Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D2/Q2D

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Quaest. 2
111 His ostensis praeambulis arguo infinitatem quattuor viis. Primo per viam efficientiae, ubi ostendetur propositum dupliciter: primo quia ipsum est primum efficiens omnium, secundo quia, efficiens puta, distincte cognoscens omnia factibilia; tertio ostendetur infinitas per viam finis, et quarto per viam eminentiae. Primam viam, ex parte causae, tangit Philosophus VIII Physicorum et XII Metaphysicae, quia movet motu infinito; ergo habet potentiam infinitam.	111. Having shown these preliminaries I argue for infinity in four ways. [First way] – First by way of efficacy, where the intended proposition will be shown in a twofold way: first because it is the first efficient cause of all things, second because the efficient cause, plainly, knows distinctly all make-able things; third, infinity will be shown by way of the end, and fourth by way of eminence. The first way, on the part of the cause, is touched on by the Philosopher, Physics 8.10.266a10-24, 266b6-20, 267b17-26 and Metaphysics 12.7.1073a3-13, because it moves with an infinite motion; therefore it has an infinite power.
112 Haec ratio roboratur quantum ad antecedens sic: aeque concluditur propositum si possit movere per infinitum sicut si moveret per infinitum, quia aeque oportet eum esse in actu sicut illud ƿposse, patet de primo quantum est ex se. Licet igitur non moveat motu infinito, sicut intelligit Aristoteles, tamen si accipiatur antecedens istud quod quantum est ex parte sua potest movere, habetur antecedens verum et aeque sufficiens ad inferendum propositum.	112. This way is confirmed as to the antecedent as follows: the intended proposition is proved just as much whether it can move through an infinity as whether it does move through an infinity, because the existence of it must be actual just as much as the power of it is; the thing is clear of the first thing to the extent it exists of itself [n.58]. Although therefore it may not move with an infinite motion in the way Aristotle understands, yet if that antecedent is taken to be what, for its part, can move, the antecedent is held to be true and equally sufficient for inferring the intended proposition.
113 Consequentia probatur sic, quia si ex se, non virtute alterius movet motu infinito; ergo non ab alio accipit sic movere, sed in virtute sua activa habet totum effectum suum simul, quia independenter. Sed quod simul habet in virtute infinitum effectum, est infinitum; ergo etc.	113. The consequence [n.111] is proved thus, that if it exists of itself, it does not move with an infinite motion by virtue of another; therefore it does not receive its thus moving from another, but it has in its own active virtue its whole effect all at once, because it has it independently. But what has in its virtue an infinite effect all at once is infinite; therefore etc.
114 Aliter roboratur prima consequentia sic: primum movens simul habet in virtute sua omnes effectus possibiles produci per motum; sed illi sunt infiniti si motus infinitus; ergo etc.	114. The first consequence [n.111] is confirmed in another way thus: the first mover has all at once in its virtue all the effects that can be produced by motion; but those effects are infinite if the motion is infinite; therefore etc.
115 Contra istas declarationes Aristotelis, quidquid sit de antecedente, tamen consequentia prima non videtur bene probari. Non primo modo, quia duratio maior nihil perfectionis addit, nam albedo quae uno anno manet non est perfectior quam si tantum uno die maneret; ergo motus quantaecumque durationis non est perfectior effectus quam motus unius diei. Ergo ex hoc quod ƿagens habet in virtute sua activa simul movere motu infinito, non concluditur maior perfectio hic quam ibi, nisi quod agens diutius movet, et ex se: et ita esset ostendendum quod aeternitas agentis concluderet eius infinitatem, alias ex infinitate motus non posset concludi. - Tunc ad formam: ultima propositio illius roborationis negatur, nisi de infinitate durationis.	115. Against these clarifications of Aristotle, whatever may be true of the antecedent, yet the first consequence does not seem well proved. Not in the first way [n.113], because a greater duration does not add any perfection, for a whiteness that persists for one year is not more perfect than if it persisted for only one day; therefore a motion of however long a duration is not a more perfect effect than the motion of one day. Therefore from the fact that the agent has all at once in its active virtue a moving with an infinite motion, the perfection is not proved to be greater in this case than in that, save that the agent moves for a longer time, and of itself; and so one would need to show that the eternity of the agent would prove its infinity, otherwise it could not be proved from the infinity of its motion. – Then as to the form of the argument: the final proposition of the confirmation [n.113] is denied, save of infinity of duration.
116 Secunda roboratio etiam consequentiae improbatur, quia non maior perfectio intensiva concluditur ex hoc quod agens quodcumque eiusdem speciei potest producere successive quotcumque quamdiu manet, quia quod potest in tempore uno in unum tale, potest eadem virtute in mille talia si mille temporibus maneat. Et non est possibilis apud philosophos infinitas nisi numeralis effectuum producibilium per motum (scilicet generabilium et corruptibilium), quia in speciebus finitatem ponebant. Ergo non magis ƿsequitur infinitas intensiva in agente ex hoc quod potest in infinita numero successive quam si posset in duo tantum; tantum enim est possibilis infinitas numeralis secundum philosophos. - Si quis autem probet infinitatem specierum possibilem, probando aliquos motus caelestes esse incommensurabiles et ita numquam posse redire ad uniformitatem, etiam si per infinitum durarent et infinitae coniunctiones specie causarent infinita generabilia specie, de hoc quidquid sit in se, nihil tamen ad intentionem Philosophi, qui infinitatem specierum negaret.	116. The second confirmation [n.114] of the consequence is also refuted, because a greater intensive perfection is not proved by the fact that any agent of the same species can go on successively producing as much and as long as it lasts, because what has power for one such thing in one stretch of time has power by the same virtue for a thousand such things if it last a thousand stretches of time. And, among philosophers, an infinity is not possible except a numerical one of effects producible by motion (namely of effects that can come to be and pass away), because in species they posited a finitude. Therefore an intensive infinity in an agent no more follows from the fact that it has power for an infinite number of things in succession than if it has power for two things only; for only a numerical infinity is possible according to philosophers. – But if someone prove an infinity of species to be possible, by proving some of the heavenly motions to be incommensurable and so never able to return to the same form, even if they endure an infinite time and even if conjunctions infinite in species cause generable things infinite in species, whatever may in itself be true about this, yet it is nothing to the intention of the philosopher, who denied an infinity of species.
117 Ultima probabilitas quae occurrit pro consequentia Philosophi declaranda, est ista: quidquid potest in aliqua multa simul quorum quodlibet requirit aliquam perfectionem sibi propriam, illud concluditur esse perfectius ex pluralitate talium. Ita videtur de primo agente esse concedendum quod si posset causare simul ƿinfinita quod esset eius virtus infinita, et per consequens, si primum agens simul habet virtutem causandi infinita, quantum est ex se simul posset ea producere; licet natura effectus non permittit, adhuc sequitur infinitas virtutis eius. Haec consequentia ultima probatur, quia non potens causare album et nigrum non est minus perfectum, quia non sunt simul causabilia; haec enim non simultas est ex repugnantia eorum et non est ex defectu agentis.	117. The ultimate probability that occurs for making clear the consequence of the Philosopher is as follows: whatever has power for many things at once, each of which requires some perfection proper to itself, is shown by the plurality of such things to be more perfect. Thus it seems one should conclude about the first agent that if it can cause infinite things all at once then its virtue must be infinite, and consequently that if the first agent has all at once the virtue to cause infinite things, then, as far depends on itself, it can produce them all at once; even if the nature of the effect does not permit of this, yet the infinity of the thing’s virtue follows. The proof of this ultimate consequence is that what cannot cause a white and a black thing is not thereby less perfect, because these things are not simultaneously causable; for this non-simultaneity comes from a repugnance in them and not from a defect in the agent.
118 Et ex isto probo infinitatem sic: si primum haberet omnem cauƿsalitatem formaliter simul, licet non possent causabilia simul poni in esse, esset infinitum, quia simul quantum est ex se posset infinita producere; et posse plura simul concludit maiorem potentiam intensive: ergo si habet perfectius quam si haberet omnem causalitatem formaliter, magis sequitur infinitas intensiva. Sed habet omnem causalitatem cuiuslibet rei secundum totum quod est in re ipsa eminentius quam si esset formaliter.	118. And from this I prove infinity as follows: if the first thing had all causality formally at the same time, although the causable things might not be able to be put into being all at once, it would be infinite, because, as far as depends on itself, it could produce infinite things all at once; and having power for several things at once proves a greater power intensively; therefore if it has this power more perfectly than if it had all causality formally, its intensive infinity would follow all the more. But all the causality for anything whatever as to the whole of what exists in reality itself is had by it more eminently than if it was had by it formally.
119 Licet igitur omnipotentiam proprie dictam secundum intentionem theologorum tantum creditam esse et non naturali ratione credam posse probari, sicut dicetur distinctione 42, tamen probatur naturaliter infinita potentia, quae simul quantum est ex se habet omnem causalitatem, quae simul posset in infinita si essent simul factibilia.	119. Although, therefore, I believe that omnipotence properly speaking, according to the intention of theologians, is a matter of belief only and cannot be proved by natural reason, as will be said later [I d.42 q. un. nn.2-3; below n.178], nevertheless an infinite potency can be naturally proved that, as far as depends on itself, has all at once of itself all the causality able to produce infinite things, provided these infinite things are capable of being made to be all at once.
120 Si obicis, primum non potest ex se simul in infinita, quia ƿnon est probatum quod sit totalis causa infinitorum, hoc nihil obstat, quia si haberet simul unde esset totalis causa, nihil perfectius esset quam nunc sit quando habet unde sit prima causa. Tum quia illae secundae causae non requiruntur propter perfectionem in causando, quia tunc remotius a prima esset perfectius, quia perfectiorem requireret causam. Sed si requiruntur causae secune cum prima secundum philosophos, hoc est propter imperfectionem effectus, ut primum cum aliqua causa imperfecta posset ƿcausare imperfectum, quod secundum ipsos non posset immediate causare . - Tum quia perfectiones totae secundum Aristotelem eminentius sunt in primo quam si ipsae formalitates earum sibi inessent si possent inesse; quod probatur, quia causa secunda proxima primae totam perfectionem suam causativam habet a sola prima; ergo totam perfectionem illam eminentius habet causa prima quam secunda causa habens ipsam formaliter. Consequentia patet, quia prima respectu illius causae secundae est causa totalis et aequivoca. Consimiliter quaeratur de tertia causa respectu secundae vel respectu primae: si respectu primae, habetur propositum; si respectu secundae, sequitur secundam eminenter continere perfectionem totalem quae est formaliter in tertia. Sed secunda habet a prima quod sic continet perfectionem tertiae, ex praeostensa; ergo prima eminentius habet continere perfectionem tertiae quam secunda, et sic de omnibus aliis, usque ad ultimam. Quare primam causam habere eminenter totalem perfectionem causativam omnium et ƿperfectius quam si haberet causalitatem omnium formaliter si esset possibile, videtur iudicio meo posse concludere ratio Aristotelis de substantia infinita quae accipitur ex VIII Physicorum et XII Metaphysicae, superius posita. ƿ	120. If you object that the first thing does not of itself have power for infinite things all at once, because it has not been proved to be the total cause of infinite things, this objection poses no obstacle, because if it had all at once the source whence it was the total cause, it would be in nothing more perfect than it is now when it has the source whence it is first cause. – Also because the second causes are not required for its perfection in causing, because then a thing more removed from the first cause would be more perfect because it would require a more perfect cause. But if second causes are, according to the philosophers, required together with the first cause, this is because of the imperfection of the effect, so that the first thing along with some imperfect cause might cause an imperfect thing, because according to them it could not cause it immediately. – Also because, according to Aristotle [Metaphysics 5.16.1021b31-32, 12.7.1072b28-34], the totality of perfections is more eminent in the first thing than if their formalities themselves were present in it, supposing they could be present in it; the proof of which is that a second cause proximate to the first cause has the whole of its causative perfection from the first cause alone; therefore the first cause has that whole perfection more eminently than the second cause, which has it formally. The consequence is plain, because the first cause is the total and equivocal cause with respect to the second cause [n.69]. One may ask a similar question of the third cause with respect to the second cause or with respect to the first; if the answer is with respect to the first [sc. that the third has its whole causative perfection from the first cause], the proposition intended is gained; if with respect to the second, it follows that the second contains eminently the total perfection which is formally in the third. But the second has from the first that it thus contains the perfection of the third, from what has just been shown above [n.120]; therefore the first has to contain more eminently the perfection of the third than the second does, and so on in all other cases right up to the last cause. Wherefore that the first cause possesses eminently the whole causative perfection of all the causes, and possesses it more perfectly than if it had the causality of all of them formally, were that possible, seems in my judgment capable of being proved by the argument of Aristotle posited above [n.111] about the infinite substance, which is taken from the Physics and Metaphysics.
121 Iuxta istam viam efficientiae arguitur quod habeat potentiam infinitam, quia creat, nam inter extrema creationis est infinita distantia. Sed hoc antecedens ponitur tantum creditum, et verum ƿest ut non esse quasi duratione praecederet esse, non tamen quasi natura secundum viam Avicennae. - Antecedens ostenditur, quia saltem prima natura post Deum est ab ipso et non a se, nec accipit esse aliquo praesupposito; ergo illud creatur. Sed sic accipiendo prius natura tam non esse quam esse, non sunt ibi extrema mutationis quam causet ista virtus, nec illud effici requirit mutari. Sed quidquid sit de antecedente, consequentia non probatur, quia quando inter extrema nulla est distantia media sed ipsa diƿcuntur praecise distare ratione extremorum inter se, tanta est distantia quantum est maius extremum. Exemplum: Deus distat in infinitum a creatura, etiam suprema possibili, non propter aliquam distantiam mediam inter extrema sed propter infinitatem unius extremi.	121. According to this way of efficacy there is an argument that it has infinite power because it creates, for between the extremes in the case of creation [sc. the extremes of creator and created] there is an infinite distance. But this antecedent is set down only as something believed [n.119], and it is true that not-being would in duration as it were precede being, not however in nature as it were, after the way of Avicenna. – The antecedent is shown by the fact that at least the first nature after God is from him and not from itself, nor does it receive being on the presupposition of anything else; therefore it is created. But if one takes being and not-being as in this way prior in nature, then they are in that case not extremes of a change which that virtue would cause, nor does the causing of the effect require a changing. But whatever may be true of the antecedent, the consequence is not proved, because when there is no distance intermediate between the extremes but the extremes are said to be distant precisely by reason of being extremes between each other, then there is as much distance as there is an extreme that is greater. An example: God is infinitely distant from the creature, even than the highest possible creature, not because of any distance between the extremes but because of the infinity of one extreme.
122 Sic ergo contradictoria non distant per aliqua media, quia contradictoria sunt immediata - ita quod quantumcumque parum recedit aliquid ab uno extremo, statim est sub altero - sed distant propter extrema in se. Tanta ergo est distantia ista quantum est illud extremum quod est perfectius; illud est finitum; ergo etc.	122. It is in this way, then, that contradictories are not distant by anything intermediate, because contradictories are immediate [Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.2.72a12-13] – such that however little anything recedes from one extreme it is at once under the other extreme – but they are distant because of the extremes in themselves. Therefore the distance is as great as the extreme which is more perfect; that extreme is infinite; therefore etc.
123 Confirmatur, quia posse totaliter super terminum positivum huiusmodi distantiae, est posse super distantiam sive super transitum ab extremo in extremum; ergo ex posse super istum transitum non sequitur infinitas nisi sequatur ex posse totaliter super terminum eius positivum. Terminus ille est finitus. ƿ	123. There is a confirmation, that the total power over the positive term of a distance of this sort is power over the distance or the transition from extreme to extreme; therefore, from power over that transition infinity does not follow unless it follows from total power over its positive term. That term is finite.
124 Quod autem dicitur communiter contradictoria distare in infinitum, potest sic intelligi, id est indeterminate, quia sicut nulla est ita parva distantia quae non sufficiat ad contradictoria, sic nulla est ita magna, etiam si esset maior maxima possibili, quin ad illa contradictoria se extenderet. Est ergo eorum distantia infinita, id est indeterminata ad quamcumque, magnam vel parvam; et ideo ex tali infinitate distantiae non sequitur consequens de infinita potentia intensive, sicut nec sequitur ad minimam distantiam, in qua salvatur sic infinita distantia: et quod non sequitur ad antecedens, nec ad consequens.	124. Now as for what is commonly said, that contradictories are infinitely distant, it can be understood thus, that is, indeterminately, because just as there is no distance so small that it does not suffice for contradictories, so there is no distance so great that, even if it were greater than the greatest possible, it would not stretch itself to the contradictories. Their distance then is infinite, that is, indeterminate to any magnitude, great or small; and therefore from such an infinity of distance the consequent about an infinite power intensively does not follow, just as neither does it follow on the smallest distance in which an infinite distance is thus preserved; and what does not follow on the antecedent does not follow on the consequent either.
125 Ostenso proposito per viam primae efficientiae quia illa prima efficientia infert infinitatem, sequitur secunda via, ex hoc quod est intelligens distincte omnia factibilia. Ubi arguo ƿsic: intelligibilia sunt infinita, et hoc actu, in intellectu omnia intelligente; ergo intellectus ista simul actu intelligens est infinitus. Talis est intellectus primi.	125. [The second way] – Having shown the intended proposition by way of the first efficient power, because the first efficient power involves infinity, the second way follows, from the fact that it distinctly understands all make-able things. Here I argue as follows: the intelligibles are infinite, and that actually, in an intellect that understands everything; therefore the intellect that understands them actually all at once is infinite. Of this sort is the first intellect.
126 Huiusmodi enthymematis probo antecedens et consequentiam. Quaecumque sunt infinita in potentia, ita quod in accipiendo alterum post alterum nullum possunt habere finem, illa omnia si simul actu sunt, sunt actu infinita; intelligibilia sunt huiusmodi respectu intellectus creati, satis patet, et in intellectu divino sunt simul omnia actu intellecta quae ab intellectu creato successive sunt intellecta; ergo ibi sunt infinita actu intellecta. Huiusmodi syllogismi probo maiorem (licet satis evidens videatur), quia omnia talia acceptabilia quando sunt simul exsistentia, aut sunt actu finita, aut sunt actu infinita; si actu finita, ergo accipiendo alterum post alterum tandem omnia possunt esse actu accepta; ergo si non possunt esse omnia actu accepta, si talia actu simul sunt, sunt actu infinita. ƿ	126. Of such an enthymeme I prove the antecedent and the consequent. As to all things that are infinite in potency, such that in taking one after another no end can be reached, if all these things are actual at once, they are actually infinite; intelligibles are of this sort with respect to a created intellect, as is plain, and in the divine intellect all things are at once understood actually that are understood successively by a created intellect; therefore an infinity of things is in the divine intellect actually understood. Of this sort of syllogism I prove the major (although it seems sufficiently evident), because all such things that can be taken one after another are, when they are simultaneously existent, either actually finite or actually infinite; if they are actually finite, then by taking one after another one can in the end actually take them all; therefore if they cannot all be actually taken, then if such things are actually simultaneous, they are actually infinite.
127 Consequentiam primi enthymematis sic probo, quia ubi pluralitas requirit vel concludit maiorem perfectionem quam paucitas, ibi infinitas numeralis concludit infinitam perfectionem. Exemplum: posse ferre decem maiorem perfectionem requirit virtutis motivae quam posse ferre quinque; ideo posse ferre infinita concludit infinitam virtutem motivam. Ergo, in proposito, cum intelligere a sit aliqua perfectio et intelligere b sit similiter aliqua perfectio, numquam intelligere idem est ipsius a et b et aeque distincte, ut duo intelligere essent, nisi perfectiones duorum intelligere includuntur in illo uno eminenter; et sic de tribus, et ultra de infinitis. Consimiliter etiam de ipsa ratione intelligendi argueretur sicut de intellectu et actu argutum est, quia maior perfectio concluditur in actu intelligendi ex pluralitate illorum quorum est ratio intelligendi ƿdistincte, quia oportet quod includat eminenter perfectiones omnium propriarum operationum intelligendi, quarum quaelibet secundum propriam rationem aliquam perfectionem ponit; ergo infinitae concludunt infinitam.	127. The consequence of the first enthymeme [n.125] I prove thus, that where a plurality requires or involves a greater perfection than a fewness does, there numerical infinity involves infinite perfection. An example: being able to carry ten things requires a greater perfection of virtue than being able to carry five; therefore being able to carry an infinite number of things involves an infinite moving virtue. Therefore, in the proposed case, since to understand a is a perfection and to understand b is similarly a perfection, there is never one and the same understanding of a and b, and with as much distinctness as two understandings would have, unless the perfections of the two understandings are included eminently in that one understanding; and thus about three understandings, and so on about an infinite number. Likewise one might also argue about the very idea of understanding what has been argued about intellect and about act, that a greater perfection in an act of understanding is implied from a plurality of things where there is the idea of distinctly understanding them, because this act must include the perfections eminently of all understanding’s proper operations, each of which, according to its proper idea, posits some perfection; therefore infinite operations involve infinite perfection.
128 Secundo iuxta istam viam de intelligere primi propositum sic ostendo: causa prima cui secundum ultimum suae causalitatis causa secunda aliquid perfectionis addit in causando, non videtur sola posse ita perfectum effectum causare sicut ipsa cum secunda, quia causalitas sola primae diminuta est respectu causalitatis ambarum; ergo si illud quod natum est esse a causa secunda et prima simul sit multo perfectius a sola prima, secunda nihil perfectionis addit primae: sed omne finitum omni finito addit aliquam perfectionem; ergo talis causa prima est infinita.	128. Second, following on this way about the understanding of the first thing I show the intended proposition thus: a first cause to which, in accord with the utmost of its causality, a second cause adds some perfection in causing, does not seem able on its own to cause as perfect an effect as it can cause along with the second, because the causality of the first cause alone is diminished in respect of the causality of both; therefore if that which is naturally from the second cause and from the first simultaneously is much more perfectly from the first alone, the second cause adds no perfection to the first; but every finite thing adds some perfection to a finite thing; therefore such a first cause is infinite.
129 Ad propositum: notitia cuiuscumque nata est gigni ab ipso sicut a causa proxima, et maxime illa quae est visio sive intuitiva intellectio; ergo si illa alicui intellectui inest sine actione quacumque talis obiecti tantummodo ex virtute alterius obiecti prioris quod natum est esse causa superior respectu talis cognitionis, sequitur quod illud obiectum superius est infinitum in cognoscibiliƿtate, quia inferius nihil sibi addit in cognoscibilitate; tale obiectum superius est natura prima, quia ex sola praesentia eius apud intellectum primi, nullo alio obiecto concomitante, est notitia cuiuscumque obiecti in intellectu eius. Ergo nullum aliud intelligibile aliquid sibi addit in cognoscibilitate; ergo est infinitum in cognoscibilitate. Sic ergo est in entitate quia unumquodque sicut se habet ad esse sic ad cognoscibilitatem, ex II Metaphysicae.	129. To the proposed case: the knowledge of a thing is naturally generated by that thing as from the proximate cause, and especially the knowledge which is vision or intuitive understanding; therefore if that knowledge is, without all action of such an object, in any intellect merely by virtue of another prior object which is naturally a superior cause with respect to such knowledge, the result is that that superior object is infinite in knowability, because the inferior object adds nothing in knowability to it; such a superior object is the first nature, because from the mere presence of it in the intellect of the first thing, without any other objection accompanying it, there is in the intellect of the first thing knowledge of any object whatever. Therefore no other intelligible adds anything to it in knowability; therefore it is infinite in knowability. Therefore it is such in its reality, because each thing is related to existence as it is to knowability, from Metaphysics 2.1.993b30-31.
130 Item tertia via, scilicet ex parte finis, arguitur sic: voluntas nostra omni finito aliquid aliud maius potest appetere et amare, sicut intellectus intelligere; et videtur quod plus inclinatio est naturalis ad summe amandum bonum infinitum, nam inde arguitur inclinatio naturalis ad aliquid in voluntate, quia ex se, sine habitu, prompte et delectabiliter vult illud voluntas libera; ita videtur quod experimur actu amandi bonum infinitum, immo non videtur voluntas in alio perfecte quietari. Et quomodo non illud naturaliter odiret si esset oppositum sui obiecti, sicut naturaliter ƿodit non esse (secundum Augustinum De libero arbitrio libro III cap. 8)? Videtur etiam si infinitum repugnaret bono quod nullo modo quietaretur in bono sub ratione infiniti, nec in illud faciliter tenderet, sicut nec in repugnans suo obiecto. Confirmabitur ista ratio in sequenti via, de intellectu.	130. [Third way] – Again in the third way, namely on the part of the end [n.111], the argument is as follows: our will can desire and love, as the intellect can understand, some other thing greater than any finite thing; and it seems that the inclination to loving an infinite good supremely is more natural, for a natural inclination in the will to something is argued from this, that free will of itself, without a habit, promptly and with delight wants it; thus it seems that we experience an infinite good in an act of loving it, nay it seems that the will does not perfectly rest in some other thing. And how would it not naturally hate that other thing if it were the opposite of its object, just as it hates notbeing (according to Augustine On Free Choice of the Will 3 ch.6 n.18, ch.8 n.23)? It also seems that, if the infinite were repugnant to good, the will would, under the idea of the infinite, in no way rest in good, nor would it easily tend to good, just as neither to what is repugnant to its object. This reason will be confirmed in the next way [n.136], about the intellect.
131 Item quarto propositum ostenditur per viam eminentiae, et arguo sic: eminentissimo incompossibile est aliquid esse perfectius, sicut prius patet; finito autem non est incompossibile esse aliquid perfectius; quare etc.	131. [The fourth way] – Again, fourth, the intended proposition is shown by way of eminence [n.111], and I argue thus: it is incompossible with the most eminent thing that something else be more perfect, as was plain before [n.67]; but with a finite thing it is not incompossible that there be something more perfect; wherefore etc.
132 Minor probatur, quia infinitum non repugnat enti; sed omni finito maius est infinitum. Ad istud aliter arguitur, et est idem: cui non repugnat infinitum esse intensive, illud non est summe perfectum nisi sit infinitum, quia si est finitum potest excedi vel excelli, quia infinitum esse sibi non repugnat; enti non repugnat ƿinfinitas; ergo perfectissimum ens est infinitum. Minor huius, quae in praecedenti argumento accipitur, non videtur posse a priori ostendi, quia sicut contradictoria ex rationibus propriis contradicunt, nec potest per aliquid manifestius hoc probari, ita non repugnantia ex rationibus propriis non repugnant, nec videtur posse ostendi nisi explicando rationes ipsorum. Ens per nihil notius explicatur, infinitum intelligimus per finitum (hoc vulgariter sic expono: infinitum est quod aliquod finitum datum secundum nullam habitudinem finitam praecise excedit, sed ultra omnem talem habitudinem assignabilem adhuc excedit).	132. The proof of the minor is that an infinite thing is not repugnant to real being; but the infinite is greater than everything finite. There is another way of arguing for this and it is the same: that to which it is not repugnant to be intensively infinite is not supremely perfect unless it is infinite, because if it is finite it can be exceeded or excelled, because to be infinite is not repugnant to it; to real being infinity is not repugnant; therefore the most perfect real being is infinite. The minor here, which is taken up in the preceding argument, does not seem capable of being shown a priori, because as contradictories contradict by their proper ideas and as this fact cannot be proved by anything more manifest, so non-repugnant things are non-repugnant by their proper ideas and it does not seem possible for this to be shown save by explaining their ideas. Real being is not explained by anything more known, the infinite we understand through the finite (I explain this vulgarly thus: the infinite is that which no given finite thing exceeds precisely by any finite relation, but beyond any such assignable relation there is still excess).
133 Sic tamen propositum suadetur: sicut quidlibet ponendum est possibile cuius non apparet impossibilitas, ita et compossibile cuius non apparet incompossibilitas; hic incompossibilitas nulla apparet, quia de ratione entis non est finitas, nec apparet ex ratione entis quod sit passio convertibilis cum ente. Alterum istorum requiritur ad repugnantiam praedictam; passiones enim primae entis et convertibiles satis videntur notae sibi inesse. ƿ	133. Thus, however, may the intended proposition be proved: just as anything whose impossibility is not apparent is to be set down as possible, so also is that whose incompossibility is not apparent to be set down as compossible; here no incompossibility is apparent, because finitude is not in the idea of real being, nor does it appear from the idea of real being that finitude is a property convertible with real being. One or other of these is required for the aforesaid repugnance; for the properties that belong to the first real being, and are convertible with it, seem to be sufficiently known to be present in it.
134 Item sic suadetur: infinitum suo modo non repugnat quantitati, id est in accipiendo partem post partem; ergo nec infinitum suo modo repugnat entitati, id est in perfectione simul essendo.	134. Again there is proof thus: the infinite is not in its mode repugnant to quantity, that is, by taking part after part; therefore neither is the infinite in its mode repugnant to real being, that is, by being in perfection all at once.
135 Item, si quantitas virtutis est simpliciter perfectior quam quantitas molis, quare erit infinitum possibile in mole et non in virtute? Quod si est possibile, est in actu, sicut ex tertia conclusione patet, supra, de primitate effectival, et etiam inferius probabitur.	135. Again, if quantity of virtue is simply more perfect than quantity of bulk, why will an infinite be possible in bulk and not in virtue? But if it is possible it is actual, as is plain from the third conclusion above, about effective primacy [n.58], and it will also be proved below [n.138].
136 Item, quia intellectus, cuius obiectum est ens, nullam invenit repugnantiam intelligendo aliquod infinitum, immo videtur perfectissimum intelligibile. Mirum est autem si nulli intellectui talis contradictio patens fiat circa primum eius obiectum, cum discordia in sono ita faciliter offendat auditum: si enim disconveniens statim ut percipitur offendit, cur nullus intellectus ab intelligibili infinito naturaliter refugit sicut a non conveniente, suum ita primum obiectum destruente?	136. Again, because the intellect, whose object is real being, finds no repugnance in understanding something infinite, nay rather the infinite seems to be the most perfect intelligible. Now it is remarkable if to no intellect a contradiction of this sort about its first object is made plain although discord in sound so easily offends the hearing; for if the discordant offends as soon as it is perceived, why does no intellect naturally flee from an intelligible infinite as from something not concordant that thus destroys its first object?
137 Per illud potest colorari illa ratio Anselmi de summo bono ƿcogitabili, Proslogion, et intelligenda est eius descriptio sic: Deus est quo cognito sine contradictione maius cogitari non potest sine contradictione. Et quod addendum sit 'sine contradictione' patet, nam in cuius cognitione vel cogitatione includitur contradictio, illud dicitur non cogitabile, quia sunt tunc duo cogitabilia opposita nullo modo faciendo unum cogitabile, quia neutrum determinat alterum.	137. Hereby can be colored the reasoning of Anselm about the highest thinkable good in the Proslogion, [nn.11, 35] and his description must be understood in this way: God is that than which, when known without contradiction, a greater cannot be thought without contradiction. And the fact that ‘without contradiction’ must be added is plain, for a thing in the knowing or thinking of which contradiction is included is said not to be thinkable, because in that case there are two opposed thinkables with no way of producing a single thinkable thing, because neither determines the other.
138 Summum cogitabile praedictum, sine contradictione, potest esse in re. Hoc probatur primo de esse quiditativo, quia in tali coƿgitabili summe quiescit intellectus; ergo in ipso est ratio primi obiecti intellectus, scilicet entis, et hoc in summo. - Et tunc arguitur ultra quod illud sit, loquendo de esse exsistentiae: summe cogitabile non est tantum in intellectu cogitante, quia tunc posset esse, quia cogitabile possibile, et non posset esse, quia repugnat rationi eius esse ab aliqua causa, sicut patet prius in secunda conclusione de via efficientiae, maius ergo cogitabile est quod est in re quam quod est tantum in intellectu. Non est autem hoc sic intelligendum quod idem si cogitetur, per hoc sit maius cogitabile si exsistat, sed, omni quod est in intellectu tantum, est maius aliquod quod exsistit.	138. The aforesaid highest thinkable without contradiction can exist in reality. This is proved first about quidditative being, because in such a thinkable the intellect supremely rests; therefore in that thinkable is the idea of the first object of the intellect, namely the idea of real being, and this in the highest degree. – And then the argument further is made that it exists, speaking of the being of existence: the supremely thinkable is not in the thinking intellect only, because then it would both be able to exist, because it is a possible thinkable, and not be able to exist, because existing by some cause is repugnant to its idea, as was clear before in the second conclusion [n.57] about the way of efficacy; therefore what exists in reality is a greater thinkable than what exists in the intellect only. But this is not to be so understood that the same thing, if it is thought on, is thereby a greater thinkable if it exists, but rather that something which exists is greater than anything which is in the intellect only.
139 Vel aliter coloratur sic: maius cogitabile est quod exsistit; id est perfectius cognoscibile, quia visibile sive intelligibile intellectione intuitiva; cum non exsistit, nec in se nec in nobiliori cui nihil addit, non est visibile. Visibile autem est perfectius cognoscibile non visibili sed tantummodo intelligibili abstractive; ergo ƿperfectissimum cognoscibile exsistit. - De differentia intellectionis intuitivae et abstractivae, et quomodo intuitiva est perfectior, tangetur distinctione 3, et alias quando locum habebit.	139. Or it [Anselm’s reasoning] is colored in another way thus: what exists is a greater thinkable; that is, it is more perfectly thinkable because visible or intelligible to intuitive intellection; when it does not exist, whether in itself or in something nobler to which it adds nothing, it is not visible. But what is visible is more perfectly thinkable than what is not visible but intelligible only in the abstract; therefore the most perfect thinkable exists. – The difference between intuitive and abstract intellection, and how the intuitive is more perfect, will be touched on later [I d.3 p.1 q.1-2 nn.29, 11, 18-19; q.3 nn.24, 10, 28], and elsewhere when there will be place for it [e.g. n.394 below, d.1 n.35 above].
140 Ultimo ostenditur propositum ex negatione causae extrinsecae, quia forma finitur per materiam; ergo quae non est nata esse in materia, est infinita.	140. Finally the intended proposition is shown from negation of an extrinsic cause, because form is limited, or made finite, through matter; therefore what is not of a nature to be in matter is infinite.
141 Haec ratio non valet, quia secundum ipsos angelus est immaterialis; ergo in natura est infinitus. - Nec possunt dicere quod esse angeli finitet essentiam eius, quia secundum eos est accidens essentiae, et posterius naturaliter; et sic in primo signo naturae essentia secundum se, ut prior esse, videtur infinita intensive, et per consequens in secundo signo naturae non erit finitabilis per esse. ƿ	141. This reasoning is not valid, because according to them an angel is immaterial; therefore it is in nature infinite. – Nor can they say that the existence of an angel limits its essence, because according to them existence is an accident of essence and naturally posterior; and thus in the first moment of nature the essence in itself, as prior to existence, seems to be intensively infinite, and consequently it will, in the second moment of nature, not be limitable by existence.
142 Breviter respondeo ad argumentum, nam quaelibet entitas habet intrinsecum sibi gradum suae perfectionis, in quo est finitum si est finitum et in quo infinitum si potest esse infinitum, et non per aliquid accidens sibi.	142. I respond briefly to the argument, for any real being has intrinsic to it its own grade of perfection, in which grade it is finite if it is finite and infinite if it can be infinite, and not by anything accidental to it.
143 Arguitur etiam 'si forma finitur ad materiam, ergo si non ad illam, non finitur'; fallacia consequentis, sicut 'corpus finitur ad corpus, igitur si non ad corpus, erit infinitum'; 'ultimum ergo caelum erit actu infinitum'. Sophisma est istud III Physicorum, quia sicut corpus in se prius finitura, ita forma finita prius est in se finita quam finiatur ad materiam, quia est talis natura in entibus, quod finitur, id est antequam uniatur materiae, nam secunda finiƿtas praesupponit primam, et non causat eam. Ergo in aliquo signo naturae erit essentia finita, ergo non finitur per esse; ergo in secundo signo non finitur per esse.	143. There is also an argument ‘if form is limited in relation to matter, then if it is not in relation to matter it is not limited’; it is the fallacy of the consequent, just like ‘body is limited in relation to body, therefore if it is not in relation to body it will be infinite’; ‘therefore the furthest heaven will be actually infinite’. The sophism is the one in Physics 3.4.203b20-22, that just as body is limited first in itself, so a finite form is finite first in itself before it is limited in relation to matter, because of such a sort is nature in real beings, that it is limited, that is, before it is united to matter, for a second finitude presupposes a first and does not cause it. Therefore in some moment of nature it will be finite in essence, therefore not made finite by existence; therefore it is not, in a second moment, made finite by existence.
144 Breviter dico unam propositionem, quod quaecumque essentia absoluta finita in se, est finita ut praeintelligitur omni comparatione sui ad aliam essentiam.	144. I assert briefly one proposition, that any absolute essence finite in itself is finite as pre-understood to every comparison of itself to another essence.
145 Ex dictis patet solutio quaestionis. Nam ex primo articulo habetur quod aliquod ens exsistens est simpliciter primum triplici primitate, videlicet efficientiae, finis et eminentiae, et ita simpliciter quod incompossibile est aliquid esse prius. Et in hoc probatum est esse de Deo quantum ad proprietates respectivas Dei ad creaturam vel in quantum determinat dependentiam respectus creaturarum ad ipsum.	145. [Epilogue] – From what has been said the solution to the question is plain. For from the first article [nn.41-73] one gets that some existent real being is simply first with a triple primacy, namely of efficacy, of end, and of eminence [nn.42-58, 60-61, 64- 66], and so it is simply that which is incompossible with something else being first [nn.59, 63, 67]. And in this article existence is proved of God as to the properties of God in respect of creatures, or insofar as he determines the dependence of respect of creatures on himself [n.39].
146 Ex secundo articulo habetur quadruplex via quod illud primum est infinitum: primo videlicet quia primum efficiens, secundo quia primum cognoscens omnia factibilia (secunda via continet quatƿtuor conclusiones de intelligibilitate primi), tertio quia finis ultimus, quarto quia eminens. Iuxta primam exclusa est quaedam via inutilis de creatione, iuxta secundam tangitur alia via de perfectione primi obiecti et intelligibilitate, iuxta quartam exponitur ratio Anselmi, Proslogion, 'Deus est quo maius cogitari non potest'; ultimo excluditur via inutilis ex immaterialitate inferens infinitatem.	146. From the second article [nn.74-144] one gets in a fourfold way that the first thing is infinite: namely first because it is the first efficient thing [nn.111-120], second because it is the first knower of all make-able things (the second way [nn.125-127] contains four conclusions about the intelligibility of the first thing [nn.75-110]), third because it is the ultimate end [n.130], fourth because it is eminent [n.131-136]. By occasion of the first way there is excluded a certain useless way about creation [nn.121- 124], by occasion of the second another way is touched on about the perfection and intelligibility of the first object [nn.128-129], by occasion of the fourth exposition is given of the argument of Anselm in Proslogion, ‘God is that than which a greater cannot be thought’ [nn.137-139, 11, 35]; lastly there is excluded a useless way inferring infinity from immateriality [nn.140-144].
147 Ex praemissis conclusionibus, probatis et ostensis, arguitur sic ad quaestionem: aliquod ens tripliciter primum in entibus exsistit in actu; et illud tripliciter primum est infinitum; ergo aliquod infiƿnitum ens exsistit in actu. Et istud est perfectissimum conceptibile et conceptus perfectissimus, absolutus, quem possumus habere de Deo naturaliter, quod sit infinitus, sicut dicetur distinctione 3. Et sic probatum est Deum esse quantum ad conceptum vel esse eius, perfectissimum conceptibilem vel possibilem haberi a nobis de Deo.	147. From the premised conclusions, proved and shown, the argument to the question goes as follows: some real being triply first among beings actually exists [nn.41-73, 145]; and that triply first thing is infinite [nn.111-141, 146]; therefore some infinite real being actually exists [n.1]. And it is the most perfect conceivable, and the most perfect, absolute conceived, that we can naturally have about God, that he is infinite, as will be said later [I d.3 p.1 qq.1-2 n.17]. And thus it has been proved that God exists as to his concept or existence, the most perfect conceivable or possible to be had by us of God. IV. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question
148 Ad argumenta huius quaestionis. Ad primum dico quod causa infinita, activa ex necessitate naturae, non compatitur aliquid sibi contrarium, sive sit ei contrarium aliquid formaliter, id est secundum quod aliquid convenit sibi essentialiter, sive virtualiter, id est secundum rationem effectus sui quem virtualiter includit. Utroque enim modo impediret quodlibet incompossibile suo effectui, sicut argutum est prius.	148. To the arguments of this question. To the first [n.1] I say that an infinite cause, active by the necessity of its nature, does not allow of anything contrary to it, whether something be contrary to it formally, that is, according as something agrees with it essentially, or virtually, that is, according to the idea of its effect which it virtually includes. For in each way it would impede whatever was incompossible with its effect, as was argued before [n.3].
149 Contra: numquid philosophi, ponentes Deum agere ex necessitate naturae, non ponebant esse aliquod malum in universo? ƿRespondeo: sicut patuit probando Deum esse agens per cognitionem, non potuerunt salvare aliquod malum fieri posse contingenter in universo, sed tantum unus ordo causarum produceret aliquid quod esset receptivum alicuius perfectionis, alius autem ordo de necessitate produceret oppositum illius perfectionis: ita quod ista perfectio non posset tunc induci concurrentibus omnibus causis, licet absolute productum ab aliquibus, consideratum secundum rationem suae speciei, esset receptivum illius perfectionis cuius oppositum necessario evenit. Quid autem possunt philosophi dicere de libero arbitrio nostro et malitia moris dicendum est alias.	149. On the contrary: is it really the case that the philosophers, when positing that God acts from the necessity of his nature, did not posit that there was anything bad in the universe? I reply: as was made evident in the proof that God is an agent through knowledge [n.86], the philosophers could not save the idea that something evil can happen contingently in the universe, but only that one order of courses would produce something that was receptive of a perfection, while another order would of necessity produce the opposite of that perfection; such that this perfection would not then be produced when all the causes came together, although absolutely a thing produced by some of the causes, when considered according to the idea of its species, would be receptive of the perfection whose opposite necessarily comes about. But what the philosophers can say about our free choice and about badness of morals must be discussed elsewhere.
150 Ad secundum dico quod consequentia non valet. Ad probationem consequentiae dico quod non est consimilis incompossibilitas ƿdimensionum in replendo locum et essentiarum in simul essendo. Non enim una entitas ita replet totam naturam entis quin cum ea posset stare alia entitas (hoc autem non debet intelligi de repletione locali, sed quasi commensuratione essentiali), sed una dimensio replet eundem locum secundum ultimum capacitatis suae. Itaque una entitas simul potest esse cum alia, sicut posset respectu loci cum corpore replente locum esse aliud corpus non replens locum. Similiter alia consequentia non valet, quia corpus infinitum si esset cum alio, fieret totum maius utroque ratione dimensionum, quia dimensiones alterius corporis essent aliae a dimensionibus corporis infiniti et eiusdem rationis cum eis; et ideo totum esset maius propter dimensionum diversitatem, et totum non maius quia dimensio infinita non potest excedi. Hic autem tota quantitas infinitae perfectionis nullam additionem recipit in ratione talis quantitatis ex coexsistentia alicuius finiti secundum talem quantitatem.	150. To the second [n.4] I say that the consequence is not valid. For proof of the consequence I say that there is not a similar incompossibility of dimensions in filling up a place and of essences in existing simultaneously. For a single entity does not so fill up the whole nature of real being that no other entity can stand along with it (but this must not be understood of spatial filling up but of, as it were, essential commensuration), but one dimension fills up the same place according to the utmost of its capacity. Therefore one entity can exist at the same time along with another, just as, in respect of place, there could exist along with a body filling the place another body not filling the place. Likewise the other consequence [n.4] is not valid, because an infinite body, if it existed along with another body, would become a greater whole than either by reason of dimensions, because the dimensions of the second body would be different from the dimensions of the infinite body, and of the same nature as them; and therefore the whole would be greater because of the diversity of dimensions, and also the whole would not be greater because an infinite dimension cannot be exceeded. Here, however, the whole quantity of infinite perfection receives, in the idea of such quantity, no addition from the coexistence of another thing infinite in such quantity.
151 Ad tertium dico quod consequentia non valet, nisi illud quod demonstratur in antecedente, a quo alia separantur, sit finitum. Exemplum: si esset aliquod ubi infinitum, per impossibile, et corpus infinitum repleret illud ubi, non sequeretur 'hoc corpus est hic ita quod non alibi, ergo est finitum secundum ubi', quia ly 'hic' non demonstrat nisi infinitum; ita, secundum ƿPhilosophum, si motus esset infinitus et tempus infinitum, non sequitur 'iste motus est in hoc tempore et non in alio, ergo est finitum secundum tempus'. Ita ad propositum oporteret probare illud quod demonstratur per ly 'hic' esse finitum; quod si assumatur, petitur conclusio in praemissa.	151. To the third [n.5] I say that the consequence is not valid unless that which is pointed to in the antecedent, from which other things are separate, is infinite. An example: if there were, per impossibile, some infinite ‘where’, and an infinite body were to fill up that ‘where’, it would not follow that ‘this body is here such that it is not elsewhere, therefore it is finite according to where’, because the ‘here’ only points to something infinite; so, according to the Philosopher, if motion were infinite and time were infinite, it does not follow that ‘this motion is in this time and not in another time, therefore it is finite according to time’. So, in relation to the intended proposition, it would be necessary to prove that what is pointed to by the ‘here’ is finite; but if it is assumed, then the conclusion is being begged in the premises.
152 Ad ultimum dico quod Philosophus infert 'moveri in non tempore' ex hoc antecedente, quod 'potentia infinita est in magnitudine', et intelligit in consequente 'moveri' proprie, ut distinguitur contra mutationem; et hoc modo consequens includit contradictionem, et etiam antecedens, secundum eum. Qualiter autem teneat illa consequentia sic declaro: si potentia est infinita et agit ex necessitate naturae, ergo agit in non tempore, quia si agat in tempore, sit illud a. Et accipiatur alia virtus, finita, quae in tempore finito agit; sit illud b. Et augmentetur virtus finita quae est b secundum proportionem illam quae est b ad a, puta si b est centuplum vel milletuplum ad a, accipiatur virtus centupla ad illam virtutem finitam datam, vel milletupla. Igitur illa virtus sic augmentata moƿvebit in a tempore, et ita virtus illa et infinita in aequali tempore movebunt, quod est impossibile si virtus infinita movet secundum ultimum potentiae suae et necessario.	152. To the final one [n.6] I say that the Philosopher infers that ‘it is moved in non-time’ from this antecedent, that ‘infinite power exists in a magnitude’, and he understands ‘it is moved’ properly in the consequent, in the way motion is distinguished from mutation; and in this way the consequent involves a contradiction, and the antecedent too, according to him. But how the consequence might hold I make clear in this way: if a power is infinite and acts from the necessity of its nature, therefore it acts in non-time. For, if it acts in time, let that time be a. And let some other virtue be taken, a finite one, which acts in a finite time; let it be b. And let the finite virtue which is b be increased according to the proportion which b has to a, to wit, if b is a hundred or a thousand times a, let a hundred or a thousand times virtue be assumed for that given finite virtue. Therefore the virtue so increased will move in the time a, and so this virtue and the infinite one will move in an equal time, which is impossible if an infinite virtue moves according to the utmost of its power and necessarily so.
153 Ex hoc ergo quod virtus est infinita, sequitur quod si agat ex necessitate, agit non in tempore; ex hoc autem quod ponitur in antecedente quod est in magnitudine, sequitur, si agit circa corpus, quod proprie moveat illud corpus, quod loquitur de virtute extensa per accidens. Talis autem virtus si ageret circa corpus, haberet partes huiusmodi corporis diversimode distantes respectu eius, puta unam partem corporis propinquiorem et aliam remotiorem; habet etiam resistentiam aliquam in corpore circa quod agit: quae duae causae, scilicet resistentia et diversa approximatio partium mobilis ad ipsum movens, faciunt successionem esse in motu et corpus proprie moveri. Ergo ex hoc quod in antecedente illo ponitur virtus in magnitudine, sequitur quod proprie movebit. Et ita iungendo illa duo simul, scilicet quod est infinitum et quod est ƿin magnitudine, sequitur quod proprie in non tempore movebit, quod est contradictio.	153. From the fact, then, that the virtue is infinite it follows that, if it act of necessity, it acts in non-time; but from the fact that it is posited in the antecedent as existing in a magnitude [n.152], it follows that, if it act about a body, it would properly move that body, which he says of extensive virtue per accidens. But such virtue, if it acted about a body, would have the parts of such a body at different distances with respect to it, to wit, one part of the body closer and another part further away; it also has some resistance in the body about which it acts; which two causes, namely resistance and the diverse approximation of the parts of the moveable thing to the mover, make there to be succession in the motion and make the body to be properly moved. Therefore from the fact that in the antecedent the virtue is posited as existing in a magnitude, it follows that it will properly move. And so by joining the two things together at once, namely that it is infinite and that it is in a magnitude, it follows that it will move properly in non-time, which is a contradiction.
154 Sed illud non sequitur de virtute infinita quae non est in magnitudine; ipsa enim licet in non tempore agat si necessario agit, quia hoc sequitur infinitatem, tamen non proprie movebit, quia non habebit in passo illas duas rationes successionis. Non igitur vult Philosophus quod infinita potentia proprie moveat in non tempore, sicut argumentum procedit, sed quod infinita potentia in magnitudine proprie moveat et non in tempore, quae sunt contradictoria; et ex hoc sequitur quod tale antecedens includit contradictoria, scilicet quod virtus infinita sit in magnitudine.	154. But this does not follow in the case of an infinite virtue which does not exist in a magnitude; for although it act in a non-time if it acts necessarily, because this is consequent to infinity, yet it will not properly move, because it will not have in the thing it acts on those two ideas of succession [n.153]. The Philosopher, therefore, does not intend that an infinite power properly move in non-time, in the way the argument proceeds [n.6], but that an infinite power in a magnitude would properly move and in non-time [n.152], which are contradictories; and from this it follows that such an antecedent involves contradictories, namely that an infinite virtue exist in a magnitude.
155 Sed tunc est dubitatio. Cum potentiam motivam ponat infinitam et naturaliter agentem, videtur sequi quod necessario ageret in non tempore licet non moveat in non tempore, immo tunc nihil movebit aliud, proprie loquendo; et quod hoc sequatur, patet, quia illud probatum fuit prius per rationern potentiae infinitae necessario agentis. ƿ	155. But in that case there is a doubt. Since he posits a motive power that is infinite and naturally active, it seems to follow that it would necessarily act in non-time although it would not move in non-time, nay it will in that case not move any other thing, properly speaking; and that this follows is plain, because the thing was proved before through the reason of an infinite power acting necessarily [nn.152-153].
156 Respondet Averroes XII Metaphysicae quod praeter primum movens quod est infinitae potentiae, requiritur movens coniunctum potentiae finitae, ita quod ex primo movente sit infinitas motus, et ex secundo sit successio, quia aliter non posset esse successio nisi concurreret illud finitum, quia si solum infinitum ageret, ageret in non tempore. Illud improbatur distinctione 8 quaestione ultima, ubi in hoc arguitur contra philosophos, qui ponunt primum agere ex necessitate quidlibet quod immediate agit. Sed christianis non est argumentum difficile, qui dicunt Deum contingenter agere; ipsi enim possunt faciliter respondere, quia licet virtus infinita necessario agens agat secundum ultimum sui, et ita in non tempore, quidquid immediate agit, non tamen virtus infinita contingenter et libere agens: sicut enim est in potestate eius agere vel non agere, ita est in potestate eius in tempore agere vel in non tempore agere; et ita facile est salvare primum movere corpus in tempore licet sit infinitae potentiae, quia non necessario agit, nec secundum ultimum potentiae, quantum scilicet posset agere, neque in tam brevi tempore in quam brevi posset agere. ƿ	156. Averroes replies, Metaphysics 12 com.41, that in addition to the first mover which is of infinite power there is required a conjoint mover of finite power, such that from the first mover there is infinite motion and from the second there is succession, because there could not otherwise be succession unless the finite thing acted along with it, because if the infinite thing alone acted it would act in non-time. This is refuted later [I d.8 p.2 q. un nn.3, 8-20], where an argument on this point is directed against the philosophers who posit that the first thing does of necessity whatever it does immediately. But the argument is not difficult for Christians, who say that God acts contingently; for these can easily reply that, although an infinite power acting necessarily do according to the utmost of itself, and so in non-time, whatever it immediately does, yet an infinite virtue acting contingently and freely does not; for just as it is in its power to act or not to act, so it is in its power to act in time or to act in non-time; and so it is easy to save the fact that the first thing moves a body in time although it is of infinite power, because it does not act necessarily, nor according to the utmost of its power, namely as much as it can act, nor in as brief a time as it can act.