et perfecta. Sicut si quis quaerat causam materialem hominis, non debet assignari pro causa, ignis aut terra quae sunt materia communis omnium generabilium et corruptibilium; sed debet assignari propria materia, ut et caro, et os, et huiusmodi.	1738. It is necessary also (726). Second, he shows that it is not only necessary to assign all the causes but also to state the proximate causes, so that by beginning with the first causes we may reach the proximate ones. For the knowledge had of a thing through first causes is only a general and incomplete knowledge, whereas that had of a thing through proximate causes is a complete knowledge. For example, if one asks about the material cause of man, one should not assign as his cause fire or earth, which are the common matter of all generable and corruptible things, but should state his proper matter, such as flesh and bones and the like.
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 11 Tertio ibi, circa naturales epilogat quod dictum est; et dicit quod circa naturales substantias et generabiles necesse est sic versari, si quis recte consideret causas, ut scilicet omnes assignentur et proximae. Et hoc est necesse, ex eo quod hae causae sunt tot, ut dictum est. Et oportet causas cognoscere ad hoc quod aliquid sciatur, quia scire est causam cognoscere.	1739. Indeed, concerning natural substances (727). Third, he summarizes the foregoing. He says that it is necessary to proceed thus in regard to natural and generable substances if one is to consider the causes correctly, giving all the causes including the proximate ones. This is necessary in view of the fact that the causes are of this number, as has been explained (725:C 1737). And it is necessary to grasp the causes of a thing in order that it may be known scientifically, because science is a knowledge of the cause.
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit in naturalibus ostendit quomodo sit materia in substantiis naturalibus et perpetuis, scilicet in corporibus caelestibus; dicens, quod in naturalibus et perpetuis substantiis, scilicet corporibus caelestibus, non est similiter materia sicut in corporibus generabilibus et corruptibilibus. Forsan quidem enim tales substantiae non habent materiam; aut si habent, non habent talem qualem habent generabilia et corruptibilia, sed solum secundum potentiam quae est in motu locali.	1740. In the case of natural substances (728). He shows how there is matter in natural substances which are eternal, namely, in the celestial bodies. He says that the matter in natural substances which are eternal, namely, in the celestial bodies, is not the same as that in bodies subject to generation and corruption. For perhaps such substances do not have matter, or if they do have matter, they do not have the sort that generable and corruptible bodies have, but only that which is subjected to local motion.
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 13 Ut enim supra dictum est, in rebus generabilibus et corruptibilibus generatio et corruptio inducit in cognitionem materiae, quia in generatione et corruptione oportet esse unum subiectum commune ad privationem et formam; unde, cum in corpore caelesti non sit potentia ad privationem formae, sed solum ad diversa loca, non habet materiam quae sit in potentia ad formam et privationem, sed quae est in potentia ad diversa loca.	1741. For, as was said above (725)C 1737), in the case of generable and corruptible things generation and corruption bring us to a knowledge of matter; because in the process of generation and corruption there must be one subject common to both privation and form. Hence, since in a celestial body there is no potentiality for privation of form but only for different places, it does not have a matter which is in potentiality to form and privation but one which is in potentiality to different places.
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 14 Corpus autem comparatur ad locum non sicut materia ad formam, sed magis sicut subiectum ad accidens. Et licet comparatio subiecti ad accidens sit quodammodo ut materiae ad formam, non tamen subiectum est omnino materia, sicut infra dicetur. Et sic corpus caeleste universaliter nullo modo habet materiam, si subiectum materiam non dicit; vel habet materiam ad ubi, si subiectum dicatur materia.	1742. However, a body is related to place not as matter to form but rather as subject to accident. And although in one respect a subject is related to an accident as matter is to form, still a subject is not to be identified with matter, as is stated below (729)C 1743). Thus a celestial body as such does not have matter in any way, if subject does not imply matter; or it has matter as regards place, if subject implies matter.
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 15 Deinde cum dicit neque quaecumque ostendit quomodo materia attribuitur accidentibus; et dicit, quod illa, quae sunt secundum naturam, non tamen sunt substantiae, sed accidentia, non habent materiam ex qua sint, sed substantia est eis subiectum. Subiectum autem habet aliquid simile materiae, inquantum est receptibile accidentis. Differt autem a materia, inquantum materia non habet actu esse nisi per formam; subiectum autem non constituitur in esse per accidens.	1743. Thus all those (729). He shows how matter is ascribed to accidents. He says that those things which exist by nature yet are not substances but accidents, (~) do not have a matter from which they come to be, but (+) they have a subject, which is the substance. Now a subject bears some likeness to matter inasmuch as it is receptive of an accident. But it differs from matter in this respect, that while matter has actual being only through form, a subject is not constituted in being by an accident.
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 16 Si ergo quaeratur quae sit causa eclipsis, non est assignare quae sit materia; sed luna est subiectum patiens talem passionem. Causa autem movens, quae corrumpit lumen, est terra interposita diametraliter inter solem et lunam. Causam vero finalem forsitan non est assignare. Ea enim, quae ad defectum pertinent, non sunt propter finem, sed magis proveniunt ex necessitate naturae, vel causae agentis. Dicit autem forsan, quia consideratio causarum circa singula quae contingunt in motibus caelestibus est valde difficilis. Causa vero formalis eclipsis est definitio eius. Sed haec definitio non est manifesta, nisi in ea ponatur causa; ut ratio eclipsis lunae est privatio luminis in luna. Sed, si addatur, quod ista privatio est a terra in medio obiecta inter solem et lunam diametraliter, haec definitio erit cum causa.	1744. Therefore, if one asks what is the cause of an eclipse, one cannot give its (~) matter, but the moon is the (+) subject undergoing this modification. And the efficient cause which extinguishes the light is the earth placed directly between the sun and the moon. But perhaps it is impossible to give the final cause; for those things which pertain to defect do not exist because of some end but are rather a result of natural necessity or of the necessity of the efficient cause. However, he says “perhaps” because an investigation of the causes of particular events which take place in celestial movements is especially difficult. And the formal cause of an eclipse is its definition. But this definition is not clear unless the [efficient] cause is given therein. Thus the definition of a lunar eclipse is the privation of light in the moon. But if one adds that this privation is caused by the earth being placed directly between the sun and the moon, this definition will contain the [efficient] cause.
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 17 Similiter hoc patet in hoc accidente quod est somnus. Sed in somno non est manifestum quid est primum subiectum patiens hanc passionem; sed hoc est manifestum quod animal est subiectum somni. Sed secundum quid primo somnus insit animali, utrum sit cor, vel aliquid aliud tale, non est manifestum; cum quidam ponant primum instrumentum sensus esse cerebrum, quidam vero cor. Somnus autem est quies operationis sensibilis. Deinde oportet considerare, habito subiecto somni, a quo sicut a causa agente sit somnus; utrum ab evaporatione alimenti, aut labore, aut aliquo huiusmodi. Deinde oportet considerare quae passio sit somnus, illius scilicet secundum quod primo inest somnus animali, et non totius animalis; quia somnus est quaedam immobilitas; sed ea competit animali per aliquod primum, quod est subiectum talis passionis. Et illud primum oportet poni in definitione somni, sicut et quodlibet accidens definitur per proprium suum primum subiectum. Color enim definitur per superficiem et non per corpus.	1745. This is evident also in regard to the accident sleep. But in the case of sleep it is not clear what the primary subject is that undergoes this modification, although it is clear that the animal is the subject of sleep. However, it is not clear to what part of the animal sleep primarily belongs-whether to the heart or some other part; for some men hold that the primary organ of sensation is the brain and some the heart. However, sleep is the cessation of sensory operation. Then, having come to an agreement on the subject of sleep, it is necessary to consider from what, as its efficient cause, sleep comes—whether from the evaporation of food or physical labor or something of this kind. Next we must consider what modification sleep is, [defining] its primary subject, which will be some part of the animal and not the whole animal. For sleep is a kind of immobility. But it belongs primarily to an animal by reason of some part which is the subject of such a modification. Now in the definition of sleep we must state this primary subject, just as in the definition of every accident we must state its primary and proper subject. For color is defined by surface but not by body.
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 18 Deinde cum dicit quoniam vero determinat de materia per comparationem ad transmutationem unius ad alterum. Et ideo primo ostendit quomodo diversimode fit transmutatio in diversis. Secundo movet quasdam dubitationes, ibi, habet autem dubitationem. Dicit ergo primo, quod quaedam quandoque sunt et quandoque non sunt sine generatione et corruptione, idest sine hoc quod ipsa per se generentur et corrumpantur; sicut puncta, et universaliter omnes species et formae, sive sint substantiales sive accidentales. Non enim album per se loquendo fit, sed lignum album: omne enim quod fit, fit ex aliquo, scilicet materia, et fit aliquid, ad quod terminatur generatio, quod est forma: et sic omne quod fit, est compositum ex materia et forma. Unde ea quae sunt formae tantum, per se fieri non possunt. Cum ergo dicitur quod contraria fiunt ex invicem, diversimode intelligendum est in compositis et simplicibus. Aliter enim fit albus homo ex nigro homine, et aliter nigrum ex albo: quia albus homo significat aliquid compositum, et ideo per se potest fieri: sed album significat formam tantum, unde non fit nisi per accidens ex nigro.	1746. But since some things (730). He deals with matter in relation to the process whereby one thing is changed into something else. Therefore, first (730), he shows how change comes about in different ways in different things. Second (731:C 1748), he proposes certain problems (“Again, there is the problem”). He says, first (730), that certain things sometimes are and sometimes arc not but “without generation and corruption,” i.e., without being gencrated and corrupted in themselves, for example, points and all specifying principles and forms generally, whether substantial or accidental. For properly speaking, white does not come to be, but white wood does; for everything which comes to be comes “from something,” i.e., from matter, and comes to be that in which the process of coming to be is terminated, which is form. Thus everything which comes to be is composed of matter and form. Hence those things which are forms only cannot come to be in themselves. Therefore, when it is said that contraries come to be from each other, this has one meaning in the case of composite things and another in the case of simple things. For white man comes from black man in a different way than white from black, because white man signifies a composite and can therefore come to be in itself. But white signifies a form only, and therefore it comes to be from black only by reason of something else.
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 19 Patet ergo ex praedictis, quod non cuiuslibet rei est materia, sed illorum quae per se generantur et transmutantur in invicem. Illa vero, quae quandoque sunt et quandoque non sunt sine hoc quod transmutentur per se, ita se habent quod eorum materia non est ex qua sint; sed habent subiectum, in quo sunt, pro materia.	1747. From the above, then, it is clear that matter does not exist in everything but only in those things which are generated or transformed essentially into each other. However, those things which sometimes are and sometimes are not, without being changed essentially, are such that their matter is not that from which they come, but they have as their matter the subject in which they exist.
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 20 Deinde cum dicit habet autem movet duas quaestiones circa praedicta. Quarum prima est, quomodo materia se habeat ad contraria: utrum scilicet, ita sit, quod in omnibus quae videntur contrarietatem aut oppositionem habere, materia aequaliter vel eodem ordine sit in potentia ad utrumque oppositorum. Sicuti sanitati opponitur infirmitas, et subiectum unum in potentia ad utrumque aequaliter est, et eodem ordine. Est enim sanitas aequalitas quaedam humorum. Infirmitas vero inaequalitas. Inaequalitas vero et aequalitas eodem ordine se habent ad suum subiectum. Videtur ergo quod ad vinum et acetum sicut ad contraria, aqua, quae est materia humorum, sit in potentia, et aequaliter se habeat ad utrumque.	1748. Again, there is the problem (731). He raises two questions in regard to the above. The first of these pertains to the way in which matter is related to contraries, namely, whether in all things which seem to have contrariety or opposition matter is in potentiality to each contrary equally and in the same order. For health is a certain equality of humors, whereas disease is their inequality. But both inequality and equality are related to their subject in the same order. Therefore it seems that water, which is the matter of humors, is in potentiality to wine and vinegar as contraries, and is disposed equally to both.
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 21 Sed philosophus dicit solvendo, quod hoc non est ita. Forma enim vini se habet ut habitus quidam et species, forma autem aceti est ut privatio quaedam et corruptio vini. Sic igitur materia se habet per prius quidem ad vinum sicut ad habitum et ad speciem, ad acetum autem sicut ad privationem et corruptionem vini. Et ita non comparatur ad acetum nisi mediante vino.	1749. But in solving this problem the Philosopher says that this is not true. For the form of wine is a certain positive state and nature, whereas the form of vinegar is the privation and corruption of wine. Hence matter is disposed first to wine as a positive state and form, but to vinegar as the privation and corruption of wine. And thus it is related to vinegar only through the medium of wine.
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 22 Deinde cum dicit dubitatio autem secundam dubitationem movet, quae talis est. Illud, ex quo fit aliquid, videtur esse materia illius; sicut ex elementis fiunt corpora mixta, et sunt eorum materia. Cum igitur ex vino fiat acetum, et ex vivo fiat mortuum, dubitatur, quare vinum non sit materia aceti, et vivum materia mortui, cum ordinentur ad ea, sicut potentia ad actum.	1750. Now this raises the problem (732). He proposes a second problem, which is as follows. That from which a thing comes to be seems to be the matter of that thing; for example, mixed bodies come to be from the elements, which constitute their matter. Therefore, since vinegar comes from wine and a dead body from a living one, the problem arises why wine is not the matter of vinegar and a living body the matter of a dead one, since one is related to the other as potentiality is to actuality.
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 23 Sed ad hoc respondetur, quod acetum est corruptio ipsius vini, mortuum vero corruptio vivi: non ergo acetum fit ex vino sicut ex materia, neque mortuum ex vivo: sed secundum accidens dicitur ex eo fieri, inquantum fit ex materia eius. Unde scyphus non est materia phialae, sed argentum. Similiter vivum non est materia mortui, sed sunt elementa.	1751. But the answer to this is that vinegar is the corruption of wine itself, and a dead body the corruption of a living one. Hence vinegar does not come from wine as matter, or a dead body from a living one; but one is said to come from the other in virtue of something else inasmuch as it comes from its matter. Hence the matter of a bowl is not a goblet but silver. Similarly, a living body is not the matter of a dead body, but the elements are.
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 24 Quod autem ex vivo dicitur fieri mortuum, vel ex vino acetum, si referantur ad ipsam formam vini vel animalis, haec praepositio ex, significabit ordinem; quia scilicet in eadem materia, post formam vini, est acetum, et post formam animalis est mortuum. Per quem modum dicimus quod ex die fit nox. Et ideo quaecumque sic transmutantur adinvicem, sicut ex vino fit acetum, et ex animali mortuum, non fit conversio transmutationis nisi redeatur ad materiam. Sicut si ex mortuo debet fieri animal vivum, oportet quod redeatur ad materiam primam, inquantum corpus mortuum resolvitur in elementa, et ex elementis iterum ordine debito venitur ad constitutionem animalis. Et similiter de aceto et vino.	1752. But because a dead body is said to come from a living one or vinegar from wine, this preposition from will signify order if reference is made to the form itself of wine or living body; for in the same matter after the form of wine there is vinegar, and after the form of a living body there is a dead one. And it is in this way that we say that night comes from day. Therefore, in all things that come from each other in this way, as vinegar from wine and a dead body from a living one, the process of change is reversed only when these things are dissolved into their matter. For example, if a living body must come from a dead one, the latter must first be dissolved into its primary matter inasmuch as a dead body is dissolved into the elements; and from the elements again in due order a living body is constituted. It is the same in regard to vinegar and wine.
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 25 Et huius ratio est, quia quandocumque materia se habet ad diversa secundum ordinem, non potest ex posteriori rediri in id quod praecedit secundum ordinem. Sicut in generatione animalis ex cibo fit sanguis, et ex sanguine semen et menstruum, ex quibus generatur animal. Non potest autem mutari ordo, scilicet ut ex semine fiat sanguis, aut ex sanguine cibus, nisi per resolutionem ad primam materiam, ex eo quod cuiuslibet rei est determinatus modus generationis. Et similiter, quia materia vini non comparatur ad acetum nisi per vinum, inquantum scilicet est corruptio vini. Similiter est de mortuo et vivo, et de caeco et vidente, et caeteris: et ideo a talibus privationibus non fit reditus ad habitus, nisi per resolutionem in primam materiam.	1753. The reason for this is that, whenever matter is disposed to different forms in a certain order, it cannot be brought back from a subsequent state to one that is prior in that order. For example, in the generation of an animal, blood comes from food; and the semen and menstrual fluid, from which the animal is generated, come from blood. But this order cannot be reversed so that blood comes from semen and food from blood, unless these are resolved into their first matter; because for each thing there is a definite mode of generation. And it is the same [in the other case], because the matter of wine is related to vinegar only through the medium of wine, namely, inasmuch as it is the corruption of wine. The same is also true of a dead body and a living one, of a blind man and one who has sight, and so on. Therefore from such privations there can be a return to a prior form only when such things are dissolved into first matter.
lib. 8 l. 4 n. 26 Si autem sit aliqua privatio ad quam materia immediate ordinatur, quae scilicet nihil aliud significat nisi negationem formae in materia sine ordine ad formam; a tali privatione poterit fieri reditus ad formam, sicut a tenebris ad lucem, quia nihil aliud sunt nisi absentia lucis in diaphano.	1754. However, if there is some privation to which matter is immediately disposed, and this signifies nothing else than the non-existence of form in matter which lacks a disposition for form, then the process of reverting from such a privation to a [prior] form, as from darkness to illumination, will be possible because this [i.e., darkness] is nothing else than the absence of light in the transparent medium.