Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D2/Q2C

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Quaest. 2
74 Ostenso esse de proprietatibus relativis primi entis, ulterius ad ostendendum illius primi infinitatem et per consequens esse de ente infinito procedo sic: primo ostendo quod primum efficiens est intelligens et volens ita quod sua intelligentia est infinitorum distincte et quod sua essentia est repraesentativa infinitorum (quae quidem essentia est sua intelligentia), et ex hoc secundo concludetur sua infinitas. Et sic cum triplici primitate ostensa erit quadruplex medium ad ostendendum eius infinitatem. Sed tamen istud quartum medium, scilicet quod primum efficiens est intelligens et volens, ex quo sicut ex quodam medio aliis addito concluditur sua infinitas, suppono quantum ad aliquid usque ad distinctionem 35. ƿ	74. Having shown the relative properties of the first being, I proceed further as follows to show the infinity of the first being and consequently the existence of an infinite being: first I show that the first efficient cause has intelligence and will such that its intelligence is of infinites distinctly and that its essence is representative of infinites (which essence indeed is its intelligence), and from this will be shown, secondly, its infinity. And thus, along with the triple primacy already shown, there will be a fourfold means for showing its infinity. But yet as to the fourth means, namely that the first efficient cause has intelligence and will, from which, as from a means added to the other three, its infinity is proved, I make a certain assumption with respect to it until distinction 35 [Ordinatio I d.35 q. un. n.2].
75 Quod autem sit intelligens et volens arguo sic: aliquod agens est per se primum agens, quia omni causa per accidens prior est aliqua causa per se, II Physicorum, ubi hoc vult de natura, de qua minus videtur; sed omne agens per se agit propter finem.	75. Now, that the first being has intelligence and will I argue thus: some agent is a per se first agent, because to every cause per accidens some cause per se is prior, Physics 2.6.198a8-9, where Aristotle intends this of nature, about which it is less evident; but every agent per se acts for an end.
76 Et ex hoc arguitur dupliciter. Primo sic: omne agens naturale praecise consideratum ex necessitate et aeque ageret si ad nullum finem alium ageret sed sit independenter agens, ergo si non agit nisi propter finem, hoc est quia dependet ab agente amante finem: tale est primum efficiens, ergo etc.	76. And from this there is a twofold argument. First thus: every natural agent, precisely considered, would act of necessity and just as much if it were not to act for any other end but was acting independently; therefore if it does not act save for an end, this is because it depends on an agent that loves the end; of such a sort is the first efficient cause, therefore etc.
77 Item, si primum agens agit propter finem, aut ergo finis ille ƿmovet primum efficiens ut amatus actu voluntatis, aut ut tantum naturaliter amatus. Si ut amatus actu voluntatis, habetur propositum. Si tantum amatus naturaliter, hoc est falsum, quia non naturaliter amat alium finem a se, ut grave centrum et materia formam; tunc enim esset aliquo modo ad finem, quia inclinatus ad illum. Si autem tantum naturaliter amat finem qui est ipse, hoc nihil est nisi ipsum esse ipsum, hoc enim non est salvare duplicem rationem in ipso.	77. Again, if the first agent acts for an end, then that end moves the first efficient cause either as loved by an act of will or as only naturally loved. If as loved by an act of will, the intended conclusion is gained. If only naturally loved, this is false, because it does not naturally love an end other than itself in the way the heavy loves the center and matter loves form; for then it would in some way be in relation to an end because inclined to an end. But if it only naturally loves the end which is itself, this is nothing save itself being itself, for this does not preserve the doubleness of idea in itself.
78 Item arguitur, quasi conferendo rationem iam factam, sic: ipsum primum efficiens dirigit effectum suum ad finem; ergo vel naturaliter dirigit, vel cognoscendo et amando illum finem. Non naturaliter, quia non cognoscens nihil dirigit nisi in virtute cognoscentis: sapientis enim est prima ordinatio, I Metaphysicae; sed primum efficiens in nullius alterius virtute dirigit, sicut nec causat, tunc enim non esset primum; ergo etc.	78. Another argument, by as it were bringing together the reason already made, is as follows: the first efficient cause itself directs its effect to an end; therefore it directs either naturally or by knowing and loving the end. Not naturally, because a non-knower directs nothing save in virtue of a knower; for it belongs first to the wise to order things, Metaphysics 1.2.982a17-18; but the first efficient cause directs in virtue of nothing else, just as neither does it cause in virtue of anything else, – for then it would not be first; therefore etc.
79 Item, aliquid causatur contingenter; ergo prima causa contingenter causat, ergo volens causat.	79. Again, something is contingently caused; therefore the first cause causes contingently, therefore it causes willingly.
80 Probatio primae consequentiae: quaelibet causa secunda causat in quantum movetur a prima; ergo si prima necessario movet, quaeƿlibet alia necessario movetur et quidlibet necessario causatur; igitur si aliqua causa secunda contingenter movet, et prima contingenter movebit, quia non causat causa secunda nisi in virtute primae causae in quantum movetur ab ipsa.	80. Proof of the first consequence: any second cause causes insofar as it is moved by the first cause; therefore if the first cause moves necessarily, any other cause is moved necessarily and anything else is caused necessarily; therefore if some second cause moves contingently, the first cause too will move contingently, because the second cause, to the extent it is moved by the first cause, does not cause save in virtue of the first cause.
81 Probatio secundae consequentiae: nullum est principium contingenter operandi nisi voluntas vel aliquid concomitans voluntatem, quia quodlibet aliud agit ex necessitate naturae, et ita non contingenter; ergo etc.	81. Proof of the second consequence: there is no principle of contingent operation save the will or something concomitant to will, because any other thing acts from the necessity of nature, and so not contingently; therefore etc.
82 Contra istam rationem instatur, et primo contra primam consequentiam arguitur sic, quia nostrum velle posset adhuc aliquid contingenter causare, et ita non requiritur quod prima causa illud contingenter causet.	82. There is an instance against this reason, and first against the first consequence the argument is as follows, that our own willing could yet cause something contingently, and so there is no requirement that the first cause contingently cause it.
83 Item, Philosophus antecedens concessit, scilicet quod aliquid contingenter causatur, et negavit consequens intelligendo de velle, scilicet quod prima causa contingenter causet, ponendo contingentiam in inferioribus non propter contingenter Deum velle sed ex motu, qui necessario causatur in quantum uniformis, sed difformitas sequitur ex partibus eius, et ita contingentia. ƿ	83. Again, the Philosopher conceded the antecedent, namely that something is contingently caused, and he denied the consequent in the sense of understanding it of will, namely that the first cause causes contingently, by positing contingency in inferior things, not because God wills contingently, but as a result of motion, which causes necessarily insofar as it is uniform but has deformity, and so contingency, following from its parts.
84 Contra secundam consequentiam, 'si causat contingenter, ergo volens': non videtur tenere, quia aliqua naturaliter mota possunt impediri, et ita oppositum - contingenter et violenter - potest evenire.	84. Against the second consequence, ‘if it causes contingently, therefore it causes willingly’: this does not seem to hold, because some of the things that are moved naturally can be impeded, and so the opposite can – contingently and violently – come about.
85 Ad primum dicendum quod si Deus est primum movens vel efficiens respectu voluntatis nostrae, idem sequitur de ipsa quod de aliis, quia sive immediate necessario movet eam, sive aliud immediate et illud, necessario motum, necessario moveat eam, quia movet non nisi ex hoc quod movetur. Sequitur tandem quod proximum voluntati necessario moveat voluntatem, etiam si proximum voluntati sit ipsamet voluntas; et ita necessario volet, et erit volens necessario. Et sequitur ulterius impossibile, quod necessario causat quodlibet causatum.	85. To the first [n.82] one must say that if God is the first moving or efficient cause with respect to our will, the same follows about it as about other things, because he necessarily either moves the will immediately or he moves another thing and this other thing, having been necessarily moved, would necessarily move the will, because this other thing only moves from the fact that it is moved. The ultimate result is that what is proximate to the will would necessarily move the will, even if what is proximate to the will is the will itself; and so it will necessarily will, and it will be necessarily willing. And further the impossibility follows that he necessarily causes whatever is caused.
86 Ad secundum dico quod non voco hic contingens quodcumque non necessarium vel non sempiternum, sed cuius oppositum posset fieri quando illud fit; ideo dixi 'aliquid contingenter causatur', et non 'aliquid est contingens'. Nunc dico quod Philosophus non potest consequens negare salvando antecedens per motum, quia si ille totus motus necessario est a causa sua, quaelibet ƿpars eius necessario causatur quando causatur, id est inevitabiliter, ita quod oppositum non potest tunc causari; et ulterius, quod causatur per quamcumque partem motus, necessario causatur et inevitabiliter. Vel igitur nihil fit contingenter, id est evitabiliter, vel primum sic causat immediate quod posset etiam non causare.	86. To the second [n.83] I say that I do not here call contingent what is nonnecessary or non-eternal, but something whose opposite might happen when that something happens; therefore I said ‘something is contingently caused’ [n.79], and not ‘something is contingent’. Now I say that the Philosopher cannot deny the consequent by saving the antecedent through recourse to motion [n.83], because if that whole motion is from its cause necessarily, any part of it is necessarily caused when it is caused, that is, it is caused inevitably, so that the opposite cannot then be caused; and further, what is caused by any part of the motion is caused necessarily and unavoidably. Either therefore nothing happens contingently, that is avoidably, or the first thing causes immediately in such a way that it might also not cause.
87 Ad tertium dico quod si aliqua causa potest impedire istam, hoc non est nisi in virtute superioris causae, et sic usque ad primam causam, quae si immediatam causam sibi necessario movet, usque ad ultimam erit necessitas; ergo necessario impediet, et per consequens non potest alia causa naturaliter causare.	87. To the third [n.84] I say that if some cause can impede it, this is only in virtue of a superior cause, and so on right up to the first cause, and if the first cause necessarily moves the cause immediate to itself, there will be necessity right up to the end; therefore it will impede necessarily, and consequently no other cause can naturally exercise its causality.
88 Sic ergo videtur triplici via ostensum quod primum agens est ƿintelligens et volens, quarum prima est quod natura agit propter finem et non nisi quia dependens et directa a cognoscente finem; secunda est quod ipsum primum agens agit propter finem, et tertia quod aliquis effectus contingenter fit quando causatur.	88. Thus therefore it seems to have been shown in a triple way that the first agent has intelligence and will, the first of which ways is that nature acts for an end and only because it is dependent and directed to the end by a knower [n.76]; the second is that the first agent itself acts for an end [nn.77-78], and the third that some effect is, when caused, contingently caused [nn.79-87].
89 Ulterius quoad quaestionem praeambulam ad infinitatem probo secundo quod eius intellectio et volitio est idem quod eius essentia, et primo de volitione sui ipsius ut obiecti ita quod primam causam amare est idem essentialiter cum natura causae et omnis actus voluntatis eius. Probatio. Causalitas et causatio causae finalis est simpliciter prima, secundum Avicennam VI Metaphysicae, dicentem quod ((si de qualibet causa esset scientia, illa quae esset de causa finali, esset nobilissima)); ipsa enim, quantum ad causalitatem, praecedit causam efficientem, quia movet efficiens ad agendum, - et ideo ƿcausalitas primi finis, et eius causatio, est penitus incausabilis secundum quamcumque causationem in quolibet genere causae. Causalitas autem finis primi est movere efficiens primum sicut amatum; idem autem est primum finem movere primum efficiens ut amatum ab ipso et primum efficiens amare primum finem, quia nihil aliud est obiectum amari a voluntate quam voluntatem amare obiectum. Ergo primum efficiens amare primum finem est penitus incausabile, et ita ex se necesse esse, et ita erit idem naturae primae. Et quasi convertitur ratio ex opposito conclusionis, quia si primum amare est aliud a natura prima, ergo est causabile, et per consequens effectibile; igitur ab aliquo per se efficiente amante finem. Igitur primum amare se esset causatum ex aliquo amore finis priore isto causato, quod est impossibile.	89. Further, as to the question preliminary to infinity, I prove second that the first agent’s understanding and will are the same as its essence, and first of the volition of itself as of an object such that the act of love of the first cause is essentially the same as the nature of that cause and as the nature of every act of its will. Proof. The causality and causing of the final cause is simply first, according to Avicenna Metaphysics 6 ch.5 (95rb), who says that “if there is knowledge about any cause whatever, knowledge about the final cause would be noblest;” for this cause, as concerns its causality, precedes the efficient cause, because it moves the efficient cause to act, – and therefore the causality of the first cause and of its causing is, according to any causation in any genus of cause, through and through un-causable. But the causality of the first end is to move the efficient cause as a thing loved; but it is the same thing for the first end to move the first efficient cause as a thing loved by it and for the first efficient cause to love the first end, because for an object to be loved by the will is nothing other than for the will to love the object. Therefore that the first efficient cause loves the first end is through and through un-causable, and so is necessary of itself, and so it will be the same as the first nature. And there is as it were a reversal of the reasoning from the opposite of the conclusion, because if the first loving is other than the first nature, then it is causable, and consequently effectible; therefore it is from some per se efficient cause which loves the end. Therefore the first loving would be caused by some love of the end prior to that caused first loving, which is impossible.
90 Hoc ostendit Aristoteles XII Metaphysicae de intelligere, quia aliter primum non erit optima substantia, quia per intelligere est honorabile. ƿ	90. Aristotle shows this fact about intelligence, Metaphysics 12.9.1074b17-21, because otherwise the first thing will not be the best substance, for it is through understanding that it is honorable.
91 Secundo, quia alias laboriosa erit eius continuatio. Item, si non sit illud, erit in potentia contradictionis ad illud; ad illam naturam sequitur labor secundum ipsum.	91. Second, because otherwise the continuance of its activity will be laborious for it. Again, if it is not that [sc. the same as its essence], it will be in potency to its contradictory; on that potency labor follows, according to him.
92 Istae rationes possunt ratione declarari. Prima sic: cum omnis entis in actu primo perfectio eius ultima sit in actu secundo quo coniungitur optimo, maxime si sit activum et non tantum factivum (omne autem intelligibile est activum, et prima natura est intelligibilis, ex praemissa), sequitur quod ultima eius perfectio erit in actu secundo; igitur si ille non sit eius substantia, substantia eius non est optima, quia aliud est suum optimum.	92. These reasons can be made clear by reason. The first [n.90] thus: since the ultimate perfection of every being in first act exists in the second act whereby it is conjoined to what is best, especially if the best acts and does not merely make (for every intelligible is active, and the first nature is intelligible, from the previous conclusion [nn.75-88]), the consequence is that its ultimate perfection will be in second act; therefore if this act is not the substance of it, its substance will not be best, because its best is some other thing.
93 Secunda ratio potest declarari sic: potentia solummodo receptiva est potentia contradictionis; ergo cum hoc non sit huiusmodi, ergo etc. - Sed quia secundum Aristotelem nec ista est ratio demonstrativa, sed tantum probabilis, aliter propositum ostendatur, ex identitate potentiae et obiecti in se; ergo actus erit ƿeis idem. Sed consequentia non valet, patet: instantia, quia angelus intelligit se et amat se et tamen actus angeli amandi et intelligendi non sunt idem substantiae eius.	93. The second reason [n.91] can be made clear thus: a potency merely receptive is a potency for the contradictory; therefore since it is not of this sort [sc. in potency to the contradictory], therefore etc. – But because according to Aristotle this reason is not demonstrative but only probable, let the intended proposition be shown in another way, from the identity of the power and of the object in itself; therefore they will have the same act. But the consequence, plainly, is not valid; an instance is that an angel understands itself and loves itself and yet an angel’s act of loving and of understanding are not the same as its substance.
94 Haec conclusio, videlicet quod essentia divina sit eadem quod volitio sui ipsius, vera est ex corollariis: nam sequitur primo quod voluntas est idem primae naturae, quia velle non est nisi voluntatis; ergo illa voluntas cuius velle est incausabile est etiam incausabilis; ergo etc. Et similiter, velle intelligitur quasi posterius voluntate; tamen velle est idem illi naturae; ergo magis voluntas.	94. This conclusion, namely that the divine essence is the same as its willing itself, is true from corollaries: for it follows first that that the will is the same as the first nature, because willing exists only in the will; therefore the will whose willing is un-causable is also un-causable; therefore etc. And likewise, willing is understood to be as it were posterior to the will; yet willing is the same as the first nature; therefore the will more so.
95 Item secundo sequitur quod intelligere se est idem illi naturae, quia nihil amatur nisi cognitum; igitur si amare se ex se est necesse esse, sequitur quod intelligere se est necesse esse ex se.	95. Again, second, it follows that understanding itself is the same as the first nature, because nothing is loved unless it is known; therefore if loving itself is necessarily existent from itself, the consequence is that understanding itself is necessarily existent from itself.
96 Et si est intelligere propinquius illi naturae quam velle, ideo sequitur ulterius quod intellectus sit idem illi naturae, sicut prius de voluntate ex velle argutum est.	96. And if understanding is closer to the first nature than willing, then the consequence further is that the intellect is the same as the first nature, as was just argued about the will from willing [n.94].
97 Sequitur quarto etiam quod ratio intelligendi se sit idem sibi, ƿquia necesse est esse ex se si intelligere sit ex se necesse esse et ratio intelligendi se quasi praeintelligitur ipsi intellectui.	97. There is a fourth consequence too, that the idea of understanding itself is the same as itself, because the idea necessarily exists of itself if understanding necessarily exist of itself, and if the idea of understanding itself is as it were pre-understood in the intellect itself.
98 Ostenso de intelligere se et velle se quod sint idem essentiae primi, ostendo propositum ex aliis, scilicet de omni intelligere et velle. Et sit conclusio tertia ista: nullum intelligere potest esse accidens primae naturae. Probatio, quia de illa natura prima ostensum est esse in se primum effectivum; ergo ex se habet unde posset quodcumque causabile causare circumscripto alio quocumque, saltem ut prima causa illius causabilis. Sed circumscripta cognitione eius, non habet unde possit illud causabile causare; ergo cognitio cuiuscumque alterius non est aliud a natura sua. - Probatio assumpti, quia nihil potest causare nisi ex amore finis volendo illud. quia non potest aliter esse per se agens, quia nec agere, propter finem; nunc autem ipsi velle alicuius propter finem praeintelligitur ƿintelligere ipsum; ante igitur primum signum in quo intelligitur causans sive volens a, necessario praeintelligitur intelligens a; ita sine hoc non potest per se efficere, et ita de aliis.	98. Having shown of self-understanding and self-willing that they are the same as the essence of the first being, I show from other things the proposition intended, namely about all its understanding and willing. And let the third conclusion be this: no understanding can be an accident of the first nature. The proof is that it has been shown of the first nature that it is in itself the first effective thing [nn.43-56]; therefore it has from itself the resources whence, after everything else has been removed, it can cause anything causable, at least as first cause of the causable. But with its knowledge removed it does not have the resources whence it might cause the causable; therefore knowledge of anything else whatever is not other than its nature. – The proof of the assumption is that nothing can cause except from love of the end, by loving it, because it cannot otherwise be a per se agent, because neither can it act, for an end; as it is, however, there is pre-understood in its willing of anything for the end its understanding of it; therefore before the first moment in which it is understood to be causing or willing a, necessarily it is pre-understood to be understanding a; so without this it cannot per se bring a about, and so in the case of other things.
99 Item, probatur idem, quia omnes intellectiones eiusdem intellectus habent similem habitudinem ad intellectum, secundum identitatem essentialem vel accidentalem (sicut patet de omni intellectu creato et eius intellectionibus), quia videntur perfectiones eiusdem generis; ergo si aliquae habent receptivum, et omnes, et si aliqua est accidens, et quaelibet. Sed aliqua non potest esse accidens in primo, ex praecedenti conclusione, quia non intellectio sui ipsius; ergo nulla erit ibi accidens.	99. Again, the same thing is proved because all understandings of the same intellect have a like relation to the intellect, according to their essential identity or accidental identity with it (as is clear of every created intellect and its understandings), because they seem to be perfections of the same genus; therefore if some of them have a subject that receives them, then all of them do, and if one of them is an accident each of them is. But it cannot be that any of them is an accident in the first thing, from the preceding conclusion [n.89], because an accident would be a non-understanding of itself; therefore none of them will there be an accident.
100 Item, intelligere si quod potest esse accidens, recipietur in intellectu ut in subiecto: ergo et in illo intelligere quod est idem intellectui, et ita perfectius intelligere erit in potentia receptiva respectu imperfectioris.	100. Again, understanding, if it is what can be an accident, will be received in the intellect as in a subject; therefore received also in the understanding which is the same as the intellect, and thus a more perfect understanding will be in the receptive power in respect of a more imperfect understanding.
101 Item, idem intelligere potest esse plurium obiectorum ordinandorum, ergo quanto perfectius, tanto plurium; ergo perfectissimum ƿquo incompossibile est perfectius intelligi erit idem omnium intelligibilium. Intelligere primi sic est perfectissimum; ergo idem est omnium intelligibilium, et illud quod est sui est idem sibi, ex proxima praecedente; ergo intelligere omnium est idem. Et eandem conclusionem volo intelligi de velle.	101. Again, the same understanding can be about setting several objects in order, therefore the more perfect it is the more the objects; therefore the most perfect understanding, with which a more perfect degree of being understood is incompossible, will be the same as the understanding of all objects. The understanding of the first thing is most perfect in this way; therefore it is the same as the understanding of all objects, and the understanding which is of itself is the same as itself, from what has just preceded [n.89]; therefore the understanding of all things is the same as itself. And I intend the same conclusion to be understood about willing.
102 Item, iste intellectus non est nisi quoddam intelligere; sed iste intellectus est idem omnium, et ita quod non potest esse alicuius alterius obiecti; ergo nec intelligere aliud. Ergo idem intelligere est omnium. - Fallacia est accidentis ex identitate aliquorum inter se concludere identitatem respectu tertii respectu cuius extraneantur; et patet in simili: intelligere est idem quod velle; 'si ergo intelligere ipsum est alicuius, ergo et velle est eiusdem', non sequitur, sed tantummodo sequitur quia est velle; quod quidem velle ƿest aliquid eiusdem, quia intelligendum est 'eiusdem' ita quod divisim inferri potest, non coniunctim, propter accidens.	102. Again, the intellect is nothing but a certain understanding; but this intellect is the same for all things, and so is something that cannot be for any other object; therefore neither can it understand any other thing. Therefore the intellect is the same as the understanding of all things. – It is the fallacy of the accident to conclude from the identity of certain things among themselves to their identity with respect to a third thing with respect to which they are extraneous; and it is plain from a similitude: to understand is the same as to will; ‘if therefore to understand itself belongs to something, then to will itself too belongs to the same thing’, does not follow, but it only follows that to will belongs to it; which willing indeed is something that belongs to the same thing, because one must so understand ‘same thing’ that the inference can be drawn in a divided, not a conjoined, manner, because of being an accident.
103 Item, intellectus primi habet actum unum adaequatum sibi et coaeternum, quia intelligere se est idem sibi; ergo non potest aliquem habere alium. - Consequentia non valet. Exemplum de beato, qui simul videt Deum et aliud etiam si videat Deum secundum ultimum capacitatis suae, ut de anima Christi ponitur, et adhuc potest videre aliud.	103. Again, the intellect of the first thing has one act that is adequate to itself and coeternal, because understanding itself is the same as itself; therefore it cannot have any other understanding. – The consequence is not valid. An example about the blessed who at the same time see God and something else even if they see God according to the utmost of their capacity, as is posited about the soul of Christ, and still he can see something else.
104 Item arguitur: intellectus iste habet in se per identitatem perfectionem maximam intelligendi; ergo et omnem aliam. - Responsio: non sequitur, quia alia quae minor est potest esse causabilis et ideo differre ab incausabili, maxima autem non potest.	104. Again an argument: this intellect has in itself through identity the greatest perfection of understanding; therefore it has every other understanding. – Response: this does not follow, because an understanding that is lesser can be causable and therefore can differ from the un-causable, but the greatest understanding cannot.
105 Quarta conclusio principalis de intellectu et voluntate Dei est ista: intellectus primi intelligit semper et distincto actu et necessario quodcumque intelligibile prius naturaliter quam illud sit in se.	105. The fourth principal conclusion about the intellect and the will of God is this: the intellect of the first thing understands always and with a distinct and necessary act any intelligible thing naturally before that thing exists in itself.
106 Prima pars probatur, quia potest cognoscere quodcumque intelligibile sic; hoc enim est perfectionis in intellectu, posse distincte et actu cognoscere quodcumque intelligibile, immo hoc ponere est necessarium ad rationem intellectus, quia omnis intellectus est ƿtotius entis sumpti communissime, ut determinabitur distinctione 3. Nullam autem intellectionem potest habere intellectus primi nisi eandem sibi, ex proxima; igitur cuiuslibet intelligibilis habet intelligere actuale et distinctum, et hoc idem sibi, et ita semper et necessario.	106. The proof of the first part is that the first thing can know what is thus intelligible; for this belongs to perfection in the intellect, to be able distinctly and actually to know any intelligible thing, nay to posit this is necessary for the idea of intellect, because every intellect is of the whole of being taken in the most common way, as will be determined later [I d.3 p.1 q.3 nn.3, 8-12, 24]. But the intellect of the first thing can only have an understanding the same as itself, from what was just said [n.98]; therefore it has actual and distinct understanding of any intelligible whatever, and this the same as itself and so always and necessarily.
107 Secunda pars, de prioritate, probatur sic, quia quidquid est idem sibi est necesse esse, sicut patuit prius; sed esse aliorum a se est non necesse esse. Necesse esse ex se est prius natura omnium non necessario.	107. The second part, about priority, is proved thus, that whatever is the same as itself is necessarily existent, as was plain above [n.106]; but the being of things other than itself is not necessarily existent. Necessary existence is of itself prior in nature to everything non-necessary.
108 Aliter probatur, quia esse cuiuslibet alterius dependet ab ipso ut a causa, et ut causa est alicuius causabilis, necessario includitur cognitio eius ex parte causae; ergo illa cognitio erit prior naturaliter ipso esse cogniti.	108. It is proved in another way, that the existence of anything else depends on the first thing as on a cause and, as a cause is of something causable, knowledge of the causable on the part of the cause is necessarily included; therefore the knowledge will be naturally prior to the very existence of the known thing.
109 Prima pars etiam conclusionis probatur aliter, quia artifex perfectus distincte cognoscit omne agendum antequam fiat, alias non perfecte operaretur, quia cognitio est mensura iuxta quam operatur; ergo Deus est omnium producibilium a se habens notitiam distinctam et actualem, vel saltem habitualem, priorem eis.	109. The first part of the conclusion is also proved in another way, that a perfect artisan distinctly knows everything to be done before it is done, otherwise he would not operate perfectly, because knowledge is the measure by which he operates; therefore God is in possession of distinct and actual knowledge, or at any rate habitual knowledge, of all things producible by him prior to those things.
110 Contra istam: instatur de arte quod ars universalis sufficit ad universalia producenda. - Responsionem quaere. ƿ	110. Against this: there is an instance about art, that universal art suffices for producing universal things [Scotus, Metaphysics I q.5 nn.3-4, VII p.2 q.15 n.1] – Look there for a response [ibid. VII p.2 q.15 n.9]. response [ibid. VII p.2 q.15 n.9].