Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4/c8

Chapter 8

Greek	Latin	English
διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὰ μοναχῶς [30] λεγόμενα καὶ κατὰ πάντων ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν ὥσπερ τινὲς λέγουσιν, οἱ μὲν οὐθὲν φάσκοντες ἀληθὲς εἶναι (οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύειν φασὶν οὕτως ἅπαντα εἶναι ὥσπερ τὸ τὴν διάμετρον σύμμετρον εἶναι), οἱ δὲ πάντ᾽ ἀληθῆ. σχεδὸν γὰρ οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι οἱ αὐτοὶ τῷ Ἡρακλείτου: ὁ γὰρ λέγων [35] ὅτι πάντ᾽ ἀληθῆ καὶ πάντα ψευδῆ, καὶ χωρὶς λέγει τῶν λόγων ἑκάτερον τούτων, [1012β] [1] ὥστ᾽ εἴπερ ἀδύνατα ἐκεῖνα, καὶ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον εἶναι.	Determinatis autem hiis palam quod * uno modo ↵ dicta et de omnibus impossibile est esse sicut quidam dicunt. Hii quidem nihil dicentes verum esse; nihil enim prohibere dicunt sic omnia esse sicut dyametrum commensurabilem esse. Illi vero omnia vera. Fere namque ipsis rationes eaedem * Era↵clito; nam qui dicit quia omnia sunt vera et omnia falsa, ↵ et seorsum rdicit rationem utramque horum1, quare si sunt impossibilia illa, et haec * impossibile esse.	Chapter 8. In view of these distinctions it is obvious that the one-sided theories which some people express about all things cannot be valid-on the one hand the theory that nothing is true (for, say they, there is nothing to prevent every statement from being like the statement 'the diagonal of a square is commensurate with the side'), on the other hand the theory that everything is true. These views are practically the same as that of Heraclitus; for he who says that all things are true and all are false also makes each of [12b] these statements separately, so that since they are impossible, the double statement must be impossible too.
ἔτι δὲ φανερῶς ἀντιφάσεις εἰσὶν ἃς οὐχ οἷόν τε ἅμα ἀληθεῖς εἶναι—οὐδὲ δὴ ψευδεῖς πάσας: καίτοι δόξειέ γ᾽ ἂν μᾶλλον ἐνδέχεσθαι ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.	Amplius autem evidenter contradictiones sunt quas non est possibile simul esse veras, nec itaque falsas omnes; et quidem utique putabitur ↵ magis contingere ex dictis.	Again, there are obviously contradictories which cannot be at the same time true-nor on the other hand can all statements be false; yet this would seem more possible in the light of what has been said.
ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντας τοὺς τοιούτους λόγους αἰτεῖσθαι δεῖ, καθάπερ ἐλέχθη καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπάνω λόγοις, οὐχὶ εἶναί τι ἢ μὴ εἶναι ἀλλὰ σημαίνειν τι, ὥστε ἐξ ὁρισμοῦ διαλεκτέον λαβόντας τί σημαίνει τὸ ψεῦδος ἢ τὸ ἀληθές. εἰ δὲ μηθὲν ἄλλο τὸ ἀληθὲς φάναι ἢ <ὃ> ἀποφάναι ; ψεῦδός ἐστιν, ἀδύνατον [10] πάντα ψευδῆ εἶναι: ἀνάγκη γὰρ τῆς ἀντιφάσεως θάτερον εἶναι μόριον ἀληθές.	Sed ad omnes tales orationes oportet quaerere, quemadmodum in superioribus sermonibus dictum est, non esse aliquid aut non esse sed significare aliquid, quare ex diffinitione disputandum accipientes quid significat ƿ verum aut falsum. Si autem nihil aliud quam verum dicere aut negare falsum est, impossibile omnia falsa esse; est enim ↵ necesse contradictionis partem aiteram esse veram.	-But against all such views we must postulate, as we said above, not that something is or is not, but that something has a meaning, so that we must argue from a definition, viz. by assuming what falsity or truth means. If that which it is true to affirm is nothing other than that which it is false to deny, it is impossible that all statements should be false; for one side of the contradiction must be true.
ἔτι εἰ πᾶν ἢ φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι ἀναγκαῖον, ἀδύνατον ἀμφότερα ψευδῆ εἶναι: θάτερον γὰρ μόριον τῆς ἀντιφάσεως ψεῦδός ἐστιν.	Amplius si omne aut dicere aut negare est necesse, utraque falsa esse impossibile est; altera namque pars contradictionis est falsa.	Again, if it is necessary with regard to everything either to assert or to deny it, it is impossible that both should be false; for it is one side of the contradiction that is false.
συμβαίνει δὴ καὶ τὸ θρυλούμενον πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις λόγοις, αὐτοὺς [15] ἑαυτοὺς ἀναιρεῖν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ πάντα ἀληθῆ λέγων καὶ τὸν ἐναντίον αὑτοῦ λόγον ἀληθῆ ποιεῖ, ὥστε τὸν ἑαυτοῦ οὐκ ἀληθῆ (ὁ γὰρ ἐναντίος οὔ φησιν αὐτὸν ἀληθῆ), ὁ δὲ πάντα ψευδῆ καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτόν. ἐὰν δ᾽ ἐξαιρῶνται ὁ μὲν τὸν ἐναντίον ὡς οὐκ ἀληθὴς μόνος ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ τὸν αὑτοῦ ὡς οὐ ψευδής, [20] οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀπείρους συμβαίνει αὐτοῖς αἰτεῖσθαι λόγους ἀληθεῖς καὶ ψευδεῖς: ὁ γὰρ λέγων τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον ἀληθῆ ἀληθής, τοῦτο δ᾽ εἰς ἄπειρον βαδιεῖται.	Accidit itaque et quod famatum est de omnibus talibus orationibus: ipsas se ipsas destruere. Nam qui omnia vera dicit ↵ orationis sue contrariam veram facit, quare suam non veram; contraria enim non dicit ipsam esse veram. Qui vero omnia falsa, et ipse se ipsum. Si autem excipiant, hic quidem contrariam quod non vera sola est, ille vero suam propriam quod non falsa, nihil minus * infinitas accidit ipsis petere oratio↵nes veras et falsas. Nam qui dicit veram orationem veram verus est, hoc autem in infinitum vadet.	Therefore all such views are also exposed to the often expressed objection, that they destroy themselves. For he who says that everything is true makes even the statement contrary to his own true, and therefore his own not true (for the contrary statement denies that it is true), while he who says everything is false makes himself also false.-And if the former person excepts the contrary statement, saying it alone is not true, while the latter excepts his own as being not false, none the less they are driven to postulate the truth or falsity of an infinite number of statements; for that which says the true statement is true is true, and this process will go on to infinity.
φανερὸν δ᾽ ὅτι οὐδ᾽ οἱ πάντα ἠρεμεῖν λέγοντες ἀληθῆ λέγουσιν οὐδ᾽ οἱ πάντα κινεῖσθαι.	Palam autem quia nec qui omnia quiescere dicunt vera dicunt nec qui omnia moveri.	Evidently, again, those who say all things are at rest are not right, nor are those who say all things are in movement.
εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἠρεμεῖ πάντα, ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ ἀληθῆ καὶ [25] ψευδῆ ἔσται, φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο μεταβάλλον (ὁ γὰρ λέγων ποτὲ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἦν καὶ πάλιν οὐκ ἔσται):	Nam si quiescunt omnia, * semper haec vera et falsa erunt, videtur autem hoc transmutatum; ↵ nam qui dicit aliquando ipse * non erat et iterum non erit.	For if all things are at rest, the same statements will always be true and the same always false,-but this obviously changes; for he who makes a statement, himself at one time was not and again will not be.
εἰ δὲ πάντα κινεῖται, οὐθὲν ἔσται ἀληθές: πάντα ἄρα ψευδῆ: ἀλλὰ δέδεικται ὅτι ἀδύνατον.	Si vero omnia moventur, nihil erit verum; ergo omnia falsa. Sed ostensum est quia impossibile est.	And if all things are in motion, nothing will be true; everything therefore will be false. But it has been shown that this is impossible.
ἔτι ἀνάγκη τὸ ὂν μεταβάλλειν: ἔκ τινος γὰρ εἴς τι ἡ μεταβολή.	Amplius ens permutari est necesse; nam ex aliquo in aliquid est permutatio.	Again, it must be that which is that changes; for change is from something to something.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ πάντα ἠρεμεῖ [30] ἢ κινεῖται ποτέ, ἀεὶ δ᾽ οὐθέν: ἔστι γάρ τι ὃ ἀεὶ κινεῖ τὰ κινούμενα, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον αὐτό.	At vero nec omnia quiescunt aut moventur aliquando, semper ↵ autem nihil; est enim aliquid quod semper movet quae moventur, et primum movens immobile * ipsum.	But again it is not the case that all things are at rest or in motion sometimes, and nothing for ever; for there is something which always moves the things that are in motion, and the first mover is itself unmoved.