Authors/Thomas Aquinas/physics/L4/lect1

Lecture 1 Place, its existence

Latin	English
	Lecture 1 Place, its existence
lib. 4 l. 1 n. 1 Postquam philosophus determinavit in tertio de motu et infinito, quod competit motui intrinsece, secundum quod est de genere continuorum, nunc in quarto libro intendit determinare de iis quae adveniunt motui extrinsece. Et primo de iis quae adveniunt motui extrinsece quasi mensurae mobilis; secundo de tempore, quod est mensura ipsius motus, ibi: consequens autem dictis et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo determinat de loco; secundo de vacuo, ibi: eodem autem modo accipiendum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ostendit quod determinandum est a naturali de loco; secundo prosequitur propositum, ibi: quod quidem igitur locus sit et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit quod intendit: et dicit quod sicut ad naturalem pertinet determinare de infinito, si est vel non est, et quomodo sit, et quid sit, similiter etiam et de loco. Secundo ibi: et ea namque quae sunt etc., probat quod dixerat: et primo ex parte ipsius loci; secundo ex parte nostra, ibi: habet autem multas dubitationes et cetera.	406. After treating in Book III of motion, and the infinite, which belongs intrinsically to motion insofar as it is in the genus of continuous things, the Philosopher now intends, in Book IV, to deal with the things that are extrinsically connected with motion. First, of things that are connected with motion extrinsically as measures of mobile things: Secondly, of time which is the measure of motion itself, at no.558 (L.15,1. As to the first he does two things: First, he studies place; Secondly, the void, at no. 494 (L.9). About the first he does two things: First, he shows that it is the business of the natural philosopher to study place; Secondly, he carries out his proposition, at no. 411. As to the first he does two things: First, [277 208 a27] he proposes what he intends and says that just as it is the business of the natural philosopher to determine about the infinite; namely, whether it exists or not, and how it exists, and what it is, so also about place; Secondly, at no. 407, he proves what he had said: First from the viewpoint of place itself; Secondly, from our viewpoint [i.e., that of the ones studying place] at no. 409.
lib. 4 l. 1 n. 2 Circa primum ponit duas rationes: quarum prima talis est. Ea quae sunt communia omnibus naturalibus, pertinent maxime ad considerationem naturalis; sed locus est huiusmodi: omnes enim communiter opinantur omnia ea quae sunt, in aliquo loco esse. Et ad hoc probandum utuntur sophistico argumento a positione consequentis. Argumentantur enim sic. Quod non est, nusquam est, idest in nullo loco est: non enim est dare ubi sit Tragelaphus aut sphinx, quae sunt quaedam fictitia sicut Chimaera. Argumentatur ergo quod si id quod in nullo loco est, non sit; ergo omne quod est, est in loco. Sed si esse in loco convenit omnibus entibus, videtur quod locus magis pertineat ad considerationem metaphysici quam physici. Et dicendum est quod hic argumentatur ab opinione ponentium omnia entia esse sensibilia, propter hoc quod imaginationem corporum transcendere non possunt: et secundum hos naturalis scientia est philosophia prima, communis omnibus entibus, ut dicitur in IV Metaphys.	407. About the first he gives two reasons, of which the following is the first [278 208 a29]. Whatever things are common to all natural things pertain especially to the considerations of the natural philosopher; but place is such, for all generally maintain that whatever exists is in some place. They prove it by a sophistic argument consisting of positing the consequent. They argue thus: What does not exist is nowhere, i.e., in no place, for there is no place where the goat-stag or the sphinx exist, which are certain fictions after the manner of chimeras. They argue therefore that if what is found in no place does not exist, then whatever exists is in a place. But if to be in place belongs to all beings, it seems that place pertains rather to the consideration of metaphysics then that of physics. And it must be said that Aristotle here argues from the opinion of those who posit that all beings are sensible, on account of their inability to go beyond their imaginations. According to them, natural science is first philosophy, common to all beings, as is mentioned in Metaphysics IV (L.5).
lib. 4 l. 1 n. 3 Secundam rationem ponit ibi: et de motu qui communis maxime est etc.: quae talis est. Ad philosophum naturalem pertinet considerare de motu; sed motus qui est secundum locum, quem dicimus loci mutationem, est maxime communis inter omnes motus: quaedam enim, scilicet corpora caelestia, moventur hoc motu tantum, cum tamen nihil moveatur aliis motibus quin moveatur hoc motu. Similiter etiam hic motus est magis proprius: quia hic solus motus est vere continuus et perfectus, ut in octavo probabitur. Motus autem secundum locum non potest cognosci nisi cognoscatur locus. Naturalis igitur debet considerare de loco.	408. Then [279 208 a31] he gives the second reason: The consideration of motion belongs to the natural philosopher; but the motion which is according to place and is called “change of place” is the most general of all motions. For some things namely, the heavenly bodies, are moved solely according to this motion and nothing is moved with other motions without being moved by this one. Moreover, this motion is more properly so because it alone is truly continuous and perfect, as will be proved in Book VIII. But notion according to place cannot be known without knowing place. The natural philosopher therefore should consider place.
lib. 4 l. 1 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit: habet autem multas dubitationes etc., inducit ad idem rationem ex parte nostra. De illis enim a sapientibus determinandum est, de quibus dubitatio est; multae autem dubitationes sunt de loco, quid sit. Quarum quidem dubitationum duplex est causa. Una est ex parte ipsius loci: quia non omnes proprietates loci ducunt in eandem sententiam de loco; sed ex quibusdam proprietatibus loci videtur quod locus sit hoc, ex quibusdam autem videtur quod locus sit aliud. Alia vero causa est ex parte hominum: quia antiqui neque bene moverunt dubitationem circa locum, neque etiam bene exquisierunt veritatem.	409. Then [280 208 a32] he arrives at the same conclusion from our viewpoint: Wise men should settle matters about which there is doubt; but there are many doubts about what place is. The cause of these doubts is twofold. One is based on place itself: because not all the properties of place lead to the same opinion about place, but from certain properties of place it seems that place is one thing and from other properties that it is something else. The other cause is based on men, for the ancients neither proposed their doubts about place well nor pursued the truth of the matter well.
lib. 4 l. 1 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit: quod quidem igitur locus sit etc., incipit determinare de loco: et primo per modum disputativum; secundo determinando veritatem, ibi: post haec autem accipiendum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo inquirit disputative an sit locus; secundo quid sit, ibi: quoniam autem aliud et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ponit rationes ad ostendendum locum esse; secundo ad ostendendum quod locus non sit, ibi: at vero habet defectum et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ostendit locum esse, rationibus acceptis a rei veritate; secundo ab opinionibus aliorum, ibi: amplius vacuum et cetera.	410. Then [281 208 b1] he begins to determine about place. First in a dialectical manner; Secondly, by determining the truth, at no. 434. As to the first he does two things: First he discusses dialectically whether place exists; Secondly what it is at no. 422. About the first he does two things: First he gives reasons showing that place exists; Secondly, showing that it does not exist, at no. 415. As to the first he does two things: First he shows that place exists, by using reasons based on the truth of things; Secondly, by reasons based on the opinions of others, at no. 413.
lib. 4 l. 1 n. 6 Circa primum ponit duas rationes: in quarum prima sic procedit. Dicit enim quod ex ipsa transmutatione corporum quae moventur secundum locum, manifestum est quod locus aliquid sit. Sicut enim transmutatio quae est secundum formas, homines induxit ad cognitionem materiae, quia scilicet oportet esse aliquod subiectum in quo sibi formae succedant; ita transmutatio secundum locum induxit homines ad cognitionem loci; oportet enim esse aliquid ubi sibi corpora succedant. Et hoc est quod subdit, quod exeunte aqua inde ubi nunc est, sicut ex quodam vase, iterum subintrat aer. Cum igitur eundem locum quandoque aliud corpus detineat, ex hoc manifestum videtur esse quod locus sit aliud ab iis quae sunt in loco et transmutantur secundum locum: quia ubi nunc est aer, prius aqua ibi erat; quod non esset si locus non esset aliud et ab aere et ab aqua. Relinquitur igitur quod locus est aliquid; et est quoddam receptaculum, alterum ab utroque locatorum; et est terminus motus localis a quo et in quem.	411. In regard to the first, he gives two reasons. In the first of these he proceeds thus: That place is something, is clear from the very transmutation of bodies that are moved according to place. For just as the transmutation which is according to form led men to the knowledge of matter, because there had to be a subject in which the forms could succeed one another, so transmutation according to place led men to a knowledge of place, for there had to be something where bodies could succeed one another. And this is what he adds, namely, that when water goes out from where it now is, i.e., from some vessel, air re-enters. Since, therefore, another body sometimes occupies the same place, it is clear that place is something different from the things that are in place and which are moved according to place. For where air now is there was previously water, and this would not be if place were not something different from both the air and the water. Consequently, place is something: it is a sort of receptacle distinct from any of the things located in it, and it is the term “from which” and “unto which” of local motion.
lib. 4 l. 1 n. 7 Secundam rationem ponit ibi: amplius autem loci mutationes et cetera. Et dicit quod cum quorumcumque corporum motus ostendat locum esse, ut dictum est, motus localis corporum naturalium simplicium, ut ignis et terrae et aliorum huiusmodi gravium et levium, non solum ostendit quod locus sit aliquid, sed etiam quod locus habeat quandam potentiam et virtutem. Videmus enim quod unumquodque horum fertur in suum proprium locum quando non impeditur, grave quidem deorsum, leve autem sursum. Ex quo patet quod locus habet quandam virtutem conservandi locatum: et propter hoc locatum tendit in suum locum desiderio suae conservationis. Non autem ex hoc ostenditur quod locus habeat virtutem attractivam, nisi sicut finis dicitur attrahere. Sursum autem et deorsum, et alia de numero sex distantiarum, scilicet ante et retro, dextrorsum et sinistrorsum, sunt partes et species loci. Huiusmodi autem distantiae determinantur in universo secundum naturam, et non solum quoad nos. Et hoc patet, quia in his in quibus ista dicuntur quoad nos, non semper idem est sursum vel deorsum vel dextrorsum vel sinistrorsum; sed variatur secundum quod diversimode nos convertimur ad ipsum; unde multoties aliquid immobile manens, quod prius erat dextrum, fit sinistrum, et similiter de aliis, prout nos diversimode ad illa convertimur. Sed in natura aliquid determinatum est sursum et deorsum secundum motum gravium et levium: et aliae positiones secundum motum caeli, ut in tertio dictum est. Non enim indifferenter quaecumque pars mundi est sursum vel deorsum: sed semper sursum est quo feruntur levia, deorsum autem quo feruntur gravia. Quaecumque autem secundum se habent determinatas positiones, necesse est quod habeant potentias quibus determinentur: alia enim est in animali potentia dextri, et alia sinistri. Unde relinquitur quod locus sit, et habeat aliquam potentiam. Quod autem in aliquibus dicatur positio solum quoad nos, ostendit per mathematica; quae quidem, licet non sint in loco, tamen attribuitur eis positio solum per respectum ad nos. Unde in eis non est positio secundum naturam; sed solum secundum intellectum, secundum quod intelliguntur in aliquo ordine ad nos, vel supra vel subtus vel dextrorsum vel sinistrorsum.	412. He gives the second reason [282 208 b8], saying that since the motion of any body whatsoever shows that place exists, as has been said, then the local motion of natural simple bodies, such as fire and earth, and such like heavy and light bodies, not only shows that place is something, but also that place has a certain power and force. For we observe that each of these bodies is carried to its proper place when it is not prevented, i.e., the heavy are carried down and the light upward. This shows that place has a certain power of pre-serving the thing that is in place. For this reason, an object tends to its own place by a desire of self-preservation. This, however, does not prove that place has the power to attract, except in the sense in which the end is said to attract. “Up” and “down” and the other directions, namely, “before” and “behind,” “right” and “left,” are the parts and species of place. These directions are determined in the universe according to nature and not merely in relation to ourselves. This is clear from the fact that when we speak of them in relation to ourselves, the same thing is not always “up” or “down,” “right” or “left,” but varies according to our various relations to it. Hence it frequently happens that an immobile object which was “on the right” comes to be “on the left.” The same is true of the other directions, depending on our different relations to them. But in nature there is a definite “up” and “down” according to the motion of heavy and light bodies, and the other [four] directions are determined by the movements of the heavens, as was said in Book III. It is not just any part of the universe that is “up” and just any part that is “down,” but “up” is always whether light bodies are carried and “down” is whether heavy bodies tend. Now whatever things have according to themselves definite positions must have powers by which they are determined, for in an animal the power of the right is distinct from the power of the left. Accordingly, place exists and has definite powers. Now, that in certain things the position is assigned only in relation to us is shown in mathematical objects, which, although they are not in place, yet have a position attributed to them solely in relation to ourselves. Hence they have no position according to nature but only according to the intellect, inasmuch as they are understood in some relation to ourselves, either as above or below, or to the right or left.
lib. 4 l. 1 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit: amplius vacuum affirmantes etc., ostendit locum esse, ex opinionibus aliorum. Et primo ex opinione ponentium vacuum. Quia quicumque affirmant vacuum esse, necesse est quod dicant esse locum, cum vacuum nihil aliud sit quam locus privatus corpore. Et sic ex hoc et ex praemissis rationibus potest aliquis concipere quod locus sit aliquid praeter corpora, et quod omnia corpora sensibilia sint in loco.	413. Then [283 208 b25] he appeals to the opinions of others to show that place exists. First, to the opinion of those who posit a void. For whoever asserts that the void exists must admit that place exists, since the void is nothing more than a place devoid of body. And so from this and from the reasons given above, it is possible to conceive that place is something other than bodies and that all sensible bodies exist in place.
lib. 4 l. 1 n. 9 Secundo ibi: videbitur autem utique etc., inducit ad idem opinionem Hesiodi, qui fuit unus de antiquis poetis theologis; qui posuit primo factum esse chaos. Dixit enim quod primo inter omnia factum est chaos, quasi quaedam confusio et receptaculum corporum; et postea facta est terra lata ad recipiendum diversa corpora: ac si primo necesse esset esse receptaculum rerum quam ipsas res. Et hoc ideo posuerunt quia crediderunt, sicut et multi alii, quod omnia quae sunt, sint in loco. Quod si verum est, sequitur quod locus non solum sit, sed quod habeat mirabilem potentiam, quae sit prima omnium entium. Illud enim quod potest esse sine aliis, et alia non possunt esse sine eo, videtur esse primum. Locus autem secundum eos potest esse sine corporibus: quod exinde coniiciebant, quia videmus locum remanere destructis locatis. Res autem non possunt esse sine loco. Relinquitur igitur secundum eos, quod locus sit primum inter omnia entia.	414. Secondly, [284 208 b29] to confirm the same point he uses the opinion of Hesiod, who was one of the ancient theological poets. It was he who taught that the first thing made was chaos. For he said that the first of all things made was chaos, it being a sort of confusion and a receptacle for bodies; later the extended earth was made to receive various bodies—as if first a receptacle of things had to exist before the things themselves could exist. And he and others posited this because, with many others, they believed that all things that exist are in place. And if this is true, it follows that place not only exists but that it has a remarkable power in that it is the first of all beings. For that can exist without other things but they not without it, seems to be first. But according to them place can exist without bodies—a conjecture they made by observing that place remains even when the things occupying it are destroyed. But things cannot exist without place. It follows, therefore, according to them, that place is the first among all beings.