Per se

Per se. The main Aristotelian sources for the scholastic conception of per se are below, namely from the Posterior Analytics and the Metaphysics.

I have included some English translations, such as they are. Note that Moerbeke's secundum se should be rendered as per se to be consistent with other Latin translations.

Greek	Latin	English
		POSTERIOR ANALYTICS
		Mure
73a34 Καθ᾽ αὑτὰ δ᾽ ὅσα ὑπάρχει τε ἐν τῶι τί ἐστιν, οἷον τριγώνωι γραμμὴ καὶ γραμμῆι στιγμή	Per se autem sunt quaecunque sunt in eo quod quid est, ut triangulo inest linea, et punctum lineae,	Essential attributes are (1) such as belong to their subject as elements in its essential nature (e.g. line thus belongs to triangle, point to line;
(ἡ γὰρ οὐσία αὐτῶν ἐκ τούτων ἐστί, καὶ ἐν τῶι λόγωι τῶι λέγοντι τί ἐστιν ἐνυπάρχει),	substantia enim ipsorum ex his est, et in ratione dicenti quid est, insunt.	for the very being or ‘substance’ of triangle and line is composed of these elements, which are contained in the formulae defining triangle and line):
73a38 καὶ ὅσοις τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς αὐτὰ ἐν τῶι λόγωι ἐνυπάρχουσι τῶι τί ἐστι δηλοῦντι,	Et quibuscunque eorum quae insunt ipsis, ipsa in ratione insunt quid est monstranti,	(2) such that, while they belong to certain subjects, the subjects to which they belong are contained in the attribute’s own defining formula.
οἷον τὸ εὐθὺ ὑπάρχει γραμμῆι καὶ τὸ περιφερές, καὶ τὸ περιττὸν καὶ ἄρτιον ἀριθμῶι, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ σύνθετον, καὶ ἰσόπλευρον καὶ ἑτερόμηκες•	ut rectum inest lineae, et circulare, et par, et impar numero, et primum, et compositum, et isopleurum, et altera parte longius,	Thus straight and curved belong to line, odd and even, prime and compound, square and oblong, to number;
καὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἐν τῶι λόγωι τῶι τί ἐστι λέγοντι ἔνθα μὲν γραμμὴ ἔνθα δ᾽ ἀριθμός.	et quae omnibus his insunt, in ratione quid est dicente, illinc quidem linea, hinc vero numerus,	and also the formula defining any one of these attributes contains its subject-e.g. line or number as the case may be.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τὰ τοιαῦθ᾽ ἑκάστοις καθ᾽ αὑτὰ λέγω,	similiter et in aliis huiusmodi, unicuique per se esse dico.	Extending this classification to all other attributes, I distinguish those that answer the above description as belonging essentially to their respective subjects;
ὅσα δὲ μηδετέρως ὑπάρχει, συμβεβηκότα, οἷον τὸ μουσικὸν ἢ λευκὸν τῶι ζώιωι.	Quaecunque vero neutraliter insunt, accidentia sunt, ut musicum, aut album animal.	whereas attributes related in neither of these two ways to their subjects I call accidents or ‘coincidents’; e.g. musical or white is a ‘coincident’ of animal.
74b6 τὰ δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἀναγκαῖα τοῖς πράγμασιν (τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῶι τί ἐστιν ὑπάρχει• τοῖς δ᾽ αὐτὰ ἐν τῶι τί ἐστιν ὑπάρχει κατηγορουμένοις αὐτῶν,	Quae autem per se sunt necessario insunt rebus, haec enim insunt in eo quod quid est, quibusdam autem haec insunt in eo quod quid est, praedicantibus de ipsis,	Now attributes attaching essentially to their subjects attach necessarily to them: for essential attributes are either elements in the essential nature of their subjects, or contain their subjects as elements in their own essential nature.
ὧν θάτερον τῶν ἀντικειμένων ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν),	quorum alterum oppositorum necesse est inesse.	(The pairs of opposites which the latter class includes are necessary because one member or the other necessarily inheres.)
[74b 10] φανερὸν ὅτι ἐκ τοιούτων τινῶν ἂν εἴη ὁ ἀποδεικτικὸς συλλογισμός•	Manifestum est igitur quod ex huiusmodi quibusdam utique fit demonstrativus syllogismus,	It follows from this that premisses of the demonstrative syllogism must be connexions essential in the sense explained:
ἅπαν γὰρ ἢ οὕτως ὑπάρχει ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, τὰ δὲ συμβεβηκότα οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα.	omne enim aut sic inest, aut secundum accidens, accidentia autem necessaria non sunt.	for all attributes must inhere essentially or else be accidental, and accidental attributes are not necessary to their subjects.
		METAPHYSICS
	Moerbeke	Ross
1022a25 ὥστε καὶ [25] τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ πολλαχῶς ἀνάγκη λέγεσθαι.	Quare et secundum se multipliciter dici est necesse.	Therefore "in virtue of itself" must likewise have several meanings. The following belong to a thing in virtue of itself:
ἓν μὲν γὰρ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστῳ, οἷον ὁ Καλλίας καθ᾽ αὑτὸν Καλλίας καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι Καλλίᾳ:	Uno quidem enim secundum se quod quid erat esse unicuique, ut Callias * et quod quid erat esse Calliam.	(1) the essence of each thing, e.g. Callias is in virtue of himself Callias and what it was to be Callias;
ἓν δὲ ὅσα ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν ὑπάρχει, οἷον ζῷον ὁ Καλλίας καθ᾽ αὑτόν: ἐν γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ ἐνυπάρχει τὸ ζῷον:	Alio vero quaecumque in eo quod quid est existunt, ut animal Callias secundum se; nam in ratione inest animal;	(2) whatever is present in the what , e.g. Callias is in virtue of himself an animal. For animal is present in his definition;
ζῷον γάρ τι ὁ Καλλίας.	animal enim quoddam Callias.	Callias is a particular animal.
ἔτι [30] δὲ εἰ ἐν αὑτῷ δέδεκται πρώτῳ ἢ τῶν αὑτοῦ τινί, οἷον ἡ ἐπιφάνεια λευκὴ καθ᾽ ἑαυτήν, καὶ ζῇ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καθ᾽ αὑτόν:	Amplius autem si in ipso ostensum est primo aut in ipsius aliquo, ut superficies alba secundum se, et vivens secundum se homo;	(3) Whatever attribute a thing receives in itself directly or in one of its parts; e.g. a surface is white in virtue of itself, and a man is alive in virtue of himself;
ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ μέρος τι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἐν ᾗ πρώτῃ τὸ ζῆν.	anima namque pars quaedam est hominis, in qua prima est ipsum vivere.	for the soul, in which life directly resides, is a part of the man.
ἔτι οὗ μὴ ἔστιν ἄλλο αἴτιον: τοῦ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου πολλὰ αἴτια, τὸ ζῷον, τὸ δίπουν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως καθ᾽ αὑτὸν ἄνθρωπος ὁ ἄνθρωπός [35] ἐστιν.	Amplius cuius non est aliqua alia causa; hominis enim multe sunt causae, animal, bipes, at tamen secundum se homo homo est.	(4) That which has no cause other than itself; man has more than one cause animal, two-footed but yet man is man in virtue of himself.
ἔτι ὅσα μόνῳ ὑπάρχει καὶ ᾗ μόνον δι᾽ αὐτὸ κεχωρισμένον καθ᾽ αὑτό.	Amplius quaecumque soli insunt, et in quantum solum quia separatum secundum se.	(5) Whatever attributes belong to a thing alone, and in so far as they belong to it merely by virtue of itself considered apart by itself.

See also

• Per se primo modo
• Grosseteste commentary on the Posterior analytics, Book I cap. 4
• Ockham Summa Logicae III-2 cap. 7
• Aquinas lectures on the Posterior analytics, Book I lect. 10