Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I/D23

Translated by Peter Simpson.

Latin	English
Quaestio Unica	Single Question Whether Person, according as it says Something Common to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, says precisely Something of Second Intention
ƿ1 Circa distinctionem vigesimam tertiam quaero utrum persona secundum quod dicit aliquid commune Patri et Filio et Spiritui Sancto, dicat praecise aliquid secundae intentionis. Quod non: Probatio, quia persona est terminus productionis realis et adoratur; secunda intentio nec terminat productionem realem, nec adoratur; ergo etc.	1. About the twenty third distinction I ask whether person, according as it says something common to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, says precisely something of second intention. That it does not: The proof is that a person is the term of a real production and is adored; a second intention does not terminate a real production nor is adored; therefore, etc.
2 Praeterea, Trinitas in divinis non est tantum conceptuum, sed rerum, - contra errorem Sabellii; ergo etc.	2. Further, the Trinity in divine reality is not a matter of concepts only but of things, - against the error of Sabellius; therefore, etc.
3 Contra: Omne commune pluribus, univocum, distinctum et plurificatum in eis, dicitur de eis secundum aliquam rationem universalis; persona est commune univocum Patri et Filio et Spiritui Sancto, secundum Augustinum VII De Trinitate cap. 7; ergo dicitur de eis secundum aliquam rationem universalis: et si dicat aliquam intentionem secundam, vere esset in divinis aliqua ratio ƿuniversalis, quod non videtur inconveniens; si vero dicat intentionem primam, erit in divinis universale reale commune, et ita aliqua realitas potentialis, - hoc est inconveniens.	3. On the contrary: Everything common to many things that is univocal, distinct, and multiplied in them, is said of them according to some idea of a universal; person is a common univocal to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, according to Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.4 n.7; therefore person is said of them according to some idea of a universal; and if it state some second intention, there would truly be in divine reality some idea of a universal, which does not seem discordant; but if it state a first intention, there will be in divine reality a real common universal, and so some potential reality, - this is discordant. I. Opinion of Others
4 Hic dicitur quod persona tantum dicit intentionem secundam:	4. [Exposition of the opinion] - An assertion here [of Henry of Ghent] is that person only states a second intention:
5 Quia sicut individuum in omni natura, ita suppositum in natura substantiali et persona in natura intellectuali; sed individuum et suppositum dicunt tantum rem secundae intentionis; ergo et persona tantum dicit rem secundae intentionis.	5. Because what an individual is in any nature that a supposit is in substantial nature and a person in intellectual nature; but individual and supposit state only a thing of second intention; therefore person too states only a thing of second intention.
6 Confirmatur ratio, quia natura in qua sunt ista, non est de per se ratione istorum: ponitur enim in definitione istorum ut additum, ergo non variat rationes formales istorum.	6. A confirmation of the reason is that the nature in which these are [individual, supposit, person] does not belong to their per se idea; for nature is set down in the definition of them as something added, therefore it does not vary their formal ideas.
7 Item, omne commune dictum de pluribus, dicitur de eis secundum rationem alicuius universalis; ergo si persona significet rem primae intentionis, communem tribus, illa dicetur de eis sub ratione generis generalissimi, aut alicuius generis intermedii, aut secundum rationem speciei specialissimae, - quorum opposita ƿsunt manifesta. Non speciei specialissimae, quia tunc sequeretur quod duae erunt quasi species specialissimae respectu earumdem personarum; deitas enim - secundum Damascenum cap. 50 quasi notat speciem circumplectivam hypostaseon, et persona etiam notabit speciem specialissimam respectu eorum. Ergo etc.	7. Again, everything common said of many things is said of them according to the idea of some universal; therefore if person signify a thing of first intention, common to the three persons, it will state it of them under the idea of a most general genus, or of some intermediate genus, or according to some idea of most specific species, - the opposite of all which is manifest. Not under the idea of most specific species because it would follow that there will be as it were two most specific species with respect to the same persons; for deity - according to Damascene On the Orthodox Faith ch.48 -indicates as it were the species that surrounds and embraces the hypostases [I d.8 n.41], and person will indicate the most specific species with respect to them. Therefore, etc.
8 Additur autem huic opinioni, quod licet persona dicat aliquid secundae intentionis, non tamen dicit illud in abstracto, sed in concreto, - et ideo potest praedicari de re primae intentionis et supponere pro ea. Exemplificatur: 'species est secunda intentio', ibi accipitur species pro ipsa intentione in se, - et 'species praedicatur de pluribus differentibus numero' etc., ibi accipitur species pro re quam denominat; non enim praedicatur haec intentio 'species' de pluribus, ut videtur, sed homo vel asinus, de quibus dicitur haec intentio.	8. There is added to this opinion [n.4] that although person state something of second intention, yet it does not state it in the abstract but in the concrete, - and therefore it can be predicated of a thing of first intention and supposit for it. An exemplification: in the statement 'species is a second intention' species is taken for the very intention in itself - and in the statement 'species is predicated of many things differing in number' etc. species is taken for the thing that it denominates; for this intention 'species' is not, as it seems, predicated of many things, but man is so predicated or ass, of which this intention is stated.
9 Contra istud, et primo contra opinantem: Quandocumque a formalibus constitutivis aliquorum potest abstrahi aliquid commune primae intentionis, pari ratione vel maiore ratione potest aliquid abstrahi a constitutis; personae autem divinae - secundum istos - constituuntur formaliter per relatioƿnes. Ab illis autem constitutivis potest abstrahi aliquid reale primae intentionis: paternitas enim est relatio et filiatio est relatio, et hoc univoce sumendo relationem, quia potest esse certitudo de conceptu relationis ad intra, dubitando de quolibet conceptu speciali, - et talis, sic certus, non tantum habet certitudinem de voce sed de conceptu aliquo; ergo conceptus ille de relatione in communi, alius est a conceptu illius in speciali. Ergo multo magis a constitutis per istas relationes poterit abstrahi aliqua res primae intentionis. - Assumptum autem de univocatione relationis magis patebit inferius, in quaestione ista.	9. [Rejection of the opinion] - Against this opinion, and first against him who holds it [Henry]: Whenever from the formal constituents of certain things something common of first intention can be abstracted, then with equal or greater reason something can be abstracted from the constituted things; but the divine persons - according to them [the followers of Henry] - are constituted formally by relations. But from those constitutive relations can be abstracted something real of first intention; for paternity is a relation and filiation is a relation, and this when taking relation univocally, because there can be certitude about a concept of inward relation while there is doubt about every special concept whatever - and such a one, being thus certain, not only has certitude about the vocal word but about some concept; therefore the concept of the relation in general is other than the concept of it in particular. Therefore much more will a thing of first intention be able to be abstracted from the things constituted by those relations. - But the assumption about the univocity of relation will be clearer below, in this question.
10 Contra opinionem in se: Quia omnis intentio secunda est relatio rationis, non quaecumque, sed pertinens ad extremum actus intellectus componentis et dividentis vel saltem conferentis unum ad alterum (hoc patet, quia intentio secunda - secundum omnes - causatur per actum intellectus negotiantis circa rem primae intentionis, qui non potest causare circa obiectum nisi tantum relationem vel relationes rationis); persona autem non dicit relationem rationis, et praeciƿpue non pertinentem ad actum intellectus componentis. Quod autem non dicat aliquam relationem rationis, videtur, quia tunc saltem necessario coexigeret correlativum ad quod referretur, quia impossibile est intelligere relationem et non esse ad aliquem terminum et correlativum, sicut omnis intentio secunda requirit correlativum (ut species respicit genus pro suo correlativo, et particulare universale, et sic de aliis); patet de idea, quae est relatio rationis, nec potest intelligi nisi respectu alterius. Persona autem non dicitur alicuius persona, vel saltem non dicit extremum intellectus conferentis.	10. Against the opinion [n.4] in itself: Because every second intention is a relation of reason, not any such relation, but one pertaining to an extreme of an act of the intellect combining and dividing or at any rate comparing one extreme to the other (the thing is plain, because a second intention -in everyone's view - is caused by an act of the intellect busying itself about a thing of first intention, which act can cause nothing in the object save only a relation or relations of reason); but person does not state a relation of reason, and certainly not a relation pertaining to an act of the intellect combining extremes. But that it does not state any relation of reason is evident because then at any rate it would necessarily co-require the correlative to which it is referred, because it is impossible to understand a relation and not understand that it is in relation to some term and correlative, as every second intention requires its correlative (as the species requires the genus for its correlative, and the particular the universal, and so on of others); the point is plain about idea, which is a relation of reason, nor can it be understood save by respect to another. But person is not said to be person of someone, or at least it does not state an extreme of the intellect comparing things.
11 Item, duco rationem eorum ad oppositum, sumendo eandem maiorem, et oppositum minoris, quod individuum importans unitatem individualem dicat rem primae intentionis, quia unitas est passio entis (sicut patet IV Metaphysicae), et per consequens consequitur rem ex natura rei, - et maxime est verum de illa unitate quae est vera unitas, cuiusmodi est unitas individui: ergo talis unitas non dicit intentionem secundam; et sicut non unitas in omni, ƿita nec unitas in natura intellectuali: si ergo persona dicat unitatem in natura intellectuali sicut individuum in omni, sequitur oppositum conclusionis eorum.	11. Again, I take their reasoning [of Henry and his followers] to the opposite by taking the same major and the opposite of the minor, that an individual that imports individual unity states a thing of first intention, because unity is a property of being (as is plain in Metaphysics 4.2.1003b22-25), and consequently unity follows a thing from the nature of the thing - and this is above all true of the unity that is true unity, of which sort is the unity of the individual; therefore such unity does not state a second intention; and just as unity in any nature does not do this, so neither does unity in intellectual nature; if then person states unity in intellectual nature as individual does in any nature, what follows is the opposite of their conclusion [n.5].
12 Praeterea, contra secundam rationem: Augustinus De doctrina christiana (et ponitur in littera distinctione et distinctione 25 primi libri) dicit quod ((res quibus fruendum est, sunt Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus)): unde, secundum ipsum, tres personae sunt tres res; res autem non videtur dicere secundam intentionem, et tamen est commune tribus personis et numeratur in eis; igitur non oportet dicere personam significare secundam intentionem, quia est commune, numeratum in multis.	12. Further, against the second reason [n.7]: Augustine On Christian Doctrine I ch.5 n.5 (and it is Lombard's text in I d.25 ch.2 nn.220, 222) says that "things to be enjoyed are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit:" hence, according to him, the three persons are three things; but thing does not seem to state a second intention, and yet it is common to the three persons and is numbered in line with them; therefore one should not say that person, because it is common and multiplied in number several times, signifies a second intention.
13 Magister etiam, distinctione 25 cap. 8, exponit tres personas per 'tres subsistentias vel tres subsistentes'; per subsistentiam autem non videtur significare rem secundae intentionis, et tamen est commune tribus et numeratum in eis ('dicuntur enim tres subsistentiae vel tres subsistentes, tres entes vel tres res'). ƿ	13. The Master too, in d.25 ch.2 n.220, expounds three persons through 'three subsistences or three subsistents'; but by subsistence he does not seem to signify a thing of second intention, and yet it is common to the three and multiplied in number with them ('for they are called three subsistences or three subsistents, three beings or three things').
14 Praeterea, contra additum aliud arguo sic: adiectivum non determinat aliquid nisi illud ad quod terminatur eius dependentia; sed adiectivum non potest terminare dependentiam alterius adiectivi, quia aequaliter dependent; ergo neutrum determinat alterum, - et ita si hoc nomen 'persona' sit tale concretum, non bene dicetur quod sunt 'tres personae' nisi intelligendo aliud substantivum, quod determinaretur per utrumque adiectivum: sed non est dare aliud substantivum tale subintellectum, ergo etc.	14. Further, against the other thing added [n.8] I argue as follows: an adjective does not determine anything save that which is the term of its dependence; but an adjective cannot be the term of the dependence of another adjective because their dependence is equal; therefore neither determines the other, - and so if this name 'person' is a concrete of the sort in question [n.8], then the statement that there are 'three persons' will not be well made save by understanding another substantive which would be determined by both adjectives; but no such implicitly understood other substantive is given, therefore etc. a. [Note by Duns Scotus] Response: there are many concretes that are not adjectives (for example cause, genus, species), and the argument [n. 14] is against adjective, not against concrete.
15 Respondeo ad quaestionem quod accipiendo definitionem personae quam ponit Richardus IV De Trinitate cap. 22, quod ƿest ((intellectualis naturae incommunicabilis exsistentia)), per quam definitionem exponitur vel corrigitur definitio Boethii dicentis quod persona est ((rationalis naturae individua substantia)) (quia sic sequeretur animam esse personam, quod est inconveniens, et deitatem esse personam), dico quod nihil est in hac definitione ƿRichardi quod significet intentionem secundam, quia ex natura rei - sine opere intellectus - est in Patre natura intellectualis et entitas incommunicabilis.	15. My response to the question [n.1] is that by taking the definition of person that Richard [of St. Victor] posits in On the Trinity IV ch.21, that it is 'the incommunicable existence of intellectual nature', by which definition is expounded or corrected the definition of Boethius when he says that person is 'an individual substance of rational nature' (because thus it would follow that the soul is a person, which is discordant, and that deity is a person), I say that there is nothing in this definition of Richard's that signifies a second intention, because from the nature of the thing - without the work of the intellect - there is in the Father intellectual nature and incommunicable entity.
16 Ista autem incommunicabilitas duplex est (quod intelligi potest ex dictis distinctione 2), quia 'communicabile pluribus' dicitur dupliciter: uno modo dicitur 'communicabile pluribus' quod est idem cuilibet eorum, ita quod quodlibet sit ipsum, sicut universale dicitur communicari suis inferioribus; alio modo communicatur aliquid ut forma, qua aliquid est sed non est ipsum, ut anima communicatur corpori. Et utroque modo deitas est communicabilis, et neutro modo est persona communicabilis, et ita duplex est incommunicabilitas quae pertinet ad rationem personae; propter quod anima separata licet habeat primam incommunicabilitatem, non tamen est persona, quia non habet secundam, - et utraque incommunicabilitas requiritur ad per se rationem personae, et est in re ex natura rei, et ita nihil de ratione personae dicit secundam intentionem.	16. But this incommunicability is double (which can be understood from what was said in distinction 2 [nn. 379-380]), because 'communicable to many' is said in two ways: in one way that is said to be 'communicable to many' which is the same as each of them, such that, whatever it is, it is said to be communicable as a universal is to the things under it; in another way something is communicated as a form by which something is but which is not it, as the soul is communicated to the body. And in both ways deity is communicable, and in neither way is person communicable, and so the incommunicability that pertains to the idea of person is double; for which reason the separated soul, although it has the first incommunicability, is yet not a person because it does not have the second, - and each incommunicability is required for the per se idea of person, and each is in the thing from the nature of the thing, and so nothing of the idea of person states a second intention.
17 Contra istud potest obici, quia secundum istud videretur quod persona tantum significet duplicem negationem duplicis commuƿnicabilitatis , - et si hoc verum sit, tunc videtur dubium quomodo negatio Possit esse communis tribus nisi aliqua affirmatio sit comƿmunis eis, propter quam insit eis talis negatio; non est autem 'deitas' illa affirmatio, quia ipsa non numeratur in tribus; ergo oportet dare aliquod commune positivum prius - ut persona - ab eis abstractum, quam sit talis negatio, et tunc habetur propositum.	17. Against this can be objected that, according to it, person would seem to signify only a double negation of a double communicability, - and if this be true then it seems doubtful how negation could be common to the three persons unless some affirmation be common to them because of which such a negation is in them; but that affirmation is not 'deity', because deity is not multiplied in number along with the three [sc. one does not say 'three deities' or 'three Gods']; therefore some common positive as person - must be given first that is abstracted from them before there is such negation, and then the intended proposition is obtained.
18 Si etiam dicat talem negationem praecise, non videtur dicere totam rationem personae, quia persona dicit rem ad dignitatem pertinentem, negatio autem nullam dignitatem vel perfectionem ponit.	18. Even if it state such negation precisely, it does not seem to state the whole idea of person, because person states something pertaining to dignity, but negation posits no dignity or perfection.
19 Videtur etiam quod dicat relationem rationis, per hoc quod suum oppositum - scilicet communicabile - tantum dicit relationem rationis in essentia divina: est enim essentia communicabilis Filio, et tamen essentia non refertur realiter ad Filium; ergo et incommunicabile dicit relationem rationis. ƿ	19. It seems too that it states a relation of reason, because of the fact that its opposite - namely what is communicable - only states a relation of reason in the divine essence; for essence is communicable to the Son and yet essence is not really referred to the Son; therefore communicable too states a relation of reason.
20 Ad primum istorum dico quod ab ultimis distinctivis et constitutivis personarum nihil potest abstrahi commune dictum in 'quid' de eis, quia illa sunt primo diversa, hoc est nihil idem realiter includentia (tunc enim esset quaerere de eis, per quid distinguerentur); et ideo omne commune abstractum ab eis vel est conceptus omnino negativus, vel saltem non est quiditativus conceptus rationis. Certum est autem quod aliqua negatio communis potest abstrahi ab illis ultimis, et hoc unius rationis, quia negatio est unius rationis per hoc quod repugnat affirmationi unius rationis. Quibuscumque ergo repugnat affirmatio unius rationis, eis convenit negatio unius rationis, - et ita tribus personis, et etiam distinctivis illarum ultimis, potest competere negatio aliqua communis. Si illa dicatur esse incommunicabilitas, et si ponatur incommunicabilitatem solam esse de per se ratione constitutiva personae (ita quod personalitas sit 'incommunicabilitas subsistentis in natura intellectuali', et omnia praeter primum sint addita in ratione personae), tunc persona proprie non dicet aliquem conceptum positivum proprie, sed tamen non dicet aliquem conceptum intentionis secundae: omnis enim conceptus est intentionis primae qui natus est fieri immediate a re, sine opere vel actu intellectus negotiantis, qualis est conceptus non tantum positivus sed etiam negativus.	20. To the first of these objections [n.17] I say that from the ultimate distinctive and constitutive factors of the persons nothing common that is said in the 'what' of them can be abstracted from them, because these factors are primarily diverse, that is, they do not include anything really the same (for in that case it would be possible to ask about them what they were distinguished by [I d.3 n.132]); and therefore everything common abstracted from them is either a concept altogether negative or at any rate is not a quidditative concept of reason. But it is certain that some common negation can be abstracted from those ultimate factors, and that a negation of one idea, because negation is of one idea by the fact that it opposes an affirmation of one idea. Therefore whatever things an affirmation of one idea opposes, to those things belongs a negation of one idea, - and so to the three persons, and also to the ultimate factors distinctive of them, there can belong some common negation. But if that negation be said to be incommunicability, and if it be posited that incommunicability alone is of the per se idea constitutive of a person (so that personality be 'incommunicability of what subsists in intellectual nature', and everything beside the first [sc. incommunicability] be an addition to the idea of person), then person properly does not state some concept of second intention; for every concept is a concept of first intention that is of a nature to be caused immediately by the thing, without work or act of the busying intellect, of which sort is not only a positive but also a negative concept.
21 Et si hoc poneretur, cum dubitatur 'quomodo potest esse negatio communis sine positivo communi, cui insit', respondeo: quantumcumque diversis, si nihil etiam commune haberent, potƿest esse negatio communis, - sicut non Socrates est commune univocum ad omnia alia a Socrate, entibus et non entibus. Et licet illa quibus negatio est communis habeant aliquid positivum commune, non tamen oportet quod per illud commune insit eis negatio communis: non rationalitas enim convenit ultimae differentiae equi et asini, et non per aliquid commune in illis quibus convenit ista negatio, quia vel nihil est commune differentiis ultimis, vel si est entitas eis communis, non propter entitatem convenit eis talis negatio, sicut nec propter entitatem repugnat eis talis affirmatio.	21. And if this be posited, then when it is doubted 'how there can be a common negation without a common positive which it is in', I reply: however diverse things are, even if they have nothing common, they can have a common negation, - just as not-Socrates is a univocal common to everything other than Socrates, beings and not beings. And although the things to which the negation is common have something common that is positive, yet it is not necessary that the common negation be in them because of that common positive; for non-rationality agrees with the ultimate difference of horse and ass, and not because of something common to the things to which that negation belongs, because either there is nothing common to the ultimate differences, or if entity is common to them, such negation yet does not belong to them because of entity, just as neither is the contrary affirmation opposed to them because of entity.
22 Et cum secundo obicitur quod 'negatio non dicit aliquid dignitatis' (et ad hoc etiam possent adduci rationes ad principale, quia 'negatio non adoratur', 'nec etiam est terminus actionis realis'), posset dici quod negatio in genere differt et a negatione extra genus et a privatione. Privatio quippe requirit subiectum aptum, vel secundum se, si est privatio secundum se, - vel secundum genus, si ƿest privatio secundum genus (sicut talpa dicitur caeca, V Metaphysicae cap. 'De privatione'). Negatio extra genus absolute nihil requirit, quia aequaliter dicitur de ente et de non ente. Negatio autem in genere quasi mediat, quia requirit subiectum de quo dicatur, non tamen notat aptitudinem ad formam: talem forte negationem importat diversitas (de quo alias), quia notat non identitatem talem in ente, - ergo talem potest nominare incommunicabilitas ut importatur in persona, quia notat negationem duplicis communicabilitatis in natura intellectuali; nec tamen dicit aptitudinem aliquam ad communicabilitatem, sed negationem illam in natura positiva intellectuali, - et ita dicit dignitatem non ratione significati sed ratione connotati et subiecti, et sic posset concedi personam generari et adorari (sicut 'caecus ambulat vel amatur', non quod caecitas sit ratio ambulandi, sed quod illud in quo est talis privatio, sit subiectum respectu talis praedicati).	22. And when, second, it is objected that 'negation does not state anything of dignity' [n.18] (and for this can also be adduced the reasons for the principal conclusion, that 'negation is not adored', 'nor is it even a term of a real action' [n.1]), - it could be said that negation in a genus differs from negation outside a genus and from privation. Privation indeed requires an appropriate subject, either in itself if it is a privation in itself, - or in a genus, if it is a privation in genus (the way a mole is called blind, Metaphysics, the chapter on privation, 5.22.1022b24-27). Negation outside a genus requires absolutely nothing, because it is said equally of being and not-being. But negation in a genus is as it were in the middle, because it requires a subject of which to be said, though it does not indicate aptitude for a form; such negation is perhaps imported by diversity (about which elsewhere [I d.18 qq.1-2]), because it indicates such non-identity in being - therefore incommunicability, as it is included in person, can name such non-identity, because it indicates the negation of a double communicability in intellectual nature; nor yet does it state any aptitude for communicability, but it states the negation in positive intellectual nature, - and so it states dignity, not by reason of what is signified, but by reason of what is connoted and of the subject, and thus can person be conceded to be adored and generated (just as 'a blind man walks or is loved', not because the blindness is the principle of the walking, but because that in which such privation exists is the subject in respect of such predicate).
23 Cum arguitur de communicabili et incommunicabili, dico quod unum oppositum potest esse relatio rationis et alterum relatio realis (vel saltem negatio vel privatio realis alicuius relationis), sicut 'idem' perfecta identitate dicit relationem rationis (V Metaphysicae cap. 'De eodem') et tamen 'diversum' - quod negat istam identitatem - convenit rei absque actu rationis et intellectus; et ƿratio est, quia licet aliquid non conveniat rei nisi ex opere vel actu intellectus, tamen potest repugnare rei ex se, sine actu intellectus, sicut Socrati repugnat universalitas, quae tamen non competit homini nisi per actum intellectus operantis et negotiantis circa hominem. Etsi ergo communicabilitas dicat tantum relationem rationis in essentia, tamen potest repugnare personae ex aliquo quod est in re, et propter idem potest sibi competere incommunicabilitas.	23. When argument is raised about the communicable and incommunicable [n.19], I say that one opposite can be a relation of reason and the other a real relation (or at any rate a real negation or privation of some relation), just as 'the same' with perfect identity states a relation of reason (Metaphysics 5.9.1018a2-4, on 'the same'), and yet 'diverse' -which denies this identity - belongs to a thing without act of reason or intellect; and the reason is that, although something not belong to a thing save from work or act of intellect, yet that something can be opposed to the thing of itself, without any act of intellect, just as universality is opposed to Socrates, although universality does not belong to man save through an act of intellect working and busying itself about man. Although therefore communicability state only a relation of reason in the essence, yet it can be opposed to person by something that is real, and incommunicability can belong to person on the same basis.
24 Ista ergo via supposita sicut certa (quod a persona potest abstrahi aliquis conceptus negativus negationis in genere, et hoc non solum a personis quasi totis sed etiam a formalibus constitutivis earum), est dubitatio ulterior utrum solummodo tale commune sit abstrahibile ab eis vel aliquod commune positivum. Et videtur quod oporteat ponere aliquod positivum, possibile abstrahi ab eis, propter verbum Augustini De doctrina christiana et verbum Magistri in littera distinctione 25, quae adducta sunt contra primam opinionem.	24. If therefore this way is supposed as certain (that from person can be abstracted some negative concept of negation in a genus, and this abstracted not only from the persons as wholes but also from the formal constituents of them [nn.20-23]), there is a further doubt whether only such a common negative is abstractable from them or some common positive. And it seems one should posit something positive, capable of being abstracted from them, because of what Augustine says in On Christian Doctrine and of what the Master says in the text of distinction 25, which were adduced against the first opinion [nn.12-13].
25 Potest dici quod ab individuis non tantum potest abstrahi species, quae dicit quiditatem individuorum, sed aliquid quasi proprium.	25. It can be said that from individuals can be abstracted not only the species, which states the quiddity of the individuals, but also something quasi-proper.