Authors/Thomas Aquinas/physics/L4/lect5

Lecture 5 Necessary previous notions for the definition of place

Latin	English
	Lecture 5 Necessary previous notions for the definition of place.
lib. 4 l. 5 n. 1 Praemissa disputatione de loco an sit et quid sit, et solutis quibusdam dubitationibus, hic accedit ad determinandum veritatem de loco. Et primo praemittit quasdam suppositiones de loco, quibus utetur determinando de loco; secundo ostendit qualis debeat esse definitio danda de loco, ibi: oportet autem tentare etc.; tertio incipit determinare de loco, ibi: primum quidem igitur et cetera.	445. After setting forth a preliminary discussion about whether place exists and what it is, and after solving some doubtful points on these matters, the Philosopher now begins the task of determining the truth about place. First he gives some presuppositions to be used in determining about place; Secondly, he shows what qualities a definition of place should have, at no. 447; Thirdly, he begins to determine about place, at no. 448.
lib. 4 l. 5 n. 2 Dicit ergo primo quod manifestum fiet ex sequentibus quid sit locus: sed oportet prius accipere quasi quasdam suppositiones et principia per se nota, illa scilicet quae videntur per se inesse loco. Quae quidem sunt quatuor. Omnes enim reputant hoc esse dignum: primo quidem quod locus contineat id cuius est locus; ita tamen quod locus non sit aliquid locati. Quod quidem dicit ad excludendum continentiam formae, quae est aliquid rei, et alio modo continet quam locus. Secunda suppositio est, quod primus locus, idest in quo aliquid primo est, est aequalis locato, non maior neque minor. Tertia suppositio est, quod locus non deficit unicuique locato, quin omne locatum habeat locum; non tamen ita quod unus et idem locus nunquam deficiat eidem locato; quia locus est separabilis a locato: sed quando locus unus deficit alicui locato, tunc locatum fit in alio loco. Quarta suppositio est, quod in omni loco invenitur, quasi differentia loci, sursum et deorsum: et quod naturaliter unumquodque corpus, cum est extra proprium locum, fertur ad ipsum, et cum est in eo, manet in ipso. Propria autem loca naturalium corporum sunt sursum et deorsum, ad quae naturaliter moventur, et in quibus manent. Sed hoc dicit secundum eorum opinionem qui non ponebant aliquod corpus praeter naturam quatuor elementorum: nondum enim probaverat corpus caeleste esse neque grave neque leve, sed postea hoc probabit in primo libro de caelo. Ex his autem nunc suppositis, procedetur ad considerationem aliorum.	446. He says first therefore [308 210 b32] that it will be clear from the following just what place is. But we must first adopt as it were certain suppositions and self-evident principles, those namely, which appear intrinsic to place. Indeed, there are four such: For all agree on this maxim, that place contains that of which it is the place, yet in such a way that place is not any part of the thing in place. He says this to exclude the containing force of form, which is part of a thing, but contains in a manner different from place. The second supposition is that the primary place, i.e., that in which something exists primarily, is equal to, and neither greater nor less than, the thing in place. The third supposition is that a place exists for everything in place, i.e., that everything in place has a place, but not in the sense that one and the same place is never lost by one and the same thing capable of being in a place; for a place can be separated from a thing in place. However, when one place is lost by a thing in place, it acquires another place. The fourth supposition is that in all places there is found, as a [specific] difference of place, an “up” and a “down,” and that each body, when it is outside its proper place, naturally seeks it and, when it is in it, naturally remains there. Now the proper places of natural bodies are “up” and down,” to which they are naturally borne and in which they remain. But he says this in keeping with the opinion of those who posited no body other than the four elements: for he has not yet proved the heavenly body to be neither light nor heavy—which he will prove later in De Coelo, I . From these presuppositions he proceeds to the consideration of what remains.
lib. 4 l. 5 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit: oportet autem tentare etc., ostendit qualis debeat esse definitio danda de loco. Et dicit quod in definiendo locum, intentio nostra debet ad quatuor attendere, quae quidem necessaria sunt ad definitionem perfectam. Primo quidem, ut ostendatur quid sit locus: nam definitio est oratio indicans quid est res. Secundo, ut solvantur quaecumque opposita sunt circa locum: nam cognitio veritatis est solutio dubitatorum. Tertium est, quod ex definitione data manifestentur proprietates loci, quae insunt ei: quia definitio est medium in demonstratione, qua propria accidentia demonstrantur de subiectis. Quartum est, quod ex definitione loci erit manifesta causa, quare aliqui discordaverunt circa locum; et omnium quae sunt opposita circa ipsum. Et sic pulcherrime definitur unumquodque.	447. He then [309 211 a7] shows what qualities should be found in a definition of place. And he says that in defining place our attention should be focused on four things which indeed are necessary for a perfect definition: First, that one show what place is, for a definition is an expression indicating what a thing is. Secondly, that one resolve conflicting arguments about place: for the knowledge of truth involves the solution of doubts. Thirdly, that the given definition reveal the properties of place, which inhere in it, because a definition is the middle term in a demonstration, by which the proper accidents are demonstrated of the subject. Fourthly, that from the definition of place the cause will be clear why there is disagreement about place and of all the conflicting things said about it. Such a procedure is the most beautiful way of defining anything.
lib. 4 l. 5 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit: primum quidem igitur oportet etc., determinat de loco. Et primo ostendit quid sit locus; secundo solvit dubitationes prius positas, ibi: manifestum autem ex his etc.: tertio assignat causam naturalium proprietatum loci, ibi: et fertur igitur in sui ipsius et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo ostendit quid sit locus; secundo quomodo aliquid sit in loco, ibi: cui quidem igitur et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo praemittit quaedam quae sunt necessaria ad investigandum definitionem loci; secundo incipit investigare loci definitionem, ibi: iam igitur manifestum ex et cetera.	448. Then [310 211 a13] he determines about place; First he shows what place is; Secondly, at no. 487, he settles the doubts previously mentioned; Thirdly, he assigns the cause of the natural properties of place, at no. 492. About the first he does two things: First he shows what place is; Secondly, how something exists in place, at no. 472(L.7). As to the first he does two things: First he mentions some facts preliminary to his hunt for the definition; Secondly, he begins to investigate the definition of place, at no. 455 (L.6).
lib. 4 l. 5 n. 5 Circa primum quatuor praemittit. Quorum primum est, quod nunquam fuisset inquisitum de loco, nisi esset aliquis motus secundum locum. Ex hoc enim necesse fuit ponere locum aliud a locato, quia inveniuntur in eodem loco successive duo corpora, et similiter unum corpus in duobus locis; sicut etiam transmutatio formarum circa unam materiam, induxit in cognitionem materiae. Et propter hoc maxime opinantur aliqui quod caelum sit in loco, quia semper movetur. Sed motuum aliquis est secundum locum per se, scilicet loci mutatio: alius autem ex consequenti, scilicet augmentum et decrementum; quia augmentata quantitate vel diminuta, corpus accipit maiorem vel minorem locum.	449. In regard to the first, be makes four preliminary statements, the first of which is that the question of place would never have arisen were there no motion in regard to place. For it was necessary to posit place as something distinct from the object in place, because two bodies are found successively in the same place, and, in like manner, one body successively in two places. (Similarly, it was the successive change of forms in one and the same matter that led to the knowledge of matter). For this reason some are convinced that the heavens are in place, since they are always in motion. Now, of motions, one is according to place per se, namely, the change of place; another is consequently related to place, namely, increase and decline, because as a body grows or decreases, it acquires a larger or a smaller place.
lib. 4 l. 5 n. 6 Secundum ponit ibi: est autem quod movetur aliud et cetera. Et dicit quod aliquid movetur per se in actu, sicut quodcumque corpus; aliud vero secundum accidens. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter. Quaedam enim moventur secundum accidens, quae tamen sunt possibilia moveri per se; sicut partes alicuius corporis, dum sunt in toto, moventur per accidens; sed quando separantur, moventur per se; ut clavus, quando est infixus navi, movetur per accidens, sed quando extrahitur, movetur per se. Quaedam vero non possunt moveri per se, sed semper moventur per accidens; sicut albedo et scientia, quae mutant locum inquantum mutatur illud in quo sunt. Hoc autem induxit, quia hoc modo aliquid per se vel per accidens, actu vel potentia natum est esse in loco, sicut et moveri.	450. He gives the second [311 211 a17], saying that some things are moved, per se in act as in the case with every body, while others according to accident. This latter can occur in two ways. For some things that could be moved essentially are de facto moved accidentally, as the parts of a body while they are in the whole body are moved per accidens but when they are separated they are moved per se. Thus, a nail, when it is embedded in a ship, is moved per accidens, but when it is extracted it is moved per se. Other things are not be moved per se, but only per accidens, as is the case with whiteness and knowledge, which change place as that in which they are changes place. This point was brought up because things are apt to be in place per se or per accidens, actually or potentially in the same way as they are apt to be moved in those ways.
lib. 4 l. 5 n. 7 Tertium ponit ibi: quoniam autem dicimus esse et cetera. Et dicit quod aliquis dicitur esse in caelo sicut in loco, propter hoc quod est in aere, qui quidem est in caelo. Nec tamen dicimus quod in toto aere sit aliquis primo et per se; sed propter ultimam extremitatem aeris, quae continet aliquem, dicitur aliquis esse in aere; quia si totus aer esset locus alicuius, puta hominis, non esset aequalis locus et locatum; quod est contra suppositionem prius positam. Sed id in quo est aliquid primo, videtur esse extremum corporis continentis, et sic est huiusmodi, scilicet aequale.	451. He gives the third [312 211 a23] when he says that someone is said to be in the heavens as in a place because he is in the air which indeed is in the heavens. Yet we do not say that anyone is in the entire air primarily and per se, but by reason of the ultimate boundary of the air containing him he is said to be in the air. For if the whole air were anything’s place, e.g., a man’s, the place and the thing in place would not be equal—which is against what was supposed above. But that in which something exists primarily is seen to be the boundary of the containing body; and this is what primary place means, i.e., equal.
lib. 4 l. 5 n. 8 Quartum ponit ibi: cum quidem igitur non divisum et cetera. Et primo ponit; secundo probat, ibi: et cum continuum et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod cum continens non est divisum a contento, sed est ei continuum, non dicitur esse in illo sicut in loco, sed sicut pars in toto; utpote, si dicamus unam partem aeris contineri a toto aere. Et hoc concludit ex praemissis, quia ubi est continuum, ibi non est accipere ultimum in actu, quod supra dixit requiri ad locum. Sed cum continens est divisum, et contiguum contento, tunc, contentum scilicet, est in loco, existens in ultimo continentis primo et per se: illud inquam continens, quod non est pars eius, neque est maius neque minus secundum dimensionem, sed aequale. Et quomodo possint esse continens et contentum aequalia, ostendit per hoc quod ultima contingentium se sunt simul; unde oportet eorum ultima esse aequalia.	452. He gives the fourth reason [313 211 a29]. First, he mentions it; secondly, he proves it, at no. 453. He says therefore first that whenever the container is not separate from the thing contained but is continuous with it, the latter is not said to be in it as in a place, but as a part in a whole; as, for example, when we say that one part of the air is contained by the totality of air. And he concludes this from what went before, because where there is a continuum there is no ultimate boundary in act, something that is required for place, as was stated above. But when the container is separated, and contiguous to the thing contained, this latter is in place and exists in the ultimate boundary of the container primarily and per se, of a container, that is, which is not a part of the contained and neither greater nor less but equal in dimension. But how the container and the thing contained can be equal he shows by pointing out that the ultimate boundaries of things touching are together: whence, their ultimate boundaries must be equal.
lib. 4 l. 5 n. 9 Deinde cum dicit: et cum continuum quidem sit etc., probat istud quartum duabus rationibus. Quarum prima est, quod contentum continuum continenti, non movetur in continente, sed simul cum illo, sicut pars simul cum toto: sed quando est divisum contentum a continente, tunc potest moveri in illo, sive continens moveatur sive non; homo enim movetur in navi, vel quiescente vel mota. Cum ergo aliquid moveatur in loco, sequitur quod locus sit continens divisum.	453. Then he proves the fourth point by two arguments [314 211 a34]. The first of these is that something contained that forms a continuum with the container is not moved in the container but with the container, as the part is moved simultaneously with the whole; but when it is separate from the container, then it can be moved in it, whether the container be moved or not—for a man is moved on a ship whether it be moving or at rest. Therefore, since something can be moved in a place, it follows that place is a separated container.
lib. 4 l. 5 n. 10 Secundam rationem ponit ibi: amplius, cum non divisum sit et cetera. Et dicit quod cum contentum non sit divisum a continente sed continuum ei, tunc dicitur esse in eo sicut pars in toto; ut visus est sicut pars formalis in oculo, et manus sicut pars organica in corpore: sed cum divisum est contentum a continente, tunc dicitur esse in eo ut in vase, sicut aqua in cado et vinum in scypho: quorum haec est differentia, quod manus movetur cum corpore sed non in corpore, sed aqua movetur in cado. Cum ergo supra dictum sit quod esse in loco sit sicut esse in vase, non autem sicut pars in toto, sequitur quod locus sit sicut continens divisum.	454. He gives a second argument for the fourth point [315 211 b1], saying that when the thing contained is not separate from the container but continuous with it, then it is said to be in it as a part in a whole, as sight is in the eye as a formal part and the hand in the body as an organic part. But when the container and the thing contained are separate, then the latter is in it as in a vessel; as water in a barrel or wine in a cup. The difference between the example in the first case and in the second is that the hand is moved with the body, but not in the body, but the water is moved in the barrel. Therefore, since we have said above that to be in place is to be there as in a vessel but not as a part in a whole, it follows that place is like a separated container.