Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 7

Latin	English
ƿ CAP. 7. QUOMODO PROPOSITIONES REQUISITAE AD DEMONSTRATIONEM DICUNTUR PER SE?.	In what way are propositions required for demonstration called per se?
Non solum autem quaelibet propositio requisita ad demonstrationem est necessaria vel de omni, sed etiam quaelibet est per se vera. Ut autem sciatur quae propositio est per se vera et quae non, videnda est multiplicitas et aequivocatio huius termini ‘per se’.	Now not only is every proposition required for a demonstration necessary or ‘of all’, but also every one is true per se. And in order that it be known what proposition is true per se and what one is not, we should look at the multiplicity and equivocation of the term per se.
Est autem sciendum, secundum Lincolniensem, quod distinctio est inter modos dicendi per se et modum essendi per se et modum causandi per se. Aliquid enim esse per se tripliciter dicitur, eo quod ‘per se’ vel excludit omnem causam, et sic solus Deus est per se, hoc est, solus Deus non habet causam per quam sit; vel excludit causam materialem, et sic intelligentiae carentes materia sunt per se, hoc est, non habent materiam in qua forma earum subsistat; vel excludit subiectum, et sic substantia est per se, hoc est, substantia non habet subiectum in quo subsistat.	It should be known, according to Grosseteste, that there is a distinction between the modes of saying something per se and the way of being per se, and the way of causing per se. For anything is said to be per se in three ways, in that "per se" either excludes all causes, and thus only God is per se, i.e., God alone does not have a cause through which he is; or it excludes a material cause, and thus intelligences lacking matter are per se, i.e., they do not have matter in which their form subsists; or it excludes the subject, and thus substance is per se, i.e., a substance does not have a subject in which it may subsist.
Et si quaeratur, quare tot modis dicitur aliquid esse per se, dicendum quod causa huius non potest assignari nisi voluntarius usus loquentium. Alius est modus causandi per se, quando scilicet aliquid est causa per se alicuius, sicut interfectio est causa per se quare iste intereat.	And if it is asked why anything is said to be per se in so many ways, it should be replied that the cause of this cannot be assigned to anything other than the voluntary usage of the speakers. There is another mode of per se, namely when something is a cause of something per se, as the killing is the cause per se why this person perishes.
Et potest iste modus non tantum competere causae efficienti sed etiam causae finali.	And this mode can belong not only to an efficient cause, but also with a final cause.
Praeter istos modos ‘per se’ sunt aliqui alii modi dicendi per se, scilicet quando aliquid praedicatur per se de altero. Et sunt duo modi, quorum unus est quando praedicatum ponitur in definitione subiecti, alius quando subiectum ponitur in definitione praedicati.	Beyond these ways, are some other modes of saying per se, namely, when something is predicated per se of another. And there are two ways: of which one is when the predicate is given in the definition of the subject, the other when the subject is given in the definition of the predicate.
Circa istos autem modos est primo advertendum quod iste terminus ‘per se’, secundum quod praedicatur de propositione, dupliciter accipitur, scilicet stricte et large. Large dicitur propositio per se quando ƿ subiectum cadit in definitione praedicati vel e converso et per se superius ad unum definit reliquum vel definitur per reliquum. Et isto modo haec est per se ‘omnis homo est animal’, et ista ‘omnis homo est rationalis’, et ista ‘omnis homo est risibilis’, et ceterae huiusmodi.	But concerning these ways it should first be noted that the term per se, according as it is predicated of a proposition, is taken in two ways, namely strictly and broadly. A proposition is called per se broadly when the subject falls in the definition of the predicate or conversely, and [something?] per se higher than one thing defines another or is defined by the other. And in this way this is per se, "Every man is an animal", and "Every man is rational," and "Every man is capable of laughter," and others of this sort.
Aliter accipitur ‘per se’ stricte.	In the other way, per se is taken strictly.
Et sic, cum prioribus condicionibus, ad hoc quod propositio sit per se, requiritur quod ipsa sit simpliciter necessaria, ita quod nec potest nec potuit nec poterit esse falsa. Et sic accepto ‘per se’, quamvis secundum opinionem Aristotelis, qui ponit quod generatio et corruptio rerum est perpetua, multae propositiones categoricae et de inesse et de praesenti sint per se, tamen secundum veritatem tales de terminis importantibus praecise res corruptibiles sive creatas non sunt per se, quia non sunt necessariae, sicut dictum est.	And so, with the prior conditions, for a proposition to be per se in this way it is required that it be necessary simpliciter, so that it cannot be, never could have been, and never can be false. And taking "per se" in this sense, although according to the opinion of Aristotle (who assumes that generation and destruction of realities is perpetual) many categorical propositions concerning inherence and the present are per se, still according to the truth, such propositions from terms precisely conveying destructible or created realities are not per se, for they are not necessary, as was said.
Unde sic accepto ‘per se’, haec non est per se ‘omnis homo est animal’, quia potest esse falsa, puta posito quod nullus homo sit. Verumtamen propositiones de possibili et eis aequivalentes, compositae ex talibus terminis, sunt per se.	Hence, taking "per se" in this sense, the proposition "Every man is an animal," is not per se,  for it can be false - for instance, if it is assumed that no man exists. But still propositions concerning possible things, and propositions equivalent to them, composed from such terms, are per se.
Unde ista est per se ‘omnis homo potest esse animal’, sumpto subiecto pro eo quod potest esse. Viso igitur quod ad hoc quod propositio sit per se, requiritur quod sit necessaria, est ulterius sciendum quod ad hoc quod propositio sit per se, strictissime sumpto hoc termino ‘per se’, requiritur quod sit praedicatio propria et directa.	Hence "Every man can be an animal,"is per se, when the subject is taken to stand for what can be. Therefore, now that we have seen that if a proposition is to be per se it is required that it be necessary, it should be known next that for a proposition to be per se, taking the term "per se" in the strictest sense, it is required that it be a proper and direct predication.
Per quod excluduntur propositiones ubi praedicantur inferiora de superioribus particulariter sumptis et subiecta de suis passionibus et una passio de alia passione.	Through this are excluded those propositions where the lower are predicated of the higher taken as particulars, and subjects are predicated of their attributes, and one attribute is predicated of another attribute.
Propter quod tales, quamvis sint necessariae, non sunt per se, strictissime sumpto ‘per se’. Cuiusmodi sunt tales ‘aliquod animal est homo’ vel ‘aliquod animal potest esse homo’; ‘omne risibile est homo vel potest esse homo’; ‘omne risibile est susceptibile disciplinae’ et huiusmodi, quamvis essent necessariae.	Because of this, such propositions, though they are necessary, are not per se, taking "per se" in the strictest sense. And of this sort are such as "Some animal is a man," or "Some animal can be a man," "Everything that is capable of laughter is a man or can be a man," "Everything that is capable of laughter is capable of being taught" and the like, even though they are necessary.
ƿ Ulterius sciendum est quod aliquid potest cadere in definitione alterius vel in recto vel in obliquo, et secundum hoc potest praedicari vel in recto vel in obliquo. Istis visis dicendum est quod sola illa propositio est per se quae est necessaria, in qua praedicatum definit subiectum vel aliquid per se superius ad subiectum, vel subiectum definit praedicatum vel aliquid per se superius ad praedicatum.	Next it should be known that something can fall in the definition of another either directly or obliquely, and accordingly it can be predicated directly or obliquely. Having looked at these things, it should be said that a proposition is only per se necessary, in which the predicate defines the subject or something per se higher than the subject, or the subject defines the predicate or something per se higher than the predicate.
Et hoc intelligit Lincolniensis quando dicit: ‘‘Dicitur per se alterum de altero cum quidditas unius essentialiter et non per accidens a quidditate alterius egreditur. Non enim intendit quod praedicatum realiter egrediatur a subiecto vel e converso, illo modo quo effectus efficitur realiter a sua causa, cum subiectum et praedicatum sint termini, quorum neuter est causa alterius.	And Grosseteste means [intelligit] this when he says "one thing is predicated per se of another when the quiddity of one essentially, and not accidentally, proceeds from the quiddity of the other," For he does not mean that the predicate really proceeds from the subject, or conversely, in the way in which an effect is really brought about by its cause, since the subject and predicate are terms, of which neither is the cause of the other.
Sed ‘egredi’ hic a quidditate alterius vocat declarare et importare sive significare aliquid quod significatur per reliquum. Est igitur, breviter, intentio Lincolniensis, et etiam Aristotelis quod quando praedicatum per se definit subiectum vel aliquid per se superius ad subiectum, sive sicut definitio sive sicut pars definitionis vel e converso, tunc est propositio per se.	But he says "proceeds from the quiddity of the other" to explain and convey or signify something that is signified through the other. It is, therefore, briefly, the meaning of Grosseteste, and also of Aristotle, that when the predicate defines the subject per se, or something per se higher than the subject, either as a definition or as a part of the definition or conversely, then the proposition is per se.
Et est primus modus quando praedicatum definit subiectum vel per se superius ad subiectum. Propter quod tales, si essent necessariae, essent per se ‘omnis homo est animal rationale’, ‘omnis homo est animal’, ‘omnis homo est rationalis’, ‘omnis homo componitur ex corpore et anima’, quia in omnibus istis praedicatum definit subiectum.	And the first way is when the predicate defines the subject or something per se higher than the subject. Because of this, such propositions, if they were necessary, would be per se: "Every man is a rational animal," "Every man is an animal," "Every man is rational," "Every man is composed of body and soul," for in all these the predicate defines the subject.
Similiter tales, si essent necessariae, essent per se ‘omnis homo est corpus’, ‘omnis homo est substantia’, ‘omnis homo componitur ex materia et forma’, ‘omnis homo habet materiam’, quia quamvis ista praedicata non definirent istud subiectum, definirent tamen per se superius ad subiectum, et ideo essent per se.	Similarly, such propositions as these, if they were necessary, would be per se: "Every man is a body," "Every man is a substance," "Every man is composed of matter and form " "Every man has matter." For although these predicates do not define this subject, still they define something per se higher than the subject, and therefore they would be per se.
ƿ Secundus autem modus est quando subiectum vel per se superius ad subiectum definit praedicatum vel per se inferius ad praedicatum. Unde ista est per se, si sit necessaria, ‘omnis homo est risibilis’, quia in definitione exprimente quid nominis ipsius ‘risibilis’ ponitur ‘homo’.	But the second way occurs when the subject or something per se higher than the subject defines the predicate or something per se lower than the predicate. Hence this would be per se, if it were necessary: "Every man is capable of laughter," for "man" is placed in the definition expressing the nominal essence of "something capable of laughter."
Similiter haec est per se, si sit necessaria, ‘omnis homo est susceptibilis contrariorum’, quia in definitione praedicati ponitur ‘substantia’ vel ‘corpus’, quod est per se superius ad hominem; et quia ‘homo’ definit hoc praedicatum ‘esse susceptibile talium contrariorum’, demonstratis aliquibus quae non possunt competere nisi homini, et illud est per se inferius ad hoc commune ‘susceptibile contrariorum’, ideo haec est per se ‘omnis homo est susceptibilis contrariorum’.	Similarly this is per se, if it is necessary: "Every man is susceptible of contraries" for "substance" or "body," which is per se higher than man, is given in the definition of the predicate. And it is also per se since "man" defines the predicate, "being susceptible of such contraries," some contraries being indicated that cannot belong except to man, and "susceptible of such contraries" is per se lower than this general term, "susceptible of contraries," therefore the proposition "Every man is susceptible of contraries” is per se.
Ex praedictis claret quod omnes tales sunt per se ‘omnis homo potest dealbari’, ‘omnis materia potest suscipere formam’, ‘omnis creatura potest a Deo creari’, ‘Deus est creativus’, ‘calor est calefactivus’, et ceterae huiusmodi.	From the abovementioned it is clear that all such as these are per se: "Every man can become pale," "All matter can be susceptible of form " "Every creature can be created by God" "God is capable of creating," "Heat is capable of heating," and others of this sort.
Oportet autem scire quod ista quae dicta sunt, intelligenda sunt de propositionibus affirmativis, nam aliquae negativae sunt per se, in quibus tamen praedicatum non definit subiectum nec e converso.	But you have to know that what has been said is to be understood concerning affirmative propositions, for some negative propositions are per se, in which, nonetheless, the predicate does not define the subject nor vice versa.
Est autem sciendum quod omnis negativa necessaria, in qua terminus subiectus et praedicatus sunt mere absoluti et non relativi nec connotativi, est per se. Unde haec est per se ‘omnis homo non est asinus’ et haec similiter ‘omnis homo non est albedo’, quamvis secundum opinionem Aristotelis haec non sit per se ‘omnis homo non est quantitas’.	Now it should be known that every necessary negative proposition in which the subject term and predicate are purely absolute and not relative, nor connotative is per se. Hence, the proposition "Every man is not a donkey" is per se, and similarly "Every man is not a whiteness," though, in Aristotle's opinion, "Every man is not a quantity" is not per se.
Similiter, quando aliqua talis negativa est per se, illud quod per se tamquam proprium praedicatur de uno illorum affirmative, per se praedicatur negative de reliquo. Unde si haec sit per se ‘nullus homo est asinus’ et haec sit per se et primo vera ‘omnis homo est risibilis’, haec erit per se ‘nullus asinus est risibilis’.	Similarly, when some such negative proposition is per se, that which is per se predicated as a property and affirmatively of one of these is also predicated per se negatively of the other. Hence if "no man is a donkey," is per se, and "every man can laugh" is per se and a first truth, then "no donkey can laugh”will be per se.
Si autem tale praedicatum praedicetur de uno illorum non tamquam proprium sibi, non oportet quod ƿ de alio praedicetur negative, neque per se neque vere. Unde quamvis haec sit per se ‘nullus homo est asinus’, non oportet propter hoc quod haec sit per se ‘nullus homo est susceptibilis contrariorum’ quia haec est per se ‘omnis asinus est susceptibilis contrariorum’.	But if such a predicate is predicated of one of these not as its property, it does not have to be predicated of the other negatively either per se or even truly. Hence even though "no man is a donkey" is per se, it is not necessary that "no man is susceptible of contraries" be per se, because "every donkey is susceptible of contraries" is per se.