Authors/Thomas Aquinas/physics/L4/lect22

Lecture 22 How Corruption is attributed to Time—All Motion and Change are in Time

Latin	English
	Lecture 22 How Corruption is attributed to Time—All Motion and Change are in Time.
lib. 4 l. 22 n. 1 Postquam philosophus comparavit tempus et nunc ad ea quae sunt in tempore, hic manifestat quaedam quae superius tacta sunt. Et primo quomodo corruptio attribuitur tempori; secundo quomodo omnis motus et mutatio sit in tempore, ibi: his autem nobis et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo manifestat propositum per rationem; secundo per signum, ibi: signum autem sufficiens et cetera.	620. After comparing time and the “now” to things that exist in time, the Philosopher here explains some things that were touched upon above. First, how corruption is attributed to time; Secondly, how every motion and change exist in time, at no. 623. Concerning the first he does two things: First he makes his proposition clear by an argument; Secondly, by a sign, at no. 622.
lib. 4 l. 22 n. 2 Dicit ergo primo quod omnis mutatio de sui ratione removet rem quae mutatur, a naturali dispositione sua: sed tam generatio quam corruptio fit in tempore. Et ideo quidam attribuebant generationes rerum tempori, ut disciplinam et huiusmodi, dicentes tempus esse sapientissimum, propter hoc quod generatio scientiae fit in tempore. Sed quidam philosophus, Paro nomine, de secta Pythagoricorum, posuit e converso, quod tempus est penitus indisciplinabile, quia scilicet per longitudinem temporis accidit oblivio. Et in hoc rectius dixit: quia, ut prius dictum est, tempus per se magis est causa corruptionis quam generationis. Et hoc ideo, quia tempus est numerus motus: mutatio autem per se est destructiva et corruptiva. Sed causa generationis et ipsius esse non est nisi per accidens. Ex hoc enim ipso quod aliquid movetur, recedit a dispositione quam prius habebat. Sed quod perveniat ad aliquam dispositionem, hoc non importatur in ratione motus inquantum est motus, sed inquantum est finitus et perfectus: quam quidem perfectionem habet motus ex intentione agentis, quod movet ad determinatum finem. Et ideo corruptio magis potest attribui mutationi et tempori: sed generatio et esse agenti et generanti.	621. He says therefore first [446 222 b16] that every change of its very nature removes from its natural disposition the thing that is changed: but both generation and corruption take place in time. And therefore some attributed generations in things to time, as in the case of learning and the like, saying that time is “very wise” because the generation of science takes place in time. But a certain philosopher by the name of Parus, a Pythagorean, claimed on the contrary that time was “wholly unteachable,” because with length of time comes forgetfulness. And he was more right: for, as was said above, time per se is more a cause of corruption than of generation. The reason is that time is the number of motion, and change is per se destructive and corruptive. It does not cause generation and existence except per accidens. For from the fact that something is moved, it departs from the state in which it was. But that it arrive at some disposition is not implied in the notion of motion insofar as it is motion but insofar as it is finished and perfect. And this perfection is brought about by motion on account of the intention of the agent which moves to a predetermined end. Therefore corruption is attributed rather to change and time, whereas generation and being attributed to the agent and generator.
lib. 4 l. 22 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit: signum autem sufficiens etc., manifestat idem per signum: et dicit signum sufficiens esse eius quod dictum est, quod nihil invenitur fieri, nisi appareat aliquid agens et movens ipsum; sed tamen aliquid corrumpitur, cum non appareat manifeste aliquid quod moveat ipsum ad corruptionem. Et talem corruptionem solemus attribuere tempori, sicut cum aliquis senio deficit ex causa intrinseca corrumpente non manifesta: cum autem aliquis occiditur gladio, corruptio eius non attribuitur tempori. In generatione autem semper est generans manifestum, quia nihil a seipso generatur: et ideo generatio non attribuitur tempori, sicut corruptio. Non tamen corruptio sic attribuitur tempori, quod tempus faciat ipsam: sed quia fit in tempore, et corrumpens latet. Ultimo ibi: quod quidem igitur tempus etc., epilogat dictum esse quod tempus est, et quid sit, et quot modis dicitur nunc, et quid significet tunc et modo et iam et olim et repente.	622. Then [447 222 b22] he explains the same point with a sign, and he says that a sufficient sign of his claim is that nothing is found to come into being independently of an agent and a mover, but that a thing can corrupt without any mover in evidence. And such corruption we are accustomed to attribute to time, as when someone fails through old age from a corrupting internal cause that is not apparent; but when someone is killed with a sword, his corruption is not attributed to time. However, in generation the generator is always evident, because nothing is generated by itself. That is why generation is not attributed to time, as is corruption. Nevertheless, corruption is not laid to time in such a way as that time should cause it; but rather as occurring in time, while the corrupting influence is latent. Finally [448 222 b27], he asserts in a summary way that it has been explained that time exists, and what it is, and how “now” is used in various senses, and what are the meanings of “then” and “just now” and “presently” and “long ago” and “suddenly.”
lib. 4 l. 22 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit: his autem nobis sic determinatis etc., ostendit quod omnis mutatio sit in tempore, duabus rationibus. Quarum prima talis est. In omni mutatione invenitur velocius et tardius: haec autem determinantur tempore; quia velocius dicitur mutari, quod transmutatur prius ad determinatum terminum secundum idem spatium. Ita tamen quod eadem sit regula utriusque motus, ut in loci mutatione sit utraque mutatio circularis, aut utraque recta. Si autem una esset circularis et alia recta, non propter hoc velocius moveretur quod prius veniret ad terminum. Et similiter intelligendum in aliis generibus mutationum. Sequitur igitur quod omnis mutatio sit in tempore.	623. Then [449 222 b30] he above by two arguments that all change occurs in time. The first of these is that in every change is found the distinction of “faster” and “slower.” But these are determined by time—because that is said to be changed “faster,” which is changed first to a designated term, over a same distance, provided that both motions are subject to the same rule; e.g., in the case of local motion, if both motions are circular, or both in a straight line. But if one were along a circle and the other straight, the fact that one reached its terminus before the other would be no reason for saying that one moved “faster” than the other. And the same is to be understood of other types of change. It follows, therefore, that every change exists in time.
lib. 4 l. 22 n. 5 Secundam rationem ponit ibi: at vero prius in tempore est etc.; et ad hoc probandum utitur tali propositione: prius et posterius sunt in tempore. Quod quidem manifestat hoc modo. Prius et posterius dicitur aliquid per distantiam ad ipsum nunc, quod est terminus praeteriti et futuri: sed ipsa nunc sunt in tempore: ergo et prius et posterius sunt in tempore; quia in eodem oportet quod sit nunc et distantia ipsius nunc, sicut in eodem est punctum et distantia quae accipitur per respectum ad punctum; utrumque enim est in linea. Et quia dixerat quod prius et posterius determinantur per distantiam ad ipsum nunc, ostendit quomodo hoc sit e converso in praeteritis et futuris: quia in praeterito dicitur prius quod est remotius ab ipso nunc, posterius autem quod est propinquius; in futuro autem est e converso. Si ergo prius et posterius sunt in tempore, ad omnem autem motum sequitur prius et posterius, necesse est quod omnis motus sit in tempore.	624. He then gives a second reason [450 223 a4], but in this proof he makes use of the proposition that “before” and “after” exist in time. He manifests this proposition in the following way. “Before” and “after” are said according to the distance from the “now,” which is the boundary of the past and of the future. Both “now’s” exist in time; therefore both “before” and “after” exist in time, because that in which the “now” is, and that in which the distance from the “now” is, must be the same; just as it is in the same thing that there are a point and the distance taken in relation to that point, for both are in a line. And because he had said that “before” and “after” are determined by the distance to the “now,” he shows how this occurs in a contrary manner with the past and the future. For in the past, that is “before” which is farther from the “now” but “after” which is nearer; but in the future it is just the opposite. If therefore “before” and “after” exist in time, and “before” and “after” follow upon every motion, then necessarily every motion exists in time.