Authors/Thomas Aquinas/physics/L4/lect6

Lecture 6 The definition of place

Latin	English
	Lecture 6 The definition of place
lib. 4 l. 6 n. 1 Praemissis his quae sunt necessaria ad investigandum definitionem loci, hic investigat loci definitionem. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo investigat particulas definitionis; secundo concludit definitionem, ibi: quare terminus etc., tertio ostendit eam bene assignatam, ibi: et propter hoc medium et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo investigat genus loci; secundo differentiam completivam definitionis eius, ibi: videtur autem magnum aliquid et cetera. Ad investigandum autem genus loci utitur divisione quadam. Unde circa hoc tria facit: primo proponit divisionem; secundo excludit tria membra divisionis, ibi: horum autem, quod non contingat etc.; tertio concludit quartum, ibi: si igitur nihil horum et cetera.	455. After positing the preliminary notions required for the search of the definition of place, the Philosopher now begins his search for the definition. About this he does three things: First, he looks into each part of the definition; Secondly, he shows that it is a good definition, at no. 471 As to the first he does two things: First, he searches for the genus of place; Secondly, for the differentia that will complete the definition, at no.467. In searching for the genus of place he divides. In connection with this he does three things: First he gives the division; Secondly, he excludes three members of the division, at no. 457; Thirdly, he concludes to the fourth member, at no. 466.
lib. 4 l. 6 n. 2 Dicit ergo primo quod iam ex praemissis potest esse manifestum quid sit locus. Videtur enim secundum ea quae consueverunt de loco dici, quod locus sit unum de quatuor; scilicet vel materia, vel forma, vel aliquod spatium inter extrema continentis; vel si nullum spatium est inter extrema continentis, quod habeat aliquas dimensiones, praeter magnitudinem corporis quod ponitur infra corpus continens, oportebit dicere quartum, scilicet quod extrema corporis continentis sit locus.	456. He says therefore first [316 211 b5] that from the previous discussion the nature of place may already be clear. For it seems that according to what is ordinarily said of place that it is one of four things: namely, matter or form or the space between and within the boundaries of the container, or, if there is no space within the boundaries of the container which has its own dimensions over and above the dimensions of the body existing within the confines of the container, then it will be necessary to posit a fourth possibility, namely, that place is the boundary of the containing body.
lib. 4 l. 6 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit: horum autem, quod non contingat etc., excludit tria membra praedictae divisionis. Et primo proponit quod intendit, dicens manifestum esse per sequentia, quod non contingit locum esse aliquod horum trium. Secundo prosequitur, ibi: sed propter id quod continet, videtur forma etc.: et primo de forma; secundo de spatio, ibi: sed ex eo quod mutatur etc.; tertio de materia, ibi: et materia etiam videtur et cetera.	457. Then [317 211 b9] he excludes three members of this division. First, he proposes what he intends, saying that it is clear from what follows that place is not any of these three; Secondly, he pursues his intention, at no. 458. First, that it is not form; Secondly, that it is not space, at no. 460; Thirdly, that it is not matter, at no. 464.
lib. 4 l. 6 n. 4 Circa primum duo facit: primo ponit quare forma videatur esse locus: quia scilicet forma continet; quod videtur esse proprium loci. Extrema vero corporis continentis et contenti sunt simul, cum continens et contentum sint contigua ad invicem: et sic terminus continens, qui est locus, non videtur separatus esse a termino corporis contenti; et sic videtur locus non differre a forma.	458, In regard to the first he does two things. First [318 211 b10] he sets down why form seems to be place: it is because form is a container, and this seems to be a property of place. Now the boundaries of the containing body and those of the contained are together, since the container and the contained are contiguous. Thus it does not seem that the containing boundary, which is place, is separate from that of the body contained. Consequently, there does not seem to be any difference between place and form.
lib. 4 l. 6 n. 5 Secundo, ibi: sunt quidem igitur utraque etc., ostendit quod forma non sit locus. Quia quamvis locus et forma in hoc conveniant, quod utrumque eorum est quidam terminus, non tamen unius et eiusdem; sed forma est terminus corporis cuius est forma, locus autem non est terminus corporis cuius est locus, sed corporis continentis ipsum; et licet sint simul termini continentis et contenti, non tamen sunt idem.	459. Secondly, [319 211 b12], he shows that form is not place. For although place and form are alike in this, that each is a kind of boundary, nevertheless they are not the boundary of one and the same thing: for form is the boundary of the body of which it is the form, while place is not a boundary of the body of which it is the place, but of the body containing it. So, although the boundaries of the container and of the contained are together, they are not identical.
lib. 4 l. 6 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit: sed ex eo quod mutatur etc., prosequitur de spatio, et primo ponit quare spatium videtur esse locus; secundo ostendit quod non sit locus, ibi: hoc autem non est et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quia multoties mutatur corpus contentum a loco et divisum ab eo, de loco in locum, et succedunt sibi corpora invicem in eodem loco, ita quod continens remanet immobile, eo modo quo aqua exit a vase; propter hoc videtur quod locus sit aliquod spatium medium inter extremitates corporis continentis; ac si aliquid esset ibi praeter corpus quod movetur de uno loco ad alium. Quia si non esset ibi aliud praeter illud corpus, sequeretur quod vel locus non esset aliud a locato, vel quod id quod est medium inter extremitates continentis, non posset esse locus. Sicut autem oportet locum esse aliquid praeter corpus contentum, ita videtur quod oporteat locum esse aliquid praeter corpus continens; ex eo quod locus manet immobilis, corpus autem continens, et omne quod est in eo, contingit transmutari. Nihil autem aliud potest intelligi esse praeter corpus continens et contentum, nisi dimensiones spatii in nullo corpore existentes. Sic igitur ex hoc quod locus est immobilis, videtur quod spatium sit locus.	460. Then [320 211 b14] he takes up the question of space. First he sets down why space seems to be place; Secondly, he shows that it is not place, at no. 461. He says therefore first that frequently a body contained by place, and distinct from it, is changed from one place to another, and any number of bodies can succeed into its original place (but always in such a way that the container remains immobile) in the way that water goes out of a vessel. For this reason it seems that place is some middle space between the boundaries of the containing body, as though there were something there besides the body moved from one place to another. For if nothing were there besides the contained body, it would follow either that place is not distinct from the thing in place, or that what exists within the confines of the container’s boundaries cannot be place. Now just as place must be something over and above the contained body, so it must be something other than the containing body, due to the fact that place remains immobile, whereas the containing body and everything in it can be changed about. But in addition to the containing body and the contained body there is nothing present except the dimensions of space, which exist in no body. Consequently, because place is immobile, it seems that space is place.
lib. 4 l. 6 n. 7 Deinde cum dicit: hoc autem non est etc., ostendit quod spatium non sit locus, duabus rationibus. Circa quarum primam dicit, quod hoc non est verum, quod aliquid sit ibi infra extremitates corporis continentis, praeter corpus contentum, quod transfertur de loco in locum: sed infra illas extremitates corporis continentis incidit aliquod corpus, quodcumque illud esse contingat, ita tamen quod sit de numero corporum mobilium, et iterum de numero eorum quae sunt apta nata tangere corpus continens. Sed si posset esse aliquod spatium continens medium, praeter dimensiones corporis contenti, quod semper maneret in eodem loco, sequeretur hoc inconveniens, quod infinita loca simul essent. Et hoc ideo, quia cum aqua et aer habeant proprias distantias, et quodlibet corpus, et quaelibet pars corporis; omnes partes idem facient in toto quod tota aqua facit in vase. Secundum vero eorum positionem qui tenent sententiam de spatio, dum tota aqua est in vase, sunt ibi aliae dimensiones spatii praeter dimensiones aquae. Omnis autem pars continetur a toto sicut locatum a vase: nec differt nisi solum quantum ad hoc, quod pars non est divisa, locatum autem est divisum. Si ergo pars dividatur in actu, sequetur quod sint ibi aliae dimensiones totius continentis praeter dimensiones partis. Non potest autem dici quod divisio faceret ibi esse de novo aliquas dimensiones: non enim divisio causat dimensionem, sed praeexistentem dividit. Ergo antequam pars esset divisa a toto, erant aliae propriae dimensiones partis, praeter dimensiones totius penetrantes etiam partem. Quot ergo partes est accipere per divisionem in aliquo toto, ita quod una contineat aliam, tot dimensiones ab invicem distinctae erunt ibi, quarum quaedam alias penetrabunt. Est autem accipere in infinitum in aliquo toto continuo partes, quae alias continent, propter hoc quod continuum in infinitum dividitur. Relinquitur igitur quod sint infinitae dimensiones se invicem penetrantes. Si igitur dimensiones corporis continentis penetrantes locatum sunt locus, sequitur quod sint infinita loca simul, quod est impossibile.	461. Then [321 211 b18] he shows that space is not place by two arguments. As to the first of these, he states it is not true that there is anything within the confines of the containing body other than the contained body which is transferred from place to place. Rather, within the confines of the containing body there happens a body of some kind, having, nevertheless, the following two characteristics: that it be a mobile body, and be naturally apt to touch the containing body. But if, in addition to the dimensions of the contained body, there were present a space which always remained in the same place, the embarrassing conclusion would follow that there would be infinite places together. The reason is because water and air have their own dimensions, and so does each body, and each part of a body. Now all these parts will do the same thing in the whole body that the whole water does in a vessel. According to those who hold the opinion that space is place, when the entire water is in the vessel there are present, in addition to the dimensions of the water, also other dimensions of space. Now every part of a whole is contained by the whole as a thing in place is contained by a vessel: the only difference being that the part is not separated from the whole, whereas the thing in place is separated from place. If therefore a part be actually separated within the whole, it will follow that, in addition to the dimensions of the part, also other dimensions of the containing whole will be present. But it cannot be said that such division would make new dimensions to exist: for division does not cause dimension; rather it divides dimension already existing. Therefore, before that part was divided in the whole, there were present other proper dimensions of the part, in addition to the whole’s dimensions, which also penetrate that part. Now there will be as many sets of dimensions all distinct, some of which interpenetrate others, as there are parts obtainable by division of the whole, parts, namely, so divided that one contains another. But it is possible in a continuous whole to obtain ad infinitum parts which contain other parts, because a continuum can be divided ad infinitum, Consequently, we should have infinite dimensions mutually penetrating themselves. If, therefore, the containing body’s dimensions, penetrating the thing in place, are place, it follows that there are infinite places together—which is impossible.
lib. 4 l. 6 n. 8 Deinde cum dicit: simul autem erit et locus etc., ponit secundam rationem, quae talis est. Si dimensiones spatii quod est inter extremitates corporis continentis, sint locus, sequitur quod locus transmutetur: manifestum est enim quod transmutato aliquo corpore, ut puta amphora, transmutatur illud spatium quod est infra extremitates amphorae, cum nusquam sit nisi ubi est amphora. Omne autem quod transmutatur in aliquem locum, penetratur secundum eorum positionem, a dimensionibus spatii in quod transmutatur. Sequitur ergo quod aliquae aliae dimensiones subintrant dimensiones illius spatii amphorae; et sic loci erit alius locus, et multa loca erunt simul.	462. Then [322 211 b23] he gives a second reason, which is the following. If the dimensions of the space which is between the boundaries of the containing body are place, it follows that place can be transported. For it is clear that when a body is transported, as, for example, a jug, the space within the jug is transported, since that space can never be except where the jug is. Now whatever is transported to another place is penetrated (according to those who hold the doctrine of space as place) by the dimensions of the space into which it is transported. Therefore it follows that other dimensions enter the dimensions of the jug’s space; consequently there would be another place of place, and many places would be existing together.
lib. 4 l. 6 n. 9 Hoc ergo inconveniens accidit quia ponitur alius esse locus corporis contenti, ut aquae, et vasis, ut amphorae. Nam secundum illorum opinionem, locus aquae est spatium quod est infra extremitates amphorae: locus autem totius amphorae est spatium, quod est infra extremitates corporis continentis amphoram. Sed nos non dicimus quod alius sit locus partis, in quo movetur pars, cum totum vas transmutatur secundum idem (dicit autem hic partem, corpus contentum in vase, ut aquam contentam in amphora): quia secundum Aristotelem aqua movetur per accidens vase transmutato, et non mutat locum nisi inquantum amphora locum mutat. Unde non oportet quod locus in quem vadit, sit locus partis per se; sed solum inquantum est locus amphorae. Sed secundum tenentes opinionem de spatio, sequitur quod ille locus per se respondeat aquae, sicut et amphorae; et quod per se etiam respondeat spatio: et per se loquendo spatium illud movebitur et habebit locum, et non solum per accidens. Et licet corpus continens quandoque moveatur, non tamen sequitur secundum opinionem Aristotelis, quod locus moveatur, aut quod loci sit locus. Contingit quidem enim aliquod corpus continens, in quo est aliquid contentum, moveri, sicut aer vel aqua aut aliquae partes aquae: ut puta si navis est in fluvio, partes aquae quae inferius continent navem moventur; sed tamen locus non movetur. Et hoc est quod subdit, sed non in quo fiunt loco, idest sed non illud in quo aliqua fiunt sicut in loco, movetur. Et quomodo hoc sit verum, ostendit per hoc quod subdit, qui est pars loci qui est locus totius caeli. Licet enim hoc continens moveatur prout est hoc corpus, tamen prout consideratur secundum ordinem quem habet ad totum corpus caeli non movetur: nam aliud corpus quod succedit, eundem ordinem vel situm habet per comparationem ad totum caelum, quem habuit corpus quod prius effluxerat. Hoc est ergo quod dicit, quod licet aqua vel aer moveatur, non tamen movetur locus prout consideratur ut pars quaedam loci totius caeli, habens determinatum situm in universo.	463. This unacceptable consequence arises from positing one place for the contained body, for example, the water; and another place for the vessel, for example, the jug. For according to the opinion we are discussing, the place of the water is the space within the boundaries of the jug, while the place of the whole jug is the space within the boundaries of the body containing the jug. We, however, do not assign a special place for the part, in which the part moves, as distinct from the whole, when the entire vessel is transported (by “part” he means the body contained in the vessel, as the water contained in the jug): because, according to Aristotle, the water is moved per accidens when the vessel is transported, and it changes place only inasmuch as the jug changes its place. Hence it is not necessary that the place into which the transfer is made, be the place of the part per se, but only inasmuch as it becomes the place of the jug. But according to those who hold the opinion about space as place, it follows that the new place would belong per se both to water and to the jug. Likewise, that space would be transported and would have a place per se, and not only per accidens. Now although the containing body is sometimes moved, it does not follow according to the opinion of Aristotle, that the place is moved, or that there is a place of a place. For it does indeed happen that a containing body, in which something is contained, is sometimes moved, as are air or water or certain parts of the water, For example, if a boat is in a river, the parts of the water which surround the boat from below are in motion, but the boat’s place is not moved. Hence, he adds, “but not that place where they occur,”, i.e., that in which things occur as in a place is not moved. How this is true he makes clear by adding, “which is a part of the place which is the place of the whole heavens.” For although this container [e.g., the water surrounding the boat] be moved inasmuch as it is this body, yet in regard to its relation to the whole body of the heavens it is not moved: the body which succeeds it has the same order or position in relation to the whole heavens as had the body which previously flowed on. This therefore is what he says, namely, that although the water or the air be moved, not so the place, considered precisely as a certain part of the place of the whole heavens and as having a definite position in the universe.
lib. 4 l. 6 n. 10 Deinde cum dicit: et materia etiam videtur etc., prosequitur de materia. Et primo ostendit quare materia videtur esse locus; secundo ostendit quod non sit locus, ibi: sed materia quidem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo quod materia videtur esse locus, si aliquis consideret transmutationem corporum succedentium sibi in eodem loco, in aliquo uno subiecto quiescente secundum locum; et non habeatur respectus ad hoc quod locus est separatus, sed attendatur solummodo transmutatio in aliquo uno continuo. Aliquod enim corpus continuum et quietum secundum locum, cum alteratur, unum et idem numero nunc quidem est album, nunc autem nigrum, et nunc est durum et prius molle. Et propter istam transmutationem formarum circa subiectum, dicimus quod materia est aliquid, quae manet una, facta transmutatione secundum formam. Et per talem etiam apparentiam videtur locus esse aliquid: quia in eo permanente succedunt sibi diversa corpora. Sed tamen alio modo loquendi utimur in utroque. Nam ad designandum materiam vel subiectum, dicimus quod id quod nunc est aqua, prius erat aer: ad designandum autem unitatem loci, dicimus quod ubi nunc est aqua, ibi prius erat aer.	464. Then [323 211 b29] he continues by considering matter. First he shows why matter seems to be place; Secondly, that it is not place, at no. 465. He says therefore first that matter appears to be place, should one consider the transmutation of the bodies which succeed each other in the same place, as this occurs in some, one subject that is at rest in a place, with attention being paid, not to the fact that place is separate, but only to the fact that the transmutation is occurring in one and the same continuum. For some continuous body, at rest according to place, when it is being altered in quality, now white, now black; now hard, while previously soft. Yet it remains one and the same in number. And on account of this transmutation of forms in the subject we say that matter is something that remains one whole change taken place with respect to forms. Because of this, place seems to be something, because in it as remaining different bodies succeed each other. Nevertheless we use different terminology when referring to these two cases: to designate matter or the subject, we say, “What is now water, was previously air”; to designate unity in place, we say, “Where water is now there was air previously.”
lib. 4 l. 6 n. 11 Deinde cum dicit: sed materia quidem, sicut dictum est etc., ostendit quod materia non sit locus: quia sicut supra dictum est, materia non est divisa a re cuius est materia, neque continet eam: quorum utrumque competit loco. Locus igitur non est materia.	465. Then [324 211 b36] he shows that matter is not place, because, as we said above, matter is not separated from the thing of which it is the matter, nor does it contain the latter: both of which characteristics belong to place. Place, therefore, is not matter.
lib. 4 l. 6 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit: si igitur nihil horum trium etc., remotis tribus membris, concludit quartum. Et dicit quod quia locus non est aliquod trium, idest neque forma, neque materia, neque aliquod spatium quod sit alterum praeter distantias rei locatae, necesse est quod locus sit reliquum de quatuor supra nominatis, scilicet quod sit terminus corporis continentis. Et ne aliquis intelligat contentum vel locatum esse aliquod spatium medium, subiungit, quod corpus contentum dicitur illud, quod est natum moveri secundum loci mutationem.	466. Then [325 212 a2], having eliminated the first three members, he concludes to the fourth. And he says that since place is not any of these three, i.e., neither form, nor matter, nor some space which is other than the internal distances of the things in place, it must be the fourth of the above named, i.e., the boundary of the containing body. And lest anyone understand that the thing contained or in place is some middle space, he adds that the contained body is what is apt to be moved in respect to change of place.
lib. 4 l. 6 n. 13 Deinde cum dicit: videtur autem magnum aliquid etc., investigat differentiam loci, scilicet quod sit immobilis. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ostendit quod ex hac differentia non debite considerata insurrexit quidam error circa locum; secundo ostendit quomodo sit intelligenda immobilitas loci, ibi: est autem sicut vas et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod videtur magnum aliquid et difficile accipere quid sit locus; tum propter hoc quod quibusdam videtur, quod locus sit materia vel forma, quae habent altissimam considerationem, ut supra dictum est; tum propter hoc quod mutatio eius quod fertur secundum locum, fit in quodam quiescente et continente. Cum igitur nihil videatur esse continens et immobile nisi spatium, videtur contingere quod locus sit quoddam spatium medium, quod sit aliud a magnitudinibus quae moventur secundum locum. Et ad credulitatem huius opinionis multum proficit, quod aer videtur esse incorporeus: quia ubi est aer, videtur quod non sit corpus, sed quoddam spatium vacuum. Et sic videtur locus non solum esse terminus vasis, sed quoddam medium, tanquam vacuum.	467. Then [326 212 a7] he tracks down the specific difference of place; namely, that it is immobile. In regard to this he does two things: First, he shows that an error arose from improperly considering this difference; Secondly, how we must understand the immobility of place, at no. 468. He says therefore that it is a large undertaking and a difficult one to understand what place is, both because some have thought it is matter or form, both of which involve lofty speculation, as was said above (L.3), and because the change that occurs when things change place, occurs in something both at rest and containing, Now, since nothing seems to be containing and immobile except space, it seems that place is a sort of middle space distinct from the magnitudes which are moved in respect to place. And the fact that air seems to be incorporeal helps to make this opinion credible: for where air is there appears to be no body but a certain empty space. Thus place seems to be not only the boundaries of a vessel but something between the boundaries as a vacuum or void.
lib. 4 l. 6 n. 14 Deinde cum dicit: est autem sicut vas etc., ostendit quomodo intelligenda sit immobilitas loci, ut excludatur opinio praedicta. Et dicit quod vas et locus in hoc differre videntur, quod vas transmutatur, locus autem non. Unde sicut vas potest dici locus transmutabilis, ita locus potest dici vas immobile. Et ideo, cum aliquid movetur in aliquo corpore quod movetur, sicut navis in flumine, utitur isto in quo movetur magis sicut vase, quam sicut loco continente: quia locus vult esse immobilis, idest de aptitudine et natura loci est quod sit immobilis; et propter hoc magis potest dici quod totus fluvius sit locus navis, quia totus fluvius est immobilis. Sic igitur fluvius totus inquantum est immobilis, est locus communis. Cum autem locus proprius sit pars loci communis, oportet accipere proprium locum navis in aqua fluminis, inquantum habet ordinem ad totum fluvium ut est immobilis. Est igitur accipere locum navis in aqua fluente, non secundum hanc aquam quae fluit, sed secundum ordinem vel situm quem habet haec aqua fluens ad totum fluvium: qui quidem ordo vel situs idem remanet in aqua succedente. Et ideo licet aqua materialiter praeterfluat, tamen secundum quod habet rationem loci, prout scilicet consideratur in tali ordine et situ ad totum fluvium, non mutatur. Et per hoc similiter accipere debemus quomodo extremitates corporum mobilium naturalium sint locus, per respectum ad totum corpus sphaericum caeli, quod habet fixionem et immobilitatem propter immobilitatem centri et polorum. Sic igitur, licet haec pars aeris quae continebat, vel haec pars aquae effluat et moveatur inquantum est haec aqua; tamen secundum quod habet haec aqua rationem loci, scilicet situs et ordinis ad totum sphaericum caeli, semper manet. Sicut etiam dicitur idem ignis manere quantum ad formam, licet secundum materiam varietur consumptis et additis quibusdam lignis.	468. Then [327 212 a14], in order to exclude the aforesaid opinion, he shows how we must understand the immobility of place. And he says that a vessel and place are seen to differ in this, that a vessel can be transported but place cannot, Hence, just as a vessel can be called “a transportable place,” so place can be called “an immobile (non-transportable) vessel.” Therefore, when something is being moved in a body that is in motion, as a ship in a river, we speak of that in which it is being moved as a vessel rather than of a containing place, because place “wants to-be immobile,” i.e., it is of the very nature and aptitude of the place to be immobile.. On this account it is better to speak of the whole river as being the place of the ship, because the river as a whole is immobile. Thus the whole river inasmuch as it is immobile is the common place. However, since proper place is a part of common place, we must consider the proper place of the ship in flowing water, not the water inasmuch as it is flowing, but in its relation to the order or position which this flowing water has to the river as a whole: it is this order or position that remains constant, while the water flows on. Therefore, although the water materially passes on, yet, insofar as it has the motion of place, i.e. insofar as it is considered as having a certain order and position with respect to the whole river it does not change. This also shows how we ought to consider how the boundaries of natural mobile bodies are place with respect to the entire spherical body of the heavens, which is fixed and immobile on account of the immobility of the center and of the poles. Therefore, although this part of air which contains, or this part of water, flow by and move as this water, yet, insofar as this water has the motion of place, viz., a position and order to the whole spherical body of the heavens, it always remains. This is like the same fire remaining as to its form, although as to its matter it is varied as wood is consumed and other wood added.
lib. 4 l. 6 n. 15 Et per hoc cessat obiectio quae potest fieri contra hoc quod ponimus locum esse terminum continentis: quia cum continens sit mobile, et terminus continentis erit mobilis; et sic aliquod quietum existens, habebit diversa loca. Sed hoc non sequitur: quia terminus continentis non erat locus inquantum est haec superficies istius corporis mobilis, sed secundum ordinem vel situm quem habet in toto immobili. Ex quo patet quod tota ratio loci in omnibus continentibus est ex primo continente et locante, scilicet caelo.	469. This removes an objection that could be lodged against positing place as the boundary of the container, for since the container is mobile, its boundary will also be mobile; consequently, a thing at rest will have diverse places. But this does not follow: because the boundary of the container is not place insofar as it is this surface of this particular mobile body, but by reason of the order or position it has in the immobile whole. From which it is evident that the whole notion of place in all containers is taken from the first container and locator, namely, the heavens.
lib. 4 l. 6 n. 16 Deinde cum dicit: quare terminus continentis etc., concludit ex praemissis definitionem loci, scilicet quod locus est terminus immobilis continentis primum. Dicit autem primum, ut designet locum proprium, et excludat locum communem.	470. Then [328 212 a20] he concludes form the foregoing the definition of place, namely, that place is the immobile boundary of that which contains first. He says “first” to designate proper place and exclude common place.
lib. 4 l. 6 n. 17 Deinde cum dicit: et propter hoc medium caeli etc., ostendit definitionem esse bene assignatam, per hoc quod ea quae dicuntur de loco, congruunt secundum hanc definitionem. Et ponit tria. Quorum primum est, quod propter hoc quod locus est continens immobile, medium caeli, idest centrum, et ultimum circularis loci mutationis, idest corporum circulariter motorum, ultimum dico versus nos, scilicet superficies orbis lunae, videtur hoc quidem esse sursum, scilicet ultimum praedictum, illud vero esse deorsum, scilicet medium. Et hoc maxime proprie videtur dici inter omnia: quia centrum sphaerae semper manet. Illud autem quod est ultimum in corporibus circulariter motis versus nos, licet moveatur circulariter, tamen manet inquantum similiter se habet, idest in eadem elongatione ad nos. Et quia ad propria loca moventur corpora naturalia, inde est quod levia naturaliter moventur sursum et gravia deorsum: quia ipsum medium et terminus continens versus medium, vocatur deorsum; et similiter ipsum ultimum, et quod est versus ultimum, dicitur esse sursum. Utitur autem tali modo loquendi, quia terrae, quae est simpliciter gravis, locus est medium; aquae autem locus est versus medium. Et similiter locus ignis, qui est simpliciter levis, est ultimum; locus autem aeris est versus ultimum. Secundum ponit ibi: et propter hoc planum videtur et cetera. Et dicit quod quia locus est terminus, propter hoc locus videtur esse sicut quaedam superficies, et sicut quoddam vas continens: non autem sicut spatium vasis continentis. Tertium ponit ibi: amplius, simul cum re et cetera. Et dicit quod quia locus est terminus, propter hoc simul est locus et locatum: quia simul est finis locati et terminus continentis, qui est locus; quia tangentium ultima simul sunt. Et secundum hoc etiam intelligitur quod locus aequatur locato: quia scilicet aequantur secundum extrema.	471. Then [329 212 a21] he shows that the definition is well assigned, because the things said about place concur with this definition. And he gives three such things: The first is that, since place is an immobile container, the middle of the heavens, i.e., the center, and the boundary of circular change of place, i.e., of the bodies moved in a circle, namely, the boundary as to us, i.e., the surface of the sphere of the moon, is (namely, the latter) seen as “up”, and the other (namely, the middle) as “down”. Things absolutely in place, and things in place in a certain respect and this last named (the middle or center) is seen to be said most properly of all. For the center of a sphere is always at rest. Now that which is the boundary in relation to us of the bodies moved in a circle [namely, the surface of the sphere of the moon], although it moves in a circle, nevertheless remains, insofar as it remains in the same way, i.e., at the same distance from us. Hence, since natural bodies are moved to their proper places, it follows that light bodies naturally move “up”, and heavy bodies “down”—for both the middle (center) and the containing boundary in the direction of the middle are called “down”; and likewise the boundary in the other sense [ the surface of the sphere of the moon], and what is in the direction of that boundary, are called “up”. He uses this manner of speaking, because it is the center that is the place of the earth, which is simply heavy, while toward the center the place of water is found. In like manner, the place of fire, which is simply light, is the outermost, while the place of air is toward the outermost. He gives the second [330 212 a28], saying that because place is a boundary, place seems to be like a certain surface and like a containing vessel, but not like the space [or volume] of the containing vessel. He gives the third [331 212 a29] when he says that, because place is a boundary, the place and the thing in place are together; for the limits of the thing in place and the boundary of the container, which is place, are together (for the boundaries of things that touch are together). This also explains why place is equal to the thing in place: namely, because they are equated as to their boundaries.