Authors/Thomas Aquinas/physics/L4/lect20

Lecture 20 How things are, and are not, in time

Latin	English
	Lecture 20 How things are, and are not, in time
lib. 4 l. 20 n. 1 Postquam philosophus determinavit de tempore secundum se, hic determinat de tempore per comparationem ad ea quae sunt in tempore. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo comparat tempus ad ea quae sunt in tempore; secundo ad ea quae sunt in nunc, ibi: ipsum autem nunc et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo comparat tempus ad motum; secundo ad alia quae sunt in tempore, ibi: manifestum autem quod et cetera.	600. After determining the question of time in itself, the Philosopher now discusses it in relation to things that are in time. As to this, he does two things: First he compares time with things that exist in time; Secondly, with things that exist in the “now,” at no. 612 (L.21). Concerning the first he does two things: First he compares time to motion; Secondly to other things that are in time, at no. 602.
lib. 4 l. 20 n. 2 Circa primum considerandum est quod alio modo comparatur motus ad tempus, et alio modo res aliae. Motus enim mensuratur tempore et secundum illud quod est, et secundum suam durationem sive secundum esse suum. Res autem aliae, utpote homo aut lapis, mensurantur tempore secundum suum esse sive secundum suam durationem, prout habent esse transmutabile: secundum autem id quod sunt, non mensurantur tempore, sed magis eis respondet nunc temporis, ut supra dictum est. Dicit ergo quod tempus est mensura ipsius motus, et eius quod est moveri, per quod dat intelligere durationem motus. Mensurat autem tempus motum per hoc, quod tempore determinatur aliqua pars motus, quae mensurat totum. Et hoc necessarium est; quia unumquodque mensuratur per aliquid sui generis, ut dicitur in X metaphysicae. Et hoc apparet in mensuris magnitudinum. Cubitus enim mensurat totam longitudinem alicuius panni vel alicuius viae, per hoc quod determinat aliquam partem illius longitudinis, quae metitur totum. Et similiter per partem motus tempus mensurat totum motum: per motum enim unius horae mensuratur motus totius diei, et per motum diurnum mensuratur motus annuus. Quia igitur motus mensuratur tempore, nihil est aliud motum esse in tempore, quam mensurari a tempore, et secundum id quod est, et secundum suam durationem: quia secundum utrumque mensuratur a tempore, ut dictum est.	601. In regard to the first, note that motion is related to time in a way different from the way other things are related to it. For motion is measured by time both as to what it is and as to its duration i.e., its existence. But other things, such as a man or a stone, are measured by time as to their existence or their duration insofar as they have a changeable existence; but as to what they are in themselves, they are not measured by time; rather it is the “now” of time that here corresponds, as was said above (L. 18). He says therefore [426 220 b32] that time is the measure of motion itself, and “of being moved,” by which he means the duration of motion. Now time measures motion by a certain part of the motion’s being determined by time, which part then measures the whole motion. And this is necessary, because each thing is measured by something of the same genus, as is said in Metaphysics X. This is evident in the measures of lengths. For a cubit can measure the entire length of a piece of cloth or of a road, because the cubit determines some part of the length—which part then measures the whole. Likewise by means of a part of motion, time measures an entire motion: for by means of the motion of one hour, the motion of a whole day is measured, and by means of the daily motion the yearly motion is measured. Therefore, since motion is measured by times, for motion to be in time is, nothing more than for it to be measured by time, both as to what it is and as to its duration—because according to both aspects it is measured by time, as was said.
lib. 4 l. 20 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit: manifestum autem quod etc., ostendit quomodo se habeat ad alia. Et primo ostendit quomodo aliae res sint in tempore; secundo quibus rebus conveniat in tempore esse, ibi: quoniam autem est sicut et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod, quia motum esse in tempore est tempore mensurari et ipsum et esse eius, manifestum est quod etiam idem est alia in tempore esse et mensurari a tempore, non ipsa, sed esse eorum: motus enim per se mensuratur a tempore, sed alia secundum quod habent motum. Et quod hoc sit rem esse in tempore, quod mensurari esse eius a tempore, sic ostendit: quia esse in tempore dupliciter potest intelligi; uno modo ut dicatur aliquid esse in tempore, quia est simul cum tempore; alio modo ut dicantur aliqua esse in tempore, sicut dicuntur aliqua esse in numero. Quod etiam dicitur dupliciter: in numero enim est aliquid sicut pars, sicut binarius est in quaternario; et aliquid est sicut propria passio eius, ut par et impar, vel quidquid aliud est ipsius numeri: alio vero modo dicitur aliquid esse in numero, non quia ipsum est aliquid numeri, sed quia numerus est eius ut numerati, sicut homines dicuntur esse in tali vel tali numero. Sed quia tempus est numerus, utroque modo contingit aliquid esse in tempore. Nam nunc et prius et posterius et quaecumque sunt huiusmodi, hoc modo sunt in tempore, sicut sunt in numero unitas, quae est pars, et par et impar, quae sunt numeri passiones, et superfluum et perfectum. (Dicitur autem numerus perfectus, qui constat ex partibus mensurantibus ipsum; sicut numerus senarius, quem mensurant unitas, binarius et ternarius, quae simul iuncta constituunt senarium. Numerus autem superfluus dicitur, cuius partes mensurantes ipsum excedunt totum; sicut duodenarius, qui mensuratur unitate, binario, ternario, quaternario et senario, quae simul iuncta consurgunt in sexdecim). Et per hunc modum sunt aliqua in tempore, inquantum sunt aliquid temporis. Sed res quae non sunt aliquid temporis, dicuntur esse in tempore sicut numerata in numero. Unde oportet quod ea quae sunt in tempore, contineantur sub tempore sicut sub numero; sicut ea quae sunt in loco continentur sub loco sicut sub mensura. Exponit etiam consequenter primum modum essendi aliquid in tempore. Et dicit manifestum esse quod non est idem esse in tempore, et esse quando tempus est; sicut etiam non est idem esse in motu et in loco, et esse quando est locus et motus: alioquin sequeretur quod omnes res essent in quolibet, ut puta quod caelum esset in grano milii, quia quando est milium, est caelum. Est autem inter haec duo differentia: quia quando dicitur aliquid esse quando alterum est, accidit uni quod sit simul cum altero; sed illud in quo aliquid est sicut in mensura, ex necessitate consequitur; sicut tempus ex necessitate consequitur ei quod est in tempore, et motus ei quod est in motu, ut simul sint.	602. Then [427 221 a7] he shows how it is related to other things: First, how other things are in time; Secondly, what things belong in time, at no. 603. He says therefore first [427 221 a7] that since for motion to be in time is for it to be measured by time, both as to itself and as to its existence, it is clear that it is likewise the same for other things to exist in time and to be measured by time, i.e., not as to what they are, but as to their existence: for motion is essentially measured by time but other things only insofar as they have motion. He proves, in the following way, that for a thing to exist in time is to have its existence measured by time: To be in time can mean two things; first, as something is said to exist in time, because it co-exists with time; secondly, as something is said to exist in time in the way that things are said to exist in number. And this latter also has two meanings: for in a number something is present (1) as a part, as 2 is in 4; and as a property, such as even and odd, or whatever else that belongs to number; or (2) it can be there, not because it is anything pertaining to number, but because number belongs to it as numbered, as men may be said to be in such and such a number. But because time is a number something can be present in time in both ways. For the “now,” and “before” and “after,” and things of this sort, exist in time as unity exists in number, of which it is a part, and as do even and odd, which are properties of number, and as do “superfluous” and “perfect.” ( A number is called “perfect,” if the sum of the parts measuring it equals the number; for example, six is measured by one, two, and three, which, added together, equal six. A number is called “superfluous” if its divisors total up to a number which exceeds it: for example, 12 is measured by one, two, three, four, and six, which, when added together equal 16.) And that is the way in which some things exist in time, namely, as being something of time . But things that are not something of time are said to be in time as things numbered exist in number. Consequently these latter things that are in time must be contained under time as under a number, just as things in place are contained under place as under a measure. Then he explains the very first way of something’s existing in time. And he says it is clear that it is not the same thing to exist in time, and to exist when time exists [i.e., to co-exist] just as it is not the same to be in motion and in place and to be in existence when place and motion exist. Otherwise, it would follow that all things would be in anything; for example, the heavens would be in a grain of millet, because when the millet exists, the heavens exist. There are two differences between these situations: for when something is said to be when something else exists, it is incidental to the one that it exists at the same time as the other; but that in which something exists as in a measure follows necessarily [upon that which is in it], as time necessarily follows upon that which is in time, and motion upon that which is in motion, so that they are together.
lib. 4 l. 20 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit: quoniam autem est, sicut est in numero etc., ostendit quibus conveniat esse in tempore. Et primo quod non omnia entia sunt in tempore; secundo quod non omnia non entia, ibi: manifestum igitur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ostendit quod ea quae sunt semper, non sunt in tempore; secundo quod nihilominus ea quae quiescunt, inquantum huiusmodi, sunt in tempore, ibi: quoniam autem tempus et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo proponit ea ex quibus procedit ad propositum ostendendum; secundo concludit propositum, ibi: quare manifestum est, etc., proponit autem duo. Quorum primum est, quod cum aliquid sit in tempore sicut numeratum in numero, necesse est quod accipi possit aliquod tempus maius omni eo quod est in tempore; sicut potest accipi aliquis numerus maior omni eo quod est numeratum. Et propter hoc necesse est omnia quae sunt in tempore, totaliter contineri sub tempore et concludi sub ipso, sicut ea quae sunt in loco concluduntur sub loco.	603. Then [428 221 a26] he shows to what things it belongs to be in time; First he shows that not all beings exist in time; Secondly, that not all non-beings do, at no. 611. As to the first he does two things: First he shows that things which are always do not exist in time; Secondly, that nevertheless things that are at rest are, as such, in time, at no. 606. As to the first he does two things: First he mentions the facts from which he proceeds to the manifestation of his proposition; Secondly, he concludes to the proposition, at no. 605. Now he mentions two things. The first of these [428 221 a26] is that, when something is in time as the numbered is in a number, then necessarily there is some time that can be taken larger than everything that exists in that time, just as it is possible to take a number larger than everything that is numbered. Consequently, all things that exist in time are of necessity contained under time and comprehended under it just as things in place are comprehended under place.
lib. 4 l. 20 n. 5 Secundum ponit ibi: et pati iam aliquid sub tempore etc.; et est quod omne quod est in tempore, aliquid patitur sub tempore, secundum quod passio pertinet ad defectum. Et hoc probat ex consueto modo locutionis. Consuevimus enim dicere quod longitudo temporis tabefacit, idest putrefacit et corrumpit; et iterum quod propter tempus omnia senescunt quae sunt in tempore; et quod propter tempus oblivio accidit: quae enim de recenti cognovimus, in memoria manent, sed per diuturnitatem temporis elabuntur. Et ne aliquis dicat quod etiam perfectiones attribuuntur tempori sicut et passiones, hoc consequenter excludit; et ponit tria contra tria praemissa. Contra id enim quod dixit, quod obliviscitur propter tempus, subdit, quod aliquis non addiscit propter tempus: si enim aliquis diu vivat otiosus a studio addiscendi, non propter hoc addiscit, sicut propter tempus obliviscitur. Contra hoc autem quod dixit, quod omnia senescunt sub tempore, subdit, quod non est aliquid factum novum propter tempus: non enim propter hoc solum aliquid innovatur quia longo tempore durat, sed magis antiquatur. Contra illud vero quod dixerat, quod tempus tabefacit, subdit, quod tempus non facit bonum, idest integrum et perfectum, sed magis tabidum et corruptum. Et huius causa est, quia ex tempore aliqua corrumpuntur, etiam si non appareat aliquid aliud manifeste corrumpens: quod ex ipsa ratione temporis apparet. Est enim tempus numerus motus: de ratione autem motus est quod faciat distare id quod est, a dispositione in qua prius erat. Unde cum tempus sit numerus primi motus, ex quo in omnibus causatur mutabilitas, sequitur quod propter diuturnitatem temporis, omnia quae sunt in tempore removeantur a sua dispositione.	604. The second thing is then mentioned [429 221 a30] and it is that whatever exists in time suffers something under time in the sense of “suffering” (passio) which pertains to defect. And he proves this from the way people ordinarily speak. For we are wont to say that length of time “wastes things away,” i.e., decays and corrupts them, and again that on account of time all things that exist in time grow old, and that on account of time forgetting occurs - for things we have recently learned remain in the memory but with length of time they slip away. And lest anyone should say that perfections also are attributed to time as well as defects, he subsequently forestalls this, giving, in effect, three reasons over and above the three aforesaid. Complementing his statement that forgetting occurs on account of time, he add-s that no one learns on account of time; for if a person should neglect study for a long time, he does not on that account learn, while he does on account of time forget. In keeping with his statement that all things grow old in time, he adds that nothing becomes new on account of time; for a thing is not renewed on account of a long existence; rather, it becomes antiquated. To match his statement that time wastes things away, he adds that time does not make a thing good, i.e., whole, and perfect, but rather wasted and decayed. The reason for this is that time corrupts things even when there is no other manifest corrupting agents. All this is due to the very nature of time: for time is the number of motion—and it is of the nature of motion to put a distance between what now is and the condition it was in previously. Consequently, since time is the number of the first motion, which causes mutability in all things, it follows that length of time causes all things that exist to time to be removed from their former condition.
lib. 4 l. 20 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit: quare manifestum est etc., concludit propositum ex praemissis: et primo ex primo prius proposito. Ostensum est enim quod quaecumque sunt in tempore, continentur sub tempore: quae autem sunt semper, non continentur sub tempore quasi excedente; neque esse, idest duratio, ipsorum mensuratur sub tempore, cum in infinitum durent, infinitum autem non contingit mensurari: ergo illa quae sunt semper, non sunt in tempore. Sed hoc verum est secundum quod sunt semper. Corpora enim caelestia sunt semper secundum esse substantiae eorum, non autem secundum ubi; et ideo duratio eorum non mensuratur tempore, sed motus localis ipsorum tempore mensuratur. Secundo ibi: signum autem huius etc., probat idem ex secundo prius positorum. Et dicit quod signum huius, quod ea quae sunt semper non sunt in tempore, est, quod non patiuntur a tempore, quasi non existentia in tempore. Non enim tabescunt, neque senescunt, sicut dictum est de illis quae sunt in tempore.	605. Then [430 221 b3] he concludes to his proposition from the foregoing premises, and first of all, from the first. For it has been shown that whatever exists in time is contained under time while whatever things are always, are not contained under time as exceeding time. Neither is the being, i.e., the duration, of such things measured under time, since they endure to infinity, and the infinite cannot be measured. Therefore those things that exist forever, are not in time. But this is true insofar as they exist always. For the heavenly bodies exist forever according to the being of their substance, but not in regard to “where” they are; consequently, their duration is not measured by time, yet their local motion is. Secondly [431 221 b5] he proves the same point from the second of the points laid down before. And he says that a sign that those things which exist forever do not exist in time is that they do not suffer from time, as though not existing in time. For they neither waste away nor grow old, as was said of things that exist in time.
lib. 4 l. 20 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit: quoniam autem tempus etc., quia ostenderat quod ea quae sunt semper non sunt in tempore, ea autem quae quiescunt, eodem modo se habent; posset aliquis credere quod quiescentia, inquantum huiusmodi, non mensurarentur tempore. Et ideo ad hoc excludendum, ostendit quod tempus est etiam quietis mensura. Et circa hoc quinque facit. Primo enim proponit quod intendit: et dicit quod quia tempus est mensura motus per se, erit etiam et per accidens mensura quietis; quia omnis quies est in tempore, sicut et omnis motus.	606. Then [432 221 b7], because he had shown that those things which exist forever do not exist in time, while those things which are at rest also remain the same way someone might think that things at rest are, as such, not measured by time. Therefore to obviate this, he shows that time is also the measure of rest. And in regard to this he does five things: First he proposes what he intends, and says that because time is the measure of motion per se, it will also be per accidens the measure of rest; for all rest is in time just as all motion is.
lib. 4 l. 20 n. 8 Secundo ibi: non enim sicut etc., excludit quoddam, per quod videri posset quod quies non mensuretur tempore. Quia enim tempus est mensura motus, posset aliquis credere quod quiescens, quia non est in motu, non sit in tempore. Et ideo ad hoc excludendum dicit, quod non est necesse moveri omne quod est in tempore, sicut necesse est moveri omne quod est in motu: quia tempus non est motus, sed numerus motus. Contingit autem esse in numero motus non solum quod movetur, sed etiam quod quiescit.	607. Secondly [433 221 b9] he excludes something that might lead one to think that rest is not measured by time. For since time is the measure of motion, someone might suppose that a thing at rest, because it is not in motion, is not in time. Consequently, to exclude this, he says that not everything in time need be in motion, in the same way that everything in motion has necessarily to be moved. For time is not a motion but the number of motion. Now it occurs that not only what is being moved, but also what is at rest, may be in the number of motion.
lib. 4 l. 20 n. 9 Tertio ibi: non enim omne immobile etc., probat propositum, scilicet quod quiescens sit in numero motus, ita quod tempore mensuretur. Et ad hoc probandum inducit, quod non omne immobile, idest non omne quod non movetur, quiescit; sed quiescens est privatum motu, quod tamen aptum natum est moveri; sicut supra dictum est in tertio, quod movetur illud cuius immobilitas quies est; quies enim non est negatio motus, sed privatio ipsius. Et sic patet quod esse quiescentis est esse rei mobilis. Unde cum esse rei mobilis sit in tempore et mensuretur tempore, esse etiam rei quiescentis tempore mensuratur. Hic autem dicimus esse in tempore aliquid sicut in numero, quia est aliquis numerus ipsius rei, et quia esse ipsius mensuratur numero temporis. Unde manifestum est quod quiescens est in tempore, et mensuratur tempore, non inquantum est quiescens, sed inquantum est mobile. Et propter hoc praemisit quod tempus est mensura motus per se, quietis autem per accidens.	608. Thirdly [434 221 b12] he proves the proposition that a thing at rest is in the number of motion, as to be measured by time. To do this, he adduces that not every immobile thing, i.e., not every thing that is not in motion, is at rest; rather, a thing at rest is something deprived of motion, but which is nevertheless by nature disposed to be moved, as it was said above in Book III that that is moved whose immobility is rest—for rest is not the negation of motion, but its privation. Consequently, it is evident that the being [existence] of a thing at rest is the being of a mobile being. Hence, since the being [existence] of a mobile being is in time and is measured by time, the being of a thing at rest is measured by time. Now here we are saying that a thing is in time as in a number, because there is some number for that thing, and because its existence is measured by the number of time. Thus it is clear that a thing at rest exists in time and is measured by time, no insofar as it is rest but insofar as it is a mobile being. That is why he said in the beginning that time is per se a measure of motion but per accidens a measure of rest.
lib. 4 l. 20 n. 10 Quarto ibi: mensurabit autem tempus etc., ostendit secundum quid mobile et quiescens mensurantur a tempore. Et dicit quod tempus mensurat illud quod movetur et quiescit, non inquantum est lapis vel homo, sed inquantum est motum et quiescens. Mensuratio enim proprie debetur quantitati: cuius ergo quantitas tempore mensuratur, illud proprie tempore mensuratur. Ex mensuratione autem temporis cognoscitur quantus sit motus, et quanta sit quies; non autem quantum sit id quod movetur. Unde quod movetur, non simpliciter mensuratur tempore secundum propriam quantitatem, sed secundum quantitatem sui motus. Ex quo patet quod tempus proprie sit mensura motus et quietis: sed motus per se, quietis autem per accidens.	609. Fourthly, [435 221 b16] he shows in what sense a mobile and a thing at rest are measured by time. And he says that time measures what is moved and at rest not insofar as it is a stone or a man, but insofar as it is in motion and at rest. For measuring is properly due to quantity; therefore, time is properly the measure of that whose quantity is measured by time. Now, from the measuring done by time, are known both the quantity of motion and the quantity of rest, but not the quantity of the thing in motion. Hence the thing in motion is not measured by time according to its own proper quantity, but according to the quantity of its motion. From this it is clear that time properly is the measure of motion and of rest—of motion per se, but of rest per accidens.
lib. 4 l. 20 n. 11 Quinto ibi: quare quaecumque neque moventur etc., inducit quoddam corollarium ex praemissis. Si enim nihil mensuratur tempore nisi secundum quod movetur et quiescit, sequitur quod quaecumque non moventur neque quiescunt, ut substantiae separatae, non sunt in tempore: quia hoc est esse in tempore, mensurari a tempore. Tempus autem est mensura motus et quietis, ut ex dictis patet.	610. Fifthly, [436 221 b20], he adduces a certain corollary from the foregoing. For if nothing is measured by time except insofar as it is in motion or at rest, it follows that whatsoever things are neither in motion nor at rest, e.g., the separated substances, are not in time; for this is to be in time, namely, to be measured by time. But time is the measure of motion and of rest, as is clear from the foregoing.
lib. 4 l. 20 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit: manifestum igitur quoniam etc., ostendit quod non omnia non entia sunt in tempore. Et dicit manifestum esse ex praemissis, quod neque etiam omne non ens est in tempore, sicut ea quae non contingit aliter esse, ut diametrum esse commensurabilem lateri quadrati: hoc enim est impossibile, quia nunquam contingit esse verum. Huiusmodi autem non mensurantur tempore. Et hoc sic probat. Tempus primo et per se est mensura motus, alia autem non mensurantur nisi per accidens: quaecumque ergo mensurantur tempore, eis contingit moveri et quiescere. Unde et generabilia et corruptibilia et omnia quae quandoque sunt et quandoque non sunt, quia sunt in moveri et quiescere, sunt in tempore: quia quoddam tempus est maius eis, quod excellit durationem ipsorum, et propter hoc mensurat substantias eorum, non secundum id quod sunt, sed secundum esse vel durationem ipsorum. Sed inter ea quae non sunt, et tamen continentur a tempore, quaedam aliquando erant, ut Homerus; quaedam aliquando erunt, ut aliquod futurum; vel si continentur a tempore praeterito et futuro, erunt et erant. Ea vero quae nullo modo continentur a tempore, neque sunt neque fuerunt neque erunt. Et talia sunt ea quae semper non sunt, et quorum opposita semper sunt; sicut diametrum esse incommensurabilem lateri, semper est; unde non mensuratur tempore. Et propter hoc neque contrarium eius, quod est diametrum esse symmetrum, idest commensurabilem lateri, mensuratur tempore: ideo enim semper non est, quia est contrarium ei quod semper est. Quorumcumque autem contrarium non semper est, haec possunt esse et non esse, et habent generationem et corruptionem: et talia mensurantur tempore.	611. Then [437 221 b23] he shows that not all non-beings are in time. He says it is clear from the foregoing that neither is every non-being in time, as in the case of things that cannot be otherwise [whose contradictory cannot be], e.g., that a diagonal be commensurate with the side of a square: for this is impossible, because it can never be true. Now such things are not measured by time. And he proves it in this way: Time is primarily and per se the measure of motion, and anything else is measured by time only per accidens. Consequently whatever is measured by time must be capable of motion and rest. Hence things generable and corruptible, and all things that sometimes exist and sometimes do not, since they are “in motion and rest,” exist in time, for same time can be found that is greater than they are and which exceeds their duration, and for that reason measures their substances, not in regard to the nature of the substances, but in regard to their existence or duration. But among things that do not exist but are nevertheless contained by time, some things existed at one time, as Homer; others will exist, as some future event; or, if they are contained both by past and present time, they both will be and were. But things that are in no way contained by time neither are, nor were, nor will be. Such are things that forever are not, and whose opposites forever are; for example, that a diagonal be not commensurable to the side, forever is; whence it is not measured by time. And for this reason neither is its contrary measured by time, i.e. that the diagonal is symmetrical, i.e., commensurable. The reason why it forever is not, is that it is the contrary of what forever is. But of whatever things the contrary does not always exist, such things can exist and not exist, and are subject to generation and corruption; such things are measured by time.