Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D22

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Quaestio Unica	Single Question: Whether God is Nameable by us with some Name signifying the Divine Essence in itself, as it is a 'This'
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem vigesimam secundam quaero utrum Deus sit nominabilis a nobis viatoribus aliquo nomine significante essentiam divinam in se, ut est 'haec'. ƿ	1. About the twenty second distinction I ask whether God is nameable by us with some name signifying the divine essence in itself, as it is a 'this'.(a) a. [Note by Duns Scotus] That he is not. - Augustine on the Lord's words in Sermon 34: "Whatever can be said is not unsayable (or ineffable);" but God is ineffable (the proof is from St. Paul). Again, Augustine On John sermon 19 and John 5: "The Son can do nothing save what he sees the Father doing;" what the 'seeing' of the Word is cannot be demonstrated by word. Again, Hilary On the Trinity III.9: "Do not be ignorant that, as to speech about this nature, virtue does not reach it." Again Ambrose On the Trinity I ch.5: "Voice is silent, not my own only, but also that of angels." Again, by reason: he is not understood in this way [sc. as a 'this'], therefore he is not named in this way either. The inference is plain from Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.4: "He is more truly thought than talked of;" and Enchiridion 13: "Instructions are that by which someone conveys his thoughts to the knowledge of another;" and Plato: "so that [sc. thoughts] may be present to hand." On the contrary. - Augustine Against Adimantus 13: "That sublimity must be signified by human sounds." Again, [God] is understood in this way [sc. as a 'this'], therefore etc.; proof of the antecedent: he is understood to be of himself a 'this', therefore he is understood as a 'this'. Again Rabbi Moses [Maimonides] in Guide I ch.61: "We have no name [sc. for God] that is not taken from his work, save the 'Tetragrammaton' [sc. JHVH], therefore it is called 'the separated Name', because it signifies the substance of the Creator with a pure signification;" "it is written down, it is not spoken," "save in the sanctuary, by the holy priests, in giving priestly blessing alone, and by the high priest on the day of fasting." "This name 'Adonai' (Exodus 6) is a recognition of a second name that is more abstract than the other names known about God" besides the first name imposed (the four letters of the tetragrammaton were imposed by God to signify some articulated spoken word that, according to the first imposition of letters, would be signified by other letters; this spoken word was imposed by God to signify his essence purely). Maimonides is treating of the same letters, which are those of the "tetragrammaton" (jod-heth-vau-he, which are the same as the Latin letters j-e-v-h), from which letters - joined together in one syllable - no meaning is collected, but rather from teaching, about which teaching he adds ch.62: "No man knew how speaking in its case would go; the wise used to hand on, one to another, how it might be spoken." A spoken name should be a symbol between speaker and spoken to, so that the thing signified (in the way it is signified) might be known to both, and so that the name might be a sign of the thing; the truth of the divine nature, as to the idea of its immensity, is known to God alone, - it cannot, as to the idea of its immensity, be known to any creature; therefore God could appropriate to himself, and make to be his own, this 'nameable name' -, no name of a creature, just as no note of a creature, can be a name proper to the divine nature like this, by leading, through some process of removal, to a knowledge of the divine immensity. However, some proper name can be had for signifying the divine nature as it is known by the intellectual creature (a proper name made by the divine or the created intellect), by which sign the saints speak about the truth of the divine nature in the way it is know to them; that name would not be a name-sign for wayfarers, because the divine nature is in no way known to them the way the blessed know it; therefore it is not a known note, just as neither is whiteness to one born blind. A proper name can be made for us, at God's pleasure, in accord with the way he is known by us; but that name is not transferred from creatures, because what is transferred from creatures is common to creatures and was imposed on them first; therefore a name is imposed on him first and principally. 'Deus (God)' signifies what is of perfection simply, as if supreme among Latin words; it is more proper in comparison with other words that express some idea of dignity as if in particular fashion. Against the minor [sc. the first statement in the preceding paragraph] (against the major later): any of the blessed knows the object as it is infinite, because the object is seen in its supremacy (Ord. I d.1 nn.42-50); again, comprehension is not required for something to be signified; again, the mental word is a natural sign; again, a name given to God would not be an essential sign in its being; again, the saints would be able to use the name. - I concede the second point [sc. 'However, some proper name can be had for signifying the divine nature.'], but it would be of the same signified thing. On the contrary: conceiving the signified thing under the same idea as on the part of the object, such the wayfarer knows; proof: the wayfarer has some quidditative concept, otherwise he has no concept at all; that concept is a concept of the quiddity under its proper idea as object, because it is not a common concept in any way, nor a concept capable of being narrowed down, but it is diverse primarily. Solution. 'Nameable by me' is understood in two ways: by me as the one who imposes the name, or by me as imposing it on the user when he says it to me or to another. In the first way the point is denied, because [God] is not known thus, according to Aristotle and the Commentator Metaphysics 8 (the contrary here below, about names of substances, - the way is set down here below, in the solution of the question [end of n.2 below]; response to Aristotle: he is understanding it confusedly; an example: letters). In the second way it is true, not only as with a magpie [sc. when a magpie imitates and repeats a word of human language], but also with someone grasping it from the letters; an example: when someone who does not have a distinct image of Rome speaks about it, - and in the case of proper names generally, whether the name be imposed by us (as in the first case) or by God (Maimonides, Guide I, above). In a third way I conceive it as I am able to, because it is something that falls under the confused concept I have. But surely I cannot have a proper and quidditative concept? No, because creatures are deficient, even though we could draw a distinction through a simply simple concept (because the concept is proper and not able to be narrowed down, simply simple, primarily diverse), and though we could naturally know necessary truths. To the arguments: it is 'ineffable' to him to whom it is expressed; by using the verb 'he sees', just as it is expressed.
2 Dicitur quod sicut Deus intelligitur a nobis, ita potest et a nobis nominari. Secundum ergo quod diversimode aliqui sentiunt de cognitione Dei ab intellectu viatoris, ita consequenter diƿcunt diversimode de possibilitate etiam nominandi Deum, - et qui negat conceptum communem univocum Deo et creaturae et ponit ƿduos conceptus analogos (quorum scilicet alter, qui est creaturae, attribuitur alteri, scilicet illi qui est Dei), dicet secundum hoc consequenter, quod Deus est nominabilis a viatore nomine exprimente illum conceptum analogum.	2. It is said that as God is understood by us so can he also be named by us. Therefore, according to the diverse ways some think about the knowledge of God had by the intellect of the wayfarer, in like manner do they as a result speak in diverse ways about the possibility of also naming God, - and someone who denies a common concept univocal to God and creatures and posits two analogous concepts (one of which concepts, namely that of the creature, is attributed to the other concept, namely that of God), will say accordingly as a result that God is nameable by the wayfarer with a name expressing that analogous concept [e.g. Henry of Ghent, above I d.3 nn.20-21].
3 Sed contra istam opinionem specialiter arguo, quia omnis conceptus realis possibilis haberi de essentia divina, natus est fieri in intellectu virtute illius essentiae (probatur, quia etiam quodcumque obiectum intelligibile minimum, natum est facere conceptum omnem realem possibilem haberi de eo); sed secundum istos ƿtantum unicus conceptus natus est haberi de essentia divina virtute eius, licet intellectus negotians possit plures conceptus causare et fabricare circa illud obiectum; ergo quodcumque obiectum potest facere conceptum realem in intellectu de Deo, potest facere illum unicum conceptum quem illa essentia esset nata de se facere: sed ille unicus, est 'huius essentiae' ut 'haec' est, ergo quodcumque obiectum facit aliquam notitiam de Deo in intellectu nostro, faciet - secundum istam opinionem - conceptum eius ut est 'haec essentia', et ita nominabilis erit a viatore nomine significante 'hanc essentiam' ut 'haec' est.	3. But against this opinion I argue in particular that every real concept capable of being had about the divine essence is of a nature to be caused in the intellect by virtue of that essence (the proof is that any even the most minimal object is of a nature to cause every real concept capable of being had about it); but according to them only one concept is of a nature to be had about the divine essence by virtue of that essence, although the intellect, as it busies itself, might be able to cause and fashion about the object several concepts; therefore whatever object can cause in the intellect a real concept about God can cause that one concept which the essence would be of a nature of itself to cause; but that single concept is of 'this essence' as it is a 'this', therefore any object whatever that causes in our intellect some knowledge of God will cause - according to this opinion - a concept of him as he is 'this essence', and so God will be nameable by the wayfarer with a name signifying 'this essence' as it is a 'this' [I d.8 n.188].
4 Potest dici ad quaestionem breviter quod ista propositio communis multis opinionibus - scilicet quod 'sicut intelligitur, sic et nominatur' - falsa est si intelligatur praecise, quia distinctius potest aliquid significari quam intelligi.	4. One can say briefly to the question [n.1] that this proposition, common to many opinions - namely that 'as a thing is understood so also is it named' [n.2] -, is false if it is taken to be understood precisely, because something can be signified more distinctly than it can be understood.
5 Quod videtur persuaderi ex hoc, quod cum substantia non sit intelligibilis a viatore nisi in communi conceptu entis (sicut probatum est distinctione 3), si non possit distinctius significari quam intelligi, nullum nomen impositum a viatore significaret aliquam rem de genere substantiae, sed sicut praecise concipitur ab intellectu viatoris aliqua proprietas a qua imponitur nomen (quae proprietas communiter exprimitur per etymologiam nominis), ita praecise talis proprietas significaretur per nomen: puta, per nomen lapidis non significaretur aliquid de genere substantiae, sed ƿtantum aliquid de genere actionis, puta 'laesio pedis', quam exprimit etymologia et fuit a qua nomen imponebatur.	5. The point seems to be shown by this, that since substance cannot be understood by the wayfarer save in the common concept of being (as was proved in I d.3 nn.128-129), then, if it could not be signified more distinctly than it is understood, no name imposed by the wayfarer would signify anything of the genus of substance, but that, just as some property is precisely understood by the wayfarer which he uses to impose the name (and this property is commonly expressed by the etymology of the name), so it is precisely such property that would be signified by the name; for example, by the name 'stone' (or 'lapis') nothing of the genus of substance would be signified but only something of the genus of action, to wit 'striking the bone of the foot' (or 'laedens pedem'), which the etymology expresses and was the origin of the imposition of the name.
6 Et ita potest argui de omnibus aliis nominibus, impositis rebus de genere substantiae, quod nullum illorum significat aliquid nisi proprietatem accidentalem aliquam quae intelligebatur ab imponente, - vel oportet dicere quod nomen distinctius significat quam intellexit imponens.	6. And so it can be argued about all other names imposed on things in the genus of substance, because none of them signifies anything save some accidental property that was understood by the one who imposed the name - or instead one must say that the name signifies the thing more distinctly than that thing was understood by the imposer of the name.
7 Qualiter autem hoc sit possibile, potest intelligi sic, secundum viam Augustini VI De Trinitate cap. 6, qua probat compositionem in omni creatura. Nam concipiuntur ab aliquo multa accidentia, concurrentia in eodem, puta talis quantitas et talis qualitas, - et probatur neutrum illorum esse alterum, quia utrumque illorum manet sine altero; probatur etiam utrique illorum aliquid aliud esse subiectum commune, quia utrumque illorum potest destrui altero non destructo: ergo aliquid concluditur esse subiectum utrique, ut qualitati et quantitati, - illud autem quod subest, non concipitur in conceptu quiditativo nisi entis, vel 'huius entis'. Et cum frequenter contingat quod talis quantitas et talis qualitas coniunguntur in aliquo et alibi non coniunguntur, et hoc non est ƿex natura qualitatis et quantitatis, ut praeostensum est, - concluditur quod hoc est ex natura illius tertii, in quo fundantur ambo ista; non autem coniunguntur talia in isto toto, qualia in illo: ex quo enim diversimode coniunguntur in diversis, concluditur substratum istis esse diversum a substrato illis, et ex hoc concluditur hoc esse aliud ab alio tertio. Sed isti alii, sic distincto (quidquid sit illud quod est cum istis coniunctis, quae intelliguntur), imponitur nomen aliquod; illud videtur esse proprium signum 'huius', sub ratione qua 'hoc' est, ita quod imponens nomen, intendit illam essentiam de genere substantiae significare: et sicut intendit significare, ita nomen quod imponit est signum, et tamen ƿipse non intelligit illud distincte, quod distincte intendit significare per hoc nomen vel hoc signum.	7. But how this may be possible can be understood as follows, according to the way of Augustine On the Trinity VI ch.6 n.8, by which he proves there is composition in every creature. For many accidents are conceived by anyone, accidents coming together in the same thing, for example such and such a quantity and quality - and the proof that neither of these is the other is because each of them remains without the other; there is also proof that for both of them something else is the common subject, because each of them can be destroyed while the other is not destroyed; therefore something is shown to be the subject of them, for example of the quality and the quantity, - but that which is the subject is not conceived in a quidditative concept save in the concept of being, or of 'this being'. Also, since it frequently happens that such and such a quantity and quality are conjoined in something and are not conjoined in other things, and this not from the nature of quality and quantity, as was just shown above, - the conclusion follows that this is from the nature of a third thing which both the quantity and quality have for foundation; but the sort of quality and quantity conjoined in this whole are not the sort that are conjoined in that whole; for from the fact they are conjoined in diverse ways in diverse things the conclusion follows that the substrate of these is diverse from the substrate of those, and from this the conclusion follows that this third thing [sc. the substrate in the first case] is other than that third thing [sc. the substrate in the other case]. But on this thus distinct third thing (whatever it be that goes along with the things conjoined in it, which are the things understood) some name is imposed; this name seems to be the proper sign of 'this' thing, under the idea in which it is a 'this', such that he who imposes the name intends to signify the essence of it in the genus of substance; and just as he intends to signify the thing, so the name he imposes is a sign of the thing, and yet he does not understand distinctly the thing he intends distinctly to signify by this name or this sign.
8 Exemplum etiam esset: si quis imponeret characteres hebraeos, nesciens voces hebraeas in particulari, - sciens tamen quod aliqua vox est prima et aliqua secunda et aliqua tertia, imponeret sic 'aliqua est prima, et quaecumque sit illa, volo quod significetur tali nomine et tali charactere', illi characteres essent signa illarum vocum hebraearum, quas aliquis hebraeus distincte cognosceret obiectis sibi talibus signis, non hebraeus autem etsi intelligeret quid significaretur per istas figuras, non tamen illud quod significatur distincte cognosceret, sed tantum in ratione primae vocis vel secundae.	8. There would also be an example of this: if someone were to impose Hebrew characters not knowing Hebrew letters in particular - yet if, knowing that some letter is first and another second and another third, he were to impose them like this, 'some letter or other is first, and whichever it is, I will that it be signified by such and such a name and such and such a character', those characters would be signs of those Hebrew letters, which some Hebrew would distinctly know when such signs were put in front of him, while a non-Hebrew, although he would understand what was signified by those shapes, would yet not know distinctly what was signified but only under the idea of first letter or second.
9 Breviter ergo potest dici quod ad minus nomina multa imponuntur quae significant Deum in communi, quia sic potest naturaliter concipi a viatore, ut patet distinctione 3; vel si verum est quod 'distinctius potest significari quam concipi', potest Deus nominari a viatore nomine significante 'hanc essentiam'.	9. Therefore one can say briefly that, at a minimum, many names are imposed that signify God in general, because God can thus be naturally conceived by the wayfarer, as is clear from distinction 3 [I d.3 nn.58, 61]; or if it is true that 'something can be signified more distinctly than it can be understood' [n.4], then God can be named by the wayfarer with a name that signifies 'this essence'.
10 Quomodocumque autem sit de istis, verisimile est Deum nominari tali nomine, et hoc sive illud nomen sit impositum ab ipso Deo, vel ab angelo cognoscente ipsum, vel a viatore. Verisimile est enim quod multa nomina sunt in sacra Scriptura, distincte illam essentiam significantia, - sicut iudaei dicunt de nomine Dei quo vocant eum 'Tetragrammaton', et videtur Deus dicere ƿEx. 3: Haec dices filiis Israel: Qui est, misit me ad vos, hoc est nomen meum; et alibi: Ego sum Deus Abraham etc., hoc est nomen meum; et: Nomen meum magnum Adonai non indicavi eis.	10. But however it may be in these cases, it is likely that God is named by some such name, and this whether the name is imposed by God himself, or by an angel who knows him, or by a wayfarer. For it is likely that there are many names in Scripture that signify the divine essence distinctly, - as the Jews say of the name of God with which they call him, the 'Tetragrammaton' [JHVH], and as God seems to say, Exodus 3.14: "These things shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He who is sent me to you, this is my name;" and in another place, 3.15: "I am the God of Abraham etc., this is my name;" and 6.3: "my great name Adonai I have not made known to them."
11 Est ergo Deus nominabilis a viatore nomine significante proprie essentiam divinam ut est 'haec essentia', quia viator potest uti illo signo et intendere exprimere significatum illius signi, sive ipse imposuerit illud signum sive alius quicumque qui cognovit significatum; et tali etiam signo vel nomine potest viator uti tamquam nomine, licet non potuerit illud imponere tamquam signum. Et si illa propositio esset vera quod 'nullum nomen potest imponi alicui distinctius quam intelligatur', haec tamen est falsa quod 'nullus potest uti nomine, distinctius significante rem, quam ipse possit intelligere'; et ideo simpliciter concedendum est quod multis nominibus potest uti viator, exprimentibus essentiam divinam sub ratione essentiae divinae.	11. God, then, is nameable by the wayfarer with a name properly signifying the divine essence as it is 'this essence', because the wayfarer can use that name and intend to express what is signified by the sign, whether he himself imposed the sign or anyone else who knew the thing signified; and also such sign or name can be used as a name by a wayfarer even if he could not have imposed it as a sign. And if the proposition is true that 'no name can be imposed on anything more distinctly than the thing is understood' [n.5], yet this proposition is false that 'no one can use a name that signifies a thing more distinctly than he himself can understand it'; and therefore one must simply concede that the wayfarer can use many names expressing the divine essence under the idea of divine essence.