Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D2/Q2B

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Quaest. 2
39 Ad primam quaestionem sic procedo, quia de ente infinito sic non potest demonstrari esse demonstratione propter quid quantum ad nos, licet ex natura terminorum propositio est demonstrabilis propter quid. Sed quantum ad nos bene propositio est demonstrabilis demonstratione quia ex creaturis. Proprietates autem infiniti entis relativae ad creaturas immediatius se habent ad illa quae sunt media in demonstratione quia quam proprietates absolutae, ita quod de illis proprietatibus relativis concludi potest immediatius esse per ista quae sunt media in tali demonstratione quam de proprietatibus absolutis, nam immediate ex esse unius ƿrelativi sequitur esse sui correlativi: ideo primo declarabo esse de proprietatibus relativis entis infiniti et secundo declarabo esse de infinito ente quia illae relativae proprietates soli enti infinito conveniunt; et ita erunt duo articuli principales.	39. To the first question [nn.1-9] I proceed as follows, that it cannot be demonstrated for us in this way by a ‘demonstration-why’ that an infinite being exists, although from the nature of the terms the proposition is demonstrable by a ‘demonstration-why’. But for us the proposition is indeed demonstrable by a ‘demonstration-that’ from creatures [Posterior Analytics 1.13.78a22-b34]. Now the properties of an infinite being that are relative to creatures are related more immediately than are absolute terms to things that are the middles in a ‘demonstration-that’, so that it can more immediately about the relative properties than about the absolute properties be concluded that an infinite being exists through what are middle terms in such a demonstration, for from the existence of one relative the existence of its correlative immediately follows; therefore I will first make existence clear about the relative properties of an infinite being, and second I will make existence clear about the infinite being, because the relative properties belong only to an infinite being; and thus there will be two principal articles.
40 Quantum ad primum dico: proprietates relativae entis infiniti ad creaturas aut sunt proprietates causalitatis, aut eminentiae; causalitatis duplicis, aut efficientis, aut finis. Quod additur de causa exemplari, non est aliud genus causae ab efficiente, quia tunc essent quinque genera causarum; unde causa exemplaris est quoddam efficiens, quia est agens per intellectum, distinctum contra agens per naturam, de quo alias.	40. As to the first article I say: the properties of an infinite being that are relative to creatures are properties either of causality or of eminence; the causality is double, either efficient or final. As to what is added about the exemplar cause, it is not a genus of cause other than the efficient cause, because then there would be five genera of causes; hence the exemplar cause is a sort of efficient cause, because, in distinction from what operates through nature, it operates through the intellect, about which elsewhere [1 d.36 q. un n.5].
41 In primo articulo principali tria principaliter ostendam. Primo ergo ostendam quod aliquid est in effectu inter entia quod est simpliciter primum secundum efficientiam, et aliquid est quod etiam ƿest simpliciter primum secundum rationem finis, et aliquid quod est simpliciter primum secundum eminentiam; secundo ostendo quod illud quod est primum secundum unam rationem primitatis, idem est primum secundum alias primitates; et tertio ostendo quod illa triplex primitas uni soli naturae convenit ita quod non pluribus naturis differentibus specie vel quiditative. Et ita in primo articulo principali erunt tres articuli partiales.	41. In the first principal article I will principally show three things. First then I will show that there is something in effect among beings which is simply first in efficient causality, and that there is also something which is simply first in idea of end, and something which is simply first in eminence; second I show that that which is first in one idea of primacy is first also in the other primacies; and third I show that that triple primacy belongs to one nature only such that it does not belong to several natures differing in species or in quiddity. And so in the first principal article there will be three partial articles.
42 Primus articulus illorum includit tres conclusiones principales, per triplicem primitatem; quaelibet autem illarum trium conclusionum habet tres ex quibus dependet: ƿprima est quod aliquid sit primum, secunda est quod illud est in causabile, tertia est quod illud actu exsistit in entibus. Itaque in primo articulo sunt novem conclusiones, sed tres principales.	42. [First partial article] – The first article among them includes three principal conclusions, because of the triple primacy; but each of the three conclusions has three conclusions on which it depends: the first is that something is first, the second is that that thing cannot be caused, the third is that that thing actually exists in reality. And so in the first article there are nine conclusions, but three principal conclusions.
43 Prima autem conclusio istarum novem est ista, quod aliquod effectivum sit simpliciter primum ita quod nec sit effectibile, nec virtute alterius a se effectivum. Probatio, quia aliquod ens est effectibile. Aut ergo a se, aut a nihilo vel ab aliquo alio. Non a nihilo, quia nullius est causa illud quod nihil est, nec a se, quia nulla res est quae se ipsam faciat vel gignat, I De Trinitate l; ergo ab alio. Illud aliud sit a. Si est a primum, hoc modo exposito, propositum ƿhabeo; si non est primum, ergo est posterius effectivum, quia effectibile ab alio vel a virtute alterius effectivum, quia si negetur negatio ponitur affirmatio. Detur illud alterum et sit b, de quo arguitur sicut de a argutum est, et ita aut proceditur in infinitum, quorum quodlibet respectu prioris erit secundum, aut statur in aliquo non habente prius; infinitas autem impossibilis est in ascendendo, ergo primitas necessaria, quia non habens prius nullo posteriore se est posterius, nam circulum in causis esse est inconveniens.	43. Now the first conclusion of these nine is as follows, that some efficient cause is simply first such that neither can it be an effect nor can it, by virtue of something other than itself, cause an effect. The proof is that some being can be an effect. An effect of itself, then, or of nothing, or of something else. Not of nothing, because that which is nothing is cause of nothing; nor of itself, because there is nothing that makes or generates itself, Augustine On the Trinity 1 ch.1 n.1; therefore of something else. Let this something else be a. If a is first in the way expounded [n.43 init.], I have the proposition intended; if it is not first, then it is effective derivatively, because it can be the effect of another or cause an effect by virtue of another, for if a negation is denied the affirmation is asserted. Let that other be granted and let it be b, about which one argues as was argued about a, and thus either one proceeds ad infinitum, where each thing will be second in respect of a prior, or one stops at something that has no prior; but an infinity is impossible in ascending causes, therefore primacy is necessary, because what does not have a prior is posterior to nothing posterior to itself, for a circle in causes is discordant.
44 Contra istam rationem instatur dupliciter: primo, quia secundum philosophantes infinitas est possibilis in ascendendo, sicut ponunt exemplum de generationibus infinitis, ubi nullum est priƿmum sed quodlibet secundum, et tamen hoc ab eis sine circulo ponitur.	44. Against this reasoning there is a double instance: first, that according to philosophizers an infinity in ascending causes is possible, as in the example they posit about infinite generations, where none is first but each is second, and yet they posited this without circularity.
45 Secundo, videtur quod procedat ex contingentibus et ita non sit demonstratio. Antecedens probatur, quia praemissae assumunt esse de aliquo causato; omne tale contingenter est.	45. Second, it seems that the argument proceeds from contingents and so is not a demonstration. The proof of the antecedent is that the premises assume the existence of something that is caused; everything such exists contingently.
46 Ad primam instantiam excludendam dico quod philosophi non posuerunt infinitatem possibilem in causis essentialiter ordinatis sed tantum in accidentaliter ordinatis, sicut patet per Avicennam VI Metaphysicae cap. 5, ubi loquitur de infinitate individuorum in specie.	46. To exclude the first instance [n.44] I say that the philosophers did not posit that an infinity was possible in essentially ordered causes but only in accidentally ordered ones, as is clear from Avicenna in Metaphysics 6 ch.5 94rb-va, where he speaks of an infinity of individuals in a species.
47 Et ad propositum melius ostendendum, sciendum quae sunt causae essentialiter et accidentaliter ordinatae. Ubi notandum quod aliud est loqui de causis per se et per accidens et aliud est loqui de causis per se sive essentialiter et accidentaliter ordinatis. Nam in primo est tantum comparatio unius ad unum, scilicet causae ad ƿcausatum: et est causa per se quae secundum naturam propriam et non secundum aliquid sibi accidens causat, et causa per accidens e converso; in secundo est comparatio duarum causarum inter se, in quantum ab eis est causatum.	47. And, in order to show the proposed point better, one must know that there are causes essentially ordered and causes that are accidentally ordered. Here one must note that it is one thing to speak of causes per se and per accidens, and another to speak of causes per se that are essentially and accidentally ordered. For in the first case there is only comparison of one thing with another, namely of the cause with the thing caused; and a cause per se causes according to its proper nature and not according to something accidental to it and a cause per accidens is the reverse; in the second case the comparison is of two causes with each other, insofar as something is caused by them.
48 Et differunt causae per se sive essentialiter ordinatae a causis per accidens sive accidentaliter ordinatis in tribus.	48. And causes that are per se or essentially ordered differ from causes that are per accidens or accidentally ordered in three ways.
49 Prima differentia est quod in per se ordinatis secunda in quantum causat dependet a prima, in per accidens non, licet in esse vel in aliquo alio dependeat.	49. The first difference is that in per se ordered causes the second depends for its causing on the first, but not in per accidens ordered causes, even though the second is dependent in existence or in something else.
50 Differentia secunda est quod in per se ordinatis est causalitas alterius rationis et alterius ordinis, quia superior est perfectior, in accidentaliter autem ordinatis non; et differentia haec sequitur ex prima, nam nulla causa a causa eiusdem rationis dependet esƿsentialiter in causando, quia in causatione alicuius sufficit unum unius rationis.	50. The second difference is that in per se ordered causes there is causality of a second nature and a second order, because the superior cause is more perfect, but this is not the case in accidentally ordered causes; and this difference follows from the first, for no cause essentially depends for its causing on a cause of the same nature, because in the causing of something one thing of one nature is enough.
51 Tertia est quod omnes causae essentialiter et per se ordinatae simul necessario requiruntur ad causandum, alioquin aliqua causalitas essentialis et per se deesset effectui; in accidentaliter autem ordinatis non est sic, quia non requiritur simultas earum in causando. ƿ	51. The third difference is that all causes ordered essentially and per se are necessarily required simultaneously for the causing, otherwise some essential and per se causality would be lacking for the effect; but it is not so in the case of accidentally ordered causes, because the simultaneity of them in causing is not required.
52 Ex his ostenditur propositum, scilicet quod infinitas essentialiter ordinatorum est impossibilis. Similiter secunda: infinitas accidentaliter ordinatorum est impossibilis nisi ponatur status in ordinatis essentialiter; ergo omni modo est impossibilis infinitas in essentialiter ƿordinatis. Si etiam negetur ordo essentialis, adhuc infinitas est impossibilis; ergo omni modo est aliquod primum necessario et simpliciter effectivum. - Istarum trium propositionum assumptarum propter brevitatem prima dicatur a, secunda b, et tertia c.	52. These points make the proposed conclusion clear, namely that an infinity of essentially ordered causes is impossible. Likewise second, that an infinity of accidentally ordered causes is impossible unless a stand is posited in essentially ordered causes; therefore in every way an infinity in essentially ordered causes is impossible. Even if an essential order is denied, an infinity is still impossible; therefore in every way there is some first thing that is necessarily and simply efficient cause. – Of these three assumed propositions let the first for brevity’s sake be called a, the second b, and the third c.
53 Probatio illarum. Primo a, scilicet quod essentialiter ordinatorum infinitas est impossibilis. Probatio, tum quia universitas causatorum essentialiter ordinatorum est ab aliqua causa quae non est aliquid universitatis, quia tunc esset causa sui. Tota enim universitas dependentium dependet, et a nullo illius universitatis. - Tum quia causae infinitae essent simul in actu, essentialiter scilicet ordinatae, ex ƿtertia differentia supra, quod nullus philosophus ponit. - Tum tertio, quia prius est principio propinquius, V Metaphysicae; ergo ubi nullum principium, nihil essentialiter prius. - Tum quarto, quia superior causa est perfectior in causando, ex secunda differentia; ergo in infinitum superior est in infinitum perfectior, et ita infinitae perfectionis in causando, et per consequens non causans in virtute alterius, quia quaelibet talis est imperfecte causans, quia est dependens in causando ab alia. - Tum quinto, quia effectivum nullam imperfectionem ponit necessario; ergo potest esse in ƿaliquo sine imperfectione. Sed si nulla causa est sine dependentia ad aliquid prius, in nullo est sine imperfectione. Ergo effectibilitas independens potest inesse alicui naturae, et illa simpliciter est prima; ergo effectibilitas simpliciter prima est possibilis. Hoc sufficit, quia inferius ex hoc concluditur quia tale efficiens primum, si est possibile, est in re. Et sic quinque rationibus patet a.	53. Proof of the three propositions. First a, namely that an infinity of essentially ordered causes is impossible. The proof is first that the totality of essentially ordered causes is from some cause that is not any part of the totality, because then it would be cause of itself. For the whole totality of dependent things is dependent, and not on any part of the totality. Second that an infinite number of causes, namely of essentially ordered causes, would actually exist at once, from the third difference above [n.51], which no philosopher has posited. – Next, third, that the prior is what is nearer to the beginning, Metaphysics 5.11.1018b9-11; therefore where there is no beginning, nothing is essentially prior. – Next, fourth, that the superior cause is more perfect in causing, from the second difference [n.50]; therefore what is infinitely superior is infinitely more perfect, and so possessed of infinite perfection in causing, and consequently it does not cause in virtue of another, because anything of this latter sort causes imperfectly, as being dependent in causing on another cause. – Next, fifth, that an effective thing does not necessarily posit any imperfection; therefore it can be in something without imperfection. But if no cause is without dependence on something prior, it will not be in anything without imperfection. Therefore independent effective causality can exist in some nature, and this nature is simply first; therefore effective causality simply first is possible. This is enough, because from this the conclusion is later [n.58] drawn that such a first effective cause, if it is possible, exists in reality. And thus by five reasons is a made plain.
54 b probatur, scilicet quod infinitas in accidentaliter ordinatis sit impossibilis nisi ponatur status essentialiter ordinatorum, quia infinitas accidentalis si ponitur, hoc non est simul, patet, sed successive tantum, ut alterum post alterum, ita quod secundum aliquo modo fluit a priore. Non tamen dependet ab ipso in causando; potest enim causare illo non exsistente sicut illo exsistente, sicut filius generat patre mortuo sicut ipso vivo. Talis infinitas sucƿcessionis est impossibilis, nisi ab aliqua natura infinite durante, a qua tota successio et quidlibet eius, dependeat. Nulla enim deformitas perpetuatur nisi in virtute alicuius permanentis quod nihil est illius successionis, quia omnia successiva illius successionis sunt eiusdem rationis; sed est aliquid prius essentialiter, quia quidlibet successionis dependet ab ipso, et hoc in alia ordinatione quam a causa proxima quae est aliquid illius successionisb. Patet ergo b.	54. Proof of b [n.52], namely that an infinity in accidentally ordered causes is impossible unless a stand is posited in essentially ordered causes, because an accidental infinity, if posited, is not simultaneous, clearly, but only successive, as one after another, such that the second in a way flows from the prior. Yet it does not depend on the prior in causing; for it can cause when the prior does not exist just as when it does exist, as a son generates when his father is dead just as when he is alive. Such an infinity of succession is impossible save from some nature that endures permanently, on which the whole succession and any part of it depend. For no deform-ness is perpetuated save in virtue of some permanent thing that is no part of the succession, because all the successive members of the succession are of the same nature; but something is essentially prior, because any part of the succession depends on it, and that in another form of order than on the proximate cause which is some part of the succession. So b is plain.
55 Probatur etiam c, quod scilicet si negetur ordo essentialis, adhuc infinitas est impossibilis. Probatio, quia cum ex prima ratione hic ƿadducta, scilicet quod a nullo nihil potest esse, sequatur quod aliqua natura sit effectiva, si negatur ordo essentialis activorum ergo illa in nullius alterius virtute causat; et licet ipsa in aliquo singulari ponatur causata, tamen in aliquo est non causata, quod est propositum de natura; vel, si in quolibet ponatur causata, statim implicatur contradictio negando ordinem essentialem, quia nulla natura potest poni in quolibet causata ita quod sit ordo accidentalis sub ipsa sine ordine essentiali ad aliam naturam.	55. There is proof too of c [n.52], that if an essential order is denied, an infinity is still impossible. The proof is that since, from the first reason here adduced, namely that nothing can be from nothing [n.43], it follows that some nature is effective, if an essential order of active causes is denied then this nature causes in virtue of nothing else; and although it be in some individual posited as caused yet in another it is not caused, which is the proposed conclusion about nature; or, if it be in anything posited as caused, at once a contradiction is implied if one denies an essential order, because no nature can be in anything posited as caused such that there be an accidental order under it without an essential order to some other nature.
56 Ad secundam instantiam, supra positam, quae dicit quod ratio procedit ex contingentibus et ita non est demonstratio, respondeo quod posset sic argui: aliqua natura est effecta quia aliquod subiectum mutatur, et ita terminus mutationis incipit esse in subiecto, et ita ille terminus vel compositum producitur sive efficitur; ergo est aliquod efficiens, per naturam correlativorum, et tunc potest esse secundum veritatem prima contingens, sed maƿnifesta. - Potest tamen sic argui, probando primam conclusionem sic: haec est vera 'aliqua natura est effectibilis, ergo aliqua est effectiva'. Antecedens probatur, quia aliquod subiectum est mutabile, quia aliquod entium est possibile distinguendo possibile contra necessarium, et sic procedendo ex necessariis. Et tunc probatio primae conclusionis est de esse quiditative sive de esse possibili, non autem de exsistentia actuali. Sed de quo nunc ostenditur possibilitas, ultra in conclusione tertia ostendetur actualis exsistentia.	56. To the second instance posited above, which says that the reasoning proceeds of contingents and so is not a demonstration [n.43], I respond that one might argue thus: some nature is effected because some subject is changed, and so the term of the change begins to be in the subject, and so that term or composite is produced or effected; therefore there is some efficient thing, by the nature of correlatives, and then the first reason [n.43] can in truth be contingent, but it is manifest. – However, one can argue thus, by proving the first conclusion [n.43] in this way: this reasoning is true, ‘some nature is effectible, therefore some nature is effective’. The proof of the antecedent is that some subject is changeable, because some being is possible, by distinguishing the possible from the necessary [Prior Analytics 1.13.32a18-20: ‘the contingent is that which, whether it exists or not, nothing impossible follows’], and by proceeding in this way from necessaries. And then the proof of the first conclusion is about quidditative being or about possible being, but not about actual existence. But actual existence will be proved further in the third conclusion of that of which possibility is being proved now [n.58].
57 Secunda conclusio de primo effectivo est ista, quod simpliciter primum effectivum est incausabile. Hoc probatur, quia est ineffectibile independens effectivum. Hoc patet prius, quia si sit virtute alterius causativum vel ab alio effectibile, ergo vel processus in infinitum, vel circulus, vel status in aliquo ineffectibili independente effectivo; illud dico primum, et aliud patet quod non est primum, ex datis tuis. Ergo et ulterius concluditur: si primum ƿillud est ineffectibile, ergo incausabile, quia non est finibile, nec materiabile, nec formabile. Probatur consequentia prima, scilicet quod si est ineffectibile, ergo est infinibile, quia causa finalis non causat nisi quia causa movet metaphorice ipsum efficiens ad efficiendum, nam alio modo non dependet entitas finiti ab ipso ut a priori; nihil autem est causa per se nisi ut ab ipso tamquam a priori essentialiter dependet causatum. - Duae autem aliae consequentiae, scilicet quod si est ineffectibile, ergo est immateriabile et informabile, probantur simul, quia cuius non est causa extrinseca, nec intrinseca, quia causalitas causae extrinsecae dicit perfectionem sine imperfectione, causalitas vero causae intrinsecae necessario dicit imperfectionem annexam, quia causa intrinseca est pars causati; igitur ratio causae extrinsecae est naturaliter prior ratione causae intrinsecae. Negato igitur priori negatur et posterius. Probantur etiam eaedem consequentiae, quia causae intrinsecae ƿsunt causatae ab extrinsecis vel secundum esse earum vel in quantum causant compositum, vel utroque modo, quia causae intrinsecae non se ipsis sine agente constituunt compositum. - Ex istis dictis satis patet conclusio secunda.	57. The second conclusion about the first effective thing is this, that the simply first effective thing cannot be caused [n.42]. The proof is that it is an in-effectible independent effective thing. This is clear first [n.43] because, if it is causative by virtue of another or is effectible by another, then either there is a process to infinity, or a circle, or a stand at some in-effectible independent effective thing; that thing I say is first, and anything else is plainly not first, from the things you have granted. Therefore there is also this further conclusion: if that first thing is in-effectible then it is un-causable, because it is not causable by an end, or by matter, or by form. The proof of the first consequence, namely that if it is in-effectible then it is not causable by an end, is that the final cause only causes because the final cause moves metaphorically the efficient cause to bringing about its effect, for the entity of a thing with an end does not in any other way depend on the end as on something prior; but nothing is a cause per se unless the caused thing essentially depends on it as on something prior. – Now the two other consequences, namely that if it is in-effectible then it is not causable by matter or by form, are proved together because what does not have an extrinsic cause does not have an intrinsic cause either, because the causality of an extrinsic cause implies perfection without any imperfection, but the causality of an intrinsic cause necessarily implies some imperfection annexed to it, because an intrinsic cause is part of the caused thing; therefore the nature of an extrinsic cause is naturally prior to the nature of an intrinsic cause. So once the prior is denied so is the posterior. – The same consequences are also proved by the fact that intrinsic causes are caused by extrinsic ones, whether in their existence, or insofar as they cause the composite, or in both ways, because intrinsic causes do not cause the composite by themselves without an agent. – From these statements the second conclusion is plain.
58 Tertia conclusio de primo effectivo est ista: primum effectivum est in actu exsistens et aliqua natura vere exsistens actualiter sicut est effectiva. Probatio istius: cuius rationi repugnat esse ab alio, illud si potest esse, potest esse a se; sed rationi primi effectivi simpliciter repugnat esse ab alio, sicut patet ex secunda conclusione; similiter et ipsum potest esse, sicut patet ex prima ubi posita est quinta probatio ad a, quae minus videtur concludere et tamen hoc concludit. Aliae autem probationes ipsius a possunt tractari de exsistentia quam proponit haec tertia conclusio, et sunt de contingentibus, tamen manifestis; vel accipiantur a de natura et quiditate et possibilitate, et sunt ex necessariis. Ergo effectivum simpliciter primum potest esse ex se. Quod non est a se non potƿest esse a se, quia tunc non ens produceret aliquid ad esse, quod est impossibile, et adhuc, tunc illud causaret se et ita non esset incausabile omnino. - Illud ultimum, scilicet de exsistentia primi effectivi, aliter declaratur, quia inconveniens est universo deesse supremum gradum possibilem in essendo.	58. The third conclusion about the first effective thing is this: the first effective thing is actually existing and some nature is truly actually existent in the way it is effective [n.42]. Its proof: if that to whose nature it is repugnant to be from another can exist, it can exist from itself; but it is repugnant to the nature of the simply first effective thing to be from another, as is plain from the second conclusion [n.57]; likewise too it can exist, as is plain from the first conclusion where the fifth proof for a was set down [n.53], which proof seems to establish too little and yet it establishes this. But the other proofs for that very a [n.53] can be brought to bear on the existence which this third conclusion proposes, and they are about contingents, though manifest ones; or let them be taken of the nature and quiddity and possibility of a, and they proceed from necessities. Therefore a simply first effective thing can be from itself. But what is not from itself cannot be from itself, because then a non-being would bring something into being, which is impossible, and further it would then cause itself and so would not be altogether un-causable. – This last point, namely about the existence of the first effective, is made clear in another way, because for the universe to lack a possible supreme grade in its being is discordant.
59 Iuxta tres conclusiones ostensas de effectivo primo nota corollarium quoddam, quod quasi continet tres conclusiones probatas, quod scilicet primum effectivum non tantum est prius aliis, sed quo prius aliud esse includit contradictionem, sic in quantum primum exsistit. Probatur ut praecedens; nam in ratione talis primi maxime includitur incausabile, probatur ex secunda; ergo si potest esse (quia non contradicit entitati, ut probatur ex prima), sequitur quod potest esse a se, et ita est a se.	59. In accord with the three conclusions shown about the first effective thing, note a certain corollary, that it contains as it were the three proved conclusions, namely that the first effective thing is not only prior to other things but, because a contradiction is involved in something else’s being prior, thus, to the extent it is first, it exists. The proof is as in the preceding [n.58]; for un-causability is most included in the idea of such a first, as is proved from the second [n.57]; for if it can be (because this does not contradict its being, as proved from the first [nn.53, 56]), it follows that it can be of itself, and so it is of itself.
60 Iuxta tres conclusiones primas de causa effectiva propono tres conclusiones similes de causa finali. Aliquod finitivum est simpliciter primum, hoc est nec ad aliud ƿordinabile, nec in virtute alterius natum finire alia. Et probatur quinque probationibus similibus illis quae ponebantur ad primam conclusionem de primo effectivo.	60. In accord with the first three conclusions about the efficient cause I propose three similar conclusions about the final cause. Some final cause is simply first, that is, it is neither orderable to another nor is it naturally end of other things in virtue of something else. And it is proved by five reasons similar to those set down for the first conclusion about the first effective thing [n.53].
61 Secunda est quod primum finitivum est incausabile. Probatur, quia infinibile, alias non primum; et ultra, ergo ineffectibile. Haec consequentia probatur, quia omne per se agens agit propter finem, ex II Physicorum, ubi etiam hoc vult Philosophus de natura, de qua minus videtur quam de agente a proposito. Sed cuius non est aliquod per se efficiens, illud non est effectibile, quia in nullo genere potest per accidens esse primum, sicut patet in proposito, specialiter de causis agentibus per accidens, quae sunt casus et fortuna, quae secundum Aristotelem II Physicorum reducuntur necessario ad causas per se agentes, ut priores, scilicet ad naturam et intellectum vel propositum. Cuius igitur non est aliquod per se agens, eius nullum erit agens; sed cuius non est finis, eius non est aliquod per se agens: ergo ipsum erit ineffectibile, nam finibile excellitur a fine in bonitate et per consequens in perfectione, - et ultra ut supra ostensum est de causa effectiva prima.	61. The second conclusion is that the first final cause is un-causable. The proof is that it is not causable by an end, otherwise it would not be first; and, further, therefore it is in-effectible. The proof of this consequence is that every per se agent acts for an end, from Physics 2.5.196b17-22, where the Philosopher intends this to hold also of nature, about which it is less evident than about an agent that acts from deliberate choice. But that of which there is no per se efficient cause is not effectible, because in no genus can the per accidens be first, as is plain in the proposed case, especially about causes acting per accidens, which are chance and fortune, that according to Aristotle, Physics 2.6.196a5-13, are necessarily reduced to causes acting per se as to things prior, namely to nature and intellect and deliberate choice. Of that therefore of which there is no per se agent there will be no agent; but of that of which there is no end there is no per se agent; therefore it will be in-effectible, for what is causable by an end is excelled in goodness by the end and consequently in perfection, – and so on, as was proved of the first effective cause [n.57].
62 Tertia conclusio est quod primum finitivum est actu exsistens ƿet alicui naturae actu exsistenti convenit illa primitas. Probatur ut prima via de efficientia.	62. The third conclusion is that the first final cause is actually existent and that to some actually existing nature that primacy belongs. The proof is from the first way about efficient causality [n.58].
63 Corollarium: sequitur quod primum est ita primum quod impossibile est prius esse, et probatur ut corollarium in via priori.	63. A corollary: it follows that the first is so first that a prior being is impossible, and this is proved like the corollary in the prior way [n.59].
64 Conclusionibus tribus de utroque ordine causalitatis extrinsecae iam positis propono tres similes de ordine eminentiae. Aliqua natura eminens est simpliciter prima secundum perfectionem. Hoc patet, quia inter essentias ordo essentialis, quia secundum Aristotelem formae se habent sicut numeri, VIII Metaphysicae; in hoc ordine statur, quod probatur illis quinque rationibus quae de statu in effectivis sunt superius.	64. To the three conclusions about both orders of extrinsic causality I propose three similar conclusions about the order of eminence. Some eminent nature is simply first in perfection. This is plain because an order among essences is essential, for according to Aristotle forms are related like numbers, Metaphysics 8.3.1043b33; in this order there is a stand, which is proved by the five ways above about a stand in effective causes [n.53].
65 Secunda conclusio est quod suprema natura est incausabilis. Probatur, quia est infinibilis, ex praecedentibus; ergo ineffectibilis, ƿet ultra, ergo incausabilis. Istae duae consequentiae sunt probatae in secunda conclusione de effectivis. Item quod suprema natura sit ineffectibilis probatur, nam omne effectibile habet aliquam causam essentialiter ordinatam, sicut patet ex probatione ipsius b in conclusione prima de primo effectivo; causa autem essentialiter ordinata excellit effectum.	65. The second conclusion is that a supreme nature is un-causable. The proof is that it is not causable by an end, from the points preceding [nn.57, 62]; therefore it is ineffectible and, further, therefore un-causable. These two consequences were proved in the second conclusion about efficient causes [n.57]. Again, that the supreme nature is ineffectible is proved because every effectible has some essentially ordered cause, as is plain from the proof of b itself in the first conclusion about the first effective thing [n.54]; but an essentially ordered cause excels its effect.
66 Tertia conclusio est quod suprema natura est aliquod actu exsistens, et probatur ex praecedentibus.	66. The third conclusion is that a supreme nature is something actually existing, and it is proved from the preceding [nn.58, 62].
67 Corollarium: aliquam esse naturam eminentiorem vel superiorem ipsa includit contradictionem; probatur ut corollarium de efficiente et fine.	67. Corollary: that there be some nature more eminent or superior to it involves a contradiction; the proof is like the corollary about the effective thing and the end [nn.59, 63].
68 Quantum ad secundum articulum dico quod primum efficiens est ultimus finis. Probatio, quia ƿomne efficiens per se agit propter finem, et prius efficiens propter finem priorem; ergo primum efficiens propter ultimum finem. Sed propter nihil aliud a se principaliter et ultimate agit; ergo propter se sicut propter finem. Ergo primum efficiens est primus finis.	68. [Second partial article] – As to the second article [n.41] I say that the first efficient cause is the ultimate end. The proof is that every efficient cause per se acts for an end, and a prior efficient cause for a prior end; therefore the first efficient cause for the ultimate end. But it acts principally and ultimately for nothing other than itself; therefore it acts for itself as for an end. Therefore the first efficient cause is the first end.
69 Similiter, primum efficiens est primum eminens. Probatur, quia primum efficiens non est univocum respectu aliarum naturarum effectivarum, sed aequivocum; ergo eminentius et nobilius eis. Ergo primum efficiens est eminentissimum.	69. Likewise, the first efficient cause is the first eminent cause. The proof is that the first efficient cause is not univocal with other effective natures, but is equivocal; therefore it is more eminent and more noble than they. Therefore the first efficient cause is most eminent.
70 Quantum ad tertium articulum dico quod cum sit idem cui inest triplex primitas, quia cui inest una ƿinsunt et aliae, et etiam est ibi triplex identitas ita quod primum efficiens est tantum unum secundum quiditatem et naturam. Ad quod ostendendum ostendo primo quamdam conclusionem praeambulam, et secundo principalem conclusionem. Praeambula autem est quod efficiens quod est primum hac triplici primitate est necesse esse ex se. Probatio, quia est penitus incausabile, nam contradictionem includit aliquod esse prius eo in genere causae efficientis vel finis et per consequens in genere cuiuscumque causae; ergo est omnino incausabile. Ex hoc arguo: nihil potest non esse nisi cui aliquid incompossibile positive vel privative potest esse; ei autem quod est a se et penitus incausabile non potest aliquid esse quod ei sit incompossibile positive vel privative; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia nullum ens potest destrui nisi per incompossibile sibi vel positive vel privative. Minor probatur, quia illud incompossibile aut potest esse a se, aut ab alio, si a se ƿet est a se, erit igitur duo incompossibilia simul, vel neutrum est, quia utrumque destruit esse alterius; si ab alio, contra: nulla causa potest destruere aliquod ens propter repugnantiam sui effectus ad illud nisi suo effectui perfectius et intensius esse det quam sit esse illius alterius destructibilis; nullius entis ab alio est nobilius esse a causa sua quam sit esse necessarii a se, quia omne causatum habet esse dependens, sed quod est ex se habet esse independens.	70. [Third partial article] – As to the third article [n.41] I say that since that in which there is the triple primacy is the same thing, for that in which one primacy is the others are too, there is also in it a triple identity such that the first efficient cause is only one in quiddity and in nature. To show this I show first a certain preliminary conclusion, and second the principal conclusion. Now the preliminary conclusion is that the efficient cause that is first by this triple primacy is necessarily existent of itself. The proof is that it is through and through uncausable, for there is a contradiction involved in something’s being prior to it in the genus of efficient or final cause and consequently in the genus of any cause at all; therefore it is altogether un-causable. From this I argue: a thing cannot not be unless there is something positively or privatively incompossible with it that can be; but in the case of that which is from itself and is through and through un-causable there cannot be anything which is positively or privatively incompossible with it; therefore etc. The major is plain, because no being can be destroyed save by what is positively or privatively incompossible with it. The proof of the minor is that that incompossible thing can either be from itself or from another; if it can be from itself and it is from itself, then two incompossible things will be at the same time, or neither of them exists, because each destroys the being of the other; if it can be from another, then to the contrary: no cause can destroy some being on account of the repugnance of its effect to that being unless it give to its effect a more perfect and intense being than is the being of the other destructible thing; of no being from another is its being from its cause nobler than is the being of something necessary of itself, because every caused thing has dependent being, but what is from itself has independent being.
71 Ex hac ultra ad propositum probatur unitas naturae primae, quae est principale intentum in hoc tertio articulo. Quod ostenditur tribus rationibus. Primo sic, quia si duae naturae sunt necesse esse, aliquibus rationibus propriis realibus distinguuntur, et dicantur a et b. Illae rationes aut sunt formaliter necessariae, aut non. Si sic, igitur utrumque duabus rationibus formalibus erit necesse esse, quod ƿest impossibile, quia cum neutra illarum rationum per se includat aliam, utraque istarum circumscripta esset necesse esse. Si vero per illas rationes quibus distinguuntur neutrum sit formaliter necesse esse, igitur illae rationes non sunt rationes necessario essendi, et ita neutrum includitur in necesse esse, quia quaecumque entitas non est necesse esse, est de se possibilis, sed nihil possibile includitur in necesse esse.	71. Further, to the intended proposition, there is proof from this of the unity of the first nature, which is the thing principally intended in this third article. This is shown by three reasons. First in this way, that if two natures are necessarily existent they are distinguished by some real proper reasons, and let them be called a and b. The reasons are either formally necessary or not. If they are, then each nature will be necessarily existent by two formal reasons, which is impossible, because since neither of the reasons per se includes the other, each of the natures, when taken separately, would be necessarily existent. But if by the reasons by which they are distinguished neither one of them is formally necessarily existent, then the reasons are not reasons for necessarily existing, and so neither of them is included in necessary existence, because whatever is not necessarily existent is of itself possible, but nothing possible is included in necessary existence.
72 Secundo probatur, quia duae naturae eminentissimae non possunt esse in universo; ergo nec duo prima effectiva. Probatio antecedentis, quia species se habent sicut numeri, ex VIII Metaphysicae, et per consequens duae non possunt esse in eodem ordine; ergo multo minus nec duae primae vel duae eminentissimae.	72. The second proof is that there cannot be two most eminent natures in the universe; therefore neither can there be two first effective things. The proof of the antecedent is that species are related as numbers, Metaphysics 8.3.1043b33, and consequently there cannot be two in the same order; therefore much less can there be two first or two most eminent natures.
73 Hoc etiam patet tertio per rationem de ratione finis, quia ƿduo fines ultimi si essent, haberent duas coordinationes entium ad se ita quod ista entia ad illa nullum ordinem haberent, quia nec ad finem illorum, nam quae ordinantur ad unum finem ultimum, non possunt ordinari ad alium, quia eiusdem causati duas esse causas totales et perfectas in eodem ordine est impossibile; tunc enim aliquid esset in aliquo ordine per se causa, quo non posito nihil minus esset causatum illud. Ordinata ergo ad unum finem nullo modo ordinantur ad alium, nec per consequens ad illa quae ordinantur ad alium, et ita ex eis non fieret universum. - Hoc etiam confirmatur in communi, quia nulla duo possunt esse terminantia totaliter dependentiam alicuius eiusdem, quia tunc illud terminaret dependentiam, quo subtracto non minus terminaretur illa dependentia, et ita non esset dependentia ad illud. Sed ad efficiens et eminens et ad finem dependent alia essentialiter. Ergo nullae duae naturae possunt esse primo terminantia alia entia secundum illam triplicem dependentiam. Praecise igitur est aliqua una natura terminans entia secundum illam triplicem dependentiam, et ita habens istam triplicem primitatem. ƿ	73. This is also plain, third, by reasoning about the idea of end, because if there were two ultimate ends, they would have two coordinate orders of beings related to them such that these beings here would have no order to those beings there, because they would have no order to the end of those beings either, for things that are ordered to one ultimate end cannot be ordered to another end, because there cannot be two total and perfect causes in the same order of the same caused thing; for then something would be in some order a per se cause such that, when it was not posited, the caused thing would nevertheless be. Therefore things ordered to one end are in no way ordered to another end, nor consequently ordered to things that are ordered to the other end, and so from them no universe would come to be. – There is also a general confirmation of this, that there cannot be two things that are the total term of the dependence of some one and the same thing, because then a thing would be the term of a dependence such that, when it was removed, the dependence would no less have a term, and so it would not be a dependence on that thing. But other things are essentially dependent on the efficient and eminent and final cause. Therefore there cannot be two natures that are the first terms of other things according to that triple dependence. There is therefore precisely some one nature which is the term of beings in accord with that triple dependence, and so which has that triple primacy.